ORDER D.D. Seth, J. - This reference has been made to this Court by the learned Sessions Judge, Lucknow-Kanpur at Kanpur, by his order dated 16-6-1967 and arises out of the following circumstances. 2. Kailash Nath Applicant along with opposite parties Nos. 4 to 6, viz. Sarwanlal, Moti Chand and Smt. Shanti Devi, are the Directors of M/s M.K. Bros. (P) Ltd., Kanpur. This firm did cotton business and used to purchase cotton from outstation and used to sell the same to the textile mills at Kanpur. Opposite party No. 2 Sri Kesardeo Budhia was an employee of M/s. M.K. Bros. (P) Ltd. and used to look after the work of taking delivery of cotton bales from the railway station Kanpur. Opposite party No. 3 Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal belonged to J.K. Cotton Mills Kanpur. In 1958 the financial position of M/s. M.K. Bros was not very sound and great delays used to be caused in taking delivery of the consignments of cotton bales with the result that the cotton bales used to remain lying in the goods shed at Kanpur railway station for long periods with the result arrears of demurrage and wharfage chargeable by the railway authorities mounted up. 3. According to the prosecution hi the year 1958 textile industry, as a whole, was facing crisis and in order to help it the Government granted some concession to that industry. The concession was that consignees who had their own railway sidings used to get remittance from the railway authorities in respect of demurrage and wharfage even though they could not take delivery of goods for a long time. According to the prosecution in 1958 M/s. M.K. Bros, were the consignees of a large number of consignments of cotton bales purchased by that firm but which were held up as the firm could not take delivery of those bales on account of financial difficulties. M/s. M.K. Bros., therefore, evolved a scheme in order to avail itself of the benefit granted to the textile industry by the Government. Accordingly they worked up a plan by which they misrepresented that the consignments of cotton bales received at the Kanpur railway station in the name of the firm actually belonged to M/s J.K. Cotton Mills Kanpur. M/s. M.K. Bros., therefore, evolved a scheme in order to avail itself of the benefit granted to the textile industry by the Government. Accordingly they worked up a plan by which they misrepresented that the consignments of cotton bales received at the Kanpur railway station in the name of the firm actually belonged to M/s J.K. Cotton Mills Kanpur. In order to get the benefit of the concession made by the Government and in order to further the scheme evolved by it M/s. M.K. Bros, confided in opposite party No. 3 Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal and in another employee of the J.K. Cotton Mills at Kanpur. The Directors of M/s. M.K. Bros, together with opposite party No. 2 Sri Kesardeo Budhia, Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal and another employee of J.K. Cotton Mills entered into a conspiracy in furtherance of their object and as a result they submitted false applications to the railway authorities on behalf of J.K. Cotton Mills for remitting wharfages by representing that the consignments of cotton had been consigned to J.K. Cotton Mills. They also made false endorsements for transfer of those bales on railway receipts. Thus, according to the prosecution case, as a result of the conspiracy the railway administration was defrauded in the year 1958-59 to the tune of Rs. 43,355 and odd. The matter was referred to the Central Bureau of Investigation at Lucknow whose Inspector, on 9-9-1963, submitted a charge-sheet against the Petitioner and opposite parties Nos. 2 to 6 Under Sections 120B, 467, 468 and 471, IPC. 4. Enquiry proceedings were started in the court of Sri Gir Raj Kishore, Magistrate first class, Kanpur and the case was friable as a Sessions case. Opposite party No. 2 Sri Kesardeo Budhia made a confession u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Magistrate first class on 30-6-1962 by which he admitted that he was guilty of conspiracy, forgery and cheating etc. along with the other culprits. According to the learned Magistrate first class, Kanpur Sri Kesardeo Budhia was told by the Magistrate that he was not bound to make a confession and that if he did so the confession made by him may be used as evidence against him. along with the other culprits. According to the learned Magistrate first class, Kanpur Sri Kesardeo Budhia was told by the Magistrate that he was not bound to make a confession and that if he did so the confession made by him may be used as evidence against him. The learned Magistrate further certified that he believed that the confession was made voluntarily and was recorded by his own hand and was read over to Sri Kesardeo Budhia who admitted it to be correct. Similarly on 12-7-1963 opposite party No. 3 Devi Prasad Agarwal also made a similar confession as made by Sri Kesardeo Budhia before the learned Magistrate first class Kanpur confessing his liability for the commission of the crime for which charge sheet had been submitted by the Inspector of the Central Bureau of Investigation at Luck-now. 5. On 17--12-1964 both Sri Kesardeo Budhia and Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal made separate applications u/s 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Magistrate first class Kanpur praying that pardon may be granted to them. Both the applications for tender of pardon were supported by the prosecution which prayed that the applications