JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - The appeal from an appellate judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge of Kanpur raises certain vexed questions which of late have been agitating the made of judge, jurists, professional lawyers and administrators alike, whether refusal by a disciplinary authority while on quiring into charges against a Government servant to allow that Government servant to have his case presented and defended by another person in whom he has confidence, may be his own colleague in his office or a lawyer, amount to denial of adequate opportunity or reasonable opportunity to defend himself. 2. The plaintiff appellant Ram Harkh Tiwari was employed as a lower division clerk in the Harness and Saddlery Factory, Kanpur, an establishment under the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India. He was charged with gross misconduct in having tried to commit theft of Government property. The Board of Enquiry was constituted under Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952, before whom the charges levelled against him were enquired into. The Board of Enquiry on a consideration of the evidence on record found the charged proved. A notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service was then served on the plaintiff and his explanation having been found unsatisfactory the appointing authority by its order dated 6-7-1960 dismissed him from service. A departmental appeal having proved unsuccessful, the plaintiff then instituted the suit in the court of the Munsiff at Kanpur. The substantive relief claimed was as follows :- "That it be declared that the plaintiff has been wrongly dismissed from service and his services are still continuing and he is entitled to all benefits and privileges of a Government servant of rank and position and that the order of dismissed dated 6-7-1960 is illegal, null and void and without jurisdiction and does not and cannot affect the legal status of the plaintiff." 3. The cause of action as revealed by the plaint was based on certain allegation concerning the conduct of enquiry by the Board of Enquiry under Rr. 15 of the above mentioned rules. Briefly stated the allegation was that the Court of Enquiry conducted the trial of the plaintiff in utter violation the trial of the principles of natural justice. The cause of action as revealed by the plaint was based on certain allegation concerning the conduct of enquiry by the Board of Enquiry under Rr. 15 of the above mentioned rules. Briefly stated the allegation was that the Court of Enquiry conducted the trial of the plaintiff in utter violation the trial of the principles of natural justice. It was alleged that (a) accusation against the plaintiff was false and has come up as a result of conspiracy against him by Sri Viz., and Jaipal Singh, Gate-keeper and Senior Gate-keeper of the Factory respectively; (b) that the request of the plaintiff to engage a person for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses he in not being good health and having no experience of conduct of trials and having no knowledge of the rules of the Court of Enquiry, was turned down; (c) that the request of the plaintiff to permit him to keep a person with him to note statement of the witnesses so that he could prepare himself for their cross-examination was also rejected; (d) that relevant material question which were absolutely necessary and germane to the enquiry were not allowed to be put to the witness in cross-examination; (e) that the answers which went to belie and falsify the charge levelled a against the Enquiry; (f) that material witnesses were withheld despite the plaintiff's prayer to summon them and he was further denied an opportunity to produce one of his witnesses; (g) that the plaintiff was denied an effective right of cross-examination by the Court of Enquiry; (h) that certain documents in support of the defence case sought to be adduced by the plaintiff were not admitted in evidence. 4. On behalf of the Union of India all the allegations made in the plaint relating to the conduct of enquiry were denied and it was pleaded that the enquiry was held strictly in accordance with the rules and no principle of natural justice was violated and the plaintiff was afforded full opportunity to present his defence to himself examine the departmental witnesses and to examine the departmental witnesses and to examine witnesses in defence which opportunity the plaintiff fully utilized. It was further denied that the plaintiff was not afforded an effective opportunity for examining the departmental witnesses and that only those questions were disallowed which in the opinion of the Enquiry Committee were irrelevant. It was further denied that the plaintiff was not afforded an effective opportunity for examining the departmental witnesses and that only those questions were disallowed which in the opinion of the Enquiry Committee were irrelevant. It was stated that all the material witnesses on behalf of the department for establishing the charges were produced and no material witness was withheld. As regards the allegation of the plaintiff that one of his defence witnesses was not summoned and not allowed to be examined, it was stated that he was not a material witness. The plea of the plaintiff that he was refused assistance of a representative to present his case and conduct the defence at the enquiry was met in the written statement in para. 11 in the following words:- "According to the departmental rule it is only an illiterate person who can be allowed the assistance and advice of a friend during the conduct of the enquiry and no literate person could be allowed to get the help of any legal adviser or a friend and the request of the plaintiff for such assistance was rightly rejected." 5. The learned Munsif on the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues :- (1) Whether the plaintiff was denied reasonable opportunity in the departmental enquiry? If so, its effect? (2) Whether the order of dismissal is bad for violation of rules as alleged in para. 16 of the plaint? If so its effect? (3) Whether the notice under S. 80, Civil P.C., is invalid? (4) Whether the Court has jurisdiction to try the suit? (5) Whether the suit is bad for reasons given in para. 27 of the written statement? (6) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled. 6. At the trial amount others the plaintiff examined himself as a witness and on behalf of the defendant the main witness examined was Sri A.S. Sinha, the President of the Court of Enquiry. A large number of documents were produced in evidence on behalf of the parties. 