JUDGMENT : These writ petitions were heard on the preliminary point regarding the constitutionality of the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by levy) Order, 1966, the Kerala Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) O.1966, the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 and the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965. The Orders themselves, for short, would be referred to hereinafter as the Levy Order, the Declaration Order and the Maximum Prices Orders. They were attacked as offending Art.14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution and also as being ultra vires the provisions of the parent Act under which they were promulgated viz., the Essential Commodities Act. At the commencement of the hearing itself, it was agreed that after settling the question of the constitutional validity of the Orders, the writ petitions themselves, may if necessary, be posted for further hearing on their merits or for appropriate orders. In some of these writ petitions the validity of the Kerala Rice Purchase by Levy Order, 1966 and the Kerala Rice and Paddy Regulation of Movement Control O.1966, were also challenged. The vires of this latter Order is now pending determination by a Division Bench. It was represented almost at the conclusion of the hearing that the validity of the Levy Order in particular, and the Declaration Order, was being challenged also with respect to Art.25 and 26 of the Constitution in certain other writ petitions. As no arguments were advanced with respect to Art.25 and 26 in these writ petitions, nothing contained in this judgment should be taken as precluding any contention against these Orders under these Articles, or as dealing with anything other than the validity of these four Orders in the light of the broad contentions already indicated. 2. The Levy O.1966, by Cl.3 thereof requires every cultivator to sell to the Government or to its agent paddy derived from lands cultivated by him in accordance with a certain graduated scale of levy. There is a similar obligation on rent receivers also under Cl.3B. Cl.4 provides for the issue of notice to the cultivators; Cl.6 provides for objection and appeal. Cl.7 forbids the cultivator and rent receiver after service of notice from selling or removing paddy from his stock without measuring the levy demanded and provides for payment of price in respect of the levy paddy to be sold to the Government. Cl.4 provides for the issue of notice to the cultivators; Cl.6 provides for objection and appeal. Cl.7 forbids the cultivator and rent receiver after service of notice from selling or removing paddy from his stock without measuring the levy demanded and provides for payment of price in respect of the levy paddy to be sold to the Government. Cl.9 provides for seizure of paddy, and Cl.10 again provides for powers of entry, search, seizure, etc. Cl.11 confers a power of revision on the Government or on the Commissioner; and Cl.13 confers on the Government the power of exemption with respect to any class or classes of cultivators in any area from the provisions of the Order. 3. The Declaration Order defines "Stockholder" as meaning, in the case of producers one having in his possession or control, ten quintals or more of paddy or seven quintals or more of rice, and in the case of non-producers, one having three quintals or more of paddy or two quintals or more of rice. Cl.3 of the Order requires every stockholder within five days of the commencement of the Order, and every person becoming a stockholder thereafter, within three days of his becoming such, to make a declaration in the prescribed form of the quantity of the paddy and rice in his possession and control to a specified authority, and make further declaration of any further stock of paddy coming into his possession or control, within three days of such stock thus coming into his possession or control. Cl.4 of the Order requires every stockholder to sell to the Government or any agent of the Government at the controlled price such quantity of paddy or rice in his possession as may be specified by the order in writing served on the stockholder. "Controlled Price" is defined by Cl.2 (b) as the price fixed by the two Maximum Prices O.1965, referred to earlier, for rice and for paddy. Cl.6 provides for appeal and Cl.7 for inspection and seizure of stocks of paddy or rice. Cl.10 provides for the Government's power to grant exemptions from the provisions of the Order; and Cl.11 provides for the right to call for records and issue orders. 4. The provisions of the Maximum Prices Orders will be noticed in the appropriate context. 5. I shall first take up the grounds of challenge to the Levy Order. Cl.10 provides for the Government's power to grant exemptions from the provisions of the Order; and Cl.11 provides for the right to call for records and issue orders. 4. The provisions of the Maximum Prices Orders will be noticed in the appropriate context. 5. I shall first take up the grounds of challenge to the Levy Order. It was urged that the Order is beyond purview of the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act. Cl.3 (2) (f) of the Act" was pointed out as the source of the power to pass the Levy Order. The said clause reads: "(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), an order made thereunder may provide (f) for requiring any person holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock to the Central Government or a State Government or to an officer or agent of such Government or to such other person or class of persons and in such circumstances as may be specified in the order." The above clause contemplates or authorises only actions with respect to any person "holding in stock any essential commodity". Cl.3C of the Levy Order requires a cultivator even before the harvest of each crop to give information regarding the details and particulars of his cultivation and of the intended harvest; Cl.4 also envisages action even before the harvest of each crop. In so far as these clauses cover a stage when the paddy cannot be described as in "stock'' with the cultivator, it was contended that to that extent the provisions of the Levy Order fell outside the ambit of S.3 (2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act. A like argument was advanced in Atulya Kumar v. Director of Procurement and Supply (AIR 1953 Calcutta 48) with respect to the provisions of the West Bengal Food grains (Intensive Procurement) O.1952. Adverting to the argument Sinha J. observed: "If clause (f) of sub-section (2) of S.3 of the Act was the source from which the Government derived its power to promulgate the order, I must hold at once that the point made by Mr. Das is quits sound. Adverting to the argument Sinha J. observed: "If clause (f) of sub-section (2) of S.3 of the Act was the source from which the Government derived its power to promulgate the order, I must hold at once that the point made by Mr. Das is quits sound. Here the essential commodity concerned is paddy and if the power to make an order was given only in respect of a person "holding in stock" paddy, it would be absurd to bold that a person who has a crop of rice growing in the field is the "holder" of a "stock" of paddy. It is admitted that notices in Form "A" are given when the crop is still in the field, and at least in the case of Mr. Das's clients they had not yet harvested it when notice was served" The learned Judge then went on to hold on the authority of the ruling in Santosh Kumar v. The State (AIR. 1951 SC. 201) that the fallacy of the argument lay in tracing the source of the power to S.3(2)(f) of the Act which was only illustrative of the generality of the power conferred by sub-s. (1) of S.3 of the Act, under which the impugned Order could well be sustained. The learned Judge also noticed the difficulty of sustaining the impugned Order in that case under S.3(1) of the Act on the terms of the notification issued by the Government of India under S.3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (the precursor of the Essential Commodities Act) and found that the language of the notification was inartistic and reflected incompetent drafting. The language of the notification therein is closely akin to the language used in G. S. R.906 dated 9th June 1966, in pursuance of which the impugned Levy Order was enacted. The said notification in so far as it is material reads: "GSR. No. 906, dated June 9, 1966. In exercise of the powers conferred by S.5 as of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955. The said notification in so far as it is material reads: "GSR. No. 906, dated June 9, 1966. In exercise of the powers conferred by S.5 as of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955. the Central Government hereby directs (a) that the powers conferred on it by sub-section (1) of S.3 of the said Act to make orders to provide for the matters specified in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-section (2) thereof shall, in relation to foodstuffs, be exercisable also by a State Government subject to the conditions (1) that such powers shall be exercised by a State Government subject to such directions, if any, as may be issued by the Central Government in this behalf and (2) that before making an order relating to any matter specified in the said clauses (a) and (c) or in regard to regulation of transport of any foodstuffs under the said clause (d), the State Government shall also obtain the prior concurrence of the Central Government; (b) that the Orders of the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Department of Food; specified in the Schedule below shall stand rescinded: x x x x" Sinha T., adverting to the terms of the similarly worded notification in the Calcutta case observed thus: "the matters specified in sub-section 2 being without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) must be held to include such powers and that therefore the conferment of general powers under sub-section (1) cannot be excluded from the terms of the notification". I am in agreement with the above reasoning, A Division Bench of this Court adopted a similar reasoning in N. J. Thomas & others v. The State of Kerala (1966 KLT. 931) It was further ruled therein that the expression "holding in stock" does not necessarily postulate holding in excess of one's requirements. 6. In considering the vires of the Kerala Paddy [Restriction on Milling] O.1967 in O. P. Nos. 3397/67 etc., the learned Advocate General agreed that the terms of the Government of India notification-GSR. 931) It was further ruled therein that the expression "holding in stock" does not necessarily postulate holding in excess of one's requirements. 