ORDER C.D. Sahgal, J. - The petitioner was an Assistant Clerk in the Zila Parishad of Barabanki having been appointed as such in the year 1951 to that post in the District Board, Barabanki. There is a controversy in the case as to whether be was initially appointed as an Assistant Clerk or was only an officiating Assistant Clerk, but there is no dispute that he was appointed as an Assistant Clerk in the District Board, Barabanki which office he continued to hold when the District Board of Barabanki was replaced by the Zila Parishad of Barabanki. 2. On the 4th of June, 1964 he applied for one years leave of absence without pay. His application was, however, rejected. He again applied for the reconsideration of the application but in that application he also stated that in case the leave was not granted, his resignation may be accepted. His resignation was accordingly accepted by the Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad. But he made an appeal against the acceptance of his resignation to the Commissioner, Faizabad Division which appeal was allowed. He received communication of the allowing of his appeal on the 13th of May, 1966. He claims that it was received by him on that date at 3-25 P. M. The office of the Zila Parishad was closed on the 14th of May, 1966, being a Saturday, and on the 15th of May, 1966, being a Sunday. On the 16th of May, 1966 he claims to have submitted his joining report to the Adhyaksha at 10-00 A. M. On the same day, however, he received an order of the Adhyaksha purporting to be of the 14th of May, 1966 to the following effect: "You are hereby informed that your services are no longer required by the Zila Parishad and are herewith terminated. You are given 3 months pay in lieu of 3 month's notice". It is this order of the Adhyaksha respondent that is challenged in this writ petition and is sought to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 3. You are given 3 months pay in lieu of 3 month's notice". It is this order of the Adhyaksha respondent that is challenged in this writ petition and is sought to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 3. It has been pointed out in the petition that the order terminating the services of the petitioner was arbitrary and contrary to law, that it was illegal and without jurisdiction, that in view of the petitioner being a permanent employee he could not be dismissed or removed from service without a reasonable opportunity being afforded to him to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, that the termination of the services of the petitioner was in violation of the principles of natural justice and that in view of the fact that the post held by the petitioner is still in existence and has not been abolished, the removal of the petitioner was illegal. 4. Let us, in the circumstances, examine as to how far the contentions raised by the petitioner are tenable. 5. The petitioner was originally appointed to the office of an Assistant Clerk in the District Board which office he held at the time of the termination of his services under the impugned order. At the time his services were terminated, he was under the employ of the Zila Parishad, Barabanki which had replaced the District Board. 6. Section 46 (1) of the U. P. Kshettra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961 (Act XXIII of 1961), in so far as it is relevant, provides that all officers and servants in the employ of the District Board constituted under the United Provinces District Boards Act, 1922 and of the Antarim Zila Parishad immediately before the appointed date, which means the date notified under Section 17 of the Act, i. e., the date on which the Zila Parishad came into existence, shall notwithstanding anything in Sections 39 and 43 but subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) be officers and servants employed by the Zila Parishad and until appointed to posts created under Section 39 shall be entitled to the same salaries and allowances and shall be subject to the same conditions of service to which they were entitled or were subject immediately before the said date. Section 39 (2) provides for the creation of certain posts other than contained in sub-section (1), while Section 43 provides for the manner of recruitment to these posts. Sub-section (2) of Section 46 provides for the procedure to be followed while appointing servants of the District Board to continue to be in the service of the Zila Parishad to the posts created under Section 39. 7. There is no dispute in the case that no posts have yet been created by the Zila Parishad under sub-section (1) of Section 39 and as such the petitioner continued to be employed by the Zila Parishad on the same salary and allowances and was subject to the same conditions of service to which he was entitled or was subject immediately before the replacement of the District Board by the Zila Parishad. 8. Section 270 of the Act provides for the continuation of any appointment, delegation, rule, bye-law, regulation etc., under the United Provinces District Boards Act, 1922, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, until it is superseded by any appointment, delegation, rule, bye-law, regulation etc., made, issued or imposed under the Act or any other law. 9. Certain Rules were made under the District Boards Act and those Rules still continue to remain in force, as they have not been superseded by any new Rules. The power of the termination of the services of the petitioner have been exercised by the Adhyaksha under Rule 3-A of the Rules contained in Chapter III of the General Rules and Orders contained in the District Board Manual, Uttar Pradesh. This rule purports to have been issued by a notification No. 2636/IX-409/39 dated July 25, 1940, and in so far as it is relevant, it provides that the period of office of a permanent servant of the board shall not determine until he has been given by the authority competent to appoint his successor not less than three months notice or a sum equal to three months pay in lieu of notice where his pay exceeds Rs. 15 and in other cases not less than one months notice or a sum equal to one months pay in lieu of notice. 