ORDER This revision petition by the Executive Engineer, P. W. D., Manipur, and others raises the question whether the judgments and Orders made under the Arbitration Act are subject to review in terms of Section 41 of the Arbitration Act read with Sections 114 and 141 and Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code. 2. Disputes having arisen between the contractor Th. Iboyaima Singh, the respondent herein, and the Executive Engineer, Highways (South Division), Manipur, respecting the contract work by the former of special repairs to a bridge on the Imphal river, a reference was made to arbitration for settlement thereof. The arbitrator gave the award on 6-12-1965 which went against the contractor, who, therefore, made an application to the Subordinate Judge, Imphal, under Section 33 of the Act for setting aside the award. That application was rejected by the Court on 4-4-1967. Thereafter, the contractor moved an application praying for review of the order dated 4-4-1967 on the grounds stated therein. That application was opposed by the present petitioners on merits as also on the footing that the Court had no power to review the order. This latter objection having been controverted by the contractor, the Court dealt with it as a preliminary issue and by its order dated 20th December, 1967 held the same to be not valid in law. Aggrieved by that order, the Executive Engineer, the Union Territory of Manipur and the Union of India have come up in revision to this Court. 3. The parties counsel were agreed that the right of review like that of an appeal is not a natural or inherent right available to a litigant and that it can either be given expressly by a statute or by the rales having the force of law. Arbitration Act does not deal explicitly with the subject of review. Shri Nilamani Singh urged for the respondent that despite that circumstance right to claim review is conferred on a party to arbitration proceedings by clause (a) of Sec. 41 of the Act. That clause states that subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act and of the rules made thereunder, the provisions of the Code shall apply to all proceedings before the Court and to all appeals under the Arbitration Act. That clause states that subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act and of the rules made thereunder, the provisions of the Code shall apply to all proceedings before the Court and to all appeals under the Arbitration Act. Shri Nilaniani Singh, submitted, while developing the point, that the omnibus nature of clause (a) of Section 41 of the Act makes all the provisions of the Code including those of review comprised in Section 114 and Order 47 applicable to the arbitration proceedings, subject, of course, to the overriding proviso that the provisions of the Code are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. 4. To appreciate these submissions, it is appropriate that Section 114 of the Code should be reproduced here. It runs as under : "Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, any person considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit." This section contains a brief statement of the Courts general power of review. The exact terms subject to which a prayer for review can be made to the Court and the procedure to be adopted in connection therewith are specified in details in Order 47 of the Code. It was the contention of Shri Nilamani Singh that when clause (a) of Section 41 of the Act is read along with Section 114 of the Code there is left no room for doubt that the right of review can be claimed by a party to an arbitration proceeding. 5. It was the contention of Shri Nilamani Singh that when clause (a) of Section 41 of the Act is read along with Section 114 of the Code there is left no room for doubt that the right of review can be claimed by a party to an arbitration proceeding. 5. Shri N. Ibotombi Singh, the Government Advocate, urged, on the other hand, that the provisions of Order 47 have to be read in conjunction with Section 114 of the Code and that unless the requirements or Section 114 are proved to exist the right to review cannot be claimed by a party to an arbitration proceeding despite what is stated in clause (a) of Section 41 of Act and Order 47 of the Code. While explaining his stand further, Shri Ibotombi Singh submitted that right to review is available in terms of Section 114 of the Code only in respect of a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by the Code and none has been preferred, or when no appeal is allowed by the Code, and that since neither the Code allows nor disallows an appeal respecting an order or decree made in arbitration proceedings, it is not open to the respondent of the instant case to approach the Court for review of its order dated 4-4-1967. He stated further that since an appeal against an order rejecting a prayer, for setting aside an award is provided for in Section 39 of the Act, the provisions of Section 114 of the Code are not attracted. Shri Nilamani Singh challenged this interpretation of Section 114 of the Code read with cl. (a) of Section 41 of the Act. The parties counsel were, however, at one in stating that the point in issue is res integra and so it has to be determined by this Court without the aid of any judicial pronouncement on the relevant provisions of the Act and the Code. 6. After carefully going through Sections 114 and 141 of the Code and clause (a) of Section 41 of the Act, I have reached the conclusion that the view canvassed by Shri Nilamani Singh appears to be more sound than the one pronounced by Shri Ibotombi Singh. 6. After carefully going through Sections 114 and 141 of the Code and clause (a) of Section 41 of the Act, I have reached the conclusion that the view canvassed by Shri Nilamani Singh appears to be more sound than the one pronounced by Shri Ibotombi Singh. Section 141 of the Code enacts that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be allowed, as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. It is not in dispute that the proceedings under the Arbitration Act are in the nature of proceedings in a Court of civil jurisdiction. However, Section 141 refers only to the "Procedure" provided by the Code and not to the rest or the provisions forming part of the Code, e. g., the provisions relating to appeals, revisions and review. The Arbitration Act was placed on the statute book of the country in the year 1940 while the Civil Procedure Code came into force in the year 1908. It is therefore legitimate to presume that the Legislature was well aware of Section 141 of the Code when the Arbitration Act came up before it for consideration. In that context the corollary that follows is that Section 41 was incorporated in the Act to serve some purpose which could not be achieved by Sec. 141 of the Code in respect of arbitration proceedings. A plain reading of Clause (a) of Section 41 would indicate that the Legislature meant