6. In considering the vires of the Kerala Paddy [Restriction on Milling] O.1967 in O. P. Nos. 3397/67 etc., the learned Advocate General agreed that the terms of the Government of India notification-GSR. 1111 dated 24-7-1966 conferred only certain specified powers under sub-section [2] of S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act and not the generality of the power under sub-section [1] thereof In my judgment in these cases I was inclined to endorse the concession made by Advocate General as having been rightly made. The reasoning of Sinha J., in the Calcutta case noticed supra and the Division Bench ruling of this Court were not then brought to my notice. Having noticed these, I see nothing to preclude the impugned Levy Order being sustained with respect to the generality of the powers under S.3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act read with GSR. 906 dated 9th June 1966. 7. It was contended that the Levy Order had not been laid before Parliament as required by S.3(6) of the Essential Commodities Act. A like argument with respect to the Kerala Paddy (Restriction on Milling) O.1967 was considered and repelled by me in my Judgment in O P. Nos 3397 of 1957 etc. I there held on the juxtaposition and co-relation of S.3(6) of the Act and S.5 thereof, that the requirement of laying before Parliament is enjoined by the provisions of the Statute only with respect to an Order made by the Central Government under S.3 of the Act and not with respect to one made by the delegate under S.5 thereof. I repeat what I said in that case, that the consequence may be anomalous, but, where the terms of the statute are clear, the remedy is not by judicial legislation. There is also sufficient authority to hold that the requirement of laying before the Parliament without any time limit therefor, nor any penalty for disobedience or default, is, in the circumstances, only directory and not mandatory, (vide AIR. 1966 SC. 385 and 1960 KLJ. 1319). 8. A contention was raised that the Levy Order was promulgated in pursuance of the notification GSR. 906 dated 9th June 1966, and that with the super-cession of the said notification by GSR. 1966 SC. 385 and 1960 KLJ. 1319). 8. A contention was raised that the Levy Order was promulgated in pursuance of the notification GSR. 906 dated 9th June 1966, and that with the super-cession of the said notification by GSR. 1111 dated 24-7-1966 the Levy Order itself had lapsed or ceased to be operative. I am unable to understand how this consequence follows. A similar argument was repelled by me in my judgment in O. P. No. 4200 of 1967. S.5 of the Essential Commodities Act enables the Central Government by notified order to direct that the power to make orders under S.3 shall, in relation to specified matters, and subject to specified conditions, be exercisable by the State Government. The matters in respect of which and the conditions subject to which, the State Government could exercise its powers were specified, for the nonce, in GSR. 906. In pursuance of the same the Levy Order was enacted. The fact that subsequent to the promulgation of the Order, additional or different restrictions on the State Government's powers were placed by GSR. 1111 does not seem to me in any way to invalidate the Levy Order properly and validly promulgated in accordance with GSR. 906. It is of no consequence that no saving clause expressly saving Orders made in pursuance of GSR. 906 and deeming them to have been passed under GSR. 1111 was expressly enacted in the latter. The incorporation of such an express saving clause in GSR. 906 might well have been ex abundante cautela. Its absence cannot affect the validity of the Levy Order passed under GSR. 906. 9. The Levy Order was attacked as violating Art.14 of the Constitution. One of the main grounds relied on was that the Order contained no workable definition of the term "Cultivator". Such definition as it contained provided no guide lines for administering the provisions of the Act and was productive of great mischief and inequity in practical application. It was complained that there was no effective opportunity provided to the cultivator for raising objections to the levy demanded and to avoid expropriation of paddy. Cl.2(b) of the Order defines "cultivator" as follows: "2. It was complained that there was no effective opportunity provided to the cultivator for raising objections to the levy demanded and to avoid expropriation of paddy. Cl.2(b) of the Order defines "cultivator" as follows: "2. In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires, (b) "cultivator" means a person who actually cultivates any land with paddy." Clause 4 authorises certain specified officers either immediately before the harvest, or as soon as may be after the harvest to issue a notice to each cultivator specifying (a) the extent of paddy cultivation, (b) the quantity of paddy to be sold and (c) the period within which and the officer, agent or person to whom the paddy shall be sold. Cl.6 which provides for objection and appeal reads as follows: "6. Objection and appeal. (1) If any cultivator is not in a position to sell the quantity of paddy according to the scale specified in the notification under Cl.3 of this Order, on account of failure of crops, drought, flood, damage by insects, or any other circumstances beyond his control, he may within 7 days of the date of receipt of the notice under Cl.4, file an objection petition before the Taluk Supply Officer: Provided that the cultivator shall, before filing any objection under this sub-clause, sell to the Government or other officers or persons referred to in Cl.3, the quantity of paddy admitted by him to be liable to such sale: Provided further that it shall be lawful for the Taluk Supply Officer to seize such admitted quantity of paddy on payment of the price therefor at the rate specified in Cl.7, in case such admitted quantity of paddy is not sold within the period specified in the notice issued under Cl.4. (2) On receipt of the objection petition under sub-clause (I) the Taluk Supply Officer may, after giving an opportunity to the cultivator to state his case and conducting such enquiries as be deems necessary, pass orders reducing the quantity of paddy to be sold by the cultivator or refusing to reduce the quantity of paddy to be sold. (2) On receipt of the objection petition under sub-clause (I) the Taluk Supply Officer may, after giving an opportunity to the cultivator to state his case and conducting such enquiries as be deems necessary, pass orders reducing the quantity of paddy to be sold by the cultivator or refusing to reduce the quantity of paddy to be sold. (3) Any person aggrieved by the orders of the Taluk Supply Officer under this clause may, within 7 days of the receipt of such orders, appeal to the District Supply Officer, and the decision of the District Supply Officer on such appeal shall, subject to the provisions of Cl.11, be final." It was contended that objections were open under sub-clause (1) only on limited and narrow grounds such as failure of crops, drought, flood, damage by insects or any other circumstances beyond the control of the cultivator and that the scope of appeal provided by sub-clause (3) could not be wider than that of the objections provided under sub-clause (1). It was further emphasised that whereas the right of seizure of paddy for a failure to sell on service of notice under Cl.4 could formerly not be exercised during the pendency of an appeal or even before expiry of the time provided for filing an appeal, after the latest amendment to Cl.9, seizure could be effected immediately after the disposal of the objections under Cl.6(1) without allowing the cultivator any time to file an appeal and without awaiting its result, if he had filed one. It was stressed that there was no provision at all for the cultivator to object to the levy on grounds, for instance, that he was not a cultivator, or that the estimate of produce shown in the notice was high and excessive, or that there had been a partition in the family of the cultivator as a result of which the cultivator is liable to measure, if at all, only in respect of his individual share of the land; or even that the extent of land shown in the notice was not correct. In view of these, it was contended that the opportunity afforded to the cultivator to object to the levy demanded was quite illusory and inadequate This argument appears attractive in the first blush, but cannot bear closer scrutiny on analysis. In view of these, it was contended that the opportunity afforded to the cultivator to object to the levy demanded was quite illusory and inadequate This argument appears attractive in the first blush, but cannot bear closer scrutiny on analysis. Cl.3C of the Levy Order requires every cultivator holding more than two acres of land (who alone is liable to satisfy the levy) to give intimation in writing to the Village Officer at least 7 days before the harvest of each crop of his intention to harvest the crop, the proposed date of harvest, the extent of lands cultivated and the anticipated production. It further directs him to harvest the crop only under the written permission of the Village Officer. Cl.3A similarly requires every rent receiver to inform the Village Officer of the fact of receipt of rent, specifying the quantity received, the date of receipt, the number of members in the family etc. Thereupon the Village Officer is to serve a notice on the Rent Receiver under Cl.3B and on the cultivator under Cl.4 directing sale to the Government or to the agent of the Government of the requisite paddy as levy. In the face of these provisions it is difficult to accept the contention that the cultivator has no effective opportunity to object either in respect of the extent of the lands of the quantum of the yield therefrom. It is to be presumed that the notice under Cl.4 is to be issued only after receipt of the information furnished by Cl.3C and it cannot be lightly assumed that the Officers in question would arbitrarily magnify either the extent of the holding or the yield from the harvest. It may be that the Levy Order does not in terms provide for investigation of an objection as to whether a person is a cultivator within the meaning of the Levy Order or not. But this is a jurisdictional fact on which depends the jurisdiction of authorities to issue the requisite notices and to take the requisite action under the Order. It was rightly conceded by the Government Pleader that this jurisdictional fact, if denied by the person concerned, is liable to investigation and decision by the authorities functioning under the terms of the Order. It was rightly conceded by the Government Pleader that this jurisdictional fact, if denied by the person concerned, is liable to investigation and decision by the authorities functioning under the terms of the Order. The argument that under the terms of Cl.9 as it stands at present, a seizure of paddy for failure to self in pursuance of a notice under Cl.4 can be effected even if the time for appeal under Cl.6(3) is not over and even while an appeal, if filed, is pending decision is not sufficient to strike down the provision as arbitrary. The cultivator has, after all, had one opportunity of preferring his objections and getting a decision thereon. The fact that action by way of seizure is not postponed till after the statutory or other remedies are exhausted is no ground to hold that the provision is violative of Art.14. Cl.6 (3) provides for an appeal; and a further right of revision is; provided by Cl.11. These are adequate remedies for the cultivator. On a conspectus of the relevant provisions it is difficult to sustain the objection that the opportunities afforded are ineffective or illusory. Similar arguments about ineffective or inadequate opportunities to show cause against the levy demanded were repelled by a Special Bench of the Patna High Court in Mohammed Anzar Hussain v. State of Bihar (AIR 1952 Patna 220), and by Sinha, J. of the Calcutta High Court in Atulya Kumar v Director of Procurement & Supply (AIR 1953 Calcutta 548). 