JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Messrs Nasir Ali Mohammad Ali and Nasir Ali for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order in appeal dated 9-9-1963 of the Sugar-cane Commissioner, respondent No. I, and the order dated 27-5-1963 of the Assessing Officer under the U. P. Sugar-cane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 (U. P. Act No. IX of 1961). A request was also made that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the respondents not to realise the Sugar-cane Purchase Tax levied against the petitioner. 2. The dispute relates to the crushing season 1962-63. Nasir Ali, petitioner No. 2, is the owner of the firm Messrs Nasir Ali Mohammad Ali, which is a 'unit' as contemplated by the U. P. Sugar-cane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961, for the manufacture of Gur, Rab and Khandsari Sugar. The unit crushes sugar-cane not only grown by petitioner No. 2, but also by others. In fact, such sugar-cane is purchased by petitioner No. 1 for the manufacture of Gur etc. 3. Most of the facts alleged by the petitioners have been denied. Consequently, for the purpose of this writ petition only the material facts need be given. The petitioners started working the unit from, as they say, November 4, 1962. The returns for the months of November and December, 1962 and January, 1963 were submitted on April 7, 1963, and the monthly re-turns for the months of February and March, 1963 on May 14, 1963. From the endorsement made by the petitioner No. 2 himself on annexure I to the counter affidavit, it can be assumed that the monthly returns for these two months had been submitted earlier, but they were not on the record and hence fresh returns for these months were filed that day. The Khandsari Inspector, Shri D. B. N. Misra, who was also the Assessing Officer, inspected the unit on various dates. The Assessing Officer did not regard the returns to be reliable and he made the best judgment assessment. The assessment orders for the five months are annexures 2 to 6 to the petition. The petitioners preferred an appeal, but the Sugar-cane Commissioner partly allowed the appeal and partly dismissed it. 4. The orders of the respondents are challenged on many grounds and it shall be proper to take up the points one by one. 5. The assessment orders for the five months are annexures 2 to 6 to the petition. The petitioners preferred an appeal, but the Sugar-cane Commissioner partly allowed the appeal and partly dismissed it. 4. The orders of the respondents are challenged on many grounds and it shall be proper to take up the points one by one. 5. The first point contended is that the U. P. Sugar-cane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961, is invalid and unconstitutional, being beyond the powers of the State legislature. Reliance was placed on the case of Diamond Sugar Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1961 SC 652. This case made reference to entry No. 52 of the State list II of the seventh schedule of the Constitution. The entry is "taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for con-sumption, use or sale therein". The Supreme Court considered the meaning of the term "local area". However, the present tax imposed by the State legislature can come under entry No. 54 of this list, which is "taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92-A of list I". 6. Entry No. 92-A of list I is "taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce." Consequently, under entry No. 54 of list II the State legislature can impose a tax on the 'sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers within the limits of the State. The impugned enactment makes a provision for the imposition -I. of purchase tax on sugar-cane invariably purchased from within the State. It is not the petitioners' case that they were purchasing sugar-cane from outside the State. Consequently, the present imposition of purchase tax cannot fall under entry 92-A of list 1. 7. Entry 54 of list II has been worded generally and, therefore, the State legislature has the power to impose tax not only on the sale but on the purchase of goods also. Sales tax is payable by the seller though he may realise the amount from the purchaser, while purchase tax is payable by the purchaser though, if permissible he may collect it from the seller. Entry 54 being general must be given a liberal interpretation. In the circumstances, a tax on the purchase of sugar-cane can be imposed. Sales tax is payable by the seller though he may realise the amount from the purchaser, while purchase tax is payable by the purchaser though, if permissible he may collect it from the seller. Entry 54 being general must be given a liberal interpretation. In the circumstances, a tax on the purchase of sugar-cane can be imposed. Where the transaction does not amount to sale or purchase, no such tax can be imposed: for example, where the grower of sugar-cane utilises the sugar-cane in his own factory or unit, he cannot be deemed to have sold or purchased sugar-cane and no tax as contemplated by entry 54 shall be leviable. It may be mentioned that such transactions have been exempted under the impugned Act. 8. Entry 52 of list II differs from entry 54 in many respects. Under entry 52 tax can be imposed on the entry of goods not only for sale, but also for consumption and use; while under entry 54 only on sale or purchase. Entry 54 is not restricted to a local area. It can be imposed for areas or units similarly placed. 