DUTTA, C. J.: This petition has been filed against the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, United Khasi & Jaintia Hills District, setting aside an award. The petitioner entered into a con­tract with the Union of India (hereinafter called the Government) for the construc­tion of buildings of the Assam Rifles at Tezu in the N. E. F. A. The contract contained a clause being clause No. 25 for settlement of disputes arising out of the contract by arbitration. The works were completed on 18-10-57 but disputes in res­pect of certain items arose and could not be settled. The petitioner (hereinafter called the contractor) took final payment on 18-10-57 under protest and without prejudice to his claims. Thereafter on 29-10-60 the contractor requested the Government for appointment of a sole arbitrator as the disputes had arisen between the parties as aforesaid. The Superintending Engineer as per agree­ment appointed one Shri N.M. Malkani as arbitrator on 1-1-62. The contractor objected to this appointment and prayed for the appointment of one Shri Nath as arbitrator by an application purported to be under Sections 8, 20, 31 and 41 of the Arbitration Act 1940 (hereinafter called the Act) filed before the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner at Shillong who held that the appointment of Shri Malkani was valid. Shri Malkani, however, died before he could act as arbitrator and in his place one Shri P. S. Rao was appoint­ed as arbitrator. The contractor again objected to the appointment of Sri Rao and filed an appli­cation purported to be under Sections 8 and 20 of the Act praying for appoint­ment of another person as arbitrator. The Government resisted the petition. The learned Assistant to the Deputy Commis­sioner however, allowed the petition after hearing both the parties and appointed Shri G. N. Dutta. as arbitrator by an order dated 29-4-65. The Government then filed a revision petition before this Court against the order of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner. This Court dismissed that petition. The Gov­ernment then preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court and this appeal was also dismissed. The arbitrator Shri G. N. Dutta filed his award in Court on 21-1-66 and the Government filed a petition on 17-2-66 for setting aside the award. This Court dismissed that petition. The Gov­ernment then preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court and this appeal was also dismissed. The arbitrator Shri G. N. Dutta filed his award in Court on 21-1-66 and the Government filed a petition on 17-2-66 for setting aside the award. The learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner after hearing both the parties dismissed the said objection peti­tion on 27-4-67 and made the award a rule of the Court and ordered drawing up of a decree in terms of the same. Thereafter the Government filed an appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner and the contractor also filed a cross-appeal. The contractor, however, did not press his appeal and it was dismissed. The Additional Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeal of the Government and set aside the award. The contractor has filed this petition against the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner. 2. This petition is said to be under Rule 36 of the Rules for the Administra­tion of Justice and Police in the Khasi & Jaintia Hills District and also under Sec­tions 115 and 151 of the Civil Procedure applies to the present proceedings. Under section 41 of the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court and all appeals under the Act. In the pre­sent case the original order was passed by a Munsiff in his capacity as Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner in Shillong. There was an appeal to the Additional Deputy Commissioner whose position is analogous to that of a District Judge. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Act bars a second appeal against an appellate order passed under the said section. The appeal before the Additional Deputy Com­missioner was filed under Section 39 (1) (vi) of the Act for setting aside the award. Hence this petition must be treated only as a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The High Court has no power to interfere under this section except in three cases viz. where the subordinate court appears (1) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vest­ed in it by law; or (2) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law; (3) to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material ir­regularity. 3. where the subordinate court appears (1) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vest­ed in it by law; or (2) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law; (3) to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material ir­regularity. 3. It appears that a preliminary objec­tion was raised before the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner regarding the maintainability of the petition. It may be noted that the objection petition was at first said to have been filed under Sec­tion 33 of the Act. But later this was corrected and the petition was shown to be under Section 17 of the Act. The learned Assistant to the Deputy Commis­sioner held that the award should be made a rule of the court since there was no petition under Section 33. But all the same, he went on to examine the con­tentions raised by the Government. It is argued before us by the learned coun­sel for the contractor that this view of the learned Assistant to the Deputy Com­missioner was not set aside by the ap­pellate court. In fact, it was not gone into by it and hence he had no jurisdic­tion to set aside the award. 4. The word application has not been defined in the Act. It is not necessary to make the application in any particular form. Under Section 33 the Court should decide the objections raised ordinarily on affidavits. But it is clear from the proviso to Section 33 that the Court is entitled to decide them on other evidence also. It has been laid down by several High Courts as well as the Supreme Court that there is no special form pres­cribed for an objection petition. In Sheoramprasad v. Gopalprasad, AIR 1959 Madh Pra 102, it was held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court that an application filed for permission to inspect record could be treated as an application under Section 33. All the grounds of challenge to the award were mentioned in that ap­plication, but details thereof were fur­nished later in the written statement. It was held that the absence of details could not come in the way of the court treat­ing the application as one falling under, Section 33. 