7. (6) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled. 6. At the trial amount others the plaintiff examined himself as a witness and on behalf of the defendant the main witness examined was Sri A.S. Sinha, the President of the Court of Enquiry. A large number of documents were produced in evidence on behalf of the parties. 7. The learned Munsif considered issues numbers 1 and 2 together and he examined the subject : matter covered by those issues under distinct grounds : (1) That the plaintiff was not given full opportunity to cross examine the witnesses; (2) that the statements were not correctly recorded; (3) that the plaintiff was not allowed to engage a defence counsel; (4) that the plaintiff wanted to examine one Rama Shamkar who was not examined. 8. On grounds numbers 1 and 2 the learned Munsif concluded:- "There is no reason to disbelieve Sri Sinha. To my mind these allegations are after-thought and the result of advice later had. These grounds are therefore baseless and have no substance. On ground No. 3 the conclusion was as follows :- Sri Sinha has stated that under departmental rules only illiterates are allowed to be assisted by other person. Moreover, the present case was of fact and those too not complicated, not involving legal intricacies. So this ground has to my mind, not prejudiced the plaintiff." As to ground No. 4 the learned Munsif said :- "Sri Sinha has stated that Rama Shankar was not examined because the plaintiff's past carrier was irrelevant to the charge of theft against the plaintiff under enquiry." 9. The issues numbers 4 and 5 were not pressed on behalf of the defendant. In view of the findings on issues numbers 1 and 2 the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 10. An appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif preferred by the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned Additional Civil Judge of Kanpur substantially for the same reasons as commended themselves to the learned Munsif. 11. Sri K.L. Grover, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellant, contended that the judgment and decree of the court below were vitiated because of an erroneous approach made by the learned Judge of the court below to the facts and circumstances of the case resulting in the fail failure to apply the correct principles of law which were well established. 12. 12. The first submission of the learned counsel was that the question that arose in the case was not that the plaintiff as of right could claim representation through a counsel but the real question that arose was whether in the circumstances of the case the refusal by the court of Enquiry to permit the plaintiff to have the assistance of his colleagues to present his case and conduct the defence, or to have the assistance of some one to take down notes of the statement to facilitate the cross-examination of the prosecution witness, amounted to a non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 15 which enjoined that an adequate opportunity shall be afforded to the delinquent employee to defend his case. It was pointed out by the learned counsel, and rightly so, that the plaintiff had never sought permission from the Court of Enquiry to allow a counsel, that is a professional lawyer, to present the defence case at the enquiry. It has been established on the evidence on record that the plaintiff had given names of three persons who were employees of the Factory and sought permission of the Court of Enquiry that one or more of them be allowed to present and conduct the case of the defendant at the enquiry which permission was refused. It has also been established on record that the plaintiff made an application for permission of the Court of Enquiry to have another person by his side to take down the depositions of the prosecution witnesses and thus assist the plaintiff who under the stress of serious accusations against him could not have taken the depositions and at the same time think of cross-questions for effective examination, but this simple prayer even was refused. Sri A.N. Sinha in his deposition stated that he declined permission to the plaintiff to have the aid of a counsel on account of a rule to the effect that only an illiterate employee can have that privilege and the plaintiff being a literate person was not entitled to be defended by counsel. It is significant that while in the pleadings the defendants had relied upon a rule to that effect but ultimately in evidence it transpired that there was no rule to that effect but only some Government Order. Sri Sinha's statement that there was some rule to that effect does not appear to be correct. It is significant that while in the pleadings the defendants had relied upon a rule to that effect but ultimately in evidence it transpired that there was no rule to that effect but only some Government Order. Sri Sinha's statement that there was some rule to that effect does not appear to be correct. He himself relied upon some letter of the Government containing the necessary instructions. 13. Sri K.L. Grover is on strong ground in contending that a mere Government directive contained in any circular latter would not have the effect of a statutory rule of a binding nature and will not limit or whittle down the true effect of the provision of R. 15 as to the requirement of affording adequate opportunity to the Government employees to defend himself. 