JUDGMENT J.N. Takru, J. - This appeal by Ramnath under Section 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act-hereinafter called the Act- is directed against the order of the learned District Judge, Bulandshahr, allowing the appeal of the first respondent, and directing the appellant to pay Rs. 1395.32 p. and costs to the first respondent. 2. The material facts giving rise to this appeal are these: The appellant and Suresh Chandra, the second respondent, filed a petition before the learned Insolvency Judge, Bulandshahr praying that Mohammad Aman Khan, the 4th respondent, be adjudged an insolvent. The learned Insolvency Judge allowed the petition and adjudged the 4th respondent insolvent. The fourth respondent prefer. red an appeal to the lower appellate court, but to no avail. He then preferred a revision to this Court. During the pendency of that revision the appellant made an application to the first respondent, the official Receiver, to seize, attach and sell the property of the insolvent, and followed it up by making a statement before the 1st respondent that in case the said property was for any reason exempted from sale he would pay all the expenses. On this undertaking being given the property of the insolvent was put to auction and knocked down for Rs. 6200/-. Thereupon the second respondent who was also a creditor of the insolvent as also the insolvent moved an application before the Insolvency Judge that the property could fetch much more than what it was auctioned for and the former also prayed that it might be ordered to be re-sold. On these applications being made the learned Insolvency Judge set aside the sale and ordered a fresh sale of the attached property. The property was again auctioned and the highest bid this time was Rs. 15350/-. 3. It appears that while the aforesaid proceedings were going on, the 4th respondent's revision against the order of the lower appellate court affirming his adjudgment as an insolvent was allowed, on the ground that he had not committed any act of insolvency and the learned Insolvency Judge, had consequently, no jurisdiction to adjudge him an insolvent. As a result of the aforesaid order the auction sale fell through. Thereupon the auction purchaser moved an application for the refund of the amount which he had deposited with the Receiver, the first respondent, on account of the sale price. As a result of the aforesaid order the auction sale fell through. Thereupon the auction purchaser moved an application for the refund of the amount which he had deposited with the Receiver, the first respondent, on account of the sale price. The first respondent returned the amount after deducting Rs. 1395/32 from it on account of his remuneration and expenses. At the same time he made a report to the learned Insolvency Judge that the appellant and the second respondent viz the creditors at whose instance he had held the sale, were liable to pay Rs. 1395.32 p. to him. 4. On this report notices were issued to the appellant and the 2nd respondent and they both appeared and denied their liability to pay the amount claimed by the 1st respondent. They admitted that they had got the property put up for sale, and while the second respondent stated that he had not given any undertaking to the first respondent the appellant stated that the undertaking given by him was not of the kind alleged in the report. The learned Insolvency Judge accepted the case of the appellant and the second respondent that they were not liable to pay the Receiver's fee and on this finding he dismissed the report of the first respondent. On appeal by the first respondent the lower appellate court, as stated above, reversed the finding of the learned Insolvency Judge and held that the first respondent was entitled to get his remuneration with costs but only from the appellant. Hence this appeal by Ram Nath. 5. On behalf of the appellant his learned counsel Sri Shambu Prasad challenged the order of the court both on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to pass the instant order, and on merits I shall deal with these grounds in the order stated above. 6. So far as the first ground is concerned it is undisputed that it turns upon the correct interpretation of Section 4 (1) of the Act. 6. So far as the first ground is concerned it is undisputed that it turns upon the correct interpretation of Section 4 (1) of the Act. That section reads as follows: "4 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in Any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court or which the court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case." 7. It is obvious that the question of the receiver's remuneration involves neither a question of title nor of priority. Hence if it is to fall under Ser. 4 (1) , it has to be covered by the expression 'of any nature whatsoever', Sri Shambhu Prasad contended that the aforesaid expression should be read eujesdenz generis with the questions which precede it, i.e. it should be treated as embracing only such questions as are analogous to these specified immediately previously. In my opinion this contention is sound, besides being supported by the authority of this Court in Budhsen v. Asharfi Lal, A.I.R. 1938 Alld. 28. In this case it was held that: "The term "or of any nature whatsoever" in Section 4 is a very wide one. It must however, be read in conjunction with the earlier part of the section which refers to questions whether of title, or priority and with the opening words of Section 4 subject to the provisions of this Act, in other words the term "or of any nature whatsoever" must be subject to the limitation of ejusdem generis, or to the limitation to orders nor specifically provided for in the Act." 8. In this view of the matter Section 4 (1) of the Act has no application to proceedings of the kind involved in this appeal and consequently the remedy of the first respondent, if any, is by way of a separate suit. 9. The decision on the question of merits depends upon the interpretation of the undertaking given by the applicant to the first respondent. 