JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This writ petition comes up before us upon a reference made by Hon. Khare, J. 2. The facts leading up to the petition are as follows: Major Agha Zakir Husain, opposite part No. 3, (hereinafter referred to as the Thekedari), was a Thekedar of village Parbatpur, Tahsil Suar in the state of Rampur prior to its merger in the Dominion of India in 1949 and he continued to be a Thekedar of the village till July 1, 1954 when by an order published in the official Gazette his Theka, along with other similar Thekas, was determined under Section 3 of the Rampur Thekedari and Pattedari Abolition Act 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the 1953 Act). The Thekedar filed a writ petition in this court challenging the validity of the 1953 Act and, on July 26, 1954, obtained an interim order restraining the State of U. P. and the Collector of Rampur from interfering with his possession over village Parbatpur. The writ petition was, however, dismissed on April 11, 1957. An appeal against the judgment of this court was then preferred by the Thekedar to the Supreme Court but the appeal too was dismissed on December 18, 1958. During the pendency of the appeal also there was an injunction order restraining the State of U. P. from interfering with the possession of the Thekedar. The result, therefore, was that the Thekedar remained in possession of village Parbatpur till the year 1958, and it was only after the dismissal of his appeal by the Supreme Court that the State of U. P. took possession over the village. The Revenue authorities of the State realised from the Thekedar during the period of his Theka money from year to year and on two occasions when there was some delay in the payment of the money penalty (Tawan) was also realised. After the coming into force of the U. P. Recovery of Government Dues (Acquired Estates and Determined Leases) Act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Government Dues Act) proceedings under the provisions thereof were started against the Thekedar for realisation of Government dues said to be due from the Thekedar on account of his possession without title after the determination of the Theka. A notice under Section 6 of the Government Dues Act for the recovery of Rs. A notice under Section 6 of the Government Dues Act for the recovery of Rs. 13074.46 P. claimed as due on account of the Thekedar's possession from I362F to 1366F was issued to the Thekedar by the Assessing Officer. The Thekedar filed an objection to the notice. After hearing the Thekedar and taking his evidence, the Assessing Authority held that the State Government is entitled to realise a sum of Rs. 11,003.05 P. on account of the possession of the Thekedar from 1362F to I365F and directed that proceedings for the recovery of the said amount be taken against him under the provisions of the Government Dues Act. The Assessing Authority held that in 1366F the State Government itself realised rent from tenants and the Thekedar was not liable to pay any sum in respect of that year. An appeal against the order of the Assessing Officer was then filed by the Thekedar. By his order dated March 121. 1964 the 1st Civil and Sessions Judge Rampur allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Assessing Officer and held that the State of U. P. is not entitled to recover any amount from the Thekedar under the pro- visions of the Government Dues Act. The present writ petition has been filed by the State of U. P. for the quashing of the said judgment of the Civil and Sessions Judge. It is not in dispute that the Theka under which the Thekedar held village Parbatpur from the erstwhile Rampur State was governed by the provisions of the Act Qabza Arazi Riyasat Rampur 1937 (hereinafter referred to as the Rampur Tenancy Act) . It is also not in dispute that it was by Notification No. 152-AZI1-A-1021-56 dated January 26, 1959 that the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1951 were, with the modifications mentioned in the notification, extended to those estates owned by the State Government as were included in leases to which the 1953 Act applied. The said notification also repealed The Rampur Tenancy Act, as Schedule 111 of the notification would show. Admittedly, village Parbatpur is an estate owned by the State Government and the lease in favour of the Thekedar in respect of that village was a lease to which the 1953 Act applied. The said notification also repealed The Rampur Tenancy Act, as Schedule 111 of the notification would show. Admittedly, village Parbatpur is an estate owned by the State Government and the lease in favour of the Thekedar in respect of that village was a lease to which the 1953 Act applied. The position, therefore, is that the Rampur Tenancy Act had not been expressly repealed till January 26, 1959 and, unless there was any implied repeal, it remained in force during 1362F - to 1365F, the period for which the claim of the State Government against the Thekedar was upheld by the Assessing Officer. 3. The ground on which the learned Civil and Sessions Judge held that no amount was recoverable from the Thekedar under the provisions of the Government Dues Act was that since the State Government had, from 1362F to 1365F, realised Theka money and also "Tawan" for late payment from the Thekedar, his possession during that period was in the capacity of a Thekedar from year to year by virtue of Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act and nothing could be said to be due from him as Government dues within the meaning of the Government Dues Act. It is the correctness of this reason for disallowing the claim-of the State Government that is challenged in this writ petition. 4. One of the contentions raised on behalf of the State before Khare, J. was that the Rampur Tenancy Act stood impliedly repealed as a result of the enforcement of the 1953 Act. This contention was not raised before us; but we may observe that there is nothing in the 1953 Act that may warrant the conclusion that it had the effect of repealing the Rampur Tenancy Act by implication. The object of the 1953 Act was to provide for the abolition of Thekedari and Pattedari system in Rampur with a view to facilitate the introduction of land reforms. For achieving that object, Section 3 of the 1953 Act empowered the State Government to determine, by means of an order published in the official gazette, any lease with effect from the date indicated in the section. The consequences of the determination of a lease were laid down in Section 4. For achieving that object, Section 3 of the 1953 Act empowered the State Government to determine, by means of an order published in the official gazette, any lease with effect from the date indicated in the section. The consequences of the determination of a lease were laid down in Section 4. The sections that follow Section 4 provide for taking possession of the land covered by such a lease, for payment of compensation to the lessee and the mode of assessing compensation. We do not find any irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of the Rampur Tenancy Act and the 1953 Act and, in our opinion, there was nothing in the latter to preclude the coexistence of both the enactments. The U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was extended to those estates owned by the State Government that were included in leases to which 1953 Act applied by notification No. 152-AZII-A-1021-56 dated January 26, 1959 with the modification mentioned in the notification and it was by means of the said notification that the Rampur Tenancy Act was repealed. Till January 26, 1959, therefore, Rampur Tenancy Act continued in force and we have to determine whether the possession of the Thekedar from 1362F to 1365F was that of a person without title or, by virtue of Section 215 of the aforesaid Act, that of a person holding under a Theka from year to year. 5. Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act seems to have been only a translation in Urdu of Section 218 of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 which ran as follows: "If a Thekedar remains in possession after the expiry of his Theka and the lessor accepts rent or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the Theka is in the absence of a contract to the contrary renewed from year to year." 6. The counsel for the parties agree that the above would be a correct and accurate rendering in English of Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act. 7. It is no doubt true that the State Government continued to realise rent from the Thekedar even after the determination of his Theka in accordance with the provisions of the 1953 Act. The counsel for the parties agree that the above would be a correct and accurate rendering in English of Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act. 7. It is no doubt true that the State Government continued to realise rent from the Thekedar even after the determination of his Theka in accordance with the provisions of the 1953 Act. But can it be said on that account that there was in the circumstances of the case such acceptance of rent by the lessor as was contemplated by Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act? The lease in favour of the Thekedar had been determined under a statutory provision, and the statutory result of complete extinction of all the rights, title and interest of the Thekedar, as laid down in Section 6 of the 1953 Act, had immediately followed. The relationship of lessor and lessee had come to an end by force of law and it could not continue thereafter. The injunctions restraining the State Government from taking over possession from the Thekedar during the pendency of writ petition in this court and of the appeal in the Supreme Court had only the effect of allowing the Thekedar to remain in possession and not of renewing the Theka or recreating the relationship of lessor and lessee between the State Government and the Thekedar. 8. The words "accepts rent or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession" in Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act of 1926 clearly indicate that acceptance or rent, as contemplated by the said provisions, was one of the modes of assenting to continuance in possession, and the necessary implication is that if the continuance in possession was against the will of the erstwhile lessor and not by his consent and if it was not within his power to put an end to the possession, acceptance of rent by him would not be of such a character as would attract the operation of the said previsions. Acceptance postulates voluntariness and in the context of Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act and Section 218 of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 it had to spring from and be expressive of a willingness on the part of the erstwhile lessor to allow the possession to continue before the said provisions could come into play. Acceptance postulates voluntariness and in the context of Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act and Section 218 of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 it had to spring from and be expressive of a willingness on the part of the erstwhile lessor to allow the possession to continue before the said provisions could come into play. In this view we are fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. v. The Province of Bengal, A.I.R. 1951 SC 285 where, in regard to similar words occurring in Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, their Lordships observed : "A reference to Section 116, T. P. Act, will show that for the application of that section, two things are necessary: (1) the lessee should be in possession after the termination of the lease; and (2) the lessor or his representative should accept rent or otherwise assent to his continuing in possession. The use of the word "otherwise" suggests that acceptance of rent by the landlord has been treated as a form of his giving assent to the tenants continuing in possession. There can be no question of the lessee "continuing in possession" until the lease has expired, and the context in which the provision for acceptance of rent finds a place clearly shows that what is contemplated is that the payment of rent and its acceptance should be made at such a time and in such a manner as to be equivalent to the landlord assenting to the lessee continuing in possession." 9. Referring to the circumstances of that case, their Lordships further observed : "But it seems to us that the very fact that the payment was made at a time when there was no question of the lessor assenting to the lessees continuing in possession and neither party treated the payment as importing such assent as sufficient to take the case out of the mischief of Section 116, T. P. Act." 10. In the instant case, it is clear that the State did all that it would towards taking possession of the land covered by the lease in favour of the Thekedar. In the instant case, it is clear that the State did all that it would towards taking possession of the land covered by the lease in favour of the Thekedar. It determined the lease under Section 3 of the 1953 Act and if the injunction orders had not been there the Collector or an officer appointed by him would have actually taken possession of the land under Section 6 of the said Act. Obviously, the possession of the Thekedar after the determination of the lease was not attributable to any assent of the State and the realisation of the Theka money too could not be expressive of any assent nor could it be regarded by the parties as amounting to a renewal of the lease. 