ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - This is a Defendant's appeal. It arises out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 2000/- on the basis of an amount acknowledged between the parties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on the finding that it was barred by time. On appeal, the appellate court came to the conclusion that the delay in instituting the suit was liable to be condoned u/s 14 of the Limitation Act. It confirmed the finding that the Plaintiff have proved their claim. It then held that not only the period during which the Plaintiffs had been prosecuting a case in another court but also the period between the return of the plaint and its presentation in the present court, was also liable to be excluded because the Plaintiffs has justifiably explained the lapse of time before instituting the plaint in the present court. 2. For the Appellant it has been urged that in law the time spent by the Plaintiffs after the return of the plaint and before its actual presentation in the proper court could not be deducted. In this case the accounts were settled between the parties on 6-4-1952. The Plaintiffs instituted the suit for recovery of the money on 5-4-1955 in the court of Munsif, Ghaziabad. The Defendant took objection to the jurisdiction of the court and on 10-12-1957, the court directed the plaint to be returned to the Plaintiffs for presentation to the proper court on the finding that the courts at Ghaziabad had no jurisdiction. The plaint was actually returned to the counsel for the Plaintiffs on 11-12-1957. It was presented in the Court of Munsif at Budaun on 18-12-1957. There is no dispute that the period between 5-4-1955 and 11-12-1957 was liable to be deducted in computing the period for the Limitation of the suit. For the Appellant it has been urged that the period after the actual return of the plaint on 11-12-1957 and till its presentation on 18-12-1957 could not be deducted u/s 14 of the Act, no matter what the reasons might have been for the delay. 3. u/s 14 of the Limitation Act, the time during which the Plaintiffs have been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceedings, is liable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit. 3. u/s 14 of the Limitation Act, the time during which the Plaintiffs have been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceedings, is liable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit. The first explanation to that section stated that in excluding the time during which a former civil proceedings were pending, the day on which that proceedings were instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted. Thus, the relevant period, which can be excluded, is the period during which the Plaintiffs had been prosecuting another proceedings. The explanation goes to explain that the Plaintiffs will be deemed to be prosecuting another proceeding during the period of its pendency. The pendency of the proceedings will be calculated from the date on which the suit was instituted and the date on which the proceedings in that court ended. Thus, the period while the proceedings were actually pending in another court could be treated as a period during which the Plaintiffs had been prosecuting the proceedings. In the present case the period while the previous proceedings were pending would commence from 5-4-1955 and would end either on 10-12-1957, when the order for return was made, or on 11-12-1957 when the plaint was actually returned. In order to decide the controversy in the present appeal, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the pendency of the previous proceedings would end on 10th December or 11th December, 1957. 4. Assuming, however, that the previous proceedings remained pending till 11-12-1957, it is clear, that they could not be deemed to be pending after 11-12-1957, when that plaint was actually returned to the Plaintiffs through their counsel. The proceedings having not remained pending after 11th December, it is difficult to hold that the Plaintiffs can be characterised as prosecuting with due diligence that proceeding after that date. Section 14 only authorises a court to exclude the period during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting another proceeding. The period of time when the Plaintiff could not be said to be prosecuting another proceeding could not be excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion, the period after the actual return of the plaint could, in any event, not be a period during which the Plaintiff would be said to be prosecuting the civil proceedings. The period of time when the Plaintiff could not be said to be prosecuting another proceeding could not be excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion, the period after the actual return of the plaint could, in any event, not be a period during which the Plaintiff would be said to be prosecuting the civil proceedings. After the plaint had been returned, no proceeding was pending in any court which could, possibly, be prosecuted by the Plaintiff. Consequently, the period from 12-12-1957 to 17-12-1957 could not be excluded u/s 14 of the Act. This view of law has been upheld by the decisions of Patna and Madras High Courts in Firm Firm Jiwan Ram Ramchandra Vs. Jagernath Sahu and Another, AIR 1937 Patna 495 and Subbu Naidu and Ors. v. Varadarajulu Naidu and Ors. AIR 1948 Mad. 26. 5. The lower appellate court has gone beyond the language of Section 14 of the Limitation Act when it concluded that in a case where the litigant was not responsible for the delay in presenting the plaint before the proper court, the time so spent could have also been counted during which the previous proceeding could be said to be pending. It is well settled that in applying the rules of Limitation Act, equitable considerations are out of place. On equitable ground the clear language of the provision cannot be transgressed. The time which the litigant takes in presenting the plaint before the proper court after it has been returned to him by the previous court, cannot be said to be taken during which the Plaintiff was prosecuting any civil proceeding in any court. Such time was not liable to be excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act. No other provision of the Limitation Act would entitle the court to exclude such period of time. 6. The lower appellate Court was, therefore, not justified in excluding the period of time between 12-12-1957 to 17-12-1957. The suit was instituted on the last day of limitation. Consequently, it was barred by time when it was filed on 18-12-1957 before the court at Budaun. The trial court was justified in dismissing the suit on that ground. 7. The lower appellate court has stated that it was not argued on behalf of the Defendant that the period between the return and representation could not be deducted. Consequently, it was barred by time when it was filed on 18-12-1957 before the court at Budaun. The trial court was justified in dismissing the suit on that ground. 7. The lower appellate court has stated that it was not argued on behalf of the Defendant that the period between the return and representation could not be deducted. No authority was cited on behalf of the Defendant on that point. The learned Judge himself felt doubtful on that question and gave his opinion. The matter is covered by the authority which has been cited in this Court on behalf of the Defendant-Appellant. 8. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The decree of the lower appellate court, is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The parties shall bear their own costs in this Court.