14. Sri. P.M. Sahai, the learned standing Counsel appearing for the defendant respondent rightly did not attempt to show that what was contained in the latter whose reference is made in exhibit 7 on record would amount to a statutory rule but submitted that the Court of Enquiry having acted upon those instructions, its decision which was based on exercise of discretion vested in the Court of Enquiry was not open to scrutiny in a civil court and the court below rightly held that the court of enquiry having the power to refuse permission to the delinquent employee to be defended by a counsel and it having exercised that power in its discretion it could not be said that say principle of natural justice was violated. The learned Junior Standing Counsel placed strong reliance on the observations of Das Gupta, J. in the case of Kalindri v. Tata Locomotive Ltd., A.I.R. 1960 SC 914 in support of his contention that a mere refusal by a domestic tribunal to allow the delinquent employee to be defended by a counsel or a person of his choice would not be denial of natural justice as it was no part of natural justice that in case of enquiries into charges against a workman he would have a right of representation. In the case cited the learned Judges of the Supreme Court were considering the question that when the management of industry holds an enquiry into the charges against a workman for the purpose of deciding what action, if any, should be taken against him has the workman a right to be represented by a representative of his Union at the enquiry? The learned Judges of the Supreme Court were not faced with the problem which arises in the instant case pertaining to the scope and extent of requirements of an adequate opportunity being afforded to a delinquent employee at an enquiry conducted under the statutory rules. I am not aware of any statutory rules having been framed or any law having been enacted regulating the procedure at a domestic enquiry carried on by the employers of an industry against their workman and that seems to be the fundamental difference. It would be seen that Das Gupta, J. who spoke for the Court in the case cited took notice of the fact that under the law it was always open to the workman to raise an industrial dispute against the verdict of the employer and take recourse to an adjudicatory process before an independent authority. Further the Supreme Court noticed that while the management rejected the request of the workman to be represented by a representative of the Union, it did permit the workman, if he so desired, to be represented by a co-worker form the workman's own department at the enquiry. Once these facts and circumstances are appreciated, the observations of the Supreme Court in that context to the effect. "When the general practice adopted by domestic tribunals is that the person accused conducts his own case, we are unable to accept an argument that natural justice demands that in the case of enquiries into a charge sheet of mis-conduct against a workman he should be represented by a member of the Union." Become: evidently clear that at a domestic enquiry the workman cannot claim on the basis of principles of natural justice that he had an absolute right to be represented by the representative of the Union of which he was a member. A reference was made to the rules framed by Government an regards the procedure to be followed in enquiries against their own employees and it was shown that no provision is made in those rules that the person against whom an enquiry is held may be represented by anybody else and the conclusion drawn by the Supreme Court seems apparently to derive support from that circumstance but that to my mind would not be a declaration of law that even in the case of a Government servant who is being proceeded against under the rules framed by the Government in no case can he be allowed to be represented by a counsel or by anybody else. I have already observed above that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court were confined to an enquiry into the question whether as of right a delinquent workman could claim representation through anybody else and the decision of Supreme Court therefore would be declaratory of law only to the extent that a workman cannot as of right claim before a domestic tribunal enquiring into charges against him to be represented by somebody else. However, in this appeal before me Sri Grover for the appellant has not contended that the right of the plaintiff to be represented by somebody else at the enquiry has been violated. What he contends for is that in the particular circumstances of the case the refusal on the part of the Court of Enquiry to allow the plaintiff to represent his case through somebody else or to have the assistance of somebody else to take down notes, will amount to the breach of the provisions of rule 15 of the said Rules which provide that an adequate opportunity ought to be afforded to the delinquent employee to defend himself. 15. I am conscious of the fact that there are authorities and even of the highest Court in the land that it would not amount to denial of opportunity to a delinquent employee of the Government when the enquiry officer or the Court of enquiry or the tribunal, as the case may be, refuses permission through a counsel and that a right to appear in person is confined only to participation in the proceedings by the delinquent employee himself and nothing more. Some other decisions were cited before me by the learned Standing Counsel but on a further examination of the development of the case law in contemporary time it is clear to my mind that the Courts of law have now veered round to the view that it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case whether denial to a delinquent officer or employee to have the aid of a counsel or somebody else in whom he has confidence, violates the constitutional guarantee under Article 311 of the Constitution or S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, or the statutory rule under which the enquiry is held. In the case of Dr. K. Subba Rao v. State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1957 Andh Pra 414, Subba Rao, C.J. observed as follows: "Rightly or wrongly when the public servant is under a reasonable apprehension that the enquiry is the result of a preconceived plan and a concocted action on the part of his department, his request for professional help is certainly justified and the enquiring officer should give him that opportunity. His refusal to accede to that simple request certainly deprives a public servant of an opportunity to defend himself." 