JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - Yadram, the Petitioner in this habeas corpus application (presented u/s 491 Code of Criminal Procedure), has been convicted by a Magistrate of Agra Under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, for selling adulterated milk in the city of Agra on 23-8-1965 and has been sentenced to six months' R.I. and a fine, of Rs. 1,100/- . He challenged that conviction by filing an appeal and a revision, but both were dismissed; and he is now in jail, serving out his sentence. His contention is that his detention is illegal because of certain flaws in the rules that were framed and the appointments that have been made under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 2. Mr. Tej Pal, who has argued the case for the Petitioner before us, has confined himself to the following three grounds: (1) That the rules framed by the Central Government u/s 23 of Act 37 of 1954 were not laid before both Houses of Parliament, as required by Clause (2) of that section and are consequently invalid and unenforceable. (2) That after the amendment of Act 37 of 1954 by Act 49 of 1964 it was incumbent on the Government to frame the rules afresh in consultation with the newly constituted Central Committee; but this was not done and consequently the rules framed under the Act before its amendment can no longer be enforced. (3) That the Food Inspector who took the sample of milk from the Petitioner's shop on 23-8-1965 and the Public Analyst whose report dated 6-10-1965 has been read in evidence against the Petitioner were not validly appointed and could not legally discharge any functions under the Act. 3. As regards the first point, we find no material on the record before us to suggest that the requirements of Clause (2) of Section 23 of the Act were not complied with. The normal presumption would be that the rules were duly laid before both Houses of Parliament, as required by law: and the learned Government Advocate assures us that in actual fact they were so laid before the Lok Sabha on 22-2-1956 and before the Rajya Sabha on 23-2-1956. The first contention therefore is without force. 4. The normal presumption would be that the rules were duly laid before both Houses of Parliament, as required by law: and the learned Government Advocate assures us that in actual fact they were so laid before the Lok Sabha on 22-2-1956 and before the Rajya Sabha on 23-2-1956. The first contention therefore is without force. 4. Coming to the second point, we find that Section 3 of Act 37 of 1954, as it originally stood, provided for the setting up of a Central Committee for Food Standards consisting of the Director General of Health Services, the Director of the Central Food Laboratory and various nominees of the Central Government, State Governments and the Indian Council of Medical Research; and Under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act, relating to the framing of rules by the Central Government and the State Government respectively, this Central Committee had to be consulted whenever rules were made. The Amending Act No. 49 of 1964 introduced certain minor changes in the personnel of the Committee, providing for the addition of a representative nominated by the Indian Standards Institution and for some changes in the nominees of the Central Government. But we can find nothing in the Act, as amended, that would invalidate the rules already made in consultation with the original Committee or would require such rules to be resubmitted to the newly constituted Committee, to be approved and passed again. The Rules promulgated by the Central Government on 12-9-1955, after due consultation with the Central Committee for Food Standards as then constituted, remained perfectly valid and in full force after the Amending Act was passed in 1964; and it is obvious that consultation with the new Committee (constituted under the amended Section 3) would be necessary only in the case of fresh rules that the Government might wish to frame subsequent to the amendment of the Act. 5. Regarding the third point, we do not think the Petitioner could derive any benefit from an flaw in the appointment of the Food Inspector who took the sample of milk from him. 5. Regarding the third point, we do not think the Petitioner could derive any benefit from an flaw in the appointment of the Food Inspector who took the sample of milk from him. The Food Inspector in question was examined at the trial as a witness and deposed to the sale of the milk by the accused Petitioner; and that evidence could still form a valid basis for convicting the accused (presuming that the sample sold was legally proved to be adulterated), even though the Food Inspector was found to have no proper official status because of some defect in the order by which he was appointed. Even as an ordinary member of the public he could purchase milk from that accused and if that milk was found to be adulterated, the accused would be guilty of an offence Under Sections 7/16 of the Act. 6. The question of the validity of the appointment of the Public Analyst, however, is more serious; lot if it were to be held that Dr. R.S. Srivastava, who analysed the sample of milk, taken from the accused, was not validly appointed as a Public Analyst, his report dated 6-10-1965, which was relied upon by the prosecution for proving that the said milk was adulterated, could not be used as evidence against the accused as provided by Section 13(5) of the Act. 7. In this connexion Mr. Tej Pal has strongly relied on the decision given by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal v. State 1968 AWR 207 , where it was held that a Public Analyst appointed under the unamended provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, could not be deemed to be a Public Analyst under that Act after its amendment in the year 1964. That decision is based on the finding that the Amending Act of 1964 operated to repeal the original Act; but having carefully compared the relevant provisions of the Act as it originally stood and as it stands after amendment, we are unable to agree with this proposition. Section 8, relating to the appointment of Public Analysts, originally ran as follows: 8. Section 8, relating to the appointment of Public Analysts, originally ran as follows: 8. PUBLIC ANALYSTS--The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint persons in such number as it thinks fit and possessing such qualifications as may be prescribed, to be public analysts and define the local areas over which they shall exercise jurisdiction: Provided that no person who has any financial interest in the manufacture, import or sale of any article of food shall be so appointed: Provided further that the State Government may appoint one public analyst for two or more local area, such local areas being regarded as one unit for the purposes of this Act. For this the following was substituted by Act 49 of 1964: 8. PUBLIC ANALYSTS--The Central Government or the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint such persons as it thinks fit, having the prescribed qualifications to be public analysts for such local areas as may be