JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, A. C. J. - These special appeals are directed against the judgment of our brother Lakshmi Prasad dismissing writ petitions numbers 41 and 64 of 1967 filed by the appellants. As the questions raised in the two appeals are the same and they are directed against the same judgment we are disposing them of together. 2. The prayer in the two petitions is the same i.e. that the order dated 10th January, 1967 passed by Shri S. S. Raturi, Divisional Forest Officer, South Kheri Division be quashed. The order reads : "It has been found that the sleepers against tally Nos. F-17/101/RSS/MLN to E-23/107/R. S. S./MLN dated 29-10-1966 and tally sheet No. E-7/45/RSS/BK , dated 31:10-1966 were passed in the month of November, 1966 against the allotment of 1965-66 season which was wrong. The above tallies have therefore been cancelled and the sleepers passed against these tallies after getting the passing hammer cancelled by S. D. 0. (Gola) , can again be reinspected against the allotment of 1966-67 season and these which are within the specification will be passed against the 1966-67 season. They will .kindly acknowledge receipt of this letter." 3. The facts giving rise to the two appeals before us in short are as follows. A public auction was held some time in the month of August, 1965 by the Forest Officer in which two forest lots were sold for the year 1965-66. The highest bidders at the aforesaid auction for the two lots were the appellants before us. In terms of the sale proclamation and the relevant rules the petitioners-appellants and the Divisional Forest Officer entered into an agreement by virtue of which the auction money had to be paid in specified instalments and the supply of timber had to be. made to the railway department before the end of October, 1966. 4. The petitioners-appellants made regular supplies which were accepted and paid for by the railway administration after the quality had been approved by the Divisional Forest Officer. In respect of the last supply the impugned order has been, passed. 5. Admittedly, the consignment was passed and its quality was approved by a competent Forest Officer who put the required. hammer mark on the sleepers. 6. Subsequent to this the Divisional Forest Officer passed the impugned order which we have already extracted above. 7. In respect of the last supply the impugned order has been, passed. 5. Admittedly, the consignment was passed and its quality was approved by a competent Forest Officer who put the required. hammer mark on the sleepers. 6. Subsequent to this the Divisional Forest Officer passed the impugned order which we have already extracted above. 7. When the writ petitions came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court (Lakshmi Prasad, J.) , an objection was taken on behalf of the State that the matter being contractual no writ petition would. lie, The submission appealed to the learned single Judge who dis-missed the writ petitions on the ground that the proper remedy for the petitioners-appellants was to file a regular suit. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned single Judge the two special appeals have been filed. 8. Mr. Dhaon, who has appeared for the petitioners-appellants, has made the following two submissions before us :- (1) That the learned single Judge was in error in considering the matter to be contractual, when the auction had taken place under statutory rules and the Divisional Forest Officer was a statutory authority. (2) That the impugned order is based upon irrelevant considerations, and, in any case, once a competent Forest Officer had honestly passed the sleepers declaring them of the proper quality and to have been supplied in time, Mr. Raturi could not have superseded the earlier order after the same had been given effect to. 9. No other submission has been made before us. 10. Clearly the auction had taken place and the agreement was executed by the parties under Article 146 of the Forest Manual, which is a statutory provision. The Divisional Forest Officer is a statutory authority. Consequently, we are satisfied that in these cases the complaint is not that a contract is breached, but that. the statutory rules 'have been infringed and the Divisional Forest Officer has acted illegally. 11. A similar matter came up before the. Supreme Court in K.N. Guruswamy v. The State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1954 SC 592. There an auction had been made and a liquor contract deed was executed in favour of the highest bidder. Subsequently, the Deputy Commissioner gave the contract to a third person on the ground that he was willing to pay a higher price for the contract. Supreme Court in K.N. Guruswamy v. The State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1954 SC 592. There an auction had been made and a liquor contract deed was executed in favour of the highest bidder. Subsequently, the Deputy Commissioner gave the contract to a third person on the ground that he was willing to pay a higher price for the contract. The matter went up to the Supreme Court and their Lordships observed : "The next question is whether the appellant can complain of this by way of a writ. In our opinion, he could have done so in an ordinary case. The appellant is interested in these contracts and has a right under the laws of the State to receive the same treatment and be given the same chance as anybody else. Here we have Thimmappa, who was present at the auction and who did not bid-not that it would make any difference if he had, for the fact remains that he made no attempt to outbid the appellant. If he had done so it is evident that the appellant would have raised his own bid ............ Apart from all else, that in itself would in this case have resulted in a loss to the State, because as we have said, the mere fact that the appellant has pursued this writ with such vigour shows that he would have bid higher. But deeper considerations are also at stake, namely, the elimination of favouritism and nepotism and corruption: not that we suggest that that occurred here, but to permit what has occurred in this case would leave the door wide open to the very evils which the legislature in its wisdom has endeavoured to avoid. All that is part and parcel of the policy of the legislature. None of it can be ignored. We would therefore in the ordinary course have given the appellant the writ he seeks. But, owing to the time which this matter has taken to reach us (A consequence for which the appellant is in no way to blame, for he has done all he could to have an early hearing) , there is barely a fortnight of the contract left to go ............ A writ would therefore be ineffective." 12. But, owing to the time which this matter has taken to reach us (A consequence for which the appellant is in no way to blame, for he has done all he could to have an early hearing) , there is barely a fortnight of the contract left to go ............ A writ would therefore be ineffective." 12. Therefore, with great respect, to our learned brother we are unable to agree that the petitions were filed with a view to obtain specific performance of a contract. The petitioners appellants have only prayed for the quashing of an illegal order by a public officer. As was pointed out by the Supreme.Court in K. N. Guruswamy's case, statutory rules are framed in order to eliminate corruption and favouritism. 13. The only ground on which the order of Sri S. S. Raturi dated 10-1-1967 is founded is that the sleepers against tally Nos. E-17/101/RSS/MLN to E-23/107/RSS/MLN dated 29-10-1966 and tally sheet No. E-7/45/RSS/BK dated 31-10-1966 were passed in the month of November, 1966 against the allotment of 1965-66 season which was wrong. The order was founded on no other ground. It is not stated in the order that there is any illegality, actual or assum ed, in the tally, referred to above. We are satisfied that in fact Shri Raturi has gone on irrelevant considerations in passing the impugned order. Under the terms of the agreement the supply had to be made by the petitioners appellants before 31st October, 1966. In the writ petitions and the affidavits filed in support of them it has been clearly and categorically stated that the supply was made on the 29th of October, 1966. It is a different matter that the railway sleepers were passed by the competent Forest authority in the month of November and not in the month of October. The impugned order does not say that the sleepers were not supplied in October, 1966. The act of passing was that of the Forest Officer and if' there was any delay in the passing of the railway sleepers, the petitioners-appellants cannot be blamed. There is no categorical averment in the counter affidavit to controvert the allegations made by the petitioners appellants in their petitions which are supported by affidavits, that the supply was made on 29th October, 1966. 14. There is no categorical averment in the counter affidavit to controvert the allegations made by the petitioners appellants in their petitions which are supported by affidavits, that the supply was made on 29th October, 1966. 14. Shri K. S. Varma, learned Chief Standing Counsel, contended that even though in the impugned order it has been mentioned that the railway sleepers were passed in the month of November, 1966, in view of several subsequent documents it is possible to hold that what Shri Raturi actually meant was not "passed" but "supplied". It is well settled that a public order can only be read objectively and not in the light of subsequent explanations see Commissioner of Police,. Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, A.I.R. 1952 SC 16. In any case, there is no material to show clearly that the railway sleepers were supplied by the petitioners-appellants in the month of November, 1966. Since Shri Raturi has based his decision on the alleged date of passing and not on the date of supplying, his order must be deemed to be passed on irrelevant considerations and is, for that reason, liable to be quashed. 15. As a second string to his bow Mr. Dhaon contended that, apart from all questions of mala fide, inasmuch as the competent officers duly authorised had already passed the railway sleepers and their decision had been given effect and the petitioners-appellants actually supplied the sleepers to the railway and received the price thereof, it was not open to Shri Raturi to rescind the orders passed by those officers. Reliance has been placed on the Lase of R.T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1937 PC 27 wherein the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed as follows: "In these circumstances the case become a case in which after Government officials duly competent and duly authorised in thatbehalf have arrived honestly at one decision, their successors in office, after the decision has been acted upon and is in effective operation, purport to enter upon a reconsideration of the matter and to arrive at another and totally different decision." 16. This their Lordships held, could not be done. In our judgment the submission is well founded. 17. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of opinion that there are merits in these special appeals. This their Lordships held, could not be done. In our judgment the submission is well founded. 17. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of opinion that there are merits in these special appeals. We, therefore, allow them, set aside the judgment of our brother Lakshmi Prasad dated 14th November, 1967, allow the writ petitions numbers 41 and 64 of 1967 and quash the order dated 10th January, 1967 passed by Shri Raturi with costs