be allowed and further prayed that the two accused be granted pardon so that they might be made approvers against the other accused and supply evidence for the alleged conspiracy. On the other hand, the remaining accused opposed both the applications made by Sri Kesardeo Budhia and Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal for tender of pardon u/s 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Both the applications came up for hearing before Sri Gir Raj Kishore, Magistrate first class Kanpur before whom the enquiry proceedings were pending on 27-9-1965. The learned Magistrate first class by his order dated 27-9-1965 rejected both the applications of Sri Kesardeo Budhia and Sri Devi Pd. Agarwal holding that both the accused had played a very prominent part in the conspiracy and were the main accused. The learned Magistrate further observed that in his statement made u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal had admitted that some of the Directors and partners of M/s. M.K. Bros. (P) Ltd., had promised him to pay some consideration for the part played by him in the conspiracy. The learned Magistrate further observed that in his statement made u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal had admitted that some of the Directors and partners of M/s. M.K. Bros. (P) Ltd., had promised him to pay some consideration for the part played by him in the conspiracy. The learned Magistrate further observed as follows: Secondly I have to see whether the prosecution gain much by getting the evidence of the two accused Applicants approvers. Statements u/s 164 Code of Criminal Procedure of both the accused have been recorded and they are on the record. I do not want to enter into the merit of the case but at the same time the reference to the statement u/s 164 Code of Criminal Procedure of the accused Devi Pd. is necessary for present purpose. He stated that one Sri Ram Deo Marolia was the sole purchasing agent of the cotton, of M/s. J.K. Cotton Ltd. and all the purchase of cotton were to be made through him. He told him that M/s. M.K. Bros, had to supply a lot of cotton to J.K. Manufacturers and their goods were lying at the Central Goods Shed, Kanpur and which had suffered a lot of damage. He asked him to get the damage remitted as was usually done in the cases of goods supplied to the J.K. Manufacturers. He also told him that J.K. Mills was facing a hardship due to nondelivery of goods to them. He (Devi Pd.) relying upon Sri Marolia and also in the back ground of the fact that Sri Marolia was closely connected with J.Ks. he did all for the J.Ks. This statement, I might say, would hardly show the complicity of the accused Devi Pd. in the alleged conspiracy. 6. The learned Magistrate first class Kanpur gave further reasons for rejecting the two applications made for tender of pardon to Kesardeo Budhia and Devi Prasad Agarwal. After the rejection of the applications of Sri Kesardeo Budhia and Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal by Sri Gir Raj Kishore enquiry proceedings proceeded in the learned Magistrate's court and the State took no steps to challenge the order passed by Sri Gir Raj Kishore on 27-9-41965 either by preferring a revision against that order or by making any other application for the staying of that order. On 15-4-1966, however, a second application for tendering pardon to Sri Kesardeo Budhia and Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal was made by the special counsel for, the State before the learned District Magistrate Kanpur. That application was opposed by the remaining accused. On the application dated 15-4-1966 made on behalf of the State the learned District Magistrate Kanpur issued notices to the parties through their counsel and summoned the record of the case. By his order dated 1-6-1966 Sri R.K. Trivedi, the learned District Magistrate, Kanpur ordered that Kesardeo Budhia alone may be tendered pardon on condition of his making full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offences. He did not allow the application of Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. The learned District Magistrate by his order dated 1-6-1966 held that the first application for tender of pardon was made before a subordinate court on which orders were passed by that court rejecting the application. The learned District Magistrate agreed with the contention of the Learned Counsel for the State that Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure gave concurrent jurisdiction to the District Magistrate and there was no bar whatsoever precluding him from legally entertaining a second application u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned District Magistrate further held that the State could not file, a revision against the order of the learned Magistrate first class dated 27-9-1965 and observed as follows: It would therefore be unfortunate if the State counsel were to be denied an opportunity to get his application reexamined by a concurrent court, particularly in view of the fact that no revision lies to the High Court. On grounds of propriety also I am inclined to think that this application is entertainable. 8. Against the order passed by Sri R.K. Trivedi learned Distt. Magistrate, Kanpur on 1-6-1966 the Applicant Kailash Nath preferred a revision in the court of the learned District Judge, Kanpur which was decided by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, Lucknow-Kanpur on 16-6-1967. On grounds of propriety also I am inclined to think that this application is entertainable. 