10. The Government Pleader drew my attention to the fact that in pursuance of the decision in O. P. No. 1344 of 1967 detailed administrative directions had been issued by the Government regarding the entertainment and disposal of objections under Cl.6 of the Levy Order, The wisdom and propriety of executive instructions in matters governed by statutory provisions, is itself, as contended by the petitioners, to be doubted. Besides, the inherent vice and unreasonableness of the law cannot be soothed or assuaged by the salutary way in which it is administered, whether with the aid of executive instructions or otherwise. (See Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty ( AIR 1962 SC. 316 ). 11. Besides, the inherent vice and unreasonableness of the law cannot be soothed or assuaged by the salutary way in which it is administered, whether with the aid of executive instructions or otherwise. (See Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty ( AIR 1962 SC. 316 ). 11. There remains an important aspect of the argument as to arbitrariness and Art.14 of the Constitution arising from the fact that the definition of the term 'cultivator' as given by the Levy Order is vague and furnishes do guide lines or principles for applying the provisions of the Order. The expression "cultivator" has been defined as "one who actually cultivates any land with paddy". On the definition, it seems to signify one who actually puts his hand to the plough, 'and the plough to the soil. It seems also immaterial that the land he cultivates is one in which he has himself no proprietary or beneficial interest. If this be the meaning to be attributed to the term 'cultivator' the working of the Levy Order would be reduced to an absurdity. It would mean that even a servant or labourer of an owner of land is to be regarded as a cultivator to be dealt with under the provisions of the Order. It is not to be expected that after service of notice on such servant or labourer under Cl.4 of the Order the paddy belonging to the owner could be acquired as, provided in Cl.3 and 7. Indeed, the Government Pleader realised that some limitation had to be implied on the definition of the term 'cultivator'. This indeed seems implicit from the provision in Cl.3 that the 'cultivator' contemplated by the Order should be one who is in a position to 'sell' paddy to the Government. Sale by one who has no right to pass title to what is sold is not to be presumed as intended. But in the absence of a satisfactory legislative definition of the term, its nuances and limitations are not matters to be supplied by judicial interpretation or judicial ingenuity. Much the less are they to be left to be evolved-according to the vagaries if I may so call it of the Executive Officers entrusted with powers under the Levy Order. In this context it is useful to recall the warning administered by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raja Reddy (AIR. 1967 SC. Much the less are they to be left to be evolved-according to the vagaries if I may so call it of the Executive Officers entrusted with powers under the Levy Order. In this context it is useful to recall the warning administered by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raja Reddy (AIR. 1967 SC. 1458): "A statute may expressly make a discrimination between persons or things or may confer power on an authority who would be in a position to do so. Official arbitrariness is more subversive of the doctrine of equality than statutory discrimination. In respect of a statutory discrimination one knows where he (sic one?) stands, but the wand of official arbitrariness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately. A statutory provision may offend Art.14 of the Constitution both by finding differences where there are none and by making no difference where there is one." Again in Jamnghani v. Union of India (AIR. 1967 SC. 1427), it was observed: "In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey "Law of the Constitution" Tenth Edn: Introduction ex). "Law has reached its finest moments" stated Douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlich, (1951) 342 U. S.98, "when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler....Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered". It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528 at p. 2539 "means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful." The definition of the term "producer" in the West Bengal Foodgrains (Intensive Procurement) Order referred to in Para.6 of Atulya Kumar v. Director of Procurement & Supply (AIR. It must be governed by rule, not by humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful." The definition of the term "producer" in the West Bengal Foodgrains (Intensive Procurement) Order referred to in Para.6 of Atulya Kumar v. Director of Procurement & Supply (AIR. 1953 Calcutta 548), might, with advantage be noticed. The absence of a similar working definition ia the impugned Levy Order is very much to be deplored. The learned Government Pleader referred to the definition of the term 'cultivate' in S.2 (7) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964, but admitted that there was no warrant to read the said definition into the terms of the Levy Order. 12. The inequities that are likely to result from the absence of a working definition of the term 'cultivator' may well be illustrated with reference to the facts disclosed to the affidavits of a few writ petitioners before me, chosen merely as examples and no more. 13. In O. P. No. 688 of 1967, the petitioner is a member of a Namboodiri family in which there was a partition evidenced by a registered partition deed of 1958 under which the immovable properties in the actual possession of the family were divided by metes and bounds, each of the members getting an equal share. In regard to properties in the possession of tenants a named commissioner was no allot them specifically to the sharers and till such allotment the members were to be tenants in common, the commissioner collecting the rent and distributing the same among the sharers. There were 29 members in the Mana at the time of the partition each being allotted one twentyninth of the properties. The writ petition is concerned with Ext. P-l notice issued in respect of the Makaram crop for the year 1142 M. E. by which the petitioner was called upon to measure the levy in respect of the properties of himself, his wife and children, and also his mother and divided brother, his wife and child, and another brother. In respect of the prior Kanni crop the petitioner has produced Ext. P-2 order issued by the Taluk Supply Officer by which the authorities appear to have accepted the partition and treated the petitioner and his wife and children as one branch, his mother as separate, and the brother as separate. An appeal against that order was dismissed by Ext. In respect of the prior Kanni crop the petitioner has produced Ext. P-2 order issued by the Taluk Supply Officer by which the authorities appear to have accepted the partition and treated the petitioner and his wife and children as one branch, his mother as separate, and the brother as separate. An appeal against that order was dismissed by Ext. P-3, and against the same O. P. No. 4620 of 1966 is pending in this court. It was under such circumstances that Ext. P-l notice in respect of the Makaram crop was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner straightaway approached this Court. If the partition of 1958 is true, as the authorities seem to accept in Exts. P-2 and P-3 it is difficult to regard the petitioner as the cultivator with respect to the properties of his wife and children except on the basis of actual cultivation. 14. The facts disclosed in O. P. Nos. 3717 of 1966 and 1027 of 1967 are as follows: 15. The petitioner is the same in both these writ petitions. For the 1141 M. E. Kanni crop be was issued a notice to measure 17.56 quintals of paddy in respect of 8.73 acres of land. This was done. A revised notice was issued in respect of 36.93 acres and to measure 150.90 quintals. For the Makaram crop of 1141 the levy notice was again served in respect of 36.93 acres and for 150 quintals. Against both these notices O. P. No. 613 of 1966 is pending in this Court. For 1142 Kanni crop the notice was in respect of 37.08 acres and to measure 152.48 quintals. Against the said notice O. P. No. 3717 of 1966 has been filed. For 1142 M. E. Makaram crop the notice was in respect of 29.08 acres and to measure 168.56 quintals. Against that OP. No. 1027 of 1967 has been filed. The petitioner has alleged that the notices issued include also the lands of three of his sons who had partitioned away from him under a registered partition deed of 1958, that in respect of their lands fair reats have been fixed separately and that they were all assessed to agricultural in-come-tax separately. In the counter-affidavit filed in OP. The petitioner has alleged that the notices issued include also the lands of three of his sons who had partitioned away from him under a registered partition deed of 1958, that in respect of their lands fair reats have been fixed separately and that they were all assessed to agricultural in-come-tax separately. In the counter-affidavit filed in OP. No. 3717 of 1966 it is stated that the petitioner and his sons are living in one and the same house, that there is also only one farm yard, that the alleged partition was not acted upon and that the entire lands shown in the levy notice were being cultivated by the petitioner. The counter-affidavit emphasises the fact that the test of the definition of the term 'cultivator' is actual cultivation, that the ownership of the land is not the basis for determining the levy due, and that all the lands shown in the notice were cultivated by the petitioner, and hence he was treated as cultivator. 