9. The U. P. Sugar-cane (Purchase Tax) Act was thus within the competence of the State Legislature and is valid. 10. As already mentioned above, most of the questions of fact alleged by the petitioners have been denied in the counter affidavit. The controversial questions of fact are not such as can be decided in this proceeding. The petitioners had also alleged that they were not given a reason-able opportunity to put forward their case before the Assessing Authority. This has been controverted in the counter affidavit. Annexure I to the counter affidavit makes it clear that the petitioner No. 2 was given a hearing. This was on 14-5-1963. The returns for the months of November, 1962 to January, 1963 had been filed a month earlier. As appears from the endorsement the returns for the next two months were filed all over again that day. Petitioner No. 2 must have been given a hearing before the making of assessment for these months also. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioners before making the assessment. However, it is made clear that this finding is being recorded for the purposes of the present proceeding only. Petitioner No. 2 must have been given a hearing before the making of assessment for these months also. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioners before making the assessment. However, it is made clear that this finding is being recorded for the purposes of the present proceeding only. It shall be open to the petitioners to seek such other remedy as they may be advised. 11. The next question is whether the respondents could make a best judgment assessment or the purchase tax assessed could not exceed what is contained in Schedule I to the U. P. Sugar-cane (Purchase Tax) Rules, 1961. Before making comments it shall be proper to make it dear that the U. P. Sugar-cane (Purchase Tax) Act and also the Rules framed thereunder had been amended at many occasions and for purposes of this writ petition we must consider the Act and the Rules as they were in force in May, 1963. At that time Rules 14 and 15 were as below:- "14. Return" of Cane and Purchase Tax- (1) The owner of a unit shall, unless prevented by sufficient reasons, submit to the Assessing Officer before the 18th day of each calendar month a return in Form VII showing the quantity of cane purchased by the unit during the preceding month and the amount of tax due under the Act and deposited by him under Rule 13 in respect of that cane, together with the treasury receipt indicating the deposit. (2) The owner of the unit shall also send, before the date mentioned in sub-rule (1) , a copy of the relevant return referred to therein to the sugar Commissioner and another copy to such other Officer as the Sugar Commissioner may specify in this behalf. 15. Scrutiny of return- (1) The Assessing Officer shall on receipt of a return submitted to him under Rule 14 ascertain that the amount of tax has been correctly stated therein. 15. Scrutiny of return- (1) The Assessing Officer shall on receipt of a return submitted to him under Rule 14 ascertain that the amount of tax has been correctly stated therein. (2) If the Assessing Officer finds that the tax has not been correctly stated, he shall, after giving the owner of the unit a reasonable opportunity of being heard, by order assess and determine the correct amount of tax and inform the owner of such unit of the amount so determined : Provided that where no return is submitted as required by Rule 14, the Assessing Officer may assess the tax on such quantity of sugar-cane as may be assumed in accordance with the specifications given in Schedule I to have been purchased. (3) On receipt of the information referred to in sub-rule (2) the owner of the unit shall deposit, within a period of one week, the amount found due in the Government treasury and inform the Assessing Officer accordingly forwarding to him at the same ime a copy of the treasury receipt indicating the deposit." 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the proviso to Rule 15 (2) under which the sugar-cane purchase can be assumed in accordance with specifications given in Schedule I. The proviso is, however, applicable only when no return is submitted as required by Rule 14. Consequently, where a return has been submitted, the proviso is not applicable and the Assessing Officer can make such assessment as he may consider proper. The tax assessed can exceed the limits contemplated by Schedule I or the tax assessed can be less. 13. However, in the interpretation of a tax law a view most favourable to the tax payer must be taken where two views are possible and, further, a taxation law must be strictly construed. In other words, the proviso to Rule 15 (2) shall be applicable even in such cases where a return submitted is not as required by Rule 14 i.e. in the eye of the law, no return in accordance with the law has been submitted. In other words, the proviso to Rule 15 (2) shall be applicable even in such cases where a return submitted is not