JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - This is a writ petition praying for the issue of a writ, order or direction in the nature of quo warrnto to command respondent No. 1 Sri Shri Krishna Goel to forbear from functioning as Adhyaksh, Zila Parishad, Budaun. 2. Sri Shri Krishna Goel was elected Adhyaksh of the Zila Parishad. Biennial elections for the U.P. Legislative Council were held in April, 1968, to fill certain seats on account of the retirement of certain members which was to take place on Ma) 5, 1968. Sri Goel was a candidate from the Rampur-cum-Budaun Local Authorities Constituency. He was declared duly elected on April 30, 1968. In the U.P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated May 6, 1968, the names of the members elected to the U.P. Legislative Council were notified, including the name of Sri Goel. The petitioner was elected Upadhayaksha of the Zila Parishad in February-March, 1968, for one year. According to her, on the election of Sri Shri Krishna Goel to the U.P. Legislative Council, he ceased to hold office as Adhyaksha and the petitioner was entitled to function as Adhyaksha. The petitioner moved the District Magistrate, Budaun, to ask Sri Goel to discontinue to function as Adhyaksha but the District Magistrate did not pass any orders. Hence this petition. 3. The main question, which arises for consideration in this case, is whether, by getting elected to the U.P. Legislative Council, Sri Goel became disqualified to be Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad or not. Section 19 of the U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam) provides for the election of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 19 provides that every Zila Parishad will have an Adhyaksha and an Upadhyaksha who will be elected by secret ballot. Sub-secs. (2) , (5) and (7) of Section 19, which are relevant, read thus : "19 (2) - No person, whose name is not registered as an elector in the Assembly rolls from the district or who is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 13 or any other provision of the Actor who has not attained the age of 20 year on the date of the election shall be qualified for election as Adhyaksha. 19 (5) - No member of the Parliament or the State Legislature and no President of any Municipal Board shall be elected as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha notwithstanding anything in the preceding sub-sections. 19 (7) - An Adhyaksha shall cease to hold office as such if he becomes disqualified for election as an Adhyaksha." 4. Sec. 26, inter alia, provides that a person, who is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 13, shall be disqualified for being elected as Adhyaksha under Section 19. Section 27 (2) (c) provides that, if a dispute arises as to whether a person has become disqualified to be Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha for purposes of Section 19, the dispute shall be referred in the manner prescribed to the Judge whose decision shall be final and binding. Now it will be seen that sub-sec. (5) of Section 19 prohibits a member of the Parliament or of the Legislature of a State and a President of a Municipal Board from being elected as an Adhyaksha. It is not disputed that a person, who is a member of the Legislature or is a President of a municipal board, cannot stand for the election to the office of Adhyaksha, but it is contended by respondent No. 1 that, if an Adhyaksha gets elected a member of the Legislature or President of a municipal board, he does not become disqualified and does not cease to hold office as Adhyaksha. The contention is that sub-sec. (5) does not prescribe a disqualification for being elected as Adhyaksha and, therefore, under sub-sec. (7) of Section 19, an Adhyaksha does not cease to hold office on account of being elected a member of the Legislature. The contention is that Section 13 is exhaustive of the disqualifications for being elected as Adhyaksha and that an Adhyaksha ceases to hold office only if he incurs one of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 13. I am unable to accept this contention. In my opinion, Section 13 is not exhaustive of the disqualifications for being elected as Adhyasha. The words "who is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 13 or any other provision of the Act" ill sub-sec. (2) of the Section 19 clearly show that Section 19 (2) contemplates disqualifications other than those mentioned in Section 13 also. One of such disqualifications is that mentioned in sub-sec. (5) of Section 19. The words "who is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 13 or any other provision of the Act" ill sub-sec. (2) of the Section 19 clearly show that Section 19 (2) contemplates disqualifications other than those mentioned in Section 13 also. One of such disqualifications is that mentioned in sub-sec. (5) of Section 19. A plain reading of sub-sec. (5) of Section 19 shows that it does lay down a qualification for election as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. If it does not lay down a qualification; then what does it provide for-? In my opinion, it provides for nothing but a disqualification for election as Adhyaksha or Upadhaksha. A disqualification is something which dis entitles a person to a post or an office. Sub-sec. (5) provides that membership of the Legislature or presidentship of a municipal board shall disentitle a person from being elected as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. It is not possible to hold that sub-sec. (5) proscribes anything but a disqualification for election as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. It