16. I may next notice the facts in O. P. No. 4156 of 1966. The petitioner is a member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad and she got 1 acre and 72 cents of paddy land situated in Mulanjoor Amsom and Desom, Ottapalam Taluk, Palghat District in a partition in the tarwad by a registered document dated 27-12-1958. The petitioner is residing with her husband in Ernakulam. After the partition in the family the paddy lands of some of the members residing outside Palghat District including those of the petitioner were, being looked after by her cousin the 4th respondent as an agent of the other members. The 4th respondent was served with a notice dated 12-9-1966 (copy Ext. P-1) in respect of a total extent of 26 acres 73 cents of paddy land inclusive of petitioner's property and demanding a levy of 1708 paras of paddy. 17. I am not pronouncing on the facts at this stage, but have called attention to them as illustrating the inequities likely to result from the definition of the term 'cultivator' in varying situations. It would lead as noticed, to the expropriation of paddy belonging to an owner without affording him any real and effective opportunity against the levy notice. 17. I am not pronouncing on the facts at this stage, but have called attention to them as illustrating the inequities likely to result from the definition of the term 'cultivator' in varying situations. It would lead as noticed, to the expropriation of paddy belonging to an owner without affording him any real and effective opportunity against the levy notice. The facts disclosed in O. P. No. 3717 of 1966 are particularly instructive, as the counter-affidavit filed therein takes the stand that ownership of the land is not the criterion for demanding levy and that the test is actual cultivation. All the same to enforce a sale of paddy from the actual cultivator, without any regard to his proprietary or beneficial interest in the lands-or the lack of these-is inequitable, in the extreme... This was realised by the Government. Pleader who sought to imply some limitation on the term 'actual cultivator'. The Levy Order contains no provision as to when or under what circumstances, individuals, undivided families, co-owners, or an association of persons are to be treated as 'cultivators' within the meaning of the Order and bow they are to be assessed to levy. To leave these matters to be worked out according to the whims and fancies of the executive officers without providing sufficient guidelines,' or without even laying down the broad principles by terms of the Order itself, is to perpetuate discrimination in the administration of the Order. In Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1962 SC 723 ) the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act (IV of 1961) contained a definition of the term 'family' which was found to be artificial and not to conform to any of the three kinds, of families prevalent in the State. It was held that this was bound to result in discrimination and the Act was struck down. In the instant case the meaning of the term 'cultivator' may range from the one who actually puts the plough to the soil to the one who is stationed far away from the lands and who directs or supervises the cultivation or causes the same to be done by members of his family, dependants or relations, or with his own or hired labour. To say that 'cultivator' means one who actually cultivates any land is to lay down no definite standard as to the circum-statices under which the different categories, of persons would be answerable for the levy. As the definition of the term 'cultivator' as given in the Levy Order is artificial and arbitrary, and as the same is inextricably woven throughout the texture of the Levy Order, the entire Order must be held to be affected by the vice of the definition. 18. My attention was drawn to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in O. P. 1028 of 1967. There, on the actual facts, the Bench held that no levy could be demanded from the father who cultivated only 2-59 acres of land belonging to him, in Respect of 10-53 acres of land, which, on the pleadings, were shown to have included lands sold or gifted to the sons. By the said decision there was no judicial limitation of the term 'cultivator' 19. It was argued that the scale of levy provided by the notifications issued dated 30th December 1966 under S.3 of the Levy Order for the Mundakan crop and the one dated 6-7-1967 for the Virippu crop, are arbitrary. By the said notifications the entire State has been divided into 3 regions as in categories A, B and C. Different areas of the State have been included taluk-war in these categories, and cultivators in these areas are liable to be assessed to levy according to a certain slab indicated in the notifications. The petitioners attacked the whole scheme and basis underlying these notifications, contending that the scheme of levy on the basis of taluk-wise classification of the lands without any regard to their productivity or fertility or actual yield was discriminatory. It was argued that the yield and productivity of lands were bound to vary from place to place and even in the same place from field to field in such circumstances it was argued that to postulate that all cultivators, for instance, in the taluks of Chittur, Alathur and Palghat are bound to satisfy levy at the rates per acre specified ia the notifications would be to ignore the realities of the situation and the difference between the tenements assessed to levy. One difficulty in the way of accepting this contention is that there has been no sufficient or satisfactory pleading in this behalf, as, was frankly admitted by most of the counsel for the petitioners. There is no prayer to quash the notifications themselves. Besides, the State has relied on the counter-affidavit filed by it on an earlier occasion in O. P. 3143 of 1965-(a printed copy of which was treated as part of the State affidavit in these O. Ps.)-when the Levy O.1965 was attacked, to show that the area-wise classification of the lands in this State was done on the basis of statistics, research, and crop-cutting experiments and that the same was quite reasonable. In the circumstances, I am unable, on the pleadings and materials, to entertain or uphold the petitioners' contention that the taluk-wise classification of the lands for the purposes of levy has been shown to be inequitable. In Atulya Kumar v. Director of Procurement and Supply (AIR. 1953 Calcutta 548) the contention that the yield of the cultivators' lands should have been assessed after a survey and inspection of the lands was rejected as impracticable and as involving an administrative machinery so stupendous and costly that the very object of the Order would be frustrated. It was also remarked that the evils of assessing levy on the basis of estimation were sufficiently redressed by the opportunities for revision and appeal provided by the Order. In Mohammed Anzar Hussain v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1952 Patna 220) the validity of the Levy Order on the basis of an estimate from the lands was upheld, inter alia on the ground that to recruit a staff for appraising crops would have been impracticable. There is force in the reasoning of these cases. The latest notification must be presumed also, to have been issued after considering the expectation expressed by this Court in N. J. Thomas and others v. The State of Kerala ( 1966 KLT 931 ) where a prior notification under the 1965 Order was attacked, that "the matter will be duly considered by the proper quarters and the anomaly, if they are persuaded of it, rectified." 20. I would next take up the attack based on Art.31 of the Constitution. That Cl.3 and 38 of the Order provide for an acquisition by the State of paddy from the 'cultivator' and 'rent receiver' was not disputed. I would next take up the attack based on Art.31 of the Constitution. That Cl.3 and 38 of the Order provide for an acquisition by the State of paddy from the 'cultivator' and 'rent receiver' was not disputed. Being a law for acquisition of property, that it must pass the test of Art.31 (2) of the Constitution of India was also beyond dispute. Art.31(2) of the Constitution enacts: "31(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate. (2A) where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to posses-ion of any property to State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property. x x x x". There was no argument that the acquisition was not for a public purpose, and I need not dilate on that aspect any further. But it was strongly contended that there was neither any fixation of the amount of "compensation" nor any specification of the principles of compensation, as expounded by the Supreme Court with respect to Art.31(2) of the Constitution. In State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bella Banerjee ( AIR 1954 SC 170 ) the provisions of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 were challenged before the Supreme Court. The Act provided for acquisition of lands for settlement of immigrants who had migrated to the province of West Bengal owing to the communal disturbances in East Bengal. Bella Banerjee ( AIR 1954 SC 170 ) the provisions of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 were challenged before the Supreme Court. The Act provided for acquisition of lands for settlement of immigrants who had migrated to the province of West Bengal owing to the communal disturbances in East Bengal. The provisions regarding compensation contained in S.8 of the Act were to the effect that the market value of the land on the date of the publication of the notification under sub-s. (1) of S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act was to be awarded subject to the condition incorporated in the latter part of the provision to the section that if the same exceeded the market value of the land on the 31st day of December 1946, the amount of such excess shall not be taken into consideration. This latter part of the proviso to S.8 was struck down as violative of Art.31 (2). It was ruled that the principles to be laid down by the Legislature under Art.31 (2): "must ensure that what is determined as payable must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. Within the limits of this basic requirement of full indemnification of the expropriated owner, the Constitution allows free play to the legislative judgment as to what principles should guide the determination of the amount payable." Considering that the impugned Act was a permanent enactment and lands may be acquired under it many years after it came into force, the fixing of market value on 31st December 1946 as the ceiling on compensation, without reference to the value of the land at the time of the acquisition was held to be arbitrary and not due compliance in letter and spirit with Art.31 (2) of the Constitution. 