JUDGMENT Shah, J.- In our view there is no substance in this appeal. 2. On March 9, 1944 the respondent obtained a decree directing the appellant to pay Rs. 1631 and interest and costs. In execution of the decree Bhumidari rights of the appellant were notified for sale and a proclamation of sale was issued by the Court of Judicial Officer. The date fixed for sale of the Bhumidari rights was January 3, 1959 but the sale was adjourned to January 20, 1959 and property was sold for Rs. 1500/- to certain persons who are alleged to be the sister and the servants of the decree holder. The sale was confirmed on March 13, 1959. An appeal against the order confirming the sale was dismissed by the Commissioner. Normally attempts to challenge the sale of the property would have concluded at that stage, but on November 15, 1960 the appellant preferred an application under S. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for an order setting aside the sale on three grounds : (1) that the decreeholder had manipulated the sale in such a way that there was no sufficient publication of the sale and consequently the property did not fetch adequate price (2) that the sale proclamation fixed January 3, 1959 as the date for sale but the Sales Officer did not hold the sale on that day, and adjourned the sale till January 20, 1959 and thereafter without any notice to the bidders and any fresh publication of the sale proclamation held the sale on January 27, 1959 and (3) that it was the "goal of the decreeholder" to obtain the property at a court sale for inadequate price and therefore Mohan Lal and Lalta Prasad, servants of the decreeholder, and Ram Piari, sister of the decreeholder, submitted a bid on behalf of the decreeholder and the money for purchasing the property was supplied by the decreeholder. 3. In the view of the Judicial Officer who heard the application no sale was conducted on January 3, 1959 and since a fresh proclamation for sale on January 20,1959 was not issued and consequently the sale was illegal and "was the result of fraud committed on the Court". 4. We are unable to hold that from the reasons set out by the Judicial Officer an inference of fraud by fhe decreeholder may be raised. 4. We are unable to hold that from the reasons set out by the Judicial Officer an inference of fraud by fhe decreeholder may be raised. The Judicial Officer proceeded further to bold that the sale in favour of the sister and the servants of the decreeholder was for a "very negligible price" and was made without proper publication and proclamation. The sale accordingly was not only illegal but fraudulent as well and it was a fit case for the exercise of the Court s inherent power. It may be observed that the Judicial Officer recorded this finding even though the auction purchasers were not made parties to the application for setting aside the sale. The Judicial Officer then proceeded to hold that under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure he had the power to set aside the sale and there is no period of limitation provided for exercise of that power once fraud is detected. 5. Against the order of the Judicial Officer an appeal was preferred to the District Court. The District Court was apparently of the view that the order of the Judicial Officer was not correct, but since no appeal lay to that Court no relief could be given to the appellant. 6. Against the order of the District Court a second appeal was preferred to the High Court and a revision petition was also filed. The order passed by the Judicial Officer was entertained by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. With special leave the appellant has appealed to this Court. 7. We have summarised the grounds on which the application under s. 15J of the Code of Civil Procedure was founded. Prima facie, the first two grounds fell within O. 21 r. 90 of the Code, and no application under s. 151 was competent on those grounds: the third ground could not be considered unless the auction purchasers were made parties to the application and had opportunity of being heard in support of their claim. In the absence of the auction purchasers the Judicial Officer could not pronounce a decision that the auction purchasers were benamidars for the decreeholder. In the absence of the auction purchasers the Judicial Officer could not pronounce a decision that the auction purchasers were benamidars for the decreeholder. Order 21 r. 90 of the Code or Civil procedure provides "Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decreeholder, or any person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets or whose interests ate effected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity, or fraud in publishing or conducing it, Provided that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity on fraud unless upon the facts proved the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud" The application for setting aside the sale has to be filed under Art. 166 of the Limitation Act 1908 within thirty days from the date of sale. In the present case the appellant waited for one year and eight months before making the application. When the Civil Procedure Code provides a specific remedy for setting aside a sale which is challenged on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale it is not open to a person affected by the sale to bypass the limitations prescribed in that behalf. The order passed by the Judicial Officer holding that the application made by the appellant under s. 151 Code of Civil Procedure was maintainable was properly set aside by the High Court. 8. Mr. Misra for the appellant has, however, contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to revise the order and the Board of Revenue was alone competent to revise the order in exercise of the power under s. 275 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The contention that the High Court was incompetent to exercise the power under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 was never raised before the High Court. The High Court was also not invited to consider whether under s. 276 of the U.P. Tenancy Act the High Court may entertain a petition in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Act only where an appeal is competent to the District Court and no appeal lies to the High Court. The High Court was also not invited to consider whether under s. 276 of the U.P. Tenancy Act the High Court may entertain a petition in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Act only where an appeal is competent to the District Court and no appeal lies to the High Court. Where no contention was raised by the appellant before the High Court as to its competence to deal with the case under s. 115 Civil Procedure Code we would be loath to entertain that objection for the first time in this Court in an appeal with special leave. If the High Court had been apprised of the defect in its jurisdiction, the High Court would nave considered that question. The High Court s power of revision is complementary to the power of superintendence over all courts and Tribunals under Art. 227 and this in our judgment was preeminently a case ia which even if the High Court had no jurisdiction under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, the High Court would have been justified in acting under Art. 227 of the Constitution. 9. It was then urged that there was really no sale end therefore nothing was required to be set aside. That argument is sought to be based on the plea that under the proclamation sale was fixed for January 3, 1959 and under circulars issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of the power under s. 68 of the Civil Procedure Code; says Mr. Misra, no sale could be held before the 20th of any month. But the impugned sate was in fact held on January 27, 1959 after it was adjourned on January 3, 1959, to January 20, 1959. The sale, it is true, was adjourned to January 20, 1959 but under the amendment made by the Allahabad High Court ia O.21 r. 69 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code no fresh proclamation was required to be issued when the sale was adjourned for a period not exceeding a month. The sale held on January 20, 1959 and continued to be held day after day till January 27, 1959. No fault can be found with regard to that sale on the ground that it infringes the circulars issued by the Government under O.21 r. 69 (2) Civil Procedure Code. 10. The sale held on January 20, 1959 and continued to be held day after day till January 27, 1959. No fault can be found with regard to that sale on the ground that it infringes the circulars issued by the Government under O.21 r. 69 (2) Civil Procedure Code. 10. Finally it was urged that that fraud was committed by the decreeholder on the Court and a petition invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court was competent. In our judgment, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on that question whether a petition under s. 151 will lie in cases were an allegation of fraud perpetrated upon the Court is made, for in the petition filed by the appellant no grounds which would bring the case within the class of cases which may be characterised as perpetrating fraud upon the Court have been set up; The allegations on the first two points fell clearly within the terms of O.21 r.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure; the third ground could not be investigated because the auction purchasers were not parties before the Court. Even if a lenient view is taken about the plea of fraud and no particulars be insisted upon, the plea cannot be sustained merely because inadequate price was realised at the sale and that the property was sold on a date other than the date fixed. The third ground that a servant and sister of the auction purchaser bid, as we have already stated, could not also be investigated unless the auction purchasers were given notice of the claim made by the appellant. 11. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. For Citation: (1969) 1 SCWR 133