JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. - This special appeal arises out of consolidation proceedings. Certain tenancy holdings be-, longed to one Maiku. Upon his death, there were rival claims for succession to the tenancy property. One claim was by two brothers, Dayal and Hanumant. Another claimant was Srimati Chhedana. The Consolidation Officer upheld the claim of Srimati Chhedana. The claim of Dayal and Hanumant was rejected. An appeal by Dayal and Hanumant was dismissed on 3-1-1964 by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. They filed a second appeal. It was dismissed on 24-4-1965 by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. A revision was dismissed on 3-7-1965. Against these decisions, a writ petition was filed by Dayal and Hanumant. The writ petition has been allowed by a learned single Judge of this Court on 18-11-1966. He quashed the two orders, dated 24-4-1965 and 3-7-1965, and directed that the second appeal should be heard on merits. Srimati Chhedana has filed this special appeal against the order of the learned single Judge, dated 18-11-1966. 2. It is to be noted that the learned single Judge has revived the second appeal, which had been dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 24-4-1965. The question for consideration is whether the second appeal has been properly revived. It may be pointed out that the second appeal was not decided on merits. The sole reason for dismissing the second appeal was that the Appellants did not file copies of judgments of the lower courts as promised. According to the learned single Judge, that reasoning is not sound. Mr. K. Misra, appearing for the Appellant in the special appeal, supported the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, and relied upon paragraph 161 of the Revenue Court Manual. Paragraph 161 of the Revenue Court Manual states: ...The memorandum shall be accompanied by copies of the decree or order appealed from and of the judgments or orders passed in the case by all the courts subordinate to the court to which the memorandum of appeal is presented. It is obvious that in the present case Dayal and Hanumant did rot comply with paragraph 161 of the Revenue Court Manual, when they presented the second appeal before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The question is whether Dayal and Hanumant were required to comply with paragraph 161 of the Revenue Court Manual. 3. It is obvious that in the present case Dayal and Hanumant did rot comply with paragraph 161 of the Revenue Court Manual, when they presented the second appeal before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The question is whether Dayal and Hanumant were required to comply with paragraph 161 of the Revenue Court Manual. 3. The second appeal was under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. Section 41 of that Act makes the provisions of Chs. IX and X of the UP Land Revenue Act, 1901, applicable to all appeals under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. Ch. IX of the Land Revenue Act lays down the procedure of revenue courts and revenue officers. Ch. X of the Land Revenue Act provides for appeals, reference and revision. It was conceded for the Appellant that para. 161 of the Revenue Court Manual does not fall directly within Chs. IX and X of the Land Revenue Act. But it has been suggested for the Appellant that para. 161 of the Revenue Court Manual should be treated as part of Ch. X of the Land Revenue Act. 4. This question came up for consideration in Salik Ram v. Joint Director of Consolidation 1966 AWR 311. It was held by Sahgal, J. that the provisions of the Revenue Court Manual are rot applicable to the proceedings under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. 5. The same view was taken by B.N. Nigam, J., in Smt. Zaibua Nisan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation Faizabad 1966 RD 210. 6. This question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Sagar v. The Director of Consolidation, Faizabad Special Appeal No. 98 of 1962 decided on 23-1-1964. The question for consideration in that case was whether there is any provision for filing a cross-objection, when an appeal is filed under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. On this point, the learned Judges observed on p. 4 of that judgment: Rule 176 is a part of Ch. XI of the Land Revenue Act which contains Section 234. Merely because it relates to an appeal it cannot be said to be part of Ch. X of the Land Revenue Act which contains provisions regarding appeals. Only provisions of Chs. IX and X of the Land Revenue Act are applied to appeals under the Consolidation of Holdings Act by Section 41. Merely because it relates to an appeal it cannot be said to be part of Ch. X of the Land Revenue Act which contains provisions regarding appeals. Only provisions of Chs. IX and X of the Land Revenue Act are applied to appeals under the Consolidation of Holdings Act by Section 41. Therefore, Order XLI, Rule 22 cannot be applied in appeals under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. 7. In agreement with the decisions in these cases, we hold that para. 161 of the Revenue Court Manual does not govern appeals filed under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. It follows that Dayal and Hanumant were under no obligation to file copies of judgments along with the memorandum of appeal. The Deputy Director of Consolidation could not dismiss the second appeal on the short ground that copies of judgments had not been filed. It appears that the Appellants in second appeal had promised to file such copies within a week, and failed to keep their promise That circumstance also was not sufficient for dismissal of the second appeal. If the Appellants were not under any obligation to file certain papers, their failure to file those papers could not be the basis of dismissal of the appeal. 8. That was the sole ground given by the Deputy Director for dismissing the second appeal. But Mr. K.N. Misra suggested another ground in support of that decision. The other ground is that Dayal and Hanumant had already filed a revision against the decision of the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 3-1-1964, and it failed. It was, therefore, urged by Mr. Misra that, having filed a revision and failed, it was not open to Dayal and Hanumant to file a second appeal challenging the propriety of the order dated 3-1-1964. 9. In Ram Sahai and Others Vs. Maiku and Others, AIR 1963 All 421 a party filed a revision application u/s 48 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. It was held that that party could not be allowed to retrace its steps if the order in revision eventually went against that party and claim that the proceedings ought to have been disposed of as second appeal. 10. In Kiran Singh and Others Vs. It was held that that party could not be allowed to retrace its steps if the order in revision eventually went against that party and claim that the proceedings ought to have been disposed of as second appeal. 10. In Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others, AIR 1954 SC 340 ; it was held that it would be an unfortunate state of the law, if the Plaintiff who initiated proceedings in a court of his own choice could subsequently turmround and question its jurisdiction on the ground of an error in valuation which was his own. 11. In Naipal Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1966 AWR 648 B.D. Gupta, J. observed on p. 649 para 5: The conduct of the Petitioner in filing a revision and obtaining its hearing, and a decision thereon, appears to be sufficient to disentitle him to contend that he should be heard again in respect of the same matter in a second appeal. 12. These decisions do not lay down a general proposition that under no circumstances can a party, which has filed a revision subsequently file a second appeal. Whether the second appeal is competent or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. This question was not dealt with by the Deputy Director, when the second appeal was decided. The learned single Jutige has also not decided this point finally in his judgment dated 18-11-1966. We also leave this question open. When the second appeal comes up for hearing before the Deputy Director, it would be open to Srimati Chhedana to urge before him that the second appeal is incompetent. The learned single Judge made it clear that it would fee open to Srimati Chhedana to take any pleas which she might be advised in opposition to the second appeal. 13. Subject to the clarification made above, this special appeal is dismissed with costs to Respondent No. 8.