5. In Ramaswami Servai v. Muthira-layee, AIR 1954 Mad. 560 . All the grounds of challenge to the award were mentioned in that ap­plication, but details thereof were fur­nished later in the written statement. It was held that the absence of details could not come in the way of the court treat­ing the application as one falling under, Section 33. 5. In Ramaswami Servai v. Muthira-layee, AIR 1954 Mad. 560 . the petitioner before the Madras High Court had filed an award into the Court of the Munsiff with a request that a decree might be passed in terms of the award. Notice was served on the respondents and within 30 day? of the receipt of the same, the res­pondents filed a counter attacking the genuineness and validity of the award. In that counter it was prayed that the court might be pleased to pass an order dis­missing the request for a decree. It was contended that as there was no applica­tion with a prayer "to set aside the award" within 30 days as required under Section 17 of the Act and Article 158 of the Limitation Act, the objection of the respondents could not be entertained. The Munsiff rejected this contention. On a revision petition being filed agaipst the order of the Munsiff the High Court held that form of the application for setting aside an award being not prescribed the Court correctly did not insist on a parti­cular form of application with court-fee stamp affixed thereon. 6. In Panchanan Pal v. Nanl Gopal Niyogi, ILR (1951) 1 Cal. 438, it was held by the Calcutta High Court that courts could ignore technicalities and treat a petition of objection filed in course of proceedings under the Arbitration Act as one under Section 33 where, in substance, it complied with the terms thereof. 7. The above views were approved by the Supreme Court in Madan Lai v. Sunder Lai, AIR 1967 SC 1233 . The facts of that case in brief were as fol­lows. The award was filed in Court on September 7, 1957 and notice of filing was issued to the appellant and served upon him on September 30. 1957. It was in November 1957 i.e. more than 30 days later, that the appellant filed an objec­tion in the nature of a written statement. The award was filed in Court on September 7, 1957 and notice of filing was issued to the appellant and served upon him on September 30. 1957. It was in November 1957 i.e. more than 30 days later, that the appellant filed an objec­tion in the nature of a written statement. Although the appellant attacked the vali­dity of the award on various grounds, the objection did not contain any prayer at the end, nor did it indicate what relief the appellant desired. The trial Court held that the appellant's objection was not maintainable as his remedy was to apply under Section 33 if he wanted the award to be set aside. Such an applica­tion has to be filed within 30 days of the service of notice of filing the award vide Article 158 of the Limitation Act (old Act). As the objection was filed beyond the period of limitation of 30 days, it was rejected. his appellant then went in ap­peal to the High Court which dismissed his appeal. Then he went to the Supreme Court which also dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. In this connection the Supreme Court observed as fol­lows: "It is clear, therefore, from the scheme of the Act that if a party wants an award to be set aside on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 30 it must apply within 30 days of the date of service of notice of filing of the award as provided in Art. 158 of the Limitation Act. If no such application is made the award can­not be set aside on any of the grounds specified in section 30 of the Act. It may be conceded that there is no special form prescribed for making such an applica­tion and in an appropriate case an objec­tion of the type made in this case may be treated as such an application, if it is filed within the period of limitation. It may be conceded that there is no special form prescribed for making such an applica­tion and in an appropriate case an objec­tion of the type made in this case may be treated as such an application, if it is filed within the period of limitation. But if an objection like this has been filed after the period of limitation it cannot be treated as an application to set aside the award, for if it is so treated it will be barred by limitation.'' It is not in dispute in the present case that the objections raised by the appellant were covered by Section 30 of the Act, and though the appellant did not pray for setting aside the award in his objection that was what he really wanted the Court to do after hearing his objection. As in the present case the objection was filed more than 30 days after the notice it could not be treated as an application for setting aside the award, for it would then be barred by limitation." 8. In the instant case it may be noted that the trial Court actually treated the petition as one under Section 33 although he expressed the opinion that there was no petition under the said section. This is obvious from the first sentence of the judgment viz. "This is a petition for sett­ing aside the award dated 17-1-66 made by the appointed arbitrator Sri G. N. Dutta, retired Chief Engineer of Assam." Moreover, towards the end of the judg­ment, the trial court said "In the result, the present petition of the Union of India praying for setting aside the award is dis­missed with costs of Rs. 50/-." In the above circumstances, I do not find that the courts below wrongly assumed juris­diction by entertaining the objection. 9. The first appellate court held that the arbitrator misconducted himself by violating a principle of natural justice inasmuch as he made the award without giving a chance to the Government to dose its case by putting in written argu­ments. Whether there was such a viola­tion or not, is a question of fact and this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot correct errors ol fact, however gross they may be. Whether there was such a viola­tion or not, is a question of fact and this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot correct errors ol fact, however gross they may be. It is true that an award may be set aside on the ground of an error of law only when it is ap­parent on the face of the award. But this principle will not apply when there is violation of a principle of natural jus­tice e.g. when evidence is shut out. In such a case the Court can examine the proceedings. In the present case the ap­pellate court did this to arrive at the con­clusion that there was such a violation. 10. The appellate court also held that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by entertaining some new claims. It is contended that the appellate court was barred byres judicata from entering in­to this question. As the award is liable to be set aside on the ground of viola­tion of a principle of natural justice, it is not necessary to examine the said con­tention. 11. In the result, this revision petition fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costa 12. R K. GOSWAMI, J.: I agree. Revision dismissed.