Judgment SHELAT ( 1 ) THESE two appeals arise from Writ Petitions Nos. 2186 of 1963 and 121 of 1964 filed in the High court of Mysore under Article -226 of the Constitution, and are founded on a certificate obtained from that High court. There are other similar appeals pending in this court arising from similar eight writ petitions involving identical questions but for the moment we are not concerned with them as they are not before us. ( 2 ) THE petitioners in the aforesaid two writ petitions were prior to the reorganisation of State, working as Assistant Conservators of forests in the erstwhile State of Mysore. As a result of the reorganisation which involved inclusion in the erstwhile State of Mysore certain parts of the States of Bombay, Hyderabad. Coorg and Madras, the problem arose as to the integration of several employees in forest services till then serving in those States under different designations, performing different functions and having different conditions of services. For instance, in the erstwhile state of Mysore, the Forest Department considered of the following gazetted officers, namely, the Chief Conservators of Forests. Conservation or of forests, Senior Conservators, Assistant Conservators, and Sub-Assistants, covservators. In the then State of Madras the Forest Department had the Chief Conservator of Forests, Conservators and Assistant conservators In Coorg. the service considered of the Chief Conservator and Deputy Conservators. In the then State of Hyderabad and Bombay, it considered of the Chief Conservator, Conservators, Deputy Conservators and Assistant Conservators The problem, which on reorganisation of the state of Mysore, as with other States, arose was how and on what principles the various officers still then serving in the different States, but who were allotted under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, to the State of mysore, were to be integrated in the Forest Department of the new State of Mysore. ( 3 ) IT appears that the government of India delegated its power under s. 115 of the Act to the Mysore State. Accordingly, the State government by its order dated 26/03/1957, prepared a provisional inter state seniority list. ( 3 ) IT appears that the government of India delegated its power under s. 115 of the Act to the Mysore State. Accordingly, the State government by its order dated 26/03/1957, prepared a provisional inter state seniority list. In doing so, the State government equated the posts of Assistant conservators of Forests serving till then in the erstwhile States of mysore and Madras with the Deputy Conservators in the then Hyderabad and Bombay States and fixed the inter se seniority on the principle of continuous service in the cadre of question. To this objections were raised by some of the officers. A sub committee with the assistance of one of the officers deputed by the central government for that purpose went into this objections and on the advice of that committee a fresh seniority list Was prepared which was published in 1960. This list was prepared on a formula recommended by the said committee, viz; that assistant Conservators with six or more years of service should be equated with Deputy Conservators inducted from the erstwhile States of Hyderabad and Bombay. This list raised a fresh crop of objections The government of India thereupon constituted an advisory committee as provided by s. 115 (5) of the Act and on the recommendations of that committee it gave the decision impugned in the aforesaid writ petitions equating Senior assistant Conservators from the erstwhile Mysore State with the Deputy conservators Hyderabad and Bombay States and Assistant Conservators and Sub-Assistant Conservators from the erstwhile Mysore State with the assistant Conservators from the erstwhile Bombay and Hyderabad States the writ petitions from which these appeals type challenged the validity and correctness of the said decision on various grounds, namely, that in arriving at the said decision into the government of India acted in breach of and beyond the crop of the Act and also in breach of the principles of natural justice and of fairness and equity. One of the contentions urged by the petitioners in those writ petitions was that the function of integration was entrusted by the Act to the government of India, that it was a quasi judicial function that the government was, therefore, bound to act in discharging it in conformity with the principles of natural justice, that it failed to do so inasmuch as it took into account representations made to it by the officers from the erstwhile Hyderabad and Bombay States without giving an opportunity to the petitioners and others placed in similar situation to reply to those representations. In answer the government of India took the stand that the function entrusted to it by the Act was purely administrative, that therefore, it was not justiciable and that in any event no question of violation of the principles of natural justice could arise It was also said that the governments decision was based on the advice Of the said advisory committee consisting of the then Chairman of the public service commission, a retired High court Judge and the retired Law secretary to the government of India. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid stand taken in the affidavit in reply on behalf of the government of India was on the basis that the impugned decision was a final one under S. 115 of the Act and that nothing more remained to be done in connection therewith. But at the time of the hearing of these writ petitions the learned Attorney General who appeared on behalf of the union of India contended that the impugned decision was only a provisional one, that before coming to a final decision the government of India would have to examine the representations of the petitioners with the assistance of an advisory committee and if need be to revise its said provisional decision, and that therefore, the. writ petitions were premature and liable to be dismissed. The High court allowed the learned Attorney General to raise this contention though it was not raised in the affidavit in reply and was raised for, the first time and though it amounted virtually to a some result on what