JUDGMENT 1. THE facts in this case are briefly as follows: The appellant is a cooperative society registered under the bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) its object inter alia is to improve the pecuniary condition of needy and indigent women who become its members. Needy and refugee women are given training in handicrafts and cottage industries for their maintenance. The appellant supplies raw materials to its members and the articles manufactured by them are sold either amongst the members on in the open market to wholesalers or retailers on commission basis. On or about November 19, 1959 the respondent no. 4 Sujata Mitra was appointed superintendent of the Home maintained by the appellant at a salary of Rs. 300/-per month. The appointment was initially for a period of six months. The appointment of the said respondent came about in the following manner: For the purposes of running the establishment the Home engages several workmen and it is run under the direct control and administration of the Vice-President, with two secretaries. From the inception of this Industrial Home, there has been a post-the post of a superintendent whose duty it is to look after the work of the women workers, for betterment of its production and its quality and also to make arrangement for making production consistent with the orders received by the establishment and to market the finished goods. This Home was running at a loss and the vice-president Sm. Bina Das induced the said respondent Sujata Mitra who was a graduate and qualified in special crafts, to give up her employment under the community Development project and to accept the post of the superintendent of the establishment of the appellant called 'udoy Villa.' It is alleged that during the period when the said respondent acted as superintendent, quality of production improved to a great extent and she became very popular among the workers and other persons connected with this establishment. On or about October 14, 1961, her services were terminated by a letter issued under the name of Sm. Depali Ghosh, joint Secretary of the appellant. It is this matter of the termination of the services of the said respondent that has given rise to a dispute which is the subject-matter of this appeal. On or about October 14, 1961, her services were terminated by a letter issued under the name of Sm. Depali Ghosh, joint Secretary of the appellant. It is this matter of the termination of the services of the said respondent that has given rise to a dispute which is the subject-matter of this appeal. The respective cases of the parties were as follows : According to the appellant, the said respondent was appointed on trial for six months only, as superintendent and was incharge of control and supervision of the entire work of the appellant. On the 29th of September 1961 she wrote a letter saying that she wanted to be relieved of her post, but later on withdrew the same. It is alleged that, having lost confidence in the respondent, it was decided by the Managing committee of the appellant to terminate her services and to abolish the post of superintendent. Accordingly the services of th): said respondent were terminated by a resolution passed at the meeting of the board of Directors on the 11th October, 1961 with effect from 15th October, 1961 the case of the said respondent was that she had to work very hard for the establishment and inspite of the pressure of work she was compelled to entertain the friends and guests of the vice-President. This extra burden was resented by her and she thereupon resigned her post, but later on changed her mind. It is alleged that the Vicespresident sm. Bina Das was jealous about the increasing popularity of the said respondent and brought about her dismissal. As stated above, a resolution was passed by the Managing Committee on October 11, 1961 abolishing the post of Superintendent although there was no agenda at the meeting containing any such item to be considered. This is stated to be merely a device to get rid of the said respondent. A dispute was raised on behalf of the respondent by respondent No. 5 - The women's Co-operative Industrial Horne employees Union, Uday Villa. On or about the 28th of August 1963 an industrial dispute was referred to the First industrial Tribunal, in the following terms : "whether the termination of service of Srimati Sujata Mitra is justified ? what relief, if any is she entitled to?" 2. On or about the 28th of August 1963 an industrial dispute was referred to the First industrial Tribunal, in the following terms : "whether the termination of service of Srimati Sujata Mitra is justified ? what relief, if any is she entitled to?" 2. THE respondent No. 1 heard the industrial dispute and made an award dated June 20, 1964 by which he held that the termination of the services of the said respondent was not justified, and that she should be paid a compensation of Rs. 3000/- for loss of her service and the said sum must be paid within a month of publication of the award in the Calcutta Gazette. On the 1. 