21. The decision was rendered prior to the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act of 1955. That the said Amendment accepted the connotation of the term "compensation" as thus expounded, was recognised in Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Sp. Dy. Collector (AIR. 1965 SC. 1017). 21. The decision was rendered prior to the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act of 1955. That the said Amendment accepted the connotation of the term "compensation" as thus expounded, was recognised in Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Sp. Dy. Collector (AIR. 1965 SC. 1017). This decision treated Bella Banerjee's Case as authority for three propositions, viz., (1) that the compensation under Art.31 (2) shall be a "just equivalent" of what the owner has been deprived of; (2) the principles which the Legislature can prescribe are only principles for ascertaining the said "just equivalent"; and (3) if the compensation fixed was not such a "just equivalent" or if the principles did not take into account all relevant elements or took into account irrelevant elements for arriving at the just equivalent, the question in regard thereto is a justiciable issue. It was further explained: "The court cannot obviously say that the law should have adopted one principle and not the other, for it relates only to the question of adequacy. On the other hand, if a law lays down principles which are not relevant to the property acquired or to the value of the property at or about the time it is acquired, it may be said that they are not principles contemplated by Art.31 (2) of the Constitution. If a law says that though a house is acquired, it shall be valued as a land or that though a house site is acquired, it shall be valued as an agricultural land or that though it is acquired in 1950 its value in 1930 should be given, or though 100 acres are acquired compensation shall be given only for 50 acres the principles do not pertain to the domain of adequacy but are principles unconnected to the value of the property acquired. In such cases the validity of the principles can be scrutinised. The law may also prescribe a compensation which is illusory: it may provide for the acquisition of a property worth lakhs of rupees for a paltry sum of Rs. 100/-. The question in that context does not relate to the adequacy of the compensation, for it is no compensation at all. The illustrations given by us are not exhaustive. There may be many others falling on either side of the line. But this much is clear. 100/-. The question in that context does not relate to the adequacy of the compensation, for it is no compensation at all. The illustrations given by us are not exhaustive. There may be many others falling on either side of the line. But this much is clear. If the compensation is illusory or if the principles prescribed are irrelevant to the value of the property at or about the time of its acquisition, it can be said that the Legislature committed a fraud on power and, therefore, the law is bad. It is a use of the protection of Art.31 in a manner which the Article hardly intended." In the light of the above principles it was ruled in Vajravelu Mudaliar's Case that although in awarding compensation the potential value of the land was excluded, such exclusion pertains only to the method of ascertaining the compensation, sand results in the inadequacy of the compensation, but that in itself did not constitute a fraud on power. In Jeejeebhoy v. Asst. Collector, Thana (AIR. 1965 SC. 1096) it was ruled that the fixation of an anterior date for the ascertainment of the value of the property acquired without reference to any relevant circumstances which necessitated the fixing of such earlier date for computation of the real value, is arbitrary. The principle of these decisions was followed in Union of India v. The Metal Corporation of India (AIR. 1967 SC. 637). 22. In the light of the above principles let us examine the position with respect to the Levy Order. The provision for compensation is to be found in Cl.7 which reads: "7. Payment of price. After the service of the notice referred to in Cl.3B or Cl.4, no rent receiver or cultivator shall sell or remove paddy from his stock without selling the paddy specified in the said notice as required therein. Immediately after the sale, the price of the paddy shall be given to the rent receiver or cultivator by the Government or agent or the person, as the case may be, purchasing the paddy. The price so given shall be at the prevailing market rate but not exceeding. Immediately after the sale, the price of the paddy shall be given to the rent receiver or cultivator by the Government or agent or the person, as the case may be, purchasing the paddy. The price so given shall be at the prevailing market rate but not exceeding. (i) in the case of paddy, the maximum price specified by the Government for the time being under the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) O.1965, and (ii) in the case of rice, the maximum price specified for the time being under the Kerala Rice (Maximum Price) Order, 1965." The above provision, while it states that the price shall be at the prevailing market rate, puts a ceiling thereon by indicating that it shall in no case exceed the maximum price fixed by the Government for the time being under the Kerala (Maximum Prices) O.1965 for paddy and for rice. The provision itself is a confession that the market rate may well exceed the rate fixed by the Maximum Prices Orders. Under the Maximum Prices O.1965, it is the case of the State that the maximum prices have been fixed so as to ensure a reasonable margin of profit to the cultivator, and taking into account the burden on the consumer. Granted that this is so, it is a well known fact that the prices of rice or paddy have been spiralling in this State in the past few years. I can find no justification for denying the cultivator for all time the benefit of any increase in the market price of rice and paddy over the level fixed by the Maximum Prices O.1965. The provision in Cl.7 of the Levy Order bears a close analogy to the provisions considered in Mrs. Bella Banerji's case ( AIR 1954 SC 170 ) and in Jeejeebhoy's case (AIR. 1965 SC. 1096). The Maximum Price Orders themselves contain no indication that the Maximum Prices fixed by the Schedule therein are capable of periodical revision and adjustment. That the market value has for all time been tied down to the price fixed in the Maximum Prices Orders is a matter that pertains to the principles of compensation and not to its adequacy. 1096). The Maximum Price Orders themselves contain no indication that the Maximum Prices fixed by the Schedule therein are capable of periodical revision and adjustment. That the market value has for all time been tied down to the price fixed in the Maximum Prices Orders is a matter that pertains to the principles of compensation and not to its adequacy. It must therefore be held that Cl.7 of the Levy Order in so far as it imposes a ceiling on the price to be paid, fails to specify the principles on which compensation for the paddy taken is to be assessed, and thereby violates Art.31(2) of the Constitution. 23. There is another aspect of the compensation payable for the paddy acquired. The provisions of S.3 (3), 3 (3A.) and 3 (3B) of the Essential Commodities Act have a bearing on the price to be paid and may conveniently be quoted: "(3) Where any person sells any essential commodity in compliance with an order made with reference to clause (f) of sub-section (2), there shall be paid to him the price therefor as hereinafter provided:- (a) where the price can consistently with the controlled price, if any, fixed under this section, be agreed upon, the agreed price; (b) where no such agreement can be reached, the price calculated with reference to the controlled price, if any; (c) where neither clause (a) nor clause (b) applies, the price calculated at the market rate prevailing in the locality at the date of sale. (3A) (i) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for controlling the rise in prices, or preventing the hoarding of any foodstuff in any locality, it may by notification in the Official Gazette direct that notwithstanding any thing contained in. sub-section (3), the price at which the foodstuff shall be sold in the locality in compliance with an order made with reference to clause (f) of sub-section (2) shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section. sub-section (3), the price at which the foodstuff shall be sold in the locality in compliance with an order made with reference to clause (f) of sub-section (2) shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section. (ii) Any notification issued under this sub-section shall remain in force for such period not exceeding three months as may be specified in the notification, (iii) Where, after the issue of a notification under his sub-section, any person sells foodstuff of the kind specified therein and in the locality so specified incompliance with an order made with reference to clause (f) of sub-section (2), there shall be paid to the seller as the price therefor (a) where the price can, consistently with the controlled price of the foodstuff, if any fixed under this section; be agreed upon, the agreed price; (b) where no such agreement can be reached, the price calculated with reference to the controlled price, if any; (c) where neither clauses (a) nor clause (b) applies, the price calculated with reference to the average market rate prevailing in the locality during the period of three months immediately preceding the date of the notification. (iv) For the purpose of sub-clause (c) of clause (iii), the average market rate prevailing in the locality shall be determined