the case of the government fill then was This was done as the High court thought that the convention was based solely on the language of S. 115 (5) of the Act and new facts were involved. The High court accepted contention and held : "for these reasons we accept the contention of the learned Attorney general that the impugned decision of the central government though (it) purports to be a final decision is really a provisional decision. The affected persons have a right to make representations against it. The representations made by them will have to be considered by the central government with the assistance of the Advisory Committee and thereafter the central government should arrive at a final decision. This takes us to the question whether the impugned decision is liable to be struck down. As we have come to the conclusion that it is only a preliminary decision and that the same is open to review by the central government on the basis of the representations received, there can be no question of striking down that decision. " ( 5 ) HAVING held that the impugned decision was a provisional and not a final decision and that therefore the writ petitions were premature, the only thing that remained for the High court to do was to dismiss the writ Petitions, But the High court proceeded to observe that though there was no question of striking down the aforesaid provisional decision "all the same we think it desirable to notice some of the contentions advanced by the parties as the same may be of assistance to the central government in arriving at a final decision". The observations which the High court felt it should make for the assistance of the government are contained in the penultimate part of its judgment and are as follows : "for the reasons mentioned above, though we refuse to grant the reliefs prayed for in these petitions, at the same time, we direct the central government to give the petitioners as an opportunity to make representations against the equation of posts proposed, consider their objections with the aid of the Advisory committee and thereafter arrive at a final decision as regards the integration in dispute. " ( 6 ) IT is clear from these observations that they were confined to the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. " ( 6 ) IT is clear from these observations that they were confined to the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 2186, 2283,2297, 2316, 2354, all of 1963, 121 and 943 of 1964, 2574 of 1963 and 53 and 983 of 1964, in all ten writ petitions, heard and disposed of on that day by the High court by its common judgment dated 26/03/1965 under appeal and not to any other person or persons. The direction that the government of India should give an opportunity to make representations and that it should consider them with the aid of the Advisory Committee and thereafter arrive at its final decision must, therefore, apply to the petitioners then before the High court ands whose writ petitions were being heard and disposed of. ( 7 ) MR. Desai for the Union of India contended that the statement made by the learned Attorney General before the High court was an admission on a matter of law, in the present case, on an interpretation of s. 115 (5) of the Act, that the interpretation on which the said statement was based was erroneous and that he was entitled to withdraw the same and contend that the High court was in error incoming to the conclusion (a) that the said decision was provisional and not final (b) that that decision was quasi Judicial and not administrative and (c) that s. 115 did not warrant the High court to give the said directions. In support of his contention he relied on two decisions of the Privy council one in beni Parrhad Koeri rersus Dudhnath Roy (1) and the other in Societe Belge de Banque versus, Girdhari Lal (2) In the case of Bai Parshad, (1) there was a grant of a village by a zamindar to his nephew operating only for life. The nephew survived the zamindar and by an agreement acknowledged the succeeding zamindar to be entitled to the village. The grantee had, however, already executed a potash describing therein as permanent to a lessee. The nephew survived the zamindar and by an agreement acknowledged the succeeding zamindar to be entitled to the village. The grantee had, however, already executed a potash describing therein as permanent to a lessee. The latter obtained possession, and from him after the death of the original grantee for life, the zamindar who succeeded the grantor accepted rent at the rate mentioned in the pottah and did not disturb his possession the plaintiff filed the suit after the death of the lessee claiming the village as part of the inherited zamindri, the answer to the suit being that the lease was perpetual. The Privy-Council held that the original grant being only for the life of the grantee, the said pottah was void as against the grantors successor and not merely voidable after the grantees death. The acceptance of rent at the rate mentioned in the pottah could not have the effect of confirming it in its entirety which according to the High court would have been for a permanent estate. The duration of the pottah could not exceed that of the original grant nor could an admission taken by the high court to have been made on the acceptance of rent have confirmed the permanency of the lease or precluded the claim for legal rights even supposing that admission to have been made. In the case of Societe Belge de Ban que (2) also, the question was as to the effect of an admission made by counsel and the Privy council observed that it was difficult to believe that there was not some misunderstanding as to the acceptance by counsel for the bank of all the findings of the trial judge and that even if counsel did accept such a finding it could only amount to an admission of a point of law which cannot be binding upon a court. It is manifest that both these decisions were cases of admission on a point of law. In the present case there is no question of the learned Attorney General having made an admission or concession on a question of law before the High court. It is manifest that both these decisions were cases of admission on a point of law. In the present case there is no question