7th of November 1964 the appellant made an application in this Court in the writ jurisdiction and a Rule was issued calling upon the respondents to show cause why the said award should not be quashed and for other reliefs. This application was heard by Mitra, J., who by his order dated the 19th of December 1966 dismissed the same and discharged the Rule. It is against this order that this appeal is directed. Mr. Sen appearing on behalf of the appellant has before us, as in the court below, principally relied on certain technical grounds. We might make it clear before proceeding further that we are against Mr. Sen on the facts and are inclined to accept the facts as stated on behalf of the said respondent. But Mr. Sen has raised very weighty points of law which we shall now proceed to consider. The principal contention of mr. Sen is based on section 86 of the bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940. Sen on the facts and are inclined to accept the facts as stated on behalf of the said respondent. But Mr. Sen has raised very weighty points of law which we shall now proceed to consider. The principal contention of mr. Sen is based on section 86 of the bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940. The relevant provision thereof runs as follows : "any dispute (touching) relating to the affairs of the business of a cooperative society (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society)or of the liquidator of a society shall be referred to the Registrar if the parties thereto are among the following, namely:- (a) the society, its managing committee, any past or present officer, agent or servant or the liquidator of the society ; or, (b) a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member of the society; or (c) a surety of a member, past member or deceased member of the society, whether such surety is or is not a member of the society; or (d) any other co-operative society or the liquidator of such society. (The word 'touching' was deleted by the amending Act of 1965.) According to him, the parties in this case are governed by the Bengali co-operative Societies Act, 1940 and there being a specific provision in the said Act for referring the dispute for adjudication to the Registrar, Co-operative societies, the matter could not be referred as a dispute under the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 and the order of reference as well as the award made thereon are without jurisdiction and therefore, void. 3. AS regards section 86, it may be pointed out that prior to the Amending act of 1965 the word "touching" appeared in the first line, but this has been replaced by the words "relating to the affairs". The said Act is an act to amend the law relating to the co-operative societies in Bengal. The preamble says that it was passed because it was expedient to make further provision for the formation and working of the co-operative societies and for the promotion, thrift, self-help and mutual aid among persons of moderate means with needs and interest in common, to the end that better conditions of living and better methods of production and business may thereby result. By the Amending Act of 1965 the words "persons of moderate means" have been replaced by the word "people. " the preamble is of importance because a point has arisen as to whether the said Act is a special Act and the Industrial Disputes Act is a general act, or vice-versa. Upon this point it is regretted that a particular amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (viz. Act 36 of 1956) had not been brought to the notice of either the Industrial tribunal or the court below. The principal contest in the court below was upon the wording of section 86 of the said Act. The question that was contested was as to whether the dismissal of a paid servant or an employee of a co-operative society could be the subject-matter of a dispute, "touching" the business of a co-operative society. Upon this point there is a conflict of opinion. Since this question has been dealt with in the court below and also argued before us at length I must note the argument, although it will presently be seen that the 1956 Amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act will be the decisive factor in the matter. 4. AS I have stated above, by the amending Act of 1965 the word "touching" has been replaced by the words "relating to the affairs." There have been some arguments advanced as to the difference in these two expressions. Etymologically, the word "touching" seems to have a wider meaning than the expression "relating to the affairs". The difference is, however, only one of degree. Besides at the relevant time, the word 'touching' appeared in section 86. I will now proceed to deal with the cases cited before us. The first case to be cited is one of the Madras high Court - (1) Dasaratha Row v. Subba Row, Secretary, Co-Operative stores Ltd., AIR (1923) Mad. 481. In that case, a dispute arose between P. D. Row and the Co-operative Stores of vizianagram in regard to sums of money entrusted to the former by the latter, for purchase of certain articles. The stores claimed a balance due after certain adjustment and it was referred to the Registrar under section 42 (2) (1)of the Co-operative Societies Act as applicable to Madras. The stores claimed a balance due after certain adjustment and it was referred to the Registrar under section 42 (2) (1)of the Co-operative Societies Act as applicable to Madras. It was argued that the words "touching the business of a society" only referred to disputes regarding the internal management of the affairs of the society or disputes in regard to the principles which would regulate the conduct of the business. This contention was not accepted, inter alia on the ground that in that event disputes between past members inter se