8. Against the order passed by Sri R.K. Trivedi learned Distt. Magistrate, Kanpur on 1-6-1966 the Applicant Kailash Nath preferred a revision in the court of the learned District Judge, Kanpur which was decided by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, Lucknow-Kanpur on 16-6-1967. The referring court held that powers of the, District Magistrate u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure were concurrent with the powers of the enquiring Magistrate and therefore, the District Magistrate was not competent to sit in revision over the order, passed by the learned Magistrate first class and to grant pardon to any of the two accused, viz. Kesardeo Budhia and Devi Prasad Agarwal. The learned referring court on the contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the parties posed the following three questions for determination: 1. Whether the DM was competent to grant pardon in this case? 2. Whether the order of the DM is otherwise proper? 3. Whether the order of the DM is revisable? The referring court held that the order of the DM dated 1-6-1966 was revisable. The learned Civil and Sessions Judge did not address himself to the examination of the question of the propriety of the order passed by the learned District Magistrate, Kanpur in view of the fact that he was of the opinion that the order passed by the learned District Magistrate was without jurisdiction. The learned Civil and Sessions Judge further held as follows: In my view the power of the DM to grant pardon is concurrent with that of other Magistrate except for certain limitations in the case of SDM and the First Class Magistrates. Despite these limitations imposed on these two categories of Magistrates, their powers to grant pardon are concurrent with those of the DM. The corollary of this construction of Section 337 Code of Criminal Procedure would be that when one Magistrate competent to exercise jurisdiction under this section has so exercised his jurisdiction, then no other Magistrate shall be resized of the same matter. More clearly speaking that I propose to emphasise is that when one Magistrate has granted pardon or has refused to grant pardon then so far as the magistrates of various categories are concerned, it is an end of the matter and the magistrate would be incompetent to re-hear the same matter. More clearly speaking that I propose to emphasise is that when one Magistrate has granted pardon or has refused to grant pardon then so far as the magistrates of various categories are concerned, it is an end of the matter and the magistrate would be incompetent to re-hear the same matter. Thus my view is that when Sri Gir Raj Kishore had rejected the prosecution request to grant pardon whether to Kesardeo Budhia or to Devi Prasad Agarwal, no second request by the State could be made to the DM save in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction.... In my view the order of Sri Gir Raj Kishore rejecting Public Prosecutor's request to grant pardon was of a final, nature so far as the courts of Magistrates are concerned. Therefore, DM was not competent to grant pardon to accused Budhia. If the State was dissatisfied with the order of Sri Gir Raj Kishore then it should have filed a revision whether before the District Judge or before the District Magistrate. 9. By the referring order the learned Civil and Sessions Judge recommended to this Court that the order passed by Sri R.K. Trivedi, learned District Magistrate, Kanpur on 1-6-1966 be set aside as it was illegal. 10. The Applicant Kailash Nath is represented in this Court by Sri U.S. Avasthi and Sri S.N. Mulla who support the reference. Sri S.K. Sahai, the Learned Counsel appearing for opposite party No. 4 Sarwan Lal also supports the reference. The reference was, however, opposed by Sri J.N. Tewari Learned Counsel representing Sri Kesardeo Budhia and by Sri Rishi Ram the learned Government Advocate. 11. I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties at great length and have gone through the entire record which is before me. Sri J.N. Tewari representing Sri Kesardeo Budhia urged two contentions, viz. that there is no legal bar in the Code of Criminal Procedure by which the DM was deprived from exercising his jurisdiction in overriding the order of Sri Gir Raj Kishore, learned Magistrate first class dated 27-9-1965. Sri J.N. Tewari's second submission was that the order passed by the learned DM, Kanpur on 1-6-1966 was not revisable u/s 435, Code of Criminal Procedure as the DM was not acting as an inferior court to the court of the learned Sessions Judge. Sri J.N. Tewari's second submission was that the order passed by the learned DM, Kanpur on 1-6-1966 was not revisable u/s 435, Code of Criminal Procedure as the DM was not acting as an inferior court to the court of the learned Sessions Judge. Sri Rishi Ram, learned Government Advocate, submitted that the DM being persona designata u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure possesses better power than the Magistrate before whom an enquiry is held, that the powers of the DM Under Sections 337 and 338, Code of Criminal Procedure are unlimited and those of the other Magistrates are limited and further that the powers of the DM to grant pardon u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure are not concurrent with the powers of the enquiring Magistrate. 