16. In the case of Ramesh Chandra Verma v. R.D. Verma, AIR 1958 Allahabad 532, Mahrotra, J. observed: "It is true that in the departmental trials the civil servant involved is not entitled as a matter of right to claim facility for taking legal advice, but the refusal to offer a reasonable opportunity to take such advice when viewed in the light of the other circumstances of the case ultimately lead to the inference that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself." 17. Similar view has been expressed by two of the learned Judge who constituted a Special Bench in the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nipendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of W.B., A.I.R. 1961 Cal 1. In that case besides other questions of substances, one of the questions that arose related to the scope and extent of adequate opportunity within the meaning of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Control, Classification & Appeal) Rules and reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. of W.B., A.I.R. 1961 Cal 1. In that case besides other questions of substances, one of the questions that arose related to the scope and extent of adequate opportunity within the meaning of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Control, Classification & Appeal) Rules and reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. P. B. Mukerjee, J. observed: "Having regard to the volume of depositions, number of witnesses and documents, I have come to the conclusion on the facts of the case that refusal to allow the petitioner the assistance of a lawyer even for the purpose of making notes was denial of "adequate opportunity" under Rule 55 and "reasonable opportunity" under Article 311(2) of the Constitution." 18. The following may be quoted with profit from the judgment of the other learned Judge Mukerjee, J. constituting the Bench: "The rule clearly contemplates hearing of evidence and examination and cross-examination of witnesses and production and consideration of documents too. It may be, as I have said above, person charged, cannot in such enquiries, demand as of right to be heard through a lawyer or to be assisted by a lawyer, although he has, certainly, a right to be heard in person, or to demand such personal hearing and an oral enquiry but the rule does not, in my opinion, rule out of so-called delinquent's representation by a lawyer, even where that may be justly necessary for giving him "adequate" or "reasonable" opportunity to defend himself as stated in the rule itself." 19. It has not been disputed by the learned Standing Counsel that in substance the language of rule 15 of the said Rules is similar to the language of rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Counsel and Appeal) Rules. The observations of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nipendra Nath Begchi, A.I.R. 1981 Cal 1 (supra) would be pertinent and relevant for the purpose of finding out the scope and extent of the opportunity to be afforded to the plaintiff under Rule 15 of the above said Rules. The observations of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nipendra Nath Begchi, A.I.R. 1981 Cal 1 (supra) would be pertinent and relevant for the purpose of finding out the scope and extent of the opportunity to be afforded to the plaintiff under Rule 15 of the above said Rules. Here I may notice one of the arguments made at the bar by the learned Standing Counsel which was to the effect that the plaintiff not being a member of the Civil Service, or holder of any civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution, cannot take benefit of the constitutional guarantee under sun-art. (2) of Article 311 and therefore the rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant would be of no benefit to him as those rulings were given in the case of Government servant to whom the provisions of Article 311 were applicable. The submission was that it is the content of reasonable opportunity which brings in the limitation of representation through an expert or a lawyer at the departmental enquiry in complicate cases and since under the role 15 the plaintiff was only to be given adequate opportunity it is that rule alone from which it could be found out as to what the extent and scope of that opportunity is. In other words, his argument was that if that rule by itself does not provide for the right of representation through a counsel or leaves it to the discretion of the court of enquiry to allow the delinquent employee to secure the help of a lawyer in the conduct of enquiry, the plaintiff cannot complain that he has not been afforded an adequate opportunity. It was said that requirements of oral enquiry under Rule 15 were : (1) hearing of the oral evidence on the allegations which are not admitted; (2) cross-examination of the witnesses by the person charged; (3) giving of evidence in person as the delinquent wishes. 20. It was then argued that this is all what constitutes adequate opportunity within the meaning of that rule. I am unable to accept this line of argument of the learned Standing Counsel. The cataloguing of what is to be done under Rule 15 at the enquiry is not the content of the "adequate opportunity". 20. It was then argued that this is all what constitutes adequate opportunity within the meaning of that rule. I am unable to accept this line of argument of the learned Standing Counsel. The cataloguing of what is to be done under Rule 15 at the enquiry is not the content of the "adequate opportunity". What is contemplated is that for fulfilment of all the steps provided in that Rule an opportunity should be afforded. It would all depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as to what is to be done at the enquiry by delinquent employee to effectually examine and cross-examine witnesses and to present his defence case. Rule 15 affords an opportunity to the delinquent employee to defend himself. It is for defending himself that the opportunity has to be given. That opportunity, as the rule provides, must be adequate, that is to say, sufficient or commensurate with the purpose or the object. Whatever is sufficient and commensurate with the purpose to be achieved would be also said to be reasonable. It is difficult for ne to draw any distinction between the two expressions: "reasonable opportunity" and "adequate opportunity"; a thing which would not be adequate would not be reasonable and a thing which is reasonable would be adequate. Therefore, nothing turns on the argument of the learned Standing Counsel that since the case of the plaintiff does not fall within Article 311 of the Constitution no question would arise of his being represented at the enquiry through somebody else. What in the particular circumstances of the case would fulfil the requirements of reasonable opportunity would also be equally available for meeting the requirements of adequate opportunity. In my judgment if the facts and circumstances of the case required that the delinquent employee needed the aid and assistance of somebody else, may be a trained lawyer, to present and conduct his defence at the disciplinary enquiry, without which he could not properly put his case, then the refusal by the enquiry officer or the court of enquiry to permit that employee to have a such help and assistance would certainly amount to denial of adequate opportunity to the delinquent employer. 21. 21. The next question then that arises is whether in the circumstances of the instant case has the plaintiff succeeded in establishing that the refusal on the part of the court of Enquiry to permit the representation through other colleagues of his office and the subsequent refusal to permit the plaintiff to secure the aid and assistance of a writer or a recorder, amounts to denial of adequate opportunity within the meaning of Rule 15 of the said Rules. It would be seen that the plaintiff's case was that he was a victim of some conspiracy that he was falsely charged that he had brought to the Factory six rubber soles of shoes which he had purchased and which he handed over on the demand of the gate. He denied that he committed any theft of Government property and also denied the recovery of leather soles belonging to the Factory from his person as alleged. The plaintiff was charged with a serious offence of theft of Government property. The stakes were too high and risk was too deep for the plaintiff to defend himself at an enquiry unaided and unassisted. Moreso, when higher officers were to come in evidence to accuse him and he felt that there was some sort of conspiracy or concert against him of persons interested. It should be borne in mind that for the offence charged when established the plaintiff could be awarded the highest punishment, that is, of dismissal from service. His and his family's very livelihood then depended on the result of the enquiry. In those circumstances when the plaintiff made a prayer to the Court of Enquiry that he, not being in good health and not being acquainted with the rules and regulations and not having any experience of conducting trials and not having any experience of conducting trials and enquiry, needed the assistance of somebody else, his prayer could not be said to be unreasonable or improper. I find that the Court of Enquiry rejected the prayer not on a consideration of the genuineness of the demand of the plaintiff but for the reason that Court of Enquiry felt bound by the departmental circular of the Government having no option in the matter. I find that the Court of Enquiry rejected the prayer not on a consideration of the genuineness of the demand of the plaintiff but for the reason that Court of Enquiry felt bound by the departmental circular of the Government having no option in the matter. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel that the Court of Enquiry being vested with the discretion in such a matter having exercised it, it was no longer open to the Civil Court to find fault with it, has no foundation in fact. Sri Sinha in his evidence at the trial of the suit in a very straightforward manner stated that there being a rule that no literate person could be allowed to be represented by somebody else at the enquiry, the request was rejected. However, it is now found that there is no such rule but only some instructions to the effect in a departmental circular. It was not the case of Sri Sinha, the President of the court of Enquiry, that the request of the plaintiff for being represented through his colleague at the conduct of the enquriy was considered on merits and was not found to be reasonable. Both the courts below, in my judgment, fall into an error in holding that since there was a rule prohibiting the representation through some body else of a delinquent employee who was literate, the plaintiff could have no cause of action for claiming a relief in the suit on the mere refusal by the Court of Enquiry to allow the plaintiff to be represented by somebody else. 22. The learned Standing Counsel then submitted that the questions whether any prejudice was caused to the plaintiff in his not having been allowed to represent his case case and defend him self through somebody else will essentially be a question of fact and the findings of the court below would be binding in second appeal. I confess I fail to appreciate the implications of this argument. Firstly there is no finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court on this point. I confess I fail to appreciate the implications of this argument. Firstly there is no finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court on this point. While the learned Munsif thought that the case of the plaintiff at the enquiry was a simple one and therefore he did not need services of any counsel, the learned judge of the lower appellate court simply based his decision on the ground that the rules did not permit representation through a counsel, therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to have a counsel. In other words the approach made by the learned Judge of the Court below was as if the plea raised on behalf of the plaintiff was that he as of right asked for representation through a counsel at the enquiry. I do not find any discussion in the judgment of the lower appellate court relating to the nature of the case of the plaintiff at the disciplinary enquiry. In fact it appears to me that the learned Judge of the court below was not alive to the correct approach the law required in such matters. I am afraid I do not agree with the learned Standing Counsel that there is some finding of fact by which I am bound in second in appeal in this regard. MOreover, the courts below have also fallen into an error of fact by which I am bound in second appeal in this regard. Moreover, the courts below have also fallen into an error of fact on this part of the case. They seem to have thought that the plaintiff at the disciplinary enquiry wanted the aid of a lawyer. I have already said above that the evidence establish that he wanted aid and assistance of some of the colleagues in the department. The whole question ought to have been considered by the court below in that light. In this view of the matter also if there is any finding recorded by the court below on this part of the case and that finding can be said to be a finding of fact, it will be vitiated. 