or again between persons claiming through a past member inter se would never come within its scope. It was held that the words of the section were very wide and a dispute arising out of any particular transaction would not be outside the scope of the section. The next case is one of the Allahabad High court, (2) Gopi Nath and another v. Ram Nath, AIR (1925) All 356, The muttra District Co-operative Bank was one constituted under the Co-operative societies Act, 1912 (Central ). The dispute that arose was as regards the appointment of a director. The question was whether in respect of such a dispute, a suit was maintainable or the matter would have to be referred to the registrar. It was argued that the word "business" in the 1912 Act and the rules made thereunder, is confined to money business such as the giving of loans to members and the settlement of money claims and did not apply to the election of a director. This was negatived. It was held that the election of an officer was certainly a part of the business of the society, and it was the intention of the Act that such a dispute should be referred to the Registrar or the Arbitrator appointed by him according to the rules framed under the 1912 act. I next come to a single Bench judgment of this Court (3) M\s. Cooperative Milk Societies Union Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and others, AIR (1958) Cal. 373. In that case, the facts were as follows : The Co-operative Milk societies Union Ltd. was a registered society under the said Act. A dispute between the said society and its workmen relating to "wages and wage scales and dearness allowances", was rereferred for adjudication to an industrial tribunal. 373. In that case, the facts were as follows : The Co-operative Milk societies Union Ltd. was a registered society under the said Act. A dispute between the said society and its workmen relating to "wages and wage scales and dearness allowances", was rereferred for adjudication to an industrial tribunal. It was contended that the said Act was a special Act relating to co-operative societies and the dispute was one "touching" the business of the society and could only be dealt with under sections 86 and 87 of the said Act and not under the Industrial Disputes act. It was held that it was not any and every dispute that could be referred to the Registrar under section 86. There was a limitation of the kind of dispute which is to be referred to the registrar. The significant word limiting the nature and type of dispute is contained in the expression "touching the business of a co-operative society" in section 86. The dispute should be such as touches the business of the society. The learned Judge said as follows: "it is, therefore, clear that the dispute has to touch the business of the co-operative society. Now a co-operative society can do many kinds of business which may certainly include businesses of industrial nature. Can a dispute between the co-operative society and its own workmen be said to be a dispute touching the business of a cooperative society. Strictly speaking, dispute between a co-operative society and its workmen does not relate to the actual business of a co-operative society and therefore does not touch the business of the co-operative society. Consequentially however a dispute between the co-operative society and its workmen may ultimately touch or affect the business of the co-operative society, i am inclined to think that the remote and the consequential result should not be included within the expression ''any dispute touching the business of a co-operative society". I am persuaded to accept that construction by the further consideration of the fact that a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society is expressly excluded form the purview of Registrar's jurisdiction by this section 86 of the Act. " 5. I am persuaded to accept that construction by the further consideration of the fact that a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society is expressly excluded form the purview of Registrar's jurisdiction by this section 86 of the Act. " 5. THE learned Judge then proceeded to consider the definition of the word "dispute" in section 2 (j) of the said act which provides that "dispute" means any matters capable of being subject of civil litigation. The learned judge held that the dispute that was. referred to the industrial tribunal was not capable of being the subject matter of a civil action in a court. The next point decided was upon the question as to which of the two Acts, namely the said Act and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was a special or a general Act. It was argued before him that the Indus-trial disputes Act was the general Act relating to industrial disputes and the said Act was a special Act. The learned Judge said as follows : "i have given the most anxious thought to the argument based on the doctrine of conflict between general statutes and special statutes. It is necessary to say here that the definition oil the word "dispute" in the Bengal Cooperative societies Act was amended by section 2 of the First Schedule to the West Bengal Laws (Amendment and Repeal) Act, 1947 being West bengal Act XII of 1947 by introducing the words "whether such claim be admitted or not". Now- that the Act became law by receiving the assent of the governor-General and publication in the Calcutta Gazette on the 12th February 1948. The Industrial Disputes Act