JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal by the landlord from the judgment of the first Appellate Court setting aside the decree of the ejectment of the tenant passed by the trial Court and dismissing the suit. The ground on which ejectment was sought was the "personal need" of this non-residential accommodation under section 4 (h) of the Older Act, which was applicable to this case. The appellate Court, however, found that the son of the landlord, from whom the accommodation was wanted had already got alternative accommodation in the form of some uncertain and varying patch on a roadside footpath, on which he used to sit and sell his materials, having obtained a licence from the Municipality. The only question, therefore, is whether in terms of the old Act, for non-residential shopping accommodation the possession or the possibility of a licence to sit in the some corner of the roadside footpath within the municipal area, is alternative accommodation justifying the dismissal of the suit. ( 2. ) THE fact of the case are simple and are common ground The plaintiff is a lady of a trading caste with two sons in the trade The accommodation is a shop rented out to the defendant. The plaintiffs case was that she wanted this shop to enable her sons to run a business. The factual position is that one of the sons is running a shop in a rented building. Under the older Act the possession of an "owned" accommodation is not a criterion, which it is under the present new Act. The other son is doing retail business separately in cloth-selling pieces. He has no shop or some such accommodation. What he has done and has been doing for the last 6 or 7 years is to go out in the morning with a bundle of his cloth and sit at some place by the road in what is called the cloth market area. The road has got no pavement properly so called on either side, but a strip of land not usually used by vehicular traffic which is described as a footpath Peddlers sit on parts of it on licenses given by the municipal authorities, do their trade and go away at night. The road has got no pavement properly so called on either side, but a strip of land not usually used by vehicular traffic which is described as a footpath Peddlers sit on parts of it on licenses given by the municipal authorities, do their trade and go away at night. Possibly some of them put over their heads some canvass or some such protection propped on bamboo sticks but even these structures have to be removed every evening. It is suggested that the license fee, which was used to be taken by the day is now- a- days taken by the month. ( 3. ) WHATEVER might be the requirement of owned accommodation for the first son, the second son named Gopikrishna had, according to the trial court no alternative accommodation. Accordingly that Court decreed the suit. The appellate Court proceeding on the same facts held that there was alternate accommodation and in that accommodation Gopikisan, the son of the plaintiff had been doing "flourishing business" and was, therefore, not genuinely in need of the present accommodation tenanted by the defendant ( 4. ) ON the face of it the decision of the appellate Court is unsatisfactory. After all the patch of the roadside land or footpath on which Gopikishan sits and sells his ware cannot be called accommodation at all. Whatever it is, the accommodation should be something in the continuous control of the occupant. It can in certain circumstances be any land which is not being used for cultivation ; but even so it should be somebodys accommodation and not the roadside which if anything is everybodys accommodation. All that seems to have been happening is that Gopikishan goes in the morning with his bundle of cloth, finds an unoccupied patch on the foot-path in about the same locality every day. He pays a small amount every day to the Municipal Overseer for the permission to sit there or makes a consolidated payment for the month. Whatever he puts on this part of the foot-path he removes in the evening when he goes home. This is not only precarious, but no accommodation at all I do not accept the argument at the bar that any piece of uncultivated land can be accommodation. It can be if it satisfied the other criteria, such as continuous control and intrinsic adaptability for the purpose ( 5. This is not only precarious, but no accommodation at all I do not accept the argument at the bar that any piece of uncultivated land can be accommodation. It can be if it satisfied the other criteria, such as continuous control and intrinsic adaptability for the purpose ( 5. ) EVEN if we are prepared to stretch the point and hold that this is accommodation, this is certainly not "other accommodation" for the purposes of section 4 (h ). In a very general way a plaintiff or plaintiffs family member for whom the accommodation is sought will always be standing or doing his business on some piece of ground is or near the town concerned. Obviously the plaintiff or his family member cannot be just hanging in midair for the duration of the suit. If on this basis we are going to hold that he is in occupation of "other accommodation for this purpose", section 4 (h) would become a dead letter. "other accommodation" certainly means something in continuous control of the person concerned and which is broadly. speaking suitable for the purpose for which the suit accommodation is sought. It is quite conceivable that the landlord or the family member is somehow making do with some kind of arrangement, but if it is not reasonably suitable or sufficient for the purpose I would not call it other accommodation for that purpose. It is seriously urged that in the old Act unlike the new one the word suitable has not been used. But the words used are for that purpose which definitely means for the purpose for which the suit accommodation is sought. Thus, even, under the older Act two things are necessary to justify the dismissal of the suit on the ground of the landlord or his family member being in occupation of other accommodation. First, that accommodation should be for the purpose. In other words suitable for the purpose for which the suit accommodation is sought; secondly, it should be an alternative to the accommodation sought, in other-words in sufficiency and the general amenities it should be comparable By either of these tests the accommodation so called on the foot-oath is not sufficient or suitable or "for that purpose". ( 6. In other words suitable for the purpose for which the suit accommodation is sought; secondly, it should be an alternative to the accommodation sought, in other-words in sufficiency and the general amenities it should be comparable By either of these tests the accommodation so called on the foot-oath is not sufficient or suitable or "for that purpose". ( 6. ) OUT of the cases cited the following help us to understand the real significance of the words "any other accommodation for that purpose" : The ruling reported in Damodar Haridas Sharma and another v. Nandram Deviram (1960 M P LJ925) where the majority follow the earlier Madhya Bharat Full Bench ruling Motilal v. Badrilal (1954 M B l j 274.): "a tenant is liable to be ejected from the shop in his occupation on the ground that landlord requires it for continuing for starting his own business unless it can be shown that any other non-residential accommodation in occupation of the landlord is suitable for the purpose of continuing or starting the landlords own business, Ejectment of a tenant cannot be had for future expansion of the business of his landlord. On the other hand, if the landlords business has in fact grown and there is a felt need, to be determined objectively, for additional accommodation for the purpose of continuing the expanded business, the tenant is liable to be ejected. " ( 7. ) IT has been urged that it is not sufficient for the purposes of a suit under section 4 (h) of the old Act for the landlord merely to assert that he is in need of the accommodation. He should make a case for it and there should be something genuine and not ulterior. There is no doubt about this and accordingly it is unnecessary to quote the rulings in which this has been laid down. In the instant case the landlord is not merely asserting the need, but has brought out by evidence, which is admitted by the first appellate Court, the patent fact of one of the sons Gopikishan running a business in cloth for which he has no accommodation and which he has to run by sheer necessity by sitting on the foot-path. There is nothing ulterior in the request and accordingly the very findings of fact recorded by both the Courts justify a decree of the ejectment of the tenant-respondent. ( 8. There is nothing ulterior in the request and accordingly the very findings of fact recorded by both the Courts justify a decree of the ejectment of the tenant-respondent. ( 8. ) THE appeal is allowed. The judgment of the first appellate Court is set aside and the decree for ejectment passed by the trial Court is restored including the order for compensation. The plaintiff-appellant shall get the costs of her suit throughout along with pleaders fee in each of the three Courts calculated according to the rules. Appeal allowed.