15 and in other cases not less than one months notice or a sum equal to one months pay in lieu of notice. It is under this rule that the services of the petitioner have been terminated by giving him three months pay in lieu of three months notice as his pay exceeds Rs. 15. If this provision of law applies, then certainly the services of the petitioner could be terminated by the Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad, as he was competent to appoint his successor in view of the old conditions of service being still applicable to him. 10. The question is whether it was at all necessary in the circumstances to grant any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner before the termination of his services to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him and if the same has not been done, there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice. 11. The petitioner being an employee of a local authority the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution are not applicable to his case. There is, however, a rule wrongly) described as a regulation to be found at page 193 of the District Boards Manual where it is provided that no officer or servant shall be dismissed, removed or reduced without a reasonable opportunity being given to him of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. That provision, however, relates to dismissal, removal or reduction and not to determination of the services of a District Board employee. 12. Rule 3-A (iv) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in S. R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, 1963 All LJ 944 : (A.I.R. 1964 SC 1680), where it was held that such a rale could be framed under Section 82 of the District Boards Act read with Section 172 (2) of that Act. That was a case of a District Board Engineer who could be appointed under the Act by the resolution of the District Board. His services were also terminated by a resolution of the District Board. 13. That was a case of a District Board Engineer who could be appointed under the Act by the resolution of the District Board. His services were also terminated by a resolution of the District Board. 13. Section 82 of the District Boards Act provides that except in the cases provided for by Sections 70, 71 and 72, the power to decide all questions arising in respect of the service, leave, pay, allowances and privileges of servants of the board, who are employed whether temporarily or permanently on a monthly salary of more than Rs. 40 and the power to appoint, grant leave of absence to, punish, dismiss, transfer and control such servants of the board, shall vest in the President, and the said powers in the case of all other servants of the board shall vest in the Secretary. 14. Section 84 of the District Boards Act provides, among other things, that the provisions of Sections 72, 73, 80 and 82 shall be subject to the provisions of any rule relating to servants of the board. 15. Under Section 172 the State Government shall make rules consistent with the Act generally for the guidance of a board or any Committee of a board or any Government officer in any matter connected with the carrying out of the provisions of this Act. It is under this power that R. 3-A, already referred to above, has been made by the State Government, which has been held to be a valid rule in Tewaris case, 1963 All LJ 944 : (A.I.R. 1964 SC 1680) (Supra). 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relies on a certain order of the Government, copy of which is contained in Annexure 7, under paragraph 5 of which the following direction has been given by the Government. "5. Government have also noticed that local bodies often take advantage of the rule regarding notice of discharge for discharging employees who are not in their good books or by taking the easier course of giving notice of discharge in those cases also which call for proper inquiry and disciplinary proceedings. "5. Government have also noticed that local bodies often take advantage of the rule regarding notice of discharge for discharging employees who are not in their good books or by taking the easier course of giving notice of discharge in those cases also which call for proper inquiry and disciplinary proceedings. I am to say that the discharge rule should be applied only in those cases in which it is proposed to terminate the services of an employee under some scheme of retrenchment and that in such cases the services of only the junior-most man should be done away with, and if some retirements are due, the retrenched hands should be absorbed in such vacancies as far as possible". 