however became law on the 11th March, 1947. It is therefore clear that the amendment of the definition of the word 'dispute' in the Bengal Co-operative societies Act was made subsequent to the passing of the Industrial Disputes act. I draw from this the necessary conclusion that if the Legislature wanted to exclude disputes between a co-operative society under the Beng. Co-operative societies Act and its workmen from the operation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, then it would have said so expressly when it was making those amendments. I draw from this the necessary conclusion that if the Legislature wanted to exclude disputes between a co-operative society under the Beng. Co-operative societies Act and its workmen from the operation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, then it would have said so expressly when it was making those amendments. Not having done so I can only come to this conclusion that it was not intended that an industrial dispute between a co-operative society and its workman should come under section 86 of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act. I. therefore, hold on a proper interpretation that the Industrial Disputes Act is the special statute relating to the settlement of all industrial disputes whether they relate to co-operative societies or other establishments. From that point of view and from the point of view of industrial disputes the Industrial Disputes act is the special statute and the bengal Co-operative Societies Act is the general statute. So long as the dispute is industrial within the meaning of the words "industrial dispute" under the Industrial Disputes Act, that Act has the exclusive jurisdiction," 6. SO far as the ultimate conclusion was reached, namely that a dispute with regard to the scale of wages and dearness allowance was not a dispute within the scope of section 86, we fully agree. But with regard to the very wide statement that no dispute between a society and its workmen could "touch" the business of a society and thus come within the scope of section 86 and the exclusion of the said Act by the Industrial disputes Act, we think that the conclusions of the learned Judge are not correct. To start with, the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to certain provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (Act no. 36 of 1956). This Act which came into operation on the 28th August 1956 was an Act further to amend the Indusr trial Disputes Act, 1947 etc. Section 31 of the Amending Act runs as follows : "31. Act not to override State laws- (1) If, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any State or Provincial Act or St. Section 31 of the Amending Act runs as follows : "31. Act not to override State laws- (1) If, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any State or Provincial Act or St. Act relating to the settlement or adjudication of disputes, the operation of such an Act in that State in relation to the matters covered by that Act shall not be affected by the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 (14 of 1947) as amended by this Act. (2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the Central Government or the National tribunal from exercising any powers conferred on it by the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 as amended by this Act. " Immediately before the commencement of the 1956 Act there was in force in the State of West Bengal, the said Act which is a provincial or a State act. Hence, by the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act itself the said act ousts the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act and the reasoning of the learned Judge on his point fails. 7. I confess that apart from this amending Act, it is very difficult to decide as to which is the special and which is the general Act. Looked at from the point of co-operative societies, the said Act seems to be a special one. On the other hand, looked at from the point of view of industrial disputes, it may be said that even among co-operative societies there may be many kinds of disputes, some of which are industrial and others not so, and consequently, such disputes which are industrial disputes should be governed by the industrial Disputes Act, which, from this point of view, becomes a special Act. For our purposes, it is not necessary to go into these nice distinctions. The amendment mentioned above solves the problem. However, even under the said act, the definition of "disputes" must be satisfied, and we agree that a dispute regarding scale of wages and dearness allowances cannot satisfy the definition and the ultimate decision of the learned judge was correct. For our purposes, it is not necessary to go into these nice distinctions. The amendment mentioned above solves the problem. However, even under the said act, the definition of "disputes" must be satisfied, and we agree that a dispute regarding scale of wages and dearness allowances cannot satisfy the definition and the ultimate decision of the learned judge was correct. As regards the somewhat wide proposition which found acceptance by the learned Judge, namely that no disputes between a cooperative society and its workmen could touch the business of a co-operative society, we think that the finding is too wide, and not supported by the consensus of authority. There are decisions directly in conflict with the same. This will appear from the very