JUDGMENT Rajeshwari Prasad, J. - This petition in revision along with Civil Revision Petitions No 180, 181, 435 and 436 all of 1967 have come up before this Bench on account of a order of reference made by a learned Single Judge of this Court. 2. In all the five cases, the orders which are sought to be revised are orders mad under Order 33, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowing the plaintiffs in each case to sue as pauper. 3. Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 179, 18 and 181 of 1967 are petitions filed by the State of Punjab, while Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 435 and 436 are petitions whirl have been filed by the State of Una Pradesh. 4. Civil Revision No. 179 arises out of Miscellaneous Case No. 6 of 1964 while Civil Revision No. 180 of 1967 arises out of Miscellaneous Case No. 15 of 1963, Civil Revision No. 181 of 1967 arises out of Miscellaneous Case No. 30 of 1963. Out of Civil Revision Petitions filed by the Late of Uttar Pradesh, Civil Revision No. 35 of 1967 arises out of the same Miscellaneous Case No. 30 of 1963 out of which Cilivil Revision No. 181 of 1967 referred to above has arisen, while Civil Revision No. 36 of 1967 arises out of Miscellaneous Case lo. 15 of 1963 referred to above out of which Civil Revision No. 180 of 1967 has risen. In Miscellaneous Case No. 6 of 964 giving rise to Civil Revision No. 179 f 1967 and Miscellaneous Case No. 15 of 963 giving rise to Civil Revision No. 180 f 1967 were cases in which Shri R.B. Lapoor was the plaintiff-petitioner and the State of Punjab and others are the opposite, parties defendants. Miscellaneous Case No. (Sic)0 of 1963 giving rise to Civil Revision No. 81 of 1967 and Civil Revision No. 435 of 967, was the case filed by Shrimati Sheila (spoor wife of Shri R.P. Kappor aforesaid against the same set of defendants. 5. It may also be noted that the valuation of the claim in Miscellaneous Case No. 6 is 17,48,000/- Rupees and the calculated court payable is Rs. 2,26,507/-; valuation of he claim in Miscellaneous Case No. 15 is Rs. 1,02,100/- and the calculated court fee may able is Rs. 76,982/50 P. The valuation. The claim in Miscellaneous Case No. 30 1963 filed by Mrs. 2,26,507/-; valuation of he claim in Miscellaneous Case No. 15 is Rs. 1,02,100/- and the calculated court fee may able is Rs. 76,982/50 P. The valuation. The claim in Miscellaneous Case No. 30 1963 filed by Mrs. Sheila Kapoor is Rs. 1,01,400/- and the court fee payable is Rs. 76,457/-. It would be convenient to Indicate at this place that Miscellaneous Petition No. 6 was filed on 12th February, 1964, Miscellaneous Petition No. 15 was riled on 6th April 1963, and Miscellaneous Petition. No. 30 of 1963 was filed on 24th October. 1963 in the court below. 6. The claims put forth by Mr. Kapoor and M/s. Sheila Kapoor in the aforesaid proceedings are claims for damages for malicious prosecution against the State of Punjab and other officials of that State. The State of U.P. is not a party to these miscellaneous cases, but being interested in the matter of court fee it has, filed the two Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 435 and 436 of 1967. It has, however, not filed any petition against the order made in Miscellaneous Case No. 6 of 1964. 7. The law applicable to such petitions is contained in Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule I of that Order permits a suit being instituted by a pauper and the Explanation to that Rule purports to define a pauper. Rule 2 indicates as to what have to be the contents of such an application. It requires that the particulars required in regard to claims in suits will be contained in such a petition. A schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant, with the estimated value thereof has to be annexed to the petition. The petition is required to be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of the pleadings. Rule 3 deals with the manner of presentation of such applications with which we are not concerned in this case. Rule 4 lays down that where the application is in proper form and is duly presented, the court may, if it thinks fit, examine the applicant or his agent, where the applicant is allowed to appear by agent, regarding the merits of the claim and the property of the applicant. Rule 4 lays down that where the application is in proper form and is duly presented, the court may, if it thinks fit, examine the applicant or his agent, where the applicant is allowed to appear by agent, regarding the merits of the claim and the property of the applicant. Clause (2) of Rule 4 gives power to the court in a fit case to order that the applicant be examined on commission when the application had been presented through agent. Then comes Rule 5 which enjoins that the Court shall reject an application for permission to sue as a pauper - (a) where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rules 2 and 3, or (b) where the applicant is not a pauper, or (c) where he has, within two months next before the presentation of the application, disposed of any property fraudulently or in order to be able to apply for permission to sue as a pauper, or (d) where his allegations do not show a cause of action, or (e) where he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject-matter of the proposed suit under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subject-matter. 8. This is followed by Rule 6 which lays down that where the Court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the grounds stated in Rule 5, it shall fix a day (of which at least ten days' clear notice shall be given to the opposite party and the Government pleader) for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce, in proof of his pauperism, and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof. 9. Rule 7 thereafter indicates the procedure at hearing of the petition. The Court is enjoined to examine the witnesses, if any, produced by either party and it may also examine the applicant or his agent and will make a memorandum of the substance of their evidence. Under clause (2) of Rule 7, it is the duty of the Court to hear arguments which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether on the face of the application and of the evidence, if any, taken by the Court, the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in Rule 5. Under clause (2) of Rule 7, it is the duty of the Court to hear arguments which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether on the face of the application and of the evidence, if any, taken by the Court, the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in Rule 5. Clause (3) indicates that the Court shall then either allow or refuse to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper. As we are not concerned with the rest of the rules of Order 33, we need not reproduce them in this judgment. 