9. The decision on the question of merits depends upon the interpretation of the undertaking given by the applicant to the first respondent. The undertaking-is in Hindi but translated freely in English reads as follows: "If on account of the filing of objections by any one any item of property is released from the sale and any costs have to be paid then I, (Ram Nath) shall be responsible for the same." 10. A plain reading of this undertaking shows that the only thing for which the appellant had undertaken responsibility was the costs which might have had to be paid to a successful objector at whose instance any item of the auctioned property was released from the sale. That this is so is further made clear by the fact that the undertaking begins with the words "if any costs have to be paid," as, in my judgment, these words would not have found place in the undertaking if the appellant was also binding himself to pay the remuneration of the first respondent since that was an item of expense which was bound to be incurred. I am, there-fore, unable to agree with the lower appellate court that the appellant had by this undertaking bound himself to pay the fees of the Receiver and the expenses incurred by him. As the property which was auctioned by the first respondent was released from the sale not on the objection of any objector but on this court's finding that the 4th respondent had not committed any act of insolvency and was consequently not liable to be adjudged insolvent, the appellant was clearly not liable to pay anything by way of the expenses, including the receiver's fee, incurred in connection with the abortive auction sale. 11. Sri K. C. Agarwal, the learned counsel for the first respondent then contended that, in any case, the latter was entitled to his remuneration and expenses out of the assets of the insolvent i.e. the 4th respondent under Section 56 (2) (b) of the Act-I am however unable to agree with this contention.. 11. Sri K. C. Agarwal, the learned counsel for the first respondent then contended that, in any case, the latter was entitled to his remuneration and expenses out of the assets of the insolvent i.e. the 4th respondent under Section 56 (2) (b) of the Act-I am however unable to agree with this contention.. No doubt under Section 56 (1) the Court is empowered at the time of the passing of the order of adjudication or at any time thereafter, (a) to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent, and (b) to fix by a general or special order under Section 56 (1) (b) , the amount to be paid as remuneration for the services of the receiver out of the assets of the insolvent. But this section does not lay down that even where the adjudication order is set aside by the appellate or revisional court, the assets of the debtor who was wrongly adjudged insolvent by the Insolvency judge would still remain liable for the remuneration of the receiver. I am unable to find anything in the Act or equity which would justify the payment of the receiver's remuneration out of the assets of the debtor who was wrongly adjudged an insolvent except in cases in which the receiver is appointed on the petition of that debtor under Section 13 (1) of the Act, and in cases in which he does not oppose the creditors petition under Section 15 (2) of the Act. In the latter class of cases the debtor who was wrongly adjudged insolvent would be estopped by his conduct from resisting the receiver's claim to the payment of his remuneration from his assets but in all other cases, it would be extremely unjust to compel the debtor, who in spite of his objections and resistance is wrongly adjudged an insolvent on the petition of the creditors, to pay the remuneration and expenses of the receiver out of his assets. Sri Agarwal drew my attention to the decision in Laxman Prasad Thakur Ram Sao Agarwal v. Govind Prasad Rameshwarnath Tahratdar, A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 230 in which notwithstanding the setting aside of the adjudication order the remuneration for the services of the receiver was held payable out of the assets of the debtor. I agree with the rule laid down in this case provided it is confined to the facts of that case. 230 in which notwithstanding the setting aside of the adjudication order the remuneration for the services of the receiver was held payable out of the assets of the debtor. I agree with the rule laid down in this case provided it is confined to the facts of that case. In that case the debtor did no, oppose the creditors petition for his adjudgment as an insolvent. In such a case I have also held above that the debtor can be made liable for the remuneration for the services of the receiver even if his adjudication order is subsequently set aside. But if that decision intends to lay down a rule of general application, I regret I am unable to agree with it. 12. Sri K. C. Agarwal next contended that as the first respondent performed services in the interest of the general body of creditors, i.e. the appellant and the second respondent, not intending to perform them gratuitously he was entitled to get his remunerations from them under Section 70 of the Contract Act. I am unable to agree with this contention either, for the simple reason that as it was the duty of the first respondent as a receiver to attach and sell the assets of the 4th respondent and utilise its proceeds in discharging his liabilities, the fact that the appellant and the second respondent reminded him of his duty and he performed it on their asking, would not make the latter liable for these services. Hence this contention also fails and is rejected. 13. Thus for the reasons stated above this appeal succeeds and is allowed but in all the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their costs.