next authority that I will proceed to cite, namely a decision of the Bombay High Court by chagla, J., (as he then was) - (4) G. I. P. Railway Employees Co-operative bank Ltd. v. Bhikaji Merwanji Karanjia, air (1943) Bom. 341. This was a case under sec. 54 of the Bombay Co-operative societies Act, 1925 the wordings of which are similar to s. 86 of the said act. The relevant expression which was explained was "touching the business of a society." this expression appeared in section 86 of the said act before 1965 amendment and has now been replaced by the expression "relating to the affairs". The facts of that case were as follows : The petitioner in that case was the G. I. P. Railway Employees Cooperative bank Limited which was registered under the Bombay Co-operative societies Act, 1925. The business of the company was banking and the respondent was an employee of the petitioner company. In June 1941 the respondent was served by the Manager of the Bank with a charge-sheet and he was suspended from service pending the proceeding. The respondent refused to give an explanation and declined to answer the charges. On the other hand, he made an application. to the Registrar of the cooperative societies requesting him to refer his case to arbitration under section 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies act. On 17th July 1941 the Board of directors of the Bank resolved to termniate the respondent's service as and from 17th August 1941. On the other hand, he made an application. to the Registrar of the cooperative societies requesting him to refer his case to arbitration under section 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies act. On 17th July 1941 the Board of directors of the Bank resolved to termniate the respondent's service as and from 17th August 1941. In the meantime, the registrar of co-operative societies had written to the manager pointing out that the respondent had urged that the disputes should be referred to arbitral on under section 54 of the Bombay Act. Further correspondence passed and ultimately the Registrar decided that the dispute had to be decided according to section 54 of the Bombay Act and asked the Bank to appoint a nominee. The Bank took up the position that the dispute between itself and the respondent was not one "touching the business" of the Bank. However, the registrar notified that he had appointed mr. J. A. Dias as his nominee in the dispute. The Bank made an application alleging that the respondent's claim was a claim by a discharged employee against the employer for wrongful dismissal and for defamation. It was contended that such a dispute was not a dispute touching the business of society within the meaning of section 54 of the bombay Act. It, therefore, wanted a declaration from the court that there was no valid arbitration agreement. The application was made under section 33 of the Arbitration Act (X of 1940 ). It was firstly contended on behalf of the respondent that the Arbitration Act had mo application to the proceedings under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act and the court had no jurisdiction to maintain the application, Chagla, J. as he then was) held that this contention was sound, but he also examined the position in the alternative, on the assumption that his view on this point was wrong. It was argued before him that the dispute related to the employment or dismissal of a servant of the bank and this did not touch the business of the Bank. It was argued that such employment or dismissal was not the business of the Bank, but was merely a machinery to carry out the object for which the banking company was constituted. It was argued that such employment or dismissal was not the business of the Bank, but was merely a machinery to carry out the object for which the banking company was constituted. After setting out the relevant objects that are to be found in the bye-laws, the learned Judge proceeded to say as follows : "it is argued that employing or dismissing servants does not touch any one of these objects. The petitioner company undoubtedly has to carry out these objects and it can only carry them out through the agency of various persons. In doing so, it has to employ servants it has got to enter into contracts with servants ; and it has to dismiss servants. It is therefore contended that if the grievance of a servant dismissed by the petitioner company is that he was wrongfully dismissed or that he entitled to damages, that is not a question which comes within the purview of section 54, Bombay Co-operative societies Act, because it does not touch the business of the petitioner company. I do not think that it would be right to give a restricted meaning to the words "touching the business of a. society" used by the Legislature in section 54 of the Act. The word "business" is a very wide term and certainly it is not synonymous with the objects of a society. The expression "touching the business of a society" would mean affecting the business of a society or relating to the business of a society; and it cannot be said that when a company employs or dismisses a servant, it does not do something which relates to its business. It is true that it is not one of the objects of the company to employ or dismiss servants ; but it is something which it does in the ordinary course of its business. And whatever is done in the ordinary course of business certainly relates to or affects the business. " 