12. In support of his first contention Sri J.N. Tewari, Learned Counsel representing Sri Kesar Deo Budhia, relied on Section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with power to direct tender of pardon and reads as follows: At any time after commitment, but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is made may, with the view of obtaining on the trial the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any such offence, tender or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender, a pardon on the same condition to such person. 13. In my opinion Section 338, Code of Criminal Procedure has no bearing to the facts of the instant case as it deals with power to tender pardon after a case has been committed to the court of Sessions. It may be stated that the learned Government Advocate also relied upon Section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For the reasons mentioned above in my opinion the contentions of Sri J.N. Tewari and the learned Government Advocate as far as the provisions of Section 338, Code of Criminal Procedure are concerned have no force. 14. In support of his second contention that the order passed by the learned District Magistrate was not revisable Sri J.N. Tewari relied upon In re Akbar Sheriff 49 CrLJ 451. 14. In support of his second contention that the order passed by the learned District Magistrate was not revisable Sri J.N. Tewari relied upon In re Akbar Sheriff 49 CrLJ 451. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Akbar Sheriff's case (supra) passed the following order: I do not think that the act of the Magistrate u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure, namely, tendering pardon to a person is revisable by this Court. No authority has been placed before me to show that it is revisable. If there are any irregularities in the grant of the pardon they can be urged by the accused at the trial. The petitions are dismissed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge in the Madras High Court is a very criptic order and does not contain any facts or states any reasons why the act of the Magistrate u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure, namely, tendering pardon to a person is not revisable by the High Court. It follows, therefore, that Akbar Sheriff's case (supra) is not helpful in deciding the matter before me. 15. I do not find any force in the submissions made by the learned Government Advocate also. In support of his contentions the learned Government Advocate also relied upon the provisions of Section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but as already stated above Section 338 deal with power to direct tender of pardon at any time after commitment but before the judgment is passed. In the instant case the proceedings were at the stage of enquiry before the learned Magistrate first class and hence the provisions of Section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable. 16. The learned Government Advocate then relied upon a ruling of a learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court reported in State Vs. Babuli Narayan Behera and Others, (1967) 33 CLT 211 in which it was held as follows: Nothing in Section 337(1) of Section 338 of Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits Additional DM from tendering pardon to an accused even at the stage when the case is being tried by Sessions Judge after commitment. Reading the proviso to Section 337 and Section 338 together, the DM is empowered to tender a pardon even after commitment if the court so directs. Reading the proviso to Section 337 and Section 338 together, the DM is empowered to tender a pardon even after commitment if the court so directs. The conferment of the power on the trial court to direct to tender pardon u/s 338 does not deprive the DM of his power to grant a pardon u/s 337. The question of knowledge of the DM about the Sessions Court's refusal to grant pardon to the accused at an earlier stage is not relevant for deciding the question of legality of the Distt. Magistrate's order tendering pardon. The facts of the Orissa case are quite different from the facts of the instant case. The Orissa case dealt with question of tendering pardon to an accused after the accused had been committed to the court of sessions. The facts of the Orissa case are that seven accused persons were being tried in the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack in sessions trial No. 19-C of 1966 on a charge against the accused persons for having committed an offence u/s 302/149 IPC. The facts further show that by 12-9-1966, about 28 witnesses, including the Investigating Officer, had been examined in the case-and three more witnesses still remained to be examined for the prosecution. On September 12 the Associate Public Prosecutor filed before the learned trying Sessions Judge a petition for adjournment of the case for fifteen days on the grounds stated in the petition, the main ground being that one of the accused, namely, Ratnakar Prusti had offered himself to make a free and full disclosure of the facts within his knowledge. It was further stated in the petition in the Orissa case that it was under consideration by the State Government whether pardon could be tendered to an accused at that stage. It was, therefore, prayed that fifteen days adjournment may be allowed. The learned Sessions Judge by an order dated 12-9-1966 disallowed the prayer for adjournment and directed the sessions case to proceed. The main ground on which the learned Sessions Judge disallowed the prayer of adjournment was that if at that stage pardon was to be tendered to the accused Ratnakar Prusti the trial would necessarily have to be begun afresh, that the tendering of a pardon