by an officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf, with reference to the prevailing market rates for which published figures are available in respect of that locality or of a neighbouring locality; and the average market rate so determined shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. (3B) Where any person is required by any order made with reference to clause (f) of sub-section (2) to sell any grade or variety of food grains edible oilseeds or edible oil to the Central Government or a State Government or to an officer or agent of such Government and either no notification in respect of such food grains, edible oil seeds or edible oils has been issued under sub-section (3A) or any such notification having been issued has ceased to remain in force by efflux of time, then, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), there shall be paid to that person such price for the food grains, edible oil seeds or edible oils as may be specified in that order having regard to (i) the controlled price, if any, fixed under this section or by or under any other law for the time being in force for such grade or variety of food grains, edible oil seeds credible oils, and (ii) the price for such grade or variety of food grains, edible oil seeds or edible oils prevailing or likely to prevail during the post-harvest period in the area to which that order applies." It is plain that sub-section (3A) has application only to a special situation con-templated thereby, and may therefore be left out of account. It is a matter of some doubt, and of controversy, as to which of the two sub-sections viz., sub-section (3) or sub-section (3B) of S.3 of the Act has application. The petitioners' counsel thumbed for sub-section (3B), while the learned Government Pleader submitted that only sub-section (3) of S.3 would have application. According to the learned Government Pleader, sub-section (3B) would apply only in the eventuality contemplated by the opening part of sub-section (3A), subject to the difference that the notification contemplated thereby had either not been issued, or, if issued had lapsed. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand the provision in sub-section (3B) referring to the absence of a notification issued under sub-section (3A), or to the lapse by efflux of time of such notification, if issued. It was also contended by the Government Pleader that if sub-section (3B) were to be treated as unrelated to sub-section (3A), then sub-section 3 of S.3 may have to be completely swept out. There is force in this submission. In the judgment delivered by the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. It was also contended by the Government Pleader that if sub-section (3B) were to be treated as unrelated to sub-section (3A), then sub-section 3 of S.3 may have to be completely swept out. There is force in this submission. In the judgment delivered by the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 297 to 301 of 1967, a typed copy of which was made available to me, and which was concerned with the validity of the Madras Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order, 1966, the learned Judges proceeded on the basis that sub-section (3B) of the Act had application. The relative scope and the competing claims of sub-section (3) and subsection (3B) do not, if I may say so with respect, seem to have received attention; and, as seen from the judgment supplied to me, the matter seems to have been dealt with on the basis of concessions made by the Advocate General. Be that as it may, whichever be the sub-clause that applies, it is clear that the controlled price is not the sole determinant of the price to be paid to a person required to sell an essential commodity in compliance with an Order mads with reference to S.3 (2) (f) of the Act. It is only one of the factors to be taken into account. Even under S.3 (3) (b), the price in the absence of an agreement is to be fixed with reference to, and not at the controlled price (compare the language in S.3 (3) (c)). Turning to the provisions of the Levy Order, the controlled price is the sole determinant of the price to be paid. To that extent the Levy Order seems to have travelled beyond the provisions of the parent Act viz., the Essential Commodities Act in respect of the provision as to payment of price for the rice or paddy acquired. 24. The provisions regarding seizure contained in Cl.9 and 10 of the Levy Order were attacked as violative of Art.14 and 19 of the Constitution. The seizure under Cl.9 can be ordered only when the cultivator or rent receiver has failed to deliver the paddy which he has been called upon to sell to the Government or its agent. The Taluk Supply Officer has to be satisfied that there has been such a failure to sell. The seizure under Cl.9 can be ordered only when the cultivator or rent receiver has failed to deliver the paddy which he has been called upon to sell to the Government or its agent. The Taluk Supply Officer has to be satisfied that there has been such a failure to sell. The seizure again is only on payment of price in accordance with the provisions of Cl.7. It is also subject to the limitation that no seizure can be ordered till after disposal of the objections if any filed by the cultivator under Cl.6 (1). These are sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness under Art.14. Having regard to the objects of the Levy Order, viz., to secure equitable distribution of rice and paddy in a situation of famine and distress, which is well known, and of which judicial notice can be taken, I think that the restrictions imposed are reasonable, and in the interest of the general public from the point of view of Art.19 of the Constitution. 25. The more serious attack was against the more drastic provision for inspection, search and seizure contained in Cl.10 of the Levy Order. After the commencement of the arguments and almost at the conclusion of the same, Cl.10 has undergone a transformation by way of amendment, as a result of which, it has shed many of-what I may call-its offensive provisions. Cl.10 as it now stands reads as follows: "10. Powers of entry, search and seizure (1) Any Officer of the Civil Supplies Department not below the rank of Rationing Inspector, any officer of the Revenue Department not below the rank of Revenue Inspector. Cl.10 as it now stands reads as follows: "10. Powers of entry, search and seizure (1) Any Officer of the Civil Supplies Department not below the rank of Rationing Inspector, any officer of the Revenue Department not below the rank of Revenue Inspector. any Police Officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, any Panchayat Executive Officer, any Municipal Commissioner, or any other Officer authorised by the District Collector in this behalf, may, with a view to securing compliance with provisions of this Order or to satisfying himself that the said provisions have been complied with, (a) inspect any books of accounts or other documents maintained in the course of business by any cultivator or rent receiver or any stock of paddy in his possession or under his control; (b) seize any such books of accounts or other documents which in his opinion would be useful for or relevant to any proceedings 'under this Order; and, (c) enter and search any premises where any of the authorities specified above has reason to believe that paddy belonging to or in the possession or under the control of any cultivator or rent receiver is stored or kept. (d) stop and search any person, animal, vehicle, vessel or any other conveyance or receptacle which any of the authorities mentioned above has reason to believe is engaged or used for the movement of paddy. (e) seize the stock of paddy in respect of which any of the authorities specified above has reason to believe that any of the provisions of this Order has been, or is being, or is about to be contravened along with the packages, coverings, or receptacles in which such paddy is found or the animals, vessels, vehicles, or other conveyances used in carrying such paddy and thereafter take all measures necessary for securing the production of the paddy along with the packages, coverings, receptacles, animals, vessels, vehicles or other conveyances so seized, before the appropriate Court and for their safe custody pending such production. Explanation "Appropriate Court" in this sub-clause shall mean such Court as is specified in or under the Essential Commodities Act, 1965 in which proceedings would lie for contravention of the provisions of this Order and shall also include the Collector of the District referred to in S.6A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Explanation "Appropriate Court" in this sub-clause shall mean such Court as is specified in or under the Essential Commodities Act, 1965 in which proceedings would lie for contravention of the provisions of this Order and shall also include the Collector of the District referred to in S.6A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. (2) The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act 5 of 1898) relating to search and seizure shall, so far as may be apply to search and seizure under this Cl. (3) Where any of the authorities specified in sub-clause (1) effects any seizure under the said-clause, he shall prepare forthwith an inventory of the articles or materials seized and shall also issue a receipt for the same. (4) Any books of accounts or other documents seized under the provisions of sub-clause (1) shall be returned to the person from whom they were seized not later than sixty days from the date of seizure, after taking copies thereof or extracts therefrom. If necessary, provided that the person from whom they are so seized certifies as true such copies or extracts before taking back such books of accounts or other documents." The amended clause was brought to my notice on 23-1-1968 when the petitioners' counsel were replying to the arguments of the Government Pleader. After the close of arguments that day, the matter was posted to 24-1-1968 to enable the petitioners' counsel, if necessary, to address further arguments on the amended Cl. After further arguments judgment was reserved. 