as required by Rule 14 i.e. in the eye of the law, no return in accordance with the law has been submitted. Rule 11 merely lays down that, unless prevented by sufficient reasons, the owner of a unit shall submit to the Assessing Officer before the 18th day of each calendar month a return in form VII showing the quantity of cane purchased by the unit during the preceding month and the amount of tax due under the Act and deposited by him under Rule 13 in respect of that cane together with a treasury receipt indicating the deposit. The returns submitted by the petitioners are said to be defective in one respect only, namely that they were submitted late, not on the 18th day of the succeeding calendar month, but for the first three months on 18-4-1963 and for the next two months on 14-5-1963. In case a return filed late cannot be taken into consideration by the Assessing Officer it would, in the eye of law, be no return and hence shall not be a return as required by Rule 14; but where the Assessing Officer has to consider a return even though filed late, it being a different thing that he may not regard the return to be reliable, that shall be a return submitted as required by Rule 14. There is nothing in Rule 14 to show that a return submitted after the prescribed date shall be rejected or cannot be taken into consideration. It merely lays down that the return can be submitted later in case the owner of the unit was prevented by sufficient cause. When delayed submission of return is not accompanied by any penalty, the prescribed date for submission of the return is merely for guidance and cannot he regarded as a mandatory clause. 14. A return submitted late may not be regarded to be reliable, but it is a return submitted by the owner of the unit under and in accordance with rule 14, and hence it is a return as required by Rule 14. 15. 14. A return submitted late may not be regarded to be reliable, but it is a return submitted by the owner of the unit under and in accordance with rule 14, and hence it is a return as required by Rule 14. 15. All the five returns submitted by the petitioners were thus returns as required by Rule 14 and, therefore, the proviso to Rule 15(2) is inapplicable and the Assessing Officer could make a best judgment assessment. 16. The learned Advocate also contended that when the Act and the Rules gave no power to the Assessing Officer to condone the delay in the submission of a return, it was no return as required by Rule 14. This argument could have had some force if the words "unless prevented by sufficient reasons.' were not incorporated in Rule 14. These words were added to Rule 14 under notification dated 16-3-1963 published in the U. P. Gazette of 18-3-1963, when the owner of a unit has the right to submit a return after the prescribed date also, the return can be taken into consideration, all the more, when there is no provision for its rejection. 17. The scope of the proviso can also be judged with reference to the subsequent amendments, i.e., why it was considered necessary to amend the Act and also the Rules. Crushing of sugar-cane is generally done from the month of November -to the month of March and sugar-cane is purchased within this period. The yield is the maximum in winter, generally, in the months of December and January. The purchase of sugar-cane is also the highest in these months. Consequently, to avoid payment of higher tax one could, under the rules as in force in May, 1963, submit a return for the months of November, February and March when the purchase of sugar-cane was at the lowest and not to submit a return for the other months, i.e., months where the purchase exceeded the figures given in Schedule I. In such circumstances, the owner of the unit could avoid payment of Purchase Tax on an appreciable portion of sugar-cane purchased by him. Apparently, the legislature realised how the payment of proper Purchase Tax was or could be evaded and, there-fore, an amendment was made in Section 3 of the Act and corresponding changes were introduced in the Rules also. Apparently, the legislature realised how the payment of proper Purchase Tax was or could be evaded and, there-fore, an amendment was made in Section 3 of the Act and corresponding changes were introduced in the Rules also. Now it is necessary for the owner of the unit to make a declaration beforehand, before a prescribed date, whether he would like to be assessed under the schedule or on actual purchase. The option once exercised cannot be repudiated within the assessment year. This reduce the possibility of evasion of tax, and at the same time gives relief to the owners of units who, on account of illiteracy, are unable to maintain proper accounts and to submit monthly returns. 18. The history of the legislation thus makes it clear that in May, 1963 it was open to the owner of a unit to avail of the benefit of the proviso for a few months and not in the lean months. This can be another ground for adopting the view that the proviso shall be inapplicable where a return has been found to be unreliable. 19. The assessment of Purchase Tax on sugar-cane is thus not such as can be challenged in the present proceeding. The Writ Petition is hereby dismissed with costs. The stay order is vacated.