is not possible to accept the contention of respondent No. 1 that the provision of sub-sec. (5) stands only in the way before the election of an Adhyaksha but not after it. I can think of no good reason, and none has been suggested at the Bar, why the Legislature should snake any distinction between the cases of persons who are members of the Legislature before their election as Adhyaksha and of those who become members of the Legislature after their election as Adhyaksha. The obvious reason behind the provision of sub-sec. (5) is that the Legislature considered that a member of the Legislature or a President of a municipal board would not be able to give his undivided attention to the work of an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. If that be the reason, then one can safely infer that the Legislature intended that the membership of a Legislature or the presidentship of a municipal Board was a disqualification for election as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha and for continuing as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. I am, therefore, of opinion that sub-sec. If that be the reason, then one can safely infer that the Legislature intended that the membership of a Legislature or the presidentship of a municipal Board was a disqualification for election as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha and for continuing as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. I am, therefore, of opinion that sub-sec. (5) lays down a disqualification for election as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha and that, if an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha gets elected to the Parliament or to the State Legislature or becomes the President of any Municipal Board, he becomes disqualified for election as Adhyaksha and shall cease to hold the office under sub-sec. (7) of Section 19. My attention was drawn to a judgment of Satish Chandra, J. in Jai Narain Singh v. Sri P.K. Pandey, C.M. Writ No. 2628 of 1967 decided on May 10, 1968 wherein he has held that, if a Pramukh of a Kshettra samiti elected under Section 7 of the Adhiniyam gets elected to the State Legislature, he does not cease to be a Pramukh. Different provisions of the Adhiniyam though somewhat similar to the provisions which I have to consider, were involved in that decision. On the provisions of Section 19, to my mind, the position is very clear that sub-sec. (5) of Section 19 lays down a disqualification for election as an Adhyaksha and that, if this disqualification is incurred by an Adhyaksha after his election, he ceases to hold his office as Adhyaksha. 5. Certain objections were raised by learned counsel for respondent No. 1 to the maintainability of the writ petition. It was contended that there was no right in the petitioner which could be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution. The argument was that the petitioner, who was an Upadhyaksha, was bound by the provisions of the Adhiniyam and the right, which she had to challenge the continuation of respondent No. 1 in the office of Adhyaksha, was circumscribed by the provisions of Section 27 which provided the forum where the dispute could be decided. This argument loses sight of the fact that respondent No. 1 is occupying a public office illegally and, therefore, apart from any right in the petitioner as Upadhyaksha, she has a common law right to challenge the usurpation of the office. This argument loses sight of the fact that respondent No. 1 is occupying a public office illegally and, therefore, apart from any right in the petitioner as Upadhyaksha, she has a common law right to challenge the usurpation of the office. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Majid Ahmad v. Assistant Returning Officer, AIR 1954 Allahabad 234 for the contention that where a right is created by an Act and a remedy is also provided by it, then the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 266 of the Constitution is ousted. In that case, a writ petition was filed in this Court, challenging the rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner for election for the membership of a town area committee. The Act provided for the filing of an election petition. In these circumstances, this Court took the view that the alleged improper rejection of the nomination paper should be challenged by way of an election petition and not by way of a writ petition. I am unable to read this case as laying down the proposition that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was ousted. A number of cases were cited to show that where a specific remedy is provided by an Act, the jurisdiction of civil Courts was held to be ousted by necessary implication. It is true that the jurisdiction of civil courts can be ousted either by express words or by necessary implication but the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be ousted either by the Parliament or by the State Legislature either by express words or by necessary implication. Merely because the Adhiniyam has provided a method for deciding whether respondent No. 1 has ceased to hold his office as Adhyaksha, the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of quo warranto is not at all affected. 