26. I have upheld the validity of a similar clause relating to search and seizure contained in the Kerala Paddy (Restriction on Milling) O.1967, in my judgment in O. P. Nos. 3397 etc. of 1967. Explanation.3 and 4 added to Cl.10 of the Levy Order appear to be improvements to the identical Cl.7 of the Kerala Paddy (Restriction on Milling) O.1967, the validity of which I upheld in the judgment referred to earlier. The clause after amendment limits the Officers empowered to take actions to those specifically named in the opening part of the clause and any other Officer empowered by the District Collector. The clause after amendment limits the Officers empowered to take actions to those specifically named in the opening part of the clause and any other Officer empowered by the District Collector. It is not to be expected or assumed that the District Collector would exercise his power of authorisation otherwise than in accordance with the immediate necessities of the situation, of which he, as the executive head of the District should be taken to be well aware of. The powers conferred by Cl.10 can be exercised only with a view to securing compliance with the provisions of the Order or to satisfy that the said provisions have been complied with. The salutary safeguards provided by the Criminal Procedure Code in regard to search and seizure have been brought in by the Explanation.2 to Cl.10. The paddy and other articles seized under Cl.10 (e) are to be produced before the ''appropriate court", which has been identified by Explanation.1 to the Cl. Provision to prepare an inventory of the articles seized and to pass a receipt for the same has been made by Explanation (3). Explanation (4) to the clause ensures that the deprivation of the books of accounts or other documents seized is to be only temporary and that these are to be returned not later than sixty days to the person from whom they were seized. These appear; to be sufficient safeguards against any arbitrary exercise of the power. In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and others v. Ramkishan Jhavar and others (AIR. 1968 SC. 59), the Supreme Court considered the validity of a provision for search contained in S.41 (2) and (3) of the Madras General Sales-tax Act, 1 of 1959. The main reasons on which the High Court struck down clauses (2) and (3) in the section were that no safeguards had been provided for a search made thereunder and that the State Government had been given power to empower any officer to make a search under S.41(2) of the Act. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the first part of the reasoning proceeded from a misconception, as the section itself contained express provision that all searches, so far as may be, were to be made in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the first part of the reasoning proceeded from a misconception, as the section itself contained express provision that all searches, so far as may be, were to be made in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Adverting to the argument that minor minions of the Government had been empowered to carry out the search, the Supreme Court pointed out that if high ranking officers were to be detailed for dealing with the dealers who were a legion, a plethora of them would have to be found for the purpose. The fact that in the case before the Supreme Court, the Government was invested with the power to authorise the officers to effect the search and that in the Levy Order the District Collector has been clothed with the requisite authority, seems to me to make little difference. As the executive head of the District, the Collector is the person best fitted to know the immediate necessities of the situation; and it cannot be assumed that he will exercise his powers of authorisation in any arbitrary manner. I see no ground to condemn Cl.10 as either arbitrary or as amounting to an unreason, able restriction on the petitioners' fundamental rights under Art.19. 27. In my judgment in O. P. Nos. 3397 etc., of 1967, I have adverted to the plea advanced by the learned Advocate General in those cases that an attack against a provision for search and seizure could, if at all, be based only on Art.19 and not on Art.14 of the Constitution. At the time when arguments were advanced and judgment pronounced in those cases, Art.19 stood suspended by reason of the Proclamation of Emergency and by Art.358 of the Constitution. Although the emergency has now been lifted and Art.358 can no longer be raised as bar to the plea based on Art.19, I see no grounds to condemn Cl.10 as amounting to an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' right to property or trade. Having regard to the object that the Levy Order is meant to serve, the restriction on the petitioners' rights, is reasonable and in the interests of the general public'. 28. I have dealt with the attack based on Art.19 on th3 merits and negatived the same. Having regard to the object that the Levy Order is meant to serve, the restriction on the petitioners' rights, is reasonable and in the interests of the general public'. 28. I have dealt with the attack based on Art.19 on th3 merits and negatived the same. There is authority for the view that where property has been acquired under Art.31 (2) of the Constitution no question of violation of Art.19(1)(f) can arise. It is academic to pursue this line of reasoning. Besides, as noticed in Atulya Kumar v. Director of Procurement & Supply (AIR. 1953 Calcutta 548), while dealing with a composite legislation like the Levy Order, the provision dealing with acquisition will have to be separated from the rest, and it may not be proper to rule out Art.19 altogether and relegate the party only to his rights under Art.31. 29. The amended Cl.10 of the Levy Order was attacked as discriminatory by counsel for some of the petitioners at the last stage of the arguments. By Explanation.1 the "Appropriate Court" has been indicated as the court specified in the Essential Commodities Act in which proceedings could lie for contravention of the provisions of this Order, and also as including the Collector of the District referred to in S.6A of Act. It was contended that the provision left it to the sweet will and pleasure of the executive officers referred to in Cl.10 to choose either the Magistrate's Court specified in the Essential Commodities Act or the Collector referred to in S.6A thereof; and that the procedure sanctioned by the two forums and the safeguards available were fundamentally different, the one being more beneficial and the other more drastic. In so far as no guidelines were supplied as to when the one or the other of these forums should be resorted to, it was complained that the provision was discriminatory. The answer made by the Government Pleader was two-fold. First that Levy Order was concerned only with the stage of search and seizure, and the proceedings beyond that stage in either of the two forums is indicated by the Essential Commodities Act. Wherefore it was contended that the challenge at this stage was premature and could be raised only if, in any individual case the party could claim prejudice or disadvantage by reason of any particular forum having been chosen to the exclusion of the other. Wherefore it was contended that the challenge at this stage was premature and could be raised only if, in any individual case the party could claim prejudice or disadvantage by reason of any particular forum having been chosen to the exclusion of the other. Secondly it was pointed out that discrimination, if at all, was sanctioned by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, against the validity of which there was neither averment nor pleading in any of these writ petitions. Both these submissions of the learned Government Pleader are well founded. I therefore decline to entertain the contention based on Art.14 against the amended Cl.10 of the Levy Order, and in particular to Explanation.1 thereof. 30. In the result I hold that the definition of the term "cultivator" in the Levy Order is vague and does not lay down even the broad principles for a satisfactory administration of the provisions of the Order and is productive of arbitrariness. As the definition is the very crux of the Order and is inextricably woven throughout the texture of the Order the entire Order is liable to be struck down under Art.14 of the Constitution. I am further of the view that, in any event, following the principle in Mrs. Bella Bannerjee's Case (AIR. 1954 SC. 170) and Jeejeebhoy's case (AIR. 1965 SC. 1096), the proviso to Cl.7 of the Order in so far as it places a ceiling on the market value of the price to be paid to the paddy acquired is violative of Art.31 (2) of the Constitution. 31. I next take up the challenge to the Declaration Order. Cl.4 (i) provides for the requisitioning of stocks of paddy or rice by a written order. 31. I next take up the challenge to the Declaration Order. Cl.4 (i) provides for the requisitioning of stocks of paddy or rice by a written order. The first proviso to the same provides that in case of a stockholder who is a producer and who has filed a declaration in respect of his stock, the order of requisition shall be passed only after making an allowance of 1.5 quintals of paddy for every acre of land cultivated by him with paddy and at the rate of 675 grams of paddy or 450 grams of rice per day for every member of his family who has completed the age of 12 years, or at half the quantity of paddy or rice per day for every member of the family below the age of 12 years but not below the age of 2 years, for personal consumption, for a period of six months in the case of double crop lands and one year in the case of single crop lands. The second proviso enacts that in the case of a stockholder who is a non-producer and has filed a declaration, the allowance similarly to be made shall be at the rate of 510 grams of paddy or 340 grams of rice per day for every member of his family who has completed 12 years of age, and at half that quantity of paddy or rice per day for every member of his family below the age of 12 years but not below 2 years of age, for personal consumption for a period of one month from the date of sale of stock to the Government. The third proviso enacts that in the case of a stockholder who has not filed a declaration and who is found to be in possession or control of stock which he is bound to declare under Cl.3 of the Order, the order of requisition shall be for such quantity of paddy or rice after making allowance at the rate of 510 grams of paddy and 340 grams of rice for every member of his family who has completed 12 years of age, and at half that quantity for every member below 12 years of age but not below 2 years for a period of one month from the date of sale to the Government. These provisions have been attacked as amounting to discrimination (1) between producers and non-producers and (2) between stockholders who had filed a declaration and those who had not. The classification made is rational, and cannot be said to be unrelated to the objects of the Legislation. The higher rate of allowance allowed to producers as compared to non-producers is quite understandable and is based on intelligible differentia. The drastic provision made by the 3rd proviso to Cl.4(1) in the case of a stockholder who had not filed a declaration as required by the Order can not also be said to be either arbitrary or unrelated to the object of the legislation. 