to one of the accused persons would undoubtedly bring in a completely different situation and an altogether altered context of things. The operative portion of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in the Orissa case was as follows: Having regard to the actual stage the hearing of this case has reached, I do not think it advisable, expedient and proper to further adjourn the hearing of the case in order to enable the State Government to consider the question of offering pardon to the accused Ratnakar Prusti. I thus disallow the prayer for adjournment and direct that hearing of the case should proceed as before. It will be seen from the facts disclosed above that no order rejecting the prayer for tendering pardon to the accused Ratnakar Prusti was passed by the learned Sessions Judge in the Orissa case. Further facts of the Orissa case are that on the same date on which the learned Sessions Judge passed the order, i.e. 12-9-1966 the Additional District Magistrate (Executive), Cuttack, on a petition filed by the Public Prosecutor on that date tendered pardon to Ratnakar Prusti purported to be by virtue of the powers vested in him under the proviso to Section 337, Clause (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned whether as principal or abettor in the commission thereof. It was against that order that revisions were filed in the Orissa High Court on which the Orissa High Court held as already stated above. 17. The facts stated above clearly show that the ruling reported in Rama Vs. Superintendent of Police, Kolar and Another, AIR 1967 Kar 220 is distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts of the instant case before me in which an application for tendering pardon to the accused Sri Kesardeo Budhia and Devi Prasad Agarwal had already been rejected by the learned Magistrate first class by his order dated 27-9-1965. The learned Single Judge of*the Orissa High Court in Rama Vs. Superintendent of Police, Kolar and Another, AIR 1967 Kar 220 referred to a ruling reported in A.J. Peiris Vs. The learned Single Judge of*the Orissa High Court in Rama Vs. Superintendent of Police, Kolar and Another, AIR 1967 Kar 220 referred to a ruling reported in A.J. Peiris Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 616 in which the Supreme Court held as follows: By Section 338 power is no doubt given after the commitment to the Court to which the commitment is made to tender pardon, before judgment is passed, to any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned with any offence or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender the pardon. The section vests the Court to which commitment is made with power to tender pardon or order the Committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender pardon during the trial of the case but it does not take away the power conferred under the proviso to Section 337(1). The proviso contains an additional provision which empowers the District Magistrate to tender pardon where the offences are under inquiry or trial. This case also has no bearing to the facts of the present case because in the case before the Supreme Court commitment to the court of sessions had already been made and there can be no quarrel with the proposition that the provisions of Section 338, Code of Criminal Procedure, vests the Court to which commitment is made with power to tender pardon or order the committing Magistrate to tender pardon during the trial of the case but it does not take away the power conferred under the proviso to Section 337(1) which contains an additional provision which empowers the District Magistrate to tender pardon where the offences are under inquiry or trial. The Supreme Court case does not deal with a case in which a learned Magistrate first class had refused to tender pardon to an accused u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure and yet on a second application the accused was tendered pardon by the District Magistrate. 18. The Supreme Court case does not deal with a case in which a learned Magistrate first class had refused to tender pardon to an accused u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure and yet on a second application the accused was tendered pardon by the District Magistrate. 18. In the instant case we are concerned with the provisions of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as follows: (1) In the case of any offence triable exclusively by the High Court or Court of sessions, or any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, or any offence under any of the following sections of the IPC, namely Sections 161, 165, 165-A, 216-A, 369, 401, 435 and 477-A, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class may, at any stage of the investigation or enquiry into, or the trial of the offence, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof: Provided that, where the offence is under inquiry or trial, no Magistrate of the first class other than the District Magistrate shall exercise the power hereby conferred unless he is the Magistrate making the inquiry or holding the trial and where the offence is under investigation, no such Magistrate shall exercise the said powers unless he is a Magistrate having jurisdiction in a place where the offence might be inquired into or tried and the sanction of the District Magistrate has been obtained to the exercise thereof. (1-A) Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under Sub-section (1) shall record his reasons for so doing and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record: Provided that the accused shall bay for the same unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost. (2) Every person accepting a tender under this section shall be examined as a witness in the Court; of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any. 19. (2) Every person accepting a tender under this section shall be examined as a witness in the Court; of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any. 19. Sub-section (1) of Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates only four officers, namely, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class who may tender pardon at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of the offence, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. 