assigned to them by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be: Provided that no person who has any financial interest in the manufacture, import or sale of any article of food shall be appointed to be a public analyst under that section. A comparison of these two versions of Section 8 will show that, apart from mere verbal changes that do not affect the meaning, all that has been done by way of amendment is to add a provision for the appointment of Public Analysts by the Central Government and to delete the second proviso. The original Act empowered the State Government alone to make appointments, whereas the amended Act confers concurrent jurisdiction in this respect on the Central Govt. as well. The power to make appointments, conferred on the State Government by the section as it originally stood, remains unaffected by the amendment; and we fail to understand how in such circumstances the amendment can be construed as 'repealing' the original section. As for the deletion of the second proviso, it seems to us that this has merely been omitted from the amended section because it was redundant. The main clause of the section permitted the State Government to appoint Public Analysts in whatever number might be thought fit, to exercise jurisdiction over whatever local areas might be prescribed. As for the deletion of the second proviso, it seems to us that this has merely been omitted from the amended section because it was redundant. The main clause of the section permitted the State Government to appoint Public Analysts in whatever number might be thought fit, to exercise jurisdiction over whatever local areas might be prescribed. The wording of this clause was wide enough to permit the State Government to appoint two or more Analysts for one local area or one Analyst for two or more local areas; and we see no justification for interpreting the clause as meaning that each separate local area must necessarily have its separate Public Analyst. It would appear therefore that the second Proviso, expressly empowering the State Government to appoint one Analyst for two or more local areas, did not add anything material to the main clause of the section; and this is presumably the reason why the Proviso was dropped when the Act was amended. 8. Furthermore, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Shamarao V. Parulekar Vs. The District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay and Others, AIR 1952 SC 324 : The construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical rules and we must first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such as way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. In the present case we find that Act No. 37 of 1954 was amended by Act No. 49 of 1964. The latter Act has not repealed the former but has incorporated itself in the former. There is no repugnancy between the original provisions and those introduced by the amendment. Indeed, if we read Section 8 as amended, we find that the power of the State Government to appoint Public Analysts has been left intact. The latter Act has not repealed the former but has incorporated itself in the former. There is no repugnancy between the original provisions and those introduced by the amendment. Indeed, if we read Section 8 as amended, we find that the power of the State Government to appoint Public Analysts has been left intact. Consequently, whatever notifications have been issued by the State Government, appointing Public Analysts under the provisions of the original Act, remain completely unaffected by the subsequent amendment of the Act. 9. We are thus satisfied that Section 8 of the 1954 Act has in no sense been repealed by the Amending Act of 1954 (?) (1964); the only substantial difference introduced in this section by the amendment is the conferment of the power of appointment of Public Analysts on an additional authority (i.e. the Central Government), while at the same time leaving the power of appointment vested in the original authority (i.e. the State Government) intact. With all due respect, therefore, we are not prepared to accept the proposition laid down by the learned Single Judge in Prabhu Dayal's case as correct law. 10. Shortly after the decision had been given in Prabhu Dayal v. State (supra) the UP Government made an attempt to get round the difficulty created by this pronouncement by publishing a notification dated 23-3-1968 (in the UP Gazette of 30-3-1968), appointing Dr. R.S. Srivastava as Public Analyst for the whole of Uttar Pradesh, with effect from 1-3-1965. Mr. Tej Pal has argued--and the learned Govt. Advocate has had to concede--that a retrospective appointment of this character could have no validity. But even if this notification of 23-3-1968 is struck down in so far as it purports to operate retrospectively, the Petitioner will not be benefited or having repelled the proposition enunciated in Prabhu Dayal v. State (supra) we see no reason why the original notification dated 27-7-1959 (published in the U.P. Gazette of 1-8-1959), appointing Dr. R.S. Srivastava as Public Analyst for the whole of Uttar Pradesh under the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, should not be held to have remained valid and in force both on the date when the Petitioner committed the offence (i.e. 23-8-1965) and also on the date when Dr. Srivastava made his report as Public Analyst (i.e. 6-10-1965). The third contention raised by the Petitioner cannot therefore succeed. 11. Srivastava made his report as Public Analyst (i.e. 6-10-1965). The third contention raised by the Petitioner cannot therefore succeed. 11. We may point out, before leaving this case, that the Food Inspector who took the sample of milk from the Petitioner on 23-8-1965 also appears to have been validly holding his appointment as such on that date (though, as already remarked, it would make no difference to the Petitioner's guilt even if the Inspector was found to have no right to the post). Food Inspectors are appointed u/s 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act; and as in the case of Section 8, the Amending Act of 1954 (?) (1964) introduced no changes that could possibly be construed as repealing Section 9, the only material alteration being the conferment of the power of appointment on the Central Government in addition to the State Government (whereas previously the power of appointment was vested in the State Government alone). As in the case of the Public Analyst, there is a notification dated 15-4-1968 (in the UP Gazette of 27-4-1968), appointing Food Inspectors with effect from 1-3-1965; but even if this is struck down in so far as it purports to operate retrospectively, there is nothing to invalidate the original Appointment of Food Inspectors under the earlier notification dated 9-2-1956 (published in the UP Gazette of 18-2-1956). 12. Our conclusion is that none of the three contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner can be sustained. There is nothing illegal about his conviction or detention and we see no justification for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus in his favour. This petition is accordingly dismissed.