to apply all the provisions of the Code to the arbitration proceedings subject only to one proviso, namely, that the provision of the Code sought to be availed of by a party to an arbitration proceeding was not in conflict with any provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder. This was not an abnormal step taken by the Legislature. The law relating to arbitration in India excepting the Presidency towns was contained in the second schedule to the Civil Procedure Code until the Arbitration Act of 1940 was passed, and so the arbitration proceedings till, the latter event were primarily governed by the provisions of the Code. It was therefore out of historical compulsion that the Legislature incorporated Section 41 in the Arbitration Act. It was therefore out of historical compulsion that the Legislature incorporated Section 41 in the Arbitration Act. Apparently, the Legislature did not want to make a complete departure from the practice prevalent in past, and the wide amplitude in which Clause (a) of Section 41 was cast is a clear pointer to that legislative intendment. 7. The only point emphasised by Shri Ibotombi Singh against the submission made by Shri Nilamani Singh was that despite the apparently vast ambit of Clause (a) of Section 41 of the Act, it cannot be read to have changed, explicitly or impliedly, the scope of Section 114 of the Code in its applicability to arbitration proceedings. In other words, Shri Ibotombi Singhs contention was that since review can be claimed only respecting a decree or order of the nature mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 114, and since the impugned order dated 4-4-1967 does not bear that description, the claim for review is not sustainable. I regret my inability to accept that interpretation of the provisions of the Code and the Act because it smacks of much too narrow and an highly technical approach. If that interpretation were accepted, it would make Section 41 of the Act almost otiose if not a dead letter. Such an interpretation cannot commend itself to the Court. When the provisions of one statute meant to govern a particular variety of judicial proceedings are made applicable by a clause in another statute concerned with a different nature of such proceedings, some adjustment of words here and there in the former statute will have to be made to fit in with the requirements of the latter proceedings. Hence, the expression "appeal is allowed by this Code" used in the Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 114 of the Code must not be literally adhered to when their applicability is sought in respect of an arbitration proceeding by virtue of Clause (a) of Section 41 of the Act. It will be noted that the expression "as far as it can be made applicable used in Section 141 of the Code is conspicuous by its absence in Section 41 of the Act. It will be noted that the expression "as far as it can be made applicable used in Section 141 of the Code is conspicuous by its absence in Section 41 of the Act. That feature of the Section has its obvious significance, and it is, in my opinion, compatible only with the proposition that the Legislature meant to apply the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in their entirety to the arbitration proceedings. As such it would not be doing any violence to the combined reading of Section 114 of the Code and Clause (a) of Section 41 of the Act to state that the remedy of review is available to a party aggrieved by an order made in an arbitration proceeding, provided an appeal respecting the order made in those proceedings is allowed by the Act and no appeal has been preferred, or no appeal is provided by the Act, or, in other words, if the word Code used in Section 114 is substituted by the word Act for that limited purpose. 8. The same conclusion can be reached by plain interpretation of Clause (b) of Section 114 of the Code. According to that clause, a review of judgment giving rise to "a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by" the Code can be claimed by an aggrieved party. Certainly, the Code does not provide an appeal against an order rejecting an application for setting aside an award. Therefore, respecting the order dated 4-4-1967 fay which the application of the respondent Th. Iboyaima Singh under Section 33 of the Act was rejected, it can be stated without demur that no appeal against that order is provided by the Code and so Clause (b) of Section 114 of the Code will apply as it stands. The interpretation canvassed by Shri Ibotombi Singh of the words "no appeal is allowed by this Code" in Clause (b) of Section 114 of the Code if taken to its logical conclusion would mean "when an appeal is disallowed by the Court." To accept that contention would tantamount to doing offence to the plain words of the clause. Hence, I uphold the submission made by Shri Nilamani Singh that review of the impugned order can be claimed by the respondent under Clause (b) of Section 114 of the Code read with Section 41 of the Act. 9. Hence, I uphold the submission made by Shri Nilamani Singh that review of the impugned order can be claimed by the respondent under Clause (b) of Section 114 of the Code read with Section 41 of the Act. 9. Shri Nilamani Singh cited the decision in Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., AIR 1961 All 381 (FB), to reinforce his submission that the provisions of Section 114 and Order 47 of the Code apply to arbitration proceedings. In my opinion, no assistance can be derived from that authority for deciding the point that requires determination in the present revision petition. The exact point debated in the case of Jwala Prasad was whether the provisions of Section 114 of the Code apply to decrees made in appeals by the High Court under the Letters Patent. The verdict was given in the affirmative. A similar view was taken by the Punjab High Court in the case of Suba Singh v. Neki Kishen, AIR 1953 Punj 106, by the Bombay High Court in Ratanchand v. Damji, AIR 1927 Bom 232 and by the Madras High Court in the case of Venkatasubbarayudu v. Govinda Krishna, AIR 1917 Mad 670. Since an appeal to the Supreme Court against a decree made by the High Court under the Letters Patent is provided in Sections 109 and 110 of the Code, Section 114 and Order 47 very obviously can be availed of in connection with such decrees, and so those cases are quite distinguishable from the case in hand. I have made a short reference to the case of Jwala Prasad because quite a good time of the Court during the arguments was taken by both the counsel in debating its exact legal implications and the relevancy or otherwise of those implications to the facts of the present case. 10. As a result of the conclusions recorded above, the revision petition fails and is dismissed. In view of the fact that the question involved in the revision is purely legal and is barren of authority, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.