10. As a common question arises and has been urged in all the revision petitions, we have decided to dispose them of by common reasoning. 11. The case of the petitioner is that the court below should not have allowed the applicants to sue as pauper because (1) the allegations made did not show any cause of action, as required by Rule 5, clause (d) of Order 33, C.P.C. (2) the schedules of property as given in the petitions have not been verified, as, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, is required to be done, by Rule 2 of Order 33 and (3) that the petitioners had suppressed assets be-longing to them and have not shown them in the schedules. It is conspicuous to note, that, it has not been urged before us, that the petitioners are not paupers or that they are possessed of sufficient means to pay the requisite court fees. 12. We now propose to deal with the objections raised on behalf of the pet [loners and pressed before us. 13. With regard to the first submission that the allegations made did not disclose a cause of action, all that has been urge before us, is, that the allegations made i the pauper petitions did not show a taus of action against the State of Punjab a though they did show cause of action against the other defendants. On the basis, it has been urged that permission t sue the State of Punjab, as paupers shout' not have been given to the petitioners. Th view taken by the court below is that the allegations made in the petitions do go t. show cause of action not only against the defendants other than the State of Punjab but against the State of Punjab also. Th view taken by the court below is that the allegations made in the petitions do go t. show cause of action not only against the defendants other than the State of Punjab but against the State of Punjab also. 14. In support of his contention, the learn ed counsel Mr. Shanti Bhushan appear in for the State of Punjab, has urged, that State cannot be legally liable for payment of damages arising out of tortious acts o its employees. This being so, according u the learned counsel, the allegations of the plaint made in the petitions do not disclose a cause of action against the State of Pun jab. We entertained serious doubts as u the correctness of the proposition that where the allegations made in the pauper petition, which subsequently, if allowed has to be registered as a plaint, did go to show that there was cause of action against some of the defendants but not against others, permission to sue as pauper could be legally refused. The learned counsel appearing for the State of Punjab relied on a decision of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Shankarrao Balaji v. Shambihari, A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 419. In that case, it was found that the plaint did not disclose cause of action against some of the defendants and on that basis, the court proceeded to discharge those defendants from the suit and refused to reject the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed that as the plaint did not disclose any cause of action against one of the defendants, it could not invite a rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was not found possible to reject the plaint which disclosed cause of action against certain defendants and none against the rest. The course which appeared feasible to their Lordships of the Nagpur Court was that the defendant against whom the plaint did not disclose a cause of action be discharged from the suit and his name be struck off from the plaint. Their Lordships, therefore, proceeded to order accordingly. Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that the plaint shall be rejected in cases where it does not disclose a cause of action etc. Their Lordships, therefore, proceeded to order accordingly. Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that the plaint shall be rejected in cases where it does not disclose a cause of action etc. In the cases before us, the question of rejection of the pauper petition does not arise at this stage. The petitions could be rejected under Rule 5, in case, the court did not feel satisfied that the allegations made therein disclosed any cause of action. After that stage was over and notices to the opposite parties were issued, and the opposite parties appeared and raised objections against the petitions the only order that the Court could make was either to allow the petitioners to sue as paupers or refuse to allow them to do so. The question, therefore, that arises in the instant case is whether it could be feasible to permit the petitioners to sue the defendants other than the State of Punjab as paupers and to refuse to allow them to sue the State of Punjab as paupers. We are definitely of the opinion that such a course cannot be adopted for the purpose of Order 33, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no plaint before the Court at the stage when it is called upon to decide whether the petitioners should be permitted to sue as paupers or not. It is only when permission is granted that the petition can be registered as a plaint though the institution of the same will date back to the date of the presentation of the petition. The question of exempting or discharging any defendant from the suit does not arise at all. Further, it does not appeal to reason that the petitioners should be permitted to sue as paupers some of the defendants in the case while the petitioners should be called upon to pay court fee as against the other defendants to the same cause. 15. The view expressed by the Nagpur High Court, consequently, in the case of Shankarrao Balaji v. Shambihari cannot be utilised for the purpose of the instant cases. We may also indicate that we find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken by that Court even under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. The view expressed by the Nagpur High Court, consequently, in the case of Shankarrao Balaji v. Shambihari cannot be utilised for the purpose of the instant cases. We may also indicate that we find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken by that Court even under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No such order as was made by their Lordships of the Nagpur High Court, to our mind, could have been made under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil. Procedure, and that order must be deemed to be one under order one of the Code. Either the plaint could have been rejected in its entirety or not at all. Inasmuch as the allegations made did show that there was cause of action against some of the defendants, it was not possible to reject the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief against all the defendants or not, was a question which could be decided after trial of the suit, and not at the initial stage. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if the allegations made by the pauper disclose cause of action, though not against all the defendants, per-mission to sue as a pauper cannot be re-fused. The view that we have taken is also supported by the consideration of some other provisions of the Code. Order 1, Rule 7 of the Code, lays down, that where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to obtain redress, he may join two or more defendants in order that the question as to which of the defendant is liable and to what extent, may be determined as between all the parties. In view of that provision, it is open to the plaintiff to ask the court to grant him relief against such of the defendants as may be found liable. The plaintiff, in such case, impliedly concedes that he is not sure of the existence of cause of action against all the defendants. Can it be said that in those cases, permission to sue as pauper must as a rule be refused ? 16. The plaintiff, in such case, impliedly concedes that he is not sure of the existence of cause of action against all the defendants. Can it be said that in those cases, permission to sue as pauper must as a rule be refused ? 16. In support of its contention that a suit for damages can never be decree against the State, learned counsel for the State of Punjab has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi Lal Ratio Ram Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1965 SC 1039. The facts of that case put briefly were that one Ralia Ram who was a partner of a registered firm arrived at Meerut by the Frontier Mail at about midnight for the purpose of selling sold, silver and other goods in the Meerut market. While he was passing through Chaupla Bazar, he was taken into custody by three constables. His belongings were searched and he was taken to the Kotwali police station. He was detained in the police lock up and his belongings which consisted of gold weighing 103 Tolas 6 Mashas and one Ratti and silver weighing two Maunds and 6i Seers were seized from him and kept in police custody. On the next day, he was released on bail and the silver seized from him was returned to him. Thereafter he made repeated demands for the return of gold which had been seized from him, and finally, he proceeded to file the suit giving rise to the appeal before the Supreme Court claiming a decree either for the return of the gold or for the recovery of its value. The claim put forth by him was for Rs. 11,075/10/-. 17. His claim was resisted by the State of Uttar Pradesh on the ground that it was neither liable to return the gold, nor to pay its value. According to it, gold in question. had been taken into custody by one Mohammad Amir, a Head Constable and it was kept in police Malkhana under his charge. Mohammad Amir misappropriated the gold and fled away to Pakistan. According to it, gold in question. had been taken into custody by one Mohammad Amir, a Head Constable and it was kept in police Malkhana under his charge. Mohammad Amir misappropriated the gold and fled away to Pakistan. It was further pleaded that it was not a case of negligence of the police officers and that even if negligence was held to have been proved against the said police officers, the respondent State could not be said to be liable for the loss resulting from such negligence. 18. One of the two questions that arose in that case was whether the State of Uttar Pradesh was liable to compensate the appellant for the loss caused to him by the negligence of the public servant employed by the respondent State. The trial court decreed the suit for the recovery of the value of the gold. In appeal, the High Court held that the claim of the plaintiff was not justified against the respondent State. 19. The Supreme Court took the view that the trial court was right in coming to the conclusion that the loss suffered by the appellant, by the fact that gold seized from Ralia Ram has not been returned to him, was based on the negligence of the police officers employed by the respondent. The Supreme Court then proceeded to consider the question whether the State was liable to make good the loss or not. After considering some previous decisions of that Court and the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Government of India Act, the following observation was made : "Thus, it is clear that this case recognises a material distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where such acts are referable to the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to public servants, and acts committed by public servants which are not referable to the delegation of any sovereign powers. If a tortious act is committed by a public servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask is: was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public servant? If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie. If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie. On the other hand, if the tortious act" has been committed by a public servant in discharge of duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any sovereign power, an action for the damages would lie. The act of the public servant committed by him during the course of his employment is, in this category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been employed by a private individual for the same purpose." 