JUDGMENT G.S. Lal, J. - These two special appeals have been preferred by the State of U. P. and District Magistrate Lucknow against a common order of a learned Single Judge of this Court disposing of two writ petitions filed by the respondent Sri Kedar Nath Pande. They can be conveniently disposed of by a single judgment. 2. Sri Kedar Nath Pande was employed as a clerk in the office of the Deputy Commissioner Lucknow. In July, 1948 he was promoted to the post of Election Head Clerk in the District Election Office. In February, 1959 he was appointed to the post of Election Inspector in the same office. He attained the age of 55 on 15-8-1962 and retired in accordance with the rule relating to superannuation of Government servants. On September 10, 1962, however, the Secretary to Government and Chief Electoral Officer sent a letter (copy, Annexure 1 to the writ petition No. 334 of 1957) to the Deputy Commissioner Lucknow, stating that as a very special case Government had agreed to grant re-employment to Sri Kedar Nath Pande on the post of Election Inspector with effect from the date of his taking over charge till March 31, 1963. It was also stated therein that formal orders would follow. Sri Pande rejoined the post on 18-9-1962 in pursuance of the said letter. Formal orders were issued in the form of a letter to the District Officer Lucknow on December 4, 1962 (copy, Annexure 2 to the aforesaid petition). In this letter it was laid down that the salary of Sri Kedar Nath Pande would be the same as he was drawing on the date of retirement, less pension, and without special pay of Rs. 25. It appears that Sri Pande continued to work after 31-3-1963 and by another letter (copy, Annexure 3 to the petition) Sri Pande's reemployment was extended by one year. His re-employment was thus to cease on March 31, 1964, but the same day, by a letter (copy is Annexure 4 to the writ petition) from the Secretary to Government, U. P., Nirvachan Vibhag, addressed to the District Magistrate Lucknow, Sri Pande was sanctioned a further extension of re-employment "from April 1, 1964, till he attains the age of 58 years or till the expiry of the term of the post of Election Inspector, whichever is earlier". However, another letter from the Secretary of the same Vibhag was issued to the District Magistrate, Lucknow, referring to the letter of extension of March 31, 1964 and stating that "in partial modification of the orders contained therein the Governor has been pleased to sanction the re-employment of Sri Kedar Nath Pande, Election Inspector, Lucknow for a period of three months only with effect from April 1, 1964 to June 30, 1964". This letter was issued on 25-4-1964 and its copy is Annexure 5 to the writ petition. 3. Sri Pande, upon being served with a copy of this letter filed a writ petition (numbered as No. 344 of 1964) on 20-5-1964, having served a copy thereof, however, on the Senior Standing Counsel to Government on 11-5-1964. The Secretary to Government and Chief Electoral Officer sent to Sri Pande a letter dated May 16, 1964, referring to the Government order dated March 31, 1964, as modified by the order dated April 25, 1964, by which the term of re-employment would automatically come to an end on the expiry of June 30, 1964, and stating that without prejudice to the modifying Government order "the Governor is hereby pleased to give you notice that in any event your services shall stand terminated from the expiry of June 30, 1964 in terms of general rule promulgated under notification No. 230/ IIB-1953 dated January 30, 1953, regulating the termination of services of temporary Government servants." On receipt of this letter Sri Pande filed a fresh writ petn. (numbered as No. 357 of 1964) and annexing a copy of notice aforesaid as Annexure 6 thereto. In the first writ petition the prayer was for quashing the order dated 25-4-1964 and issuing a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the opposite parties (the present appellants) to refrain from giving effect to the order dated 25-4-1964. In the second writ petition the prayer was for quashing the order dated 16-5-1964 and issuing a writ of mandamus refraining the opposite parties (present appellants) from giving effect to the order dated 16-5-1964 and the order dated 25-4-1964. 4. Sri Pande claimed interim relief also which was however not allowed, with the result that he ceased to work with effect from 1-7-1964. 4. Sri Pande claimed interim relief also which was however not allowed, with the result that he ceased to work with effect from 1-7-1964. In consequence, the relief for a writ of mandamus restraining the opposite parties from giving effect to the Government orders dated 25-4-1964 and 16-5-1964 became infructuous. The relief for quashing those orders was granted by the learned Single Judge, giving rise to these special appeals. 5. The grounds on which Sri Pande challenged the two orders were: (1) that the orders amounted to his removal and were hit by Article 311 of the Constitution of India as it was beyond the powers of the Government, after having re-employed him for the period ending on 15-8-1965 (the date of his attaining the age of 58 years) to terminate his service otherwise than by complying with the provisions of Article 311; (2) that the orders were ultra vires and mala fide and (3) the rule relating to termination of services of temporary Government servants, was ultra vires the Constitution and was not applicable to him as he was not a temporary employee. In the earlier writ petition case a counter affidavit was filed by the Deputy Chief Electoral Officer. The allegation of the action being mala fide was denied, and it was given out that the Governor had the power to curtail the term of re-employment in terms of the rule relating to termination of services of temporary employees. In the later writ petition case in which direct allegations of mala fides had been made against the Minister of Justice, two counter affidavits were filed, one by the Deputy Chief Electoral Officer Sri G. D. Singh and the other by Sri Syed Ali Zaheer, the Minister of Justice. 6. The learned Single Judge did not uphold the plea of mala fides, nor of the rule being ultra vires. He however came to the conclusion that since the appointment of the petitioner was for a fixed term, the rule was not applicable to him and the premature termination of his services amounted to his removal and was hit by Article 311 of the Constitution. 7. In the appeals we have heard both the sides. He however came to the conclusion that since the appointment of the petitioner was for a fixed term, the rule was not applicable to him and the premature termination of his services amounted to his removal and was hit by Article 311 of the Constitution. 7. In the appeals we have heard both the sides. Learned counsel for the appellants has defended the judgment of the learned Single Judge in so far as it repelled the pleas of the challenged orders being mala fide and the rule aforesaid being ultra vires. He has however contended that the rule was applicable to the respondent as well irrespective of the fact that the order dated March 31, 1964, purported to give him an extension in the re-employment upto the date of attaining the age of 58 years. He also urged that even irrespective of that rule the Governor had the power to curtail the term of re-employment. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent has pressed all the grounds raised at the hearing before the learned Single Judge. 8. In regard to the plea of mala fides which was specifically raised only in the second writ petition, it was stated in paragraph 14 thereof that the petitioner came to know from newspapers that the Minister concerned was not favourably inclined towards him and after the petitioner's appointment by the Chief Minister as Election Inspector till his attaining the age of 58 years, the Minister took exception to it and made it a question of