ORDER G.D. Sahgal, J. - The dispute in this case relates to plot No. 1289 which in the basic year was recorded in the name of the Petitioner. An objection was filed by opposite party No. 4 at Section 9 stage of the consolidation proceedings to the effect that originally the plot belonged to his grand-father while his name came to be recorded in the revenue papers during the period of his minority. The opposite party No. 4 also claimed that he was a student prosecuting his studies in a recognised institution and that as he was not of 25 years of age, even though the name of the Petitioner may have continued for quite a long time, his rights in the land would not cease u/s 204 of the UP ZA and LR Act, inspite of his having not filed a suit for the ejectment of the Petitioner who had been in possession for quite a long time. Opposite party No. 4 had further claimed that the Petitioner was a cousin of his grandfather and used to send money to him for prosecuting his studies and in his absence he got his name surreptitiously entered in the revenue papers. 2. The Consolidation Officer, opposite party No. 3, allowed the claim of opposite party No. 4 holding him to be the sirdar of the plot. The Petitioner then filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Assistant Settlement Officer, opposite party No. 2, allowed the appeal and rejected the claim of opposite party No. 4. Opposite party No. 4 then went up in revision u/s 48 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act before opposite party No. 1, the Deputy Director of Consolidation who allowed the same and restored the order of the Consolidation Officer allowing the claim of opposite party No. 4. It is in these circumstances that this writ petition has been filed for the quashing of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation (copy contained in annexure 3). 3. The finding arrived at by the Deputy Director is that the land belonged to the grand-father of opposite party No. 4 after whom the latter succeeded to him and that during the minority of opposite party No. 4 the name of the Petitioner was entered against the plot. 3. The finding arrived at by the Deputy Director is that the land belonged to the grand-father of opposite party No. 4 after whom the latter succeeded to him and that during the minority of opposite party No. 4 the name of the Petitioner was entered against the plot. It has, however, been laid by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that there was no question of any suit having not been filed by opposite party No. 4 for the ejectment of the Petitioner during the period of limitation, when the suit could even now be filed opposite party No. 4 being about 25 years of age and a student in a recognised institution, namely, the Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya. 4. If the land belonged to opposite party No. 4, the Petitioner is only a trespasser and if the suit for ejectment of the Petitioner has not been filed within the period of limitation u IS. 202 of the UP ZA and LR Act, u/s 204 the Petitioner becomes a sirdar. The period of limitation for filing a suit u/s 202(f)(ii) against a person belonging to the classes mentioned in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 is three years from the date of vesting or from the date of determination of disability, whichever is latter. The question is whether opposite party No. 4 belongs to any of the clashes mentioned in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 and as such can he be said to be a disabled person and if he is a disabled person, as to when his disability ceased. 5. Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 refers to classes mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 157. One of the classes mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 157 in Clause (e) is a person who is prosecuting his studies in a recognised institution and doss not exceed 25 years in age and whose father suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (c) or (d), namely, that he is either a lunatic or an idiot, or a person incapable of cultivating by reason of blindness, or other physical infirmity, or has died. In this case the finding of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is that opposite party No. 4 has been prosecuting studies in a recognised institution and his age does not exceed 25 years, though he has not given a finding that his father suffers from any of the disabilities mentioned in Clauses (c) or (d) or has died. It is, however, obvious that the father of opposite party No. 4 has died for in the presence of his father he could not have succeeded to his grand-father. Opposite party No. 4 thus belongs to a class contemplated Under Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 as one covered by Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 157. The period of limitation against him will begin to run only when the disability, i.e., his being a person prosecuting studies in a recognised institution or his being within 25 years of age ceased and as it had not ceased when the matter came up for decision, the Petitioner cannot be said to have acquired any rights (of) sirdar u/s 204 of the UP ZA and LR Act. 6. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, however, points out that all the conditions of Sub-section (1) of Section 157 have not been satisfied in this case. Sub-section (1) of Section 157, in so far as it is relevant, provides that a Bhumidhar, or a sirdar or an asami holding the land in lieu of maintenance allowance u/s 11 who is prosecuting studies in a recognised institution and does not exceed 25 years in age and whose father suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (c) or (d) or has died, may let the whole or any part of his holding. The contention of the Petitioner is that the land is not held by opposite party No. 4 in lieu of maintenance allowance. It may be that the land is not held by opposite party No. 4 in lieu of maintenance allowance, but the criterion of the applicability of Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 is that, the person concerned belongs to one of the classes mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 157. A holder of land in lieu of maintenance is not a person belonging to one of the classes of persons mentioned in Section 157(1). A holder of land in lieu of maintenance is not a person belonging to one of the classes of persons mentioned in Section 157(1). The classes are mentioned in Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 157(1) and opposite party No. 4 comes Under Clause (e). He, therefore, belongs to one of the classes in Sub-section (1) of Section 157 even though the land may not have been held by him in lieu of maintenance. The holding of land Under Sub-section (1) of Section 157 in lieu of maintenance is not a condition precedent to the belonging of a person to any of the classes. Independently of the condition of the holding of land in lieu of maintenance, a person may belong to any of the classes mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 157. 7. There suit is that the petition has no force and is dismissed with costs.