of the learned Attorney General having made an admission or concession on a question of law before the High court. What actually transpired before the High court, as is clear from the High courts judgment, was that though, until the writ petitions came up for hearing, the case of Union of India was that the impugned decision was final and that therefore nothing remained to be done by it under s. 115 of the Act, the learned attorney-General contended for the first time and contrary to the case of the Union of India in its affidavit that the impugned decision was only provisional, that, there fore, the writ petitions were premature and no question of striking down the impugned decision could or did arise. The observation of the High court that it permitted this new contention to be raised because it turned purely on the language of s. 115 was made because the contention was that the things to be done under s 115 (5) had yet final to be done as the decision was not yet but was only tentative. The high court gave the directions on the footing that the impugned decision, as contended at that stage, was only a provisional one, though, strictly speaking, having held that the writ petitions were premature on the ground aforesaid it was not necessary for it to do anything more than to dismiss the writ petitions The High court, it seems, gave the said directions as Mr. Nambiar who appeared before the high court stated before us at the instance of the petitioners and only for clarification so that when the government of India made its final decision no legal difficulty would arise in our view the contention raised by the learned Attorney General before the High court was not an admission or concession on a matter of law and the provisions of S. 115 of the Act were canvassed before the High court because it was sought to be shown that the things required to be done thereunder were factually not yet done and that therefore the impugned decision was yet a provisional one It was on this footing that the learned Attorney General stated as reproduced by the high court as follows : "the conclusion reached by the central government and impugned in these proceedings, is only a preliminary conclusion; the affected parties have the right of representation against the conclusion; the Central government is bound to examine their representations with the assistance of the Advisory Committee and if need be revise the conclusion reached earlier; hence these petitions are premature". it is manifest that what the learned Attorney General did on behalf of the Union of India was to put forward factually the case of the government of India that though it had contended till then that the decision was final it is in fact not so, and that it was still a provisional one and that before reaching a final decision the government would necessarily have to carry out the requirements of section 115. This having been stated as the case of the Union of India, it was not an admission of law erroneously made, and, therefore, the two decisions relied on by Mr. Desai cannot apply to the facts of these appeals and assist him. The case of the Union of India thus being that in so far as the petitions then being heard by the high court were concerned, they were premature as the decision in question affecting the petitioners before the High court was not final but was only provisional. The High court was right in accepting the case of the Union of India put forward before it at the time of the bearing and in holding that the writ petitions were consequently premature and no question of striking down that decision could arise. The High court was right in accepting the case of the Union of India put forward before it at the time of the bearing and in holding that the writ petitions were consequently premature and no question of striking down that decision could arise. The decision of the High court, therefore, was unexceptionable and cannot be challenged In these appeals by the Union of India as it was given on the acceptance of its own case. ( 8 ) IT is, however, true that the High court has in its judgment staled that the aforesaid provisional list made by the State government had no legal effect, that the jurisdiction to make the list under the Act was vested in the government of India, that the jurisdiction was original and not appellate, that the function under s. 115 is quasi Judicial and not administrative and that therefore it had to be discharged in conformity with the principles of natural justice. All these observations were, as we have already stated, not necessary in view of the High court having held that the writ petitions were premature as the impugned decision was only provisional. In disposing of these appeals we should not be understood to have expressed any opinion one way or the other on these questions as in our view in what has happened none of these questions for the time being arises. Mr. Desai agreed that in view of our confirming the High courts decision that the impugned decision was only provisional as contended before the High court on behalf of the Union, the government of India will receive and consider the representations, if any, made by the petitioners is the aforesaid ten writ petitions, with the assistance of any advisory Committee which the government will constitute as provided by s. 113 (5) and will expeditiously arrive at its final decision in accordance with law It was also agreed both by Mr. Desai and Mr. Nambiar that the aforesaid petitioners will, if they so desire, make their representations within one month from the date of this decision and the central government will arrive at its final decision after considering them within six months from the date of receipt by it of those representations. Desai and Mr. Nambiar that the aforesaid petitioners will, if they so desire, make their representations within one month from the date of this decision and the central government will arrive at its final decision after considering them within six months from the date of receipt by it of those representations. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid we dismiss both the appeals, but in the circumstances of the case we think it fair that there should be no order as to costs. .