32. The provision of Cl.3(4) of the Declaration Order was attacked as arbitrary. The same enacts: "Nothing in this clause shall apply to a cultivator who has sold to the Government or an agent of the Government paddy or rice as required under Cl.3 of the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order. 1966, unless the Government, Commissioner, District Collector or District Supply Officer otherwise directs." The contention was that the statutory exemption can be rendered nugatory by the contrary direction given by the Government, the Commissioner, the District Collector or the District Supply Officer On this ground the clause cannot be regarded as arbitrary. The power of giving a direction to the contrary has been conferred on the Government and upon fairly high placed officers. It cannot be presumed that the same would be exercised arbitrarily. If such happens, it would be a case for striking down the individual orders themselves. No case has been made out to strike down the clause as arbitrary. 33. The provision regarding inspection and seizure of stocks of paddy or rice was attacked as violative of Art.14 and 19 of the Constitution. The clause is identical in language and content with Cl.10 of the Levy Order whose validity I have just upheld. This ground of attack is therefore repelled for the same reasons. 34. It was argued that the definition of the term "stockholder", is arbitrary. The definition reads: "2. Definitions. The clause is identical in language and content with Cl.10 of the Levy Order whose validity I have just upheld. This ground of attack is therefore repelled for the same reasons. 34. It was argued that the definition of the term "stockholder", is arbitrary. The definition reads: "2. Definitions. In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires, X X X X (c) "Stockholder" means in the case of producers, every person who has in his possession or control, ten quintals or more of paddy or seven quintals or more of rice and in the case of non-producers, every person who has in his possession or control, three quintals or more of paddy or two quintals or more of rice." It was pointed out that on the definition, a producer who has in his possession or control 9 quintals of paddy and 6 quintals of rice, and a non-producer similarly having, say 2 1\2 quintals of paddy and 1 1/2 quintals of rice would not answer the definition. The argument is ingenious, but I do not think that the definition fails to lay down the broad principles with sufficient clarity as in the case of the definition of the term "cultivator" in the Levy Order. The anomalies and inequities in individual cases may well be dealt with by appropriate orders. I do not think that enough has been said or made out to hold that the definition of the term 'stockholder' is arbitrary or unreasonable. 35. Cl.4 of the Declaration Order requires a stockholder to sell to the Government the quantity of paddy or rice specified in the written order at the "controlled price". The expression "Controlled price" is defined by Cl.2(b) as follows: "2. Definitions. 35. Cl.4 of the Declaration Order requires a stockholder to sell to the Government the quantity of paddy or rice specified in the written order at the "controlled price". The expression "Controlled price" is defined by Cl.2(b) as follows: "2. Definitions. In this Order unless the context otherwise requires, X X X X (b) "controlled price" in relation to any variety of paddy or rice means the maximum price fixed therefor under the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) O.1965 and the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 respectively." The provision is attacked as offending Art.31(2) of the Constitution on the ground that it does not provide the stockholder with a "just equivalent" of the paddy or rice that he has been deprived of; and on the ground that the principles laid down by the Declaration Order are not principles for ascertainment of this "just equivalent" as laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions already noticed in relation to the Levy Order. It will be noticed that, as in the case of the Levy Order, the Declaration Order also inelastically fixes the price to be paid for rice and paddy as the maximum prices fixed by the Maximum Prices Orders of 1965. The stockholder is denied the benefit of any rise in the market value of these commodities subsequent to 1965. I therefore hold that Cl.4 of the Declaration Order in so far as it directs the stockholder to sell paddy or rice to the Government at the "controlled price" offends Art.31(2) of the Constitution. There was no argument that the effect of the clause is so all pervasive that the entire Order should be struck down. 36. In the result, as far as the Declaration Order is concerned I hold that only Cl.4 thereof to the extent to which it directs sale to the Government at the "controlled price" is unconstitutional and invalid. 37. Lastly I take up the Maximum Prices Orders. Cl.2 of the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 may be reproduced: "2. Maximum prices at which paddy may be sold. 37. Lastly I take up the Maximum Prices Orders. Cl.2 of the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 may be reproduced: "2. Maximum prices at which paddy may be sold. The maximum prices at which fine medium and coarse varieties of paddy of fair average quality of Kerala original specified in column (1) of Schedule I to this Order may be sold by any person in the State ia anyone transaction shall not exceed the prices specified in the corresponding entries in column (2) of the said Schedule: Provided that in the case of paddy procured and sold by the Government or their authorised agents, the maximum prices shall be such as may be fixed by the Government by Notification in the Gazette, after taking into consideration expenses on account of transport, storage and other incidental charges." Clause 3 of the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 is more or less similarly worded. 38. With reference to these Orders, it was argued that they can be traced only to S.3 (2) (c) of the Essential Commodities Act which reads: "3 (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (i), an order made thereunder may provide X X X X (c) for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold." And therefore, the prior concurrence of the Central Government was necessary to the promulgation of these Orders. The requirement of prior concurrence was posited with reference to G. S. R.906 dated 9th June 1966. But there is an obvious fallacy in the argument, as the limitations of this G. S. R. cannot be imported into the Maximum Prices Orders promulgated prior to the date of the said notification. The Maximum Prices Orders themselves set out that they were promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (i) and clause (c) of sub-section (2) of S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act read with Notification No. 203 (General) (14) 743/64/PY. II dated the 13th October, 1964 of the Government of India, and G. S. R. No. 1100, dated 31st July 1964, of the Government of India. The Government Pleader drew my attention to these notifications under which power has been taken to promulgate the Maximum Prices Orders. II dated the 13th October, 1964 of the Government of India, and G. S. R. No. 1100, dated 31st July 1964, of the Government of India. The Government Pleader drew my attention to these notifications under which power has been taken to promulgate the Maximum Prices Orders. There is no rider or limitation under these notifications, as in G. S. R. 906, that the prior concurrence of the Central Government had to be obtained before the State Government passed an order under S.3(2)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act by virtue of the delegated powers under S.5 of the Act. I therefore reject the contention that the Maximum Prices Orders, are invalid for want of the prior concurrence of the Central Government. 39. One of the counsel for the petitioners contended that the Maximum Prices Orders had not recited in the preamble thereof that the Government was of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of an essential commodity etc., as required by S.3 clause (i) of the Essential Commodities Act. This is unnecessary. But it was contended that in the absence of an express recital of this opinion, the formation of the same cannot be assumed and must be proved or established. The difficulty in the way of entertaining this argument is that there was no avernment that the requisite opinion had not been formed by the Government. I cannot therefore entertain this contention. 40. A contention was raised that the proviso to Cl.2 of the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965, extracted earlier, freed the Government from the inhibition of the maximum prices fixed by the Order both in the matter of purchase by procurement and in the matter of sale after procurement, and that this was unreasonable. The Government Pleader rightly pointed out that the Government is freed from the inhibition of the Maximum Prices Orders only when they sell the rice or paddy procured, and that at the stage of procurement the price should be paid as fixed by the Levy Order. The Government Pleader rightly pointed out that the Government is freed from the inhibition of the Maximum Prices Orders only when they sell the rice or paddy procured, and that at the stage of procurement the price should be paid as fixed by the Levy Order. The exemption of the Government from the operation of the Maximum Prices Orders in the matter of the sale of the paddy or rice procured by them was sought to be justified as reasonable and proper, as, having procured the commodity in the interests of the general public it was only reasonable that the Government should be allowed to take into consideration the expenses of transport, storage and other incidental charges as provided by the proviso to Cl.2 and 3 of the Maximum Prices Orders. I am in agreement with this contention. 41. Nothing was made out to show that the Maximum Prices O.1965 are unconstitutional or invalid. 42. In the light of my above conclusions regarding the constitutional validity of the Orders, these writ petitions will now he posted for further hearing and appropriate orders. Post all these writ petitions on 15-2-68.