23. The whole question ought to have been considered by the court below in that light. In this view of the matter also if there is any finding recorded by the court below on this part of the case and that finding can be said to be a finding of fact, it will be vitiated. 23. The learned Standing Counsel then submitted that even if it appears to this Court that the that the case of the prosecution which the plaintiff was to meet at the disciplinary enquiry was complicated and difficult, full compliance having been made with the provisions of Rule 15 by an opportunity having been afforded to the plaintiff for submitting a written explanation at the oral enquiry examination of witnesses having been done in his presence, full scope for cross-examination having been afforded to the plaintiff, all the evidence produced in defence having been admitted and no rules of natural justice having been violated in that respect, therefore the verdict of the Court of enquiry cannot be disturbed by the indirect method of finding fault with it on some trivialities like that of cross-examination having been hampered with, some questions found to be irrelevant not having been allowed to be put and mere assistance of departmental colleague or a writer having been refused. It was further contended that unless it were shown that the so-called defects in the conduct of proceedings by the Court of Enquiry as alleged in the plaint resulted in a wrong verdict, even if there were certain irregularities the Court cannot grant a decree to the plaintiff as he has not established prejudice. 24. It was further contended that the procedure as established by the rule having been followed and there being no substantial or inherent defect in the procedure which was followed by the Court of Enquiry, its verdict can be be set aside only if the plaintiff succeeded in establishing mala fide on the part of the Court of Enquiry. Reliance has been placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court in this connection, the first is Ananda Bazar Patrika v. Their Employees, A.I.R. 1964 SC 339 and the second is Major U.R. Bhatta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1344. Reliance has been placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court in this connection, the first is Ananda Bazar Patrika v. Their Employees, A.I.R. 1964 SC 339 and the second is Major U.R. Bhatta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1344. The law laid down in the said two cases is that it is not within the competence of the civil Court to sit in judgment over the decision of the authority who is competent by law to dismiss a public servant provided he has been afforded an opportunity to defend himself in accordance with the rules and the law applicable to the proceedings of the enquiry. To my mind, none of the contentions raised by Sri Grover on behalf of the plaintiff appellant, militate against the rule of law laid down by the Supreme Court, I do not find any implication in the arguments of Sri Grover inviting this Court to consider the verdict of the Court of Enquiry on merits. His complaint on behalf of the plaintiff is confined to the denial of adequate opportunity to the plaintiff by the Court of Enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings. The learned Standing Counsel is under a misapprehension when he thinks that in order to find out whether any actual prejudice has been caused to the plaintiff by the procedure adopted by the Court of Enquiry on merits has to be done. I find some amount of contradiction in the arguments raised by the learned Standing Counsel. Firstly, he assumes that in very case prejudice has to be established and then in order to find out whether prejudice has been caused the civil Court will have to consider in retrospect whether the verdict would have been different had representation been allowed to the plaintiff to defend himself through somebody else or certain questions were allowed to be put and certain witnesses were allowed to be examined. I think in a matter like the one which I have to consider in this appeal, consideration of the merit of the verdict on a review of the evidence on which actually it is based by a retrospective process of thinking or reasoning, is not called for. I think in a matter like the one which I have to consider in this appeal, consideration of the merit of the verdict on a review of the evidence on which actually it is based by a retrospective process of thinking or reasoning, is not called for. The question relating to the affording of adequate opportunity is to be answered on the basis of facts and circumstances which emerge out from the nature of the accusation and the particulars on which the charge was based and the nature of defence raised and not on how the court of of Enquiry on the material on record reached the verdict which verdict would have been otherwise if any more material could be brought by the delinquent employee on record. I think the learned Judges in the case of A.I.R. 1957 Andhra Pra 414 decided by the High Court of Andha Pradesh (supra) an in the Calcutta case, Nipendra Nath Bagchi, A.I.R. 1961 Cal 1 (supra) laid down the proper principles of approach in such cases. In those cases the approach was not made that on certain facts and circumstances which could be brought on record in evidence by the delinquent Government servant at the enquiry had he been given further latitude by the disciplinary enquiry, the result would