20. It is, therefore, clear that it is not correct to say that a State can never be liable for a claim of the present nature. The question whether in this case, the State is or is not liable is a question to be decided in the suit itself, and there is no reason why the petitioners should not get an opportunity to prove the validity of their claim against the State of Punjab in this case. 21. We, therefore, do not find any force in that objection raised by the State of Punjab in this case. 22. The second objection as indicated above is that the schedules of the property as given in the petitions have not been verified according to Rule 2, Order 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We, however, do not find any force in such objection. In the first place, in the suit filed by Shrimati Sheila Kapoor, the schedule is sufficiently verified. In the second place, we find that Shri Kapoor examined himself in support of the pauper petition filed by him as well as that which was filed by his wife Shrimati Sheila Kapoor. He stated on oath that the properties shown in the schedule were the only assets possessed by him or his wife. This statement on oath is a sufficient consideration for dispensing with the verification of the schedules in the cases filed by Shri Kapoor. We are also of the opinion that under Order 33, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil procedure, verification of the schedule which is to be annexed to the pauper petition, is not necessary. This statement on oath is a sufficient consideration for dispensing with the verification of the schedules in the cases filed by Shri Kapoor. We are also of the opinion that under Order 33, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil procedure, verification of the schedule which is to be annexed to the pauper petition, is not necessary. The language used in Rule 2 is as follows : "Every application for permission to sue as a pauper shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits: a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant, with the estimated value thereof shall be annexed thereto; and it shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings." 23. A plain reading of the provision would indicate that what is required to be signed and verified is the application for permission to sue as pauper and not the schedule. The Rule speaks of two different documents. One is the application for permission to sue as a pauper and the other is a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant, which second document is required to be annexed to the first. The use of the word "it" in the last part of the Rule clearly indicates that one of the two documents and not both are required to be signed and verified under the Rule. It is further clear that the pronoun "it" can stand only for the "application for permission to sue" and not for the "schedule of movable or immovable property". It does not appeal to reason, that the schedule annexed to the application and not the application is required to be signed and verified. Under Rule 8 of Order 33, when the application is grant-ed, the same document shall be numbered and registered and shall be deemed to be the plaint in the suit which will proceed in all other respects as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner. This would not be possible if the application, which subsequently becomes the plaint, is neither signed nor verified. There is no provision requiring the signing and verification of the petition after the application has been granted and before it is registered as a plaint. Our view finds support from eh:. This would not be possible if the application, which subsequently becomes the plaint, is neither signed nor verified. There is no provision requiring the signing and verification of the petition after the application has been granted and before it is registered as a plaint. Our view finds support from eh:. decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Amar Nath v. Rattan Chand Kapur, A.I.R. 1932 Lahore 548. The view taken in that case was that the word "it" in the last sentence of Order 33, Rule 2 relates to the application and not to the schedule of the property. 24. It has been urged that the expression "particulars" in Rule 2 includes verification and that, therefore, both of the documents are required to be signed and verified. We are clearly of the view that the expression "particulars" does not include verification. What are the particulars of a plaint are given in Order 7, Rule 1 while verification is provided for in Rule 15 of Order 6. Verification is only the authentication of particulars and not itself a particular of the plaint. 25. In this view of the matter, we overrule the second ground of objection also. 26. The last objection raises is that there have been suppression of assets by the petitioners as they did not disclose some of their assets in the schedules annexed to the petitions. On the un controverted testimony of Shri Kapoor, the court below has arrived at the conclusion that there has been no wilful or mala fide suppression of any assets of the two petitioners and the explanations given by Shri Kapoor for not showing certain items were quite convincing. It is not every suppression of assets from the schedule annexed to a pauper petition that can result in an order of refusal of permission to sue as a pauper. There may be cases of bona fide omissions also. The view consistently taken by all the courts is that if the omission of any asset from such a schedule is bona fide, it cannot be made a ground for refusing permission to sue as a pauper. There may be cases of bona fide omissions also. The view consistently taken by all the courts is that if the omission of any asset from such a schedule is bona fide, it cannot be made a ground for refusing permission to sue as a pauper. The question whether there were any omissions at all and whether such omissions were not bona fide are clearly questions of fact, which have been decided in favour of the petitioners by the court below on the basis of the un controverted testimony of Shri Kapoor. We have also considered the explanation given by Shri Kapoor in respect of the various items of assets said to have been suppressed from the schedules and we are satisfied that the omission to mention those assets in the schedules was clearly bona fide. In our re visional jurisdiction, we cannot question the correctness of the findings of fact arrived at by the court below. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no force in this ground of objection of the revisionist also. 27. As we have mentioned above, it has not been urged, that the petitioners are not paupers or that they are possessed of sufficient means to pay the court fee in the various cases. That being so, we do not find any justification for interfering with the order of the court below in exercise of our re visional jurisdiction. The order of the court for that reason is just and appropriate. 28. We are further not satisfied that the court below exercised jurisdiction which it did not possess or that it refused to exercise jurisdiction which it possessed, nor are we convinced that the court below acted with material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction in these cases. This, therefore, is a further consideration for refusing to interfere with the orders of the court below. 29. It was for the reasons given above that we dismissed the revisions petitions with costs, aft we had heard the parties in the matte,