20. Sri Gir Raj Kishore, learned Magistrate first class, Kanpur, who refused to tender pardon to Sri Kesardeo Budhia and Devi Prasad Agarwal by his order dated 27-9-1966, was the Magistrate holding*an inquiry against an accused person and he had the same powers as the District Magistrate had to tender pardon. Under the provisions of Sub-section (1A) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure, every Magistrate who tenders a pardon Under Sub-section (1) has to record reasons for his so doing. By implication the Magistrate Who refused to tender a pardon Under Sub-section (1) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure, also has to record his reasons for so doing. Therefore, every order passed Under Sub-section (1) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure is a judicial order. I am fortified in this opinion by a ruling reported in Faqir Singh v. Emperor 1938 AWR 170 PC. There is nothing in Sub-section (1) of Section 337 Code of Criminal Procedure or the proviso thereof to show that the District Magistrate can sit in judgment over the order passed by the Magistrate first class either granting pardon to an accused or refusing to grant pardon to him. The power of the District Magistrate to tender pardon to an accused Under Sub-section (1) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure or under the proviso to that sub-section is concurrent with the power of a Presidency Magistrate, or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class to tender pardon or to refuse to tender pardon. The power of the District Magistrate to tender pardon to an accused Under Sub-section (1) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure or under the proviso to that sub-section is concurrent with the power of a Presidency Magistrate, or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class to tender pardon or to refuse to tender pardon. The learned Government-Advocate placed great reliance on the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure. A reading of that proviso clearly shows that the District Magistrate has an unrestricted power to grant pardon while the other Magistrate, i.e. the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class are competent to grant pardon only when the case is pending before them for inquiry or for trial. In my view the District Magistrate is not a superior authority to a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class who has passed an order tendering pardon or refusing to tender pardon Under Sub-section (1) of Section 33?, Code of Criminal Procedure. The power of the District Magistrate to grant pardon is concurrent to that of other Magistrates except for certain limitations in the case of Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the first class Magistrate as is clear from Sub-section (1) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure. 21. In my opinion when Sri Gir Raj Kishore had rejected the request of the prosecution to grant pardon to Sri Kesardeo Budhia and to Sri Devi Prasad Agarwal no second application by the State could be made to the District Magistrate except in the exercise of his re visional jurisdiction. It was held in Kashinath v. State of Mysore 1963 (1) Cri LJ 547 as follows: A Special Judge under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (1952) in a case pending before him cannot set aside order of the District Magistrate u/s 337(1) granting pardon to one of the accused. The power of the District Magistrate for granting pardon is concurrent with the power of the Sessions Judge. The salutary principle to be followed in such cases is that the authority to whom an application is made first should be the authority to grant pardon and the other authority should not accept an application subsequently. 22. The power of the District Magistrate for granting pardon is concurrent with the power of the Sessions Judge. The salutary principle to be followed in such cases is that the authority to whom an application is made first should be the authority to grant pardon and the other authority should not accept an application subsequently. 22. For the reasons stated above it must be held that the order passed by Sri R.K. Trivedi, learned District Magistrate, Kanpur on 1-6-1966 was illegal and was wholly without jurisdiction and was, therefore, revisable by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge. 23. After having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties at length and after having gone through the orders passed by the courts below and for the reasons mentioned above I accept this reference and quash the order of Sri R.K. Trivedi, learned District Magistrate, Kanpur dated 1-6-1966 and direct the trial to proceed before the learned Magistrate first class, Kanpur in accordance with law.