have been different. The approach that was made was on the basis of the nature of accusation and the defence raised and the difficult position in which the delinquent Government servant found himself at the threshold when about to face the enquiry. Most of the elements that were present in the two cases just mentioned by me are present in the instant case. The plaintiff when he was called upon to face the enquiry thought that he was a victim of conspiracy and a serious charge of theft of Government property falsely was brought against him by his enemies to deprive him of his only means of livelihood. A number of witness were to be examined on behalf of the department to establish the charges and some of the witnesses were occupying high posts as compared to the plaintiff. He had to refute a statement which he gave in writing immediately after the alleged incident which according to his defence was taken from him under duress and pressure of high officials who threatened to hand him over to the police. He had to refute a statement which he gave in writing immediately after the alleged incident which according to his defence was taken from him under duress and pressure of high officials who threatened to hand him over to the police. He had to establish that the recovery was not made from him of the six leather soles of the Factory but what he handed over was six rubber-soles which had been brought by him in the Factory to be taken back after working hours. Thus the nature of accusation and the nature of the defence disclosed that the case would have turned substantially on the assessment of oral evidence. The examination and the cross-examination of the witnesses thus was of great importance at the enquiry. I have observed above that for the plaintiff as an honourable employee in the Factory the matter was of supreme importance as it involved the highest punishment, that is of dismissal, on a serious charge which once established would have attached further stigma on him and effect his reputation and dignity amongst his companions. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Chintaman Sadashiva Wais-hampayan, A.I.R. 1961 SC 1623 as follows : "It is hardly necessary to emphasis that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who gave evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with the rules of natural justice". 25. In the instant case it is establish on the evidence on record that the plaintiff was asked to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses then and there and he had not been given sufficient time even to think out the effect of the examination-in-chief for putting the questions in cross-examination. His request to call in aid somebody else experienced in such matter had already been refused. His further request to have an assistant with him who could record the depositions in the examination-in-chief so that at the time of cross-examination he would have a written report before him was also denied. He was expected to rely on his memory and on his intelligence to remember everything. His further request to have an assistant with him who could record the depositions in the examination-in-chief so that at the time of cross-examination he would have a written report before him was also denied. He was expected to rely on his memory and on his intelligence to remember everything. Considering the nature of the accusation and the evidence which was adduced on behalf of the department and the nature of the defence raised it would be obvious that the plaintiff must have been put under great stress and strain. Too much was expected of him that he would preserve all what was said by the witnesses in memory, analyse the same as a trained lawyer, sift out the relevant from the irrelevant and frame questions. It is common experience that even trained lawyers do not embark upon a cross-examination of a witness unless they have first studied the whole of the deposition in the examination-in-chief and have spent some time in thinking out the line of cross-examination consistent with the defence raised. It is not an easy matter even for a trained mind. The learned Standing Counsel tried to brush aside the matter by merely saying that at the enquiry simple facts were to be considered, namely, whether the plaintiff was actually caught and recovery made from him of six leather soles balonging to the Factory. Even the most serious charges in a regular criminal trial against an accused can be reduced to that simplicity but that is no answer. The matter has to be probed and then an answer can be possible for what apparently looks simple really raises problems of immense difficulty in so far as cross-examination of the witnesses is concerned. The complaint of the plaintiff that on the first day of enquiry he was stopped from fully cross-examine the main prosecution witnesses, namely, Vij and Jaipal Singh, has a ring of truth. The plaintiff sent up a complaint to the higher officer that he had not been allowed to put questions in cross-examination and he was hampered by the Court of Enquiry in fully cross-examining the witness. He received a reply to that communication that only irrelevant questions were not allowed. There is thus an admission on the part of the Court of Enquiry that certain questions put by the plaintiff in the cross-examination were disallowed. He received a reply to that communication that only irrelevant questions were not allowed. There is thus an admission on the part of the Court of Enquiry that certain questions put by the plaintiff in the cross-examination were disallowed. A perusal of the record of proceedings of the Court of Enquiry for the day and the nature of the defence raised would make it obvious that much more could be asked from the prosecution witnesses in the light of the defence raised. The learned Judge of the Court below thought that the verdict of the Court of Enquiry that the questions were irrelevant was sufficient as under the rules it was absolutely at their discretion to control the proceedings and allow only relevant questions. I am not concerned whether the questions put were relevant or irrelevant, but what I am concerned with is that some questions put by the plaintiff at the enquiry in cross-examination