11. Reference to some provisions of the Government Dues Act will make the position still clearer. According to Section 2 (c) of that Act the expression "Government Dues" includes all sums which became or may become payable to the State Government as a result of acquisition of an estate or the determination of a lease under any enactment relating thereto for the time being in force, but which could not be realised by the State Government because of retention of possession without title of the erstwhile intermediary or lessee as the case may be. Section 4 (a) of that Act provides that in determining the net Government dues recoverable from an erstwhile intermediary or lessee all sums of land revenue or rent or any other dues in respect of the estate or the lease, as the case may be, already paid by the erstwhile intermediary or the lessee to the State Government shall be deducted. These provisions make it abundantly clear that even if the person continuing in possession after the determination of the lease in his favour pays land revenue or rent to the State Government he remains liable for the remaining sum which could not be realised by the State Government on account of retention of possession by him and the nature of his possession does not undergo any change on account of the payment made by him to the State Government. If an erstwhile lessee could claim to hold under a lease from year to year on account of acceptance of revenue or rent from him by the State Government there would be no question of his being liable for paying Government dues as defined under the aforesaid Act minus the deductions mentioned in section 4 (a) . 12. Before the learned Civil and Sessions Judge reliance was placed on behalf of the Thekedar upon the case of Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ul-Rahman, A.I.R. 1961 SC 143 and the learned Judge thought that the following observations of the Supreme Court in that case supported the contention of the Thekedar regarding the nature of his possession : "In such circumstances, the possession of the Company, though it continued because of the stay orders, cannot be said to be on behalf of the court; and it must be in occupation in the right asserted by it, even though if it had not obtained the stay orders it would not have remained in possession." 13.These observations have to be read in the context of the facts of the case and in the light of the questions involved therein. Under Section 20 (b) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land. Reforms Act which was being considered in the case what is material is not the fact of possession but an entry of the nature mentioned in the aforesaid provision. It was, however, urged on behalf of the landlords that the Company, which had continued in possession as a result of stay orders, should be deemed to have been in possession on behalf of the court. This contention was rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it was observed that the Company was in occupation "in the right asserted by it." It would be seen that the Company did not claim to be a Thekedar but took its stand upon Sections 12 and 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and claim of the Company under Section 20 of the aforesaid Act was actually upheld by the Supreme Court. The observations quoted above cannot, therefore, be relied upon as supporting the view that although the writ petition filed by the Thekedar in the instant case was dismissed and the proceedings taken against him under the 1953 Act were sustained his possession during the pendency of the writ petition and the appeal arising out of it, was under the lease. If this were so, the possession of the Thekedar, even after the determination of his lease, would be lawful and in the capacity of a lessee irrespective of any conduct of the State Government and irrespective, therefore, also of Section 215 of the Rampur Te-nancy Act. As we understand the observations of their Lordships, what was intended to be laid clown was that if on account of a stay order a person continues in possession even after a decree or order for his eviction, his possession will be deemed to be in the right asserted by him, provided that the right is ultimately recognised and upheld and not that the possession so continued will be considered to be in that right even if the right is finally negatived and rejected. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Civil and Sessions Judge misapprehended and misapplied the observations of the Supreme Court in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. and they do not support the view taken by him. 14. We may note that in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 2705 of 1966 (decided on January 17, 1967) which dealt with a petition filed in exactly the same circumstances as the present petition and which involved identical questions, Satish Chandra, J. rejected the petitioner's claim under Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act also on the ground that the provisions of the 1953 Act show that after the determination of a lease under that Act the State had no power left to renew the lease by assent or otherwise and the applicability of Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act was, therefore, excluded. It is, however, not necessary for us to enter into that question because we hold that in the circumstances of the case the requirement of Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act was not satisfied and the possession of the Thekedarfrom 1362F to 1365F was without title. 15. It is, however, not necessary for us to enter into that question because we hold that in the circumstances of the case the requirement of Section 215 of the Rampur Tenancy Act was not satisfied and the possession of the Thekedarfrom 1362F to 1365F was without title. 15. For the reasons discussed above we are of opinion that proceedings for the recovery of Government dues were validly taken against the Thekedar under the provisions of the Government Dues Act. It was admitted by the Thekedar that he remained in possession. from 1362F to 1365F. The Assessing Officer found that the amount recoverable from the Thekedar was Rs. 11, 003.05 P. only as against the original demand of Rs. 13,074.46 P. The judgment of the learned Civil and Sessions Judge shows that he did not find the figure arrived at by the Assessing Officer to be incorrect and he set aside the order of the Assessing Officer merely because he was of the view that the possession of the Thekedar was not without title and the Government Dues Act was, therefore, inapplicable. In our opinion the order passed by the Assessing Officer was correct and in holding that the possession of the Thekedar was not without title and that no proceedings under the Government Dues Act could be taken against him the learned Civil and Sessions Judge committed a manifest error of law. The judgment of the learned Civil and Sessions Judge has, therefore, to be quashed. 16. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment of the 1st Civil and Sessions Judge, Rampur dated March 13, 1964 is quashed. We make no order as to costs.