17. We, however, find that though Rule 3-A is a specific rule made by the Government under Section 172 of the United Provinces District Boards Act, it is only a direction. This direction was given in connection with the procedure to be adopted in disciplinary proceedings against servants of local bodies. The instant is not a case of disciplinary proceedings. The case, before us is that of termination of the services of a District Board employee under the rules. No dobut, if the services of the petitioner had been dispensed with in the garb of their being determined under the rules but in fact he had been dismissed for misconduct, then it was open to the Court to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order, as has been laid down in Tewari's case, 1963 All LJ 944 : (A.I.R. 1964 SC 1680) (Supra). It is settled law that the form of the order under which the employment of a servant is determined is not conclusive of the true nature of the order. The form may be merely to camouflage an order of dismissal for misconduct, and it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. 18. In the instant case the case of the petitioner is not that the order in fact amounts to dismissal or removal from service of the petitioner though it is garbed as a case of termination of service. He presumes that the order is in fact for dismissal and that the rule as to dismissal should be followed. 18. In the instant case the case of the petitioner is not that the order in fact amounts to dismissal or removal from service of the petitioner though it is garbed as a case of termination of service. He presumes that the order is in fact for dismissal and that the rule as to dismissal should be followed. There is no justification for such presumption. The terms dismissal or removal as has been pointed in Tewaris case, 1963 All LJ 944 : (A.I.R. 1964 SC 1680), itself have come to acquire technical meaning and cannot be equated with termination of service unless the termination is only a garb for dismissal or removal. 19. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioner that the G. O. contained in Annexure 7 under regulation 28 of the Regulations made by the District Board, Barabanki, has been placed before the District Board and read and considered. Regulation 28 provides: "28. At any ordinary meeting the course of business shall, unless the Chairman otherwise directs, be as follows : (a) The proceedings of the last meeting shall be read and confirmed. (b) The accounts of past month shall be presented for the purpose of being passed. (c) Government orders and circulars and other necessary communications from Government and Officers of Government and proceedings and reports of various committees snail be read and considered. (d) Any other matter or proposal brought before the meeting in conformity with these regulations". The contention is that the G. O. having been placed before the District Board and having been read, considered and accepted by the Board, it became a regulation itself. I fail to see how by being placed before the Board and being considered by it, it became a regulation. A regulation can be framed by the Board under Section 173 of the District Boards Act. The learned counsel relies on Clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 173 under which, he says, the regulation must be deemed to have been made. But Cl. A regulation can be framed by the Board under Section 173 of the District Boards Act. The learned counsel relies on Clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 173 under which, he says, the regulation must be deemed to have been made. But Cl. (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 173 relates to the period of service of all servants of a board and the conditions under which such servants, or any of them, shall receive gratuities, or compassionate allowances on retirement or on their becoming disabled through the execution of their duty, and the amount of such gratuities or compassionate allowances; and the conditions under which any gratuities or compassionate allowances may be paid to the surviving relatives of any such servants whose death has been caused through the execution of their duty. Obviously this does not cover the case of a rate determining the manner of the termination of the services of an employee of the board. In any case, merely placing of the G. O. before the Board does not amount to the making of any regulation contained in that G. O. 20. There is no question of the violation of the principles of the natural justice in the case either, as the services have been terminated under a rule which does not require any notice to be given to the party concerned. 21. In Tewaris case, 1963 All LJ 944 : (A.I.R. 1964 SC 1680) (supra) it was pointed out that Rule 3-A (iv) was a valid rule under Section 172 (2) of the District Boards Act in view of the provisions of Clause (b) of Section 84 under which a rule may be made imposing any conditions on the appointment of persons to offices or to any particular office requiring professional skill and on the punishment or dismissal of persons so appointed, and on their liability to service under the orders of any Government on the occurrence of any emergency. The instant case is not one which may be covered by Section 84 (b), but this case is covered by Section 84 (d), under which any other rule relating to servants of a board can be framed. The office of the petitioner requiring no professional skill, Clause (b) of Section 84 cannot apply to his case, but a rule of the kind can certainly be made under Section 84 (d) of the Act. 22. The office of the petitioner requiring no professional skill, Clause (b) of Section 84 cannot apply to his case, but a rule of the kind can certainly be made under Section 84 (d) of the Act. 22. Altogether, therefore, the petition has no force and is dismissed with costs.