of the two important witnesses were disallowed. The record further shows that the Court of Enquiry did not take down the questions put by the plaintiff and then disallow it on the ground that they were irrelevant which procedure they seem to have adopted on subsequent days when they found that the plaintiff had brought the the matter to the notice of the higher officer and there is much in the suggestion of Sri Grover for the plaintiff appellant that if the questions were really irrelevant the Court of Enquiry would have without hesitation noted them even on the first day and recorded its opinion that they were irrelevant. Again the grievance of the plaintiff that there was deprivation of adequate opportunity he not having been allowed to produce Rama Shankar, a witness has substance. Rama Shankar was to be produced for testifying to the enmity and bad relations alleged by the plaintiff with Vij and Jaipal Singh. Not being a very educated and trained person the plaintiff had mentioned in his application that Rama Shankar was a witness for testifying the past career. This was interpreted by the Court of Enquiry as meaning the past career of the plaintiff and was regarded as irrelevant. The plaintiff in his evidence before the Court stated that what he meant by past career the past happenings to establish enmity and bad relations. This was interpreted by the Court of Enquiry as meaning the past career of the plaintiff and was regarded as irrelevant. The plaintiff in his evidence before the Court stated that what he meant by past career the past happenings to establish enmity and bad relations. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the plaintiff ought to have been given an opportunity to produce Rama Shankar, particularly when the record shows that the plaintiff had fully co-operated at the enquiry though under server handicap and by no means could be said to have tried to adopt dilatory tactics or prolixity in procedure. He had not applied for examining an undue large number of witnesses in defence. Moreover, it is not shown that Rama Shankar was not available and it would have entailed adjournment of the enquiry. 26. Sri Grover further pointed out that the documents which were sought to be filed by the plaintiff were also not admitted in evidence on the ground that they were irrelevant. One of such documents was a receipt showing the purchase of six rubber-soles by the plaintiff on the fateful day. It is obvious that it was a relevant document to support his defence. The view of the Court of Enquiry that the factum of recovery of six leather soles having been established this document was irrelevant, to my mind, begs the very question which the Court of Enquiry was to determine. The relevance of this document cannot be doubted. The other documents which were sought to be produced were police reports and summons issued against Sri Vij, the main prosecution witness in cases relating to certain disputes of a criminal nature. These documents would have been of material hearing for establishing the enmity of bad relationship between the plaintiff and others concerned. Their relevancy also cannot be doubted. I am constrained to observe that the learned Judge of the Court below altogether missed the point in the appeal which arose before him and thinking that the orders of the Court of Enquiry in such matters being final and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Enquiry, it was not open to the Civil Court to Judge whether those orders resulted in denial of adequate opportunity to the plaintiff to defend himself at the enquiry. 27. 27. Lastly an attempt was made by the learned standing Counsel to show that the directive of the Government that only illiterate persons should be allowed to have the aid of a counsel at the disciplinary enquiry was a reasonable measure and if the enquiring authority obeys, it cannot be said to be doing anything unreasonable. The submission was that if the enquiring authority does something reasonable in the conduct of the proceedings if would not amount to denial of adequate opportunity or reasonable opportunity. The argument indeed is ingenious. There is no legal definition of literate and illiterate. If what is meant by literate is a man who can read and write and nothing more then it is hardly relevant to Judge the reasonableness of the directive on the footing that a literate man does not need the aid of a trained lawyer when facing a serious charge and when called upon to defend himself. Even the most educated men would be put under a stress when brought before a court or an authority on a serious charge and called upon to defend himself. That a certain person is a literate or educated hardly will matter in determining whether in the circumstances in which he is placed he needs the assistance of another person to defend himself. Even a man who knows how to read and write may not have a good memory and analytical intelligence. A man who may not know how to read and write yet have that sufficient amount of native intelligence and analytical power. We have to consider whether a man is capable of cross-examining a witness, an art which all know is said to be a very difficult one; merely the fact that he knows how to read and write would hardly be a criteria to judge his capacities for successfully accomplishing the task of cross-examination. To my mind the directive of the Government is wholly arbitrary and bears no relationship with the object for which it has been made. As already said above it not being a rule it would not affect the right of the delinquent employee to be afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself under R. 15 of the said Rules. 28. To my mind the directive of the Government is wholly arbitrary and bears no relationship with the object for which it has been made. As already said above it not being a rule it would not affect the right of the delinquent employee to be afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself under R. 15 of the said Rules. 28. For the reasons given above I allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and decree the suit of the plaintiff in terms of the relief (a) of the plaint. The plaintiff appellant shall be entitled to his costs throughout.