JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. - This special appeal arises out of consolidation proceedings. During consolidation operations chak No. 26 was allotted to Jagat Narain Singh. On 25-5-1964 Jagat Narain Singh executed a sale deed in favour of Munna Lal Shukla with respect to the entire holding comprised under chak No. 26. Later Jagat Narain Singh executed' another sale deed for the same property in favour of Ram Behari Shukla. Relying on the sale deed dated 25-5-1964 in his favour, Munna Lal Shukla applied for mutation. The application for mutation was dismissed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. That decision was upheld in appeal and in revision by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation respectively. Against these decisions of the consolidation authorities, a writ petition was filed in this Court by Munna Lal Shukla. The writ petition has been allowed by a learned single Judge of this Court. He quashed the orders of the three consolidation authorities, and directed that the application by Munna Lal Shukla for mutation should be disposed of in accordance with law. Against that order of the learned single Judge, the present special appeal has been filed by Ram Behari Shukla. 2. The consolidation authorities declined to allow mutation in Munna Lal's favour on the ground that he had not obtained permission from the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). On the other hand, tho learned single Judge of this Court has held that in the circumstances of the present case no such permission was needed. The question for determination in the special appeal is, therefore, whether permission was needed to support the sale deed dated 25-5-1964. 3. The matter is governed by the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 hereinafter referred to as the Act. This Act has been amended from time to time. The sale deed in question was executed in the year 1964. We are, therefore, concerned with the Act, as it stood after the amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963. 4. Sec. 5 of the Act describes the effect of a notification under Section 4 of the Act. Clause (c) of Section 5 is: "Notwithstanding anything contained ... The sale deed in question was executed in the year 1964. We are, therefore, concerned with the Act, as it stood after the amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963. 4. Sec. 5 of the Act describes the effect of a notification under Section 4 of the Act. Clause (c) of Section 5 is: "Notwithstanding anything contained ... no tenure-holder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, previously obtained shall (i) use his holding or any part thereof for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture, or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming; or (ii) transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area ..." 5. The question is whether the sale deed dated 25-5-1964 falls within the prohibition of sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of Section 5 of the Act. The consolidation authorities thought that the sale deed did fall within the prohibition. On the other hand, the learned single Judge has held that the prohibition should be confined to the sale of a part of a holding and does not extend to a sale of the entire holding. 6. A similar question came before this Court in Natthi Singh v. Kanchhida, 1962 RD (HC) 226. In that case it was held by A. P. Srivastava, J. that it is not possible to accept the contention that though one or more plots of a Khata cannot be transferred the whole Khata can be transferred without such permission. In that case the learned Judge had to consider the provision of Section 16-A of the Act as it stood before the amendment by U.P. Act XXXVIII of 1958. The provision of Section 16-A of the Act as it stood then is somewhat similar to the provision of sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of Section 5 of the Act as it stands after its amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963. 7. In the present case the learned single Judge was aware of the broad position that when there is a prohibition against the transfer of any part of a holding, it should be construed to mean prohibition against a transfer of the whole holding. But he considered that, in view of the context of Section 5 (c) (ii) , the prohibition should not be extended to the sale of the whole holding. 8. But he considered that, in view of the context of Section 5 (c) (ii) , the prohibition should not be extended to the sale of the whole holding. 8. The learned single Judge has given two reasons in support of his view. He has pointed out that clause (c) of Section 5 of the Act contains prohibitions of two kinds. Sub-clause (i) contains prohibition against use of a holding or a part of a holding for purposes not connected with agriculture etc. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of Section 5 of the Act contains a prohibition against sales etc. of any part of a holding. It is significant that the language used in sub-clause (ii) is different from the language used in sub-clause (i) . In sub-clause (i) the reference is to use of a holding or any part thereof. On the other hand, the words used in sub-clause (ii) are: "sale .... any part of his holding...." 9. If the legislature intended that the ban under sub-clause (ii) should be co-extensive with the ban in sub-clause (i) , it was quite easy for the Legislature to use the expression "holding or any part thereof" as was done under sub-clause (i) . But the language of sub-clause (ii) materially differs from the language of sub-clause (i) . 10. Secondly, the learned single Judge has pointed out that in case a portion of a holding is transferred during consolidation operations, complications will arise, because the holding will then consist of two portions one belonging to one tenure-holder, the transferor, and the other belonging to another tenure-holder, the transferee. If the entire holding is transferred, it will not disturb consolidation operations, because all that one has to do is to substitute the transferee's name in place of the transferor. 11. In view of these considerations, the learned single Judge was justified in taking the view that sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of Section 5, does not prohibit sale of the entire holding. Sri K. S. Verma, appearing for the appellant, invited us to place strict interpretation on sub-clause (ii) . We do not think that the rule of strict construction helps the appellant. The words used in sub-clause (ii) are: "Any part of his holding". 12.Strictly speaking, the entire holding cannot be described as a part of the holding. Sri K. S. Verma, appearing for the appellant, invited us to place strict interpretation on sub-clause (ii) . We do not think that the rule of strict construction helps the appellant. The words used in sub-clause (ii) are: "Any part of his holding". 12.Strictly speaking, the entire holding cannot be described as a part of the holding. So, on any view of the matter, the view taken by the learned single Judge appears to be correct. 13.The appeal is dismissed with costs to respondent No. 1.