NAYUDU, C. J. : The point that arises for consideration in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is whether the authority hearing an appeal under the terms and conditions of the tender notice is obliged to hear the party with whom a settlement had already been made, and which settlement is made the subject-matter of the appeal before that authority 2. At the outset we may state some facts. On 25th May 1966 tenders for settlement of the Haflong Region Cane Mahal were called for. The last date of submitting tenders was 15th July, 1966 and the period of settlement was three years from the 1st August, 1966 to the 31st July, 1969. The time for receiving tenders was thereafter extended up to 12 noon of 1st August, 1966. The petitioner T. O Francis submitted his tender for Rs 6,161, whereas Sri Manindra Chandra Dey. the third respondent herein, submitted a tender for Rs. 8,000.01 P. Thereafter the petitioner was asked whether he would raise his bid to the highest bid which was offered by the third respondent. On the petitioner agreeing to raise his bid, the Mahal was settled with him for that amount and the security deposit was called for and furnished and accepted. Thereafter an appeal was apparently preferred to the Chief Executive Member, North Cachar Hills District Council, who is impleaded as respondent No. 1 in this petition, by the third respondent, against the order of settle­ment made with the petitioner. This appeal was disposed of by the Chief Executive Member without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard therein, and the Chief Executive Member set aside the settle­ment made in favour of the petitioner and ordered settlement with the third respon­dent. 3. The petitioner contends that once his tender had been accepted and the settlement was made with him and an appeal was preferred against the order of settle­ment, he being the person affected by the result of the appeal, should have been given an opportunity to be heard in support of his own settlement. In other words, the contention is that the petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity to show that the settlement made in his favour is valid and should not be interfered with. In other words, the contention is that the petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity to show that the settlement made in his favour is valid and should not be interfered with. Without affording the petitioner such an opportunity the Chief Executive Member on the appeal preferred by the third respondent decided the matter behind the back of the petitioner and allowed the appeal and set aside the settlement made in favour of the petitioner which is clearly an order to the petitioners prejudice. 4. ft is contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the District Council North Cachar Hills District that the terms of the sale notice are not statutory, they were more in the nature of a contractual arrangement and. therefore, any violation of the terms and conditions of such notice cannot be made the subject of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution, nor can we issue a writ of mandamus of other writs in regard to any such matter Thus any appeal preferred against the order of settlement under such terms cannot be regarded as a judicial or quasi judicial pro feeding and, therefore, the question of applying the principles of natural justice to such proceedings would not arise. Hence, he contended that the order of the Chief Executive Member was valid and, therefore, should not be interfered with. 5. Mr. Bhattacharjee placed reliance on a decision in the case of Kumud Chandra Das v. Divisional Forest Officer, Goalpara, AIR 1961 Assam 123. That was not a case of any right of appeal having been given under the terms and conditions of the sale notice, ft was held that the sale notice in question which the learned Judges had to consider in that case, was not a sale notice covered by any of the statutes and the terms thereof, therefore, could not be said to have statutory force. In that ease some representation was also made against the settlement and that representation was dis­posed of administratively by the authority, to whom it was made, and the learned Judges therein found that the representation, although not provided for in the terms, was not excluded by them. That case his no application to the instant case. 6. Another decision relied on by Mr. Bhattacharjee is 'Dharanidhar Kalita v. State of Assam', ILR (1962) 14 Assam 416. That case his no application to the instant case. 6. Another decision relied on by Mr. Bhattacharjee is 'Dharanidhar Kalita v. State of Assam', ILR (1962) 14 Assam 416. That was a case where the acceptance of the terms of the tender was subject to a right of appeal and it was not clear from that case that the appeal was disposed of with out giving an opportunity to the person affect ed. In the instant case the tender was called for under Rule 10 of the Assam Forest Regulation. It is not seriously disputed that the Assam Forest Regulation is statutory and we are clearly of opinion, as we have held in other cases, that the rules embodied under the Assam Forest Regulation are statutory in character and as the tender in the instant case has been called for under Rule 10 of the Assam Forest Regulation, a statutory character attaches to the provi­sions of the tenders which are called for. In support of our view there is a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1966 Assam and Nagaland 101, Hari Singh v. Divisional Forest Officer, Cachar Division, to which decision our attention has been invited by Mr. Bhattacharjee in all fairness. In that case m pursuance of a sale notice issued by the Divisional Forest Officer, the petitioner in that case along with others submitted his tender for the sale of a Mahal. The petitioner offered a certain amount and the respondent offered a higher amount. Upon enquiring by the Divisional Forest Officer the petitioner indicated his readiness to raise the offer. The Divisional Forest Officer, thereupon by his order agreed to settle the Mahal with the petitioner on terms and conditions mentioned therein. The petitioner made arrangements to operate the Mahal. But he was informed that on an appeal being filed by the respondent the Mahal had been settled with the respondent by the Conservator of Forests. The facts of that case, as it may be seen from the. above, are exactly similar to those before us. Considering that sale notice, a Bench of this Court held that the sale notice was issued under Rule 10 of the Assam Forest Manual, which was a statutory provision providing for the issue of a sale notice and inviting tenders. The facts of that case, as it may be seen from the. above, are exactly similar to those before us. Considering that sale notice, a Bench of this Court held that the sale notice was issued under Rule 10 of the Assam Forest Manual, which was a statutory provision providing for the issue of a sale notice and inviting tenders. Their Lordships further held that the condition 7 (a) of the sale notice, which provided for an appeal, would be binding on the parties. Considering the manner in which the appeal was disposed of, their Lordships observed that under the circumstances the principles of natural justice were violated in the case, when with­out hearing the petitioner and behind his back the Conservator of Forest passed the order in the appeal, and that, therefore, it could not be said that there was no duty cast upon him to hear judicially the appeal filed under the conditions of the sale notice, even though the order of settlement might be an administrative order. 7. In the instant case the petitioner's tender was finally accepted and a settlement followed, which gave him certain rights under the terms of the tender. In pursuance of the acceptance of his tender and the [settlement made in his favour, he had also furnished the security deposit and offered to make payment of the first installment. When the matter had progressed to that extent and an appeal is preferred under the terms and conditions of the tender against the settlement made in favour of the peti­tioner, the object of the appeal being to re­move and get rid of the rights of the peti­tioner under the settlement, it is obvious that the appeal could not have been disposed of without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to satisfy the authority that the settlement made in his favour was perfectly valid and could not be interfered with. As the appeal was disposed of merely at the instance of the third respondent, who was interested in the matter, but without afford­ing the petitioner that opportunity and behind the back of the petitioner, the prin­ciples of natural justice obviously had been violated and we cannot in the interests of justice allow such a procedure to stand. As the appeal was disposed of merely at the instance of the third respondent, who was interested in the matter, but without afford­ing the petitioner that opportunity and behind the back of the petitioner, the prin­ciples of natural justice obviously had been violated and we cannot in the interests of justice allow such a procedure to stand. It is common knowledge and a well-known principle that whenever a citizen's rights are sought to be interfered with or defeated or removed, he must have an opportunity of satisfying the authority that such an order to his prejudice could not be made. Hence, as definitely the principles of natural justice have been violated in this case and as the settlement of the Mahal with the petitioner could not be defeated under the procedure followed in this case, we have no option but to quash the order passed by the Chief Executive Member, on the appeal preferred by the third respondent, setting aside the settlement in favour of the petitioner. 8. As there has been no proper disposal of the appeal, we direct the Chief Execu­tive Member respondent No. 1 to take the appeal back to his file and deal with it and dispose of it in accordance with law and the Assam Forest Regulation and the rules bearing on the question, after affording full opportunity to the petitioner to present his own case before him. 9. The rule is thus made absolute and the petition is allowed but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.