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1968 DIGILAW 27 (RAJ)

Tejumal v. State of Rajasthan

1968-02-06

L.S.MEHTA, LODHA

body1968
LODHA, J.—The appellant Tejumal has been convicted for an offence under sec. 302, Indian Penal Code for the murder of his wife Smt. Chandra on the night between 1st and 2nd July, and has been sentenced to imprisonment for life by the learned Sessions Judge, Alwar. 2. At about 8.30 a.m. on 2-7-1965 P. W. 2 Devaram, brother of the accused Tejumal verbally reported at the Police Station, Khairthal that at about 5 a.m. on that day while he was sleeping on the terrace of his house, he heard the cries of his brother Tejumal and Mst. Chandra, wife of Tejumal, whereupon he came down stairs and saw that Smt. Chandras clothes were ablaze with fire. He poured a pitcher full of water over her to extinguish the fire but Smt. Chandra died shortly thereafter. Devaram went on to say that Smt. Chandra used to prepare tea on stove every morning and he saw the stove and other necessary materials for preparing tea lying there. Head Constable Pooranlal (P.W. 7) recorded this report in the daily diary of the Police Out-Post, a copy of which has been placed on the record and marked Ex. P.2. Pooranlal then started for the scene of occurrence and reached the house of the accused at about 9.30 a.m. and after preparing site plan, inquest report etc., sent the dead body of Smt. Chandra to the Khairthal Dispensary for post-mortem examination. On receipt of the post-mortem report in the night on 2-7-1965 to the effect that it was a case of murder, a case under sec. 302, Indian Penal Code, was registered at Police Station, Kishengarh. The post-mortem report Ex. P. 3 showed that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation. The accused was arrested on 5-7-1965. He remained in the police custody upto 14-7-65 and on 17-7-1965 he made a confessional statement (Ex. P4) before P.W. 4 Shri Dharam Chand who was - then Munsiff-Magistrate, First Class, posted at Kishengarh, District Alwar. This confession was retracted by the accused by an application dated 7-10-1965 filed before the Committing Magistrate i.e. the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Kishengarh. He remained in the police custody upto 14-7-65 and on 17-7-1965 he made a confessional statement (Ex. P4) before P.W. 4 Shri Dharam Chand who was - then Munsiff-Magistrate, First Class, posted at Kishengarh, District Alwar. This confession was retracted by the accused by an application dated 7-10-1965 filed before the Committing Magistrate i.e. the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Kishengarh. In his statement before the Committing Court the accused stated that he was badly beaten by the police and was given an electric shock and that it was as a result of threat and inducement given by the police that he had made a confessional statement which was untrue. 3. The only evidence against the accused consists of his retracted confession. The learned Sessions Judge held that the confession was voluntary and was not brought about by any threat, inducement or promise. He also held that even though the confession was retracted it was corroborated in material particulars. In this view of the matter the learned Sessions Judge held the accused guilty for the murder of his wife Smt. Chandra. 4. That Smt. Chandra was murdered is beyond dispute. That the murder was caused by strangulation has also not been disputed. The only question therefore is who perpetrated the crime? 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the confessional statement Ex.P.4 was not voluntary nor is it corroborated in material particular, nor is it true, and therefore the conviction based thereon is illegal. 6. From the statement of the Magistrate P.W. 4 Shri Dharamchand, it appears, that the accused was produced before him for recording confession at 2 p.m. and the learned Magistrate gave him two hours time to think over the matter and thereafter his statement was recorded at 4.30 p.m. The learned counsel has urged that the time allowed to the accused before recording his confession was not sufficient in the circumstances of the case. It is argued that the accused had stated before the Magistrate that he had been given a beating by the police on 6-7-65 and an electric shock was also given to him by the police so that he may tell the truth. It also transpires from the statement of P.W. 4 Shri Dharamchand that P.W. 7 Head Constable Pooranlal the Investigating Officer had brought the accused from the Judicial Lock-up, Alwar to the Court of the Magistrate for recording the confession. It also transpires from the statement of P.W. 4 Shri Dharamchand that P.W. 7 Head Constable Pooranlal the Investigating Officer had brought the accused from the Judicial Lock-up, Alwar to the Court of the Magistrate for recording the confession. In these circumstances there was every reason to suspect that the accused had been persuaded or coerced to make a confession and therefore a longer period should have been given to the accused before his statement was recorded. In support of his contention the learned counsel has referred to Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab(1) in which their Lordships were pleased to observe as follows:— "It would naturally be difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the time which should be allowed to an accused person in any given case before recording his confession under S. 164. However, speaking generally, it would be reasonable to insist upon giving an accused person at least 24 hours to decide whether or not he should make confession. Where there may be reason to suspect that the accused has been persuaded or coerced to make a confession, even longer period may have to be given to him berofe his statement is recorded." He has also referred to Babu Singh vs. State of Punjab (2) wherein their Lordships observed as follows:— "The Court has always emphasised the fact that before confessions are recorded the magistrate who records the confession should satisfy himself that the accused persons mind has been freed from fear or other complexes developed during police custody and generally 24 hours atleast should be allowed to lapse before a confession is recorded. There can of course be no inflexible rule in the matter. In each case the magistrate has to decide how much time should be given to the accused before his confession is recorded. In the present case, having regard to the fact that the appellants were kept in police custody for a long period it seems to us that the time given to them to consider whether they should make the confession or not is wholly insufficient and unsatisfactory." 7. In the present case, having regard to the fact that the appellants were kept in police custody for a long period it seems to us that the time given to them to consider whether they should make the confession or not is wholly insufficient and unsatisfactory." 7. Keeping in view the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court we are inclined to think that in the circumstances of the case the time given to the accused by the learned Magistrate to consider whether he should make the confession or not was insufficient and unsatisfactory. 8. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the confessional statement of the accused appears to have been caused by inducement, threat or promise given by the police. In this connection he has invited our attention to those portions of the confessional statement where the accused has stated that he was beaten by the police on 6-7-1965 and an electric shock was also given to him to persuade him to tell the truth, and that the police had also told him that if he told the truth, he would be released. Learned counsel has also, in this connection, emphasised the fact that Shri Pooran Lal, Investigating Officer had brought the accused to the Magistrate for recording his confession and the accused was also handed over back to Shri Pooranlal after the confession had been recorded. Here we may also refer to the statement of P.W. 5 Ramdan, who had stated that he had asked the accused to tell the truth. Learned counsel has argued that the words "if you tell truth, you will be released" import a threat or promise unless the words are qualified in any manner. The words, according to the learned counsel, do not mean mere exhortation to tell the truth. Reliance has been placed on Dinanath vs. Emperor (3) Hashmat Khan vs. Emperor (4), and Mst. Kas-toori vs. State of Rajasthan (5) by the learned counsel in support of his contention. It has been held in several cases that the words such as "you had better make a clear breast of it," "you had better tell the truth," "tell the truth and you would be released," and "truth will go better than a lie" amount to threat or inducement. It has been held in several cases that the words such as "you had better make a clear breast of it," "you had better tell the truth," "tell the truth and you would be released," and "truth will go better than a lie" amount to threat or inducement. In the present case mere avoidance of the words "you had better" will not, in our opinion, improves the situation. As early as in 1848 Maule J., recognised this fact and said that, "......there can be no doubt that such words, if spoken by a competent person, have been held to exclude a confession at least 500 times." (Admissibility of Confessions by Fred Kaufman —at page 89—90). 9. As already stated above the accused was in the police custody upto 14-7-1965 and was brought from the judicial-lock-up, Alwar to the Court of Munsif-Magistrate, Kishengarbas for making confessional statement by no other person than the Investigating Officer Shri Pooranlal. Further, as already observed above, no sufficient time was allowed to the accused for reflection. The statement of the accused in his confession that he was asked by the police "to tell the truth, and he would be released" is also corroborated to a certain extent by the Police Officer-Shri Ramdan (P.W. 5), who stated that he had, no doubt, asked the accused to tell the truth. Looking to all the circumstances of the case, it does appear to us, that the confession by the appellant was not voluntary but was brought about by inducement and threat. We find it difficult to hold that the confession Ex. P.4 proceeded from remorse or a desire to make reparation for the crime, but there is every likelihood that it flowed from hope or fear excited by the police. It is trite law that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the Court is satisfied that it was voluntary, and while the Court is considering this, the question whether it is true or false does not arise. It is trite law that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the Court is satisfied that it was voluntary, and while the Court is considering this, the question whether it is true or false does not arise. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raja Khima vs. State of Saurashtra (6) were pleased to observe as follows: "It is abhorrent to notions of justice and fair play, and is also dangerous to allow a man to be convicted on the strength of a confession unless it is made voluntarily and unless he realises that anything he says may be used against him; and any attempt by a person in authority to bully a person into making a confession or any threat or coercion would at once invalidate it if the fear was still operating on his mind at the time he makes the confession and if it would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in nature in reference to the proceedings against him." It therefore follows that this confessional statement has to be excluded. 10. In this view of the matter, it is hardly necessary to examine the question whether the confessions has been corroborated in material particulars as it has been retracted. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the retracted confession in the present case has not been corroborated in material particulars. In our view the law is well settled that corroboration is necessary if the confession is retracted, and if any authorities are needed on this point we may refer to Arjunalal vs. The State (7), Muthuswami vs. State of Madras (8) and P.K. Singh vs. State of Manipur (9). In the present case it is true that there is no corroboration of the confessional statement regarding the complicity of the accused. 11. Lastly it was contended by the learned counsel that the confessional statement is most unnatural and untrue. The accused had stated in his confessional statement that even though his wife Smt. Chandra told him at about 10 p.m. that the would live with her paramour if the accused had died, and threw him to the ground from the cot, the accused tolerated the insult calmly and slept with her. The accused had stated in his confessional statement that even though his wife Smt. Chandra told him at about 10 p.m. that the would live with her paramour if the accused had died, and threw him to the ground from the cot, the accused tolerated the insult calmly and slept with her. The accused has further stated in his confession that at about 1 or 1.30 a.m. he woke up and found that Smt. Chandra was fast asleep, and then strangulaed her and finished her breath. It is further stated that after committing this heinous crime the accused slept by the side of Smt. Chandra on the same cot and again woke up at about 4 or 4.30 a.m. and poured kerosene oil on her body and lit fire to it. This conduct, argues the learned counsel, is hightly improbable and unnatural regard being had to the ordinary course of human conduct. We have examined this aspect of the case also and are inclined to think that the story related by the accused in his confessional statement does not appear to give a true picture of the incident. In this view of the matter also the confessional statement should not be accepted and it would be most unsafe to act upon it. 12. There is no other evidence to connect the accused with the crime except the confessional statement which, according to us, is neither proved to be voluntary nor true. 13. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant and direct that he be set at liberty, if not required in connection with any other case.