6. It was then contended that, since the Adhiniyam provides an adequate and equally efficacious alternative remedy, this Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner who has not availed of that remedy. The argument has some force and I have given my anxious consideration to it. 6. It was then contended that, since the Adhiniyam provides an adequate and equally efficacious alternative remedy, this Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner who has not availed of that remedy. The argument has some force and I have given my anxious consideration to it. There can be little doubt that Section 27 does provide an adequate and efficacious remedy for resolving the dispute which has been raised before me. The petitioner has not availed herself of that remedy. Another person Hikmatullah filed a petition under Section 27 read with rule 50 before the District Judge, Budaun, raising the question that Sri Shri Krishna Goel had ceased to hold the office of Adhyaksha on account of his election to the U.P. Legislative Council. The District Judge, relying on the decision of Satish Chandra, J., referred to above, has held that Sri Goel did not cease to hold the Office as Adhyaksha and has rejected the petition. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has contended that, if I allow this writ petition, it will result in two inconsistent orders - one of this Court and the other of the District Judge. This is also true. To get over this difficulty, an application was filed by the petitioner for quashing the order of the District Judge but, since the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings before the District Judge, she has no locus standi to challenge that order which does not directly affect any right of hers. Normally, I would have accepted the objection of respondent No. 1 and refused to exercise my discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner in these circumstances but I find that, by doing so, I would be permitting an usurper to continue in a public office which he is no longer legally entitled to hold. The office being a public office, it is desirable in the public interest to remove the usurper forth with. For this reason, 1 would not decline to exercise my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of quo wartanto. So far as the order of the District Judge is concerned, suffice it to say that, in the view which I have taken, the order is erroneous in law. 7. For this reason, 1 would not decline to exercise my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of quo wartanto. So far as the order of the District Judge is concerned, suffice it to say that, in the view which I have taken, the order is erroneous in law. 7. A new point was raised by learned counsel for respondent No. 1 during arguments that respondent No. 1 was not a member of the Council of State and, there. fore, there was no question of his ceasing to hold the office of Adhyaksha. An affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, stating that he had not yet taken the oath as a member of the Council of State as prescribed by Article 188 of the Constitution. It was further stated that, on account of the orders of the President of. India passed under Article 356 of the Constitution. the Council of State was not functioning and respondent No. 1 had not been able to sit in the House even for a single day. Copies of the orders of the President were also annexed to the affidavit. I have heard counsel for both parties on this point and I am satisfied that respondent No. 1 became a member of the Council of State with effect from May 6, 1968. It is to be noticed that the term of the members, who retired, expired on May 5, 4968, and it was notified in the U.P. Government Gazette (Extraordinary) dated May 6, 1968, that respondent No. 1 and other persons had been elected to the U.P. Legislative Council. The Legislative Council is a perennial House not subject to dissolution. Article 188 of the Constitution has been suspended by the presidential order and, on account of that, respondent No. 1 has not been able to take his oath and, on account of the suspension of some other Articles, the House is not able to function and respondent No. 1 is not in a position to take his seat; none the less he is entitled to exercise all his rights as a member of the Council of State which other members, who had taken oath, are able to exercise today. Under Sections 156 and 157 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the term of a member of the Council of State commences on the date on which his name is notified in the Official Gazette and tie, term is six years from that date. It is, therefore, obvious that the term of respondent No. 1 as a member commenced on May 6, 1968. It is further to be noticed that it is a member who is required to take oath which implies that, even before taking oath, he becomes a member. Article 195 of the Constitution, which relates to salaries and allowances of members of the Legislature has not been suspended by the presidential order and, therefore, respondent No. 1 is entitled to the salaries and allowances admissible to a member of the Council of State. In these circumstances, even though respondent No. 1 is unable to sit in the House, he is a member of the U.P. Legislative Council. The disqualification under sub-sec. (5) of Section 19 of the Adhiniyam attaches to a member of the Legislature; it does not further require that the Legislature should be actually functioning and that the member should be sitting in it. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of respondent No. 1 that he is not yet a member of the Council of State. 8. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and it is declared that respondent No. Sri Shri Krishna Goel has ceased to be Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad, Budaun. with effect from May 6, 1968. He is further directed to forbear forthwith from functioning as hyaksha of the Zila Parishad. In circumstances of this case, I make no order as to costs.