8. THE Bombay case comes very near to the facts of the instant case only it must be pointed out that in section 86 of the said Act, disputes regarding the disciplinary action taken by a society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society is excluded whereas there is no such exclusion in the Bombay Act. This exclusion however, throws some light on the question on issue. This exclusion however, throws some light on the question on issue. If no dispute between a society and its employee could touch its business or relate to its affairs then there is no point in excluding a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society. This rather supports the conclusion that other kinds of disputes will be covered by this section. In a subsequent full Bench decision of the Bombay high Court, (5) Farkhundali Nannhay v. V. B. Potdar and another, AIR (1962)Bom. 162 the above decision of Chagla, J. (as he then was) was approved. That was a case in which the petitioner was employed by a co-operative society registered under the Bombay Act. The dispute was with regard to payment of wages. The petitioner made an application before the payment of Wage Authorit for recovery of wages, retrenchment compensation and leave wages and the contention of the society was that this dispute was governed by section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act. It was held that whatever a society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its object can be said to be a part of its business. The word "touches" is very wide and would include any matter which relates to, concerns or affects the business of the society. Every society must necessarily employ some servants for the purpose of carrying on its business. The payment of wages or any sum due to them under the law is, therefore, part of the business of the society. In. any case there was no doubt that such a payment would "touch" the business of the society. The decision of Mukharji, J. in (3) AIR 1958 Cal. 373 (supra) was dissented from. Reference may be made to another single Bench judgment of this court in (6) Himangshu Bhusan Chakrabortti v. Nirmal Kumar Das, AIR (1962) Cal. 488. There it was alleged that a certain defamatory statement was made by a member against the secretary of a co-operative society. It was held that defamation was too remote a matter to be included in the expression "touching the business of a co-operative society". It appears, therefore, that the consensus of judicial opinion is against the very wide proposition laid down by mukharji, J. in (3) AIR (1958) Cal. It was held that defamation was too remote a matter to be included in the expression "touching the business of a co-operative society". It appears, therefore, that the consensus of judicial opinion is against the very wide proposition laid down by mukharji, J. in (3) AIR (1958) Cal. 373 (supra) that no dispute between a society and its workmen could come within the scope of section 86 of the said Act. We hold therefore that the dispute in this case, between the society and the respondent No. 4 regarding her dismissal from service is a dispute, "touching the business" of the society. It also relates to its affairs. I now come to the second point decided by Mukharji, j. to the effect that the Industrial disputes Act was a special Act and its provisions should prevail as against the co-operation Societies Act, which was a general Act. As I have mentioned above, the attention of the learned judge was not drawn to the provision of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1956. By section 31 of that Act, it has been expressly provided that if immediately before the commencement of the 1956 Act, there was in force in any state any provincial or State Act relating to the settlement or adjudication of disputes, the operation of such an Act in that State in relation to the matters covered by that Act shall not be affected by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amended by the Amending Act. The bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 is an earlier Act and section 86 provides for the adjudication of disputes between the society and its servants. Therefore, such a provision will not be governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but by the said Act. In view of this it is irrelevant to consider as to which act is the general Act or which is the special Act. Provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have been expressly excluded. The result is that, although on the merits we are in favour of the respondent No. 4, we are bound to hold that in law the dispute raised by her against the society is governed by section 86 of the said Act and that the Industrial tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter. Consequently, a reference to such a tribunal and its award, are both invalid and must be quashed and set aside. Consequently, a reference to such a tribunal and its award, are both invalid and must be quashed and set aside. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment and order of the court below is set aside. The Rule is made absolute and there will be a writ of certiorari quashing the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated June 20, 1964 and the respondents are ordered by an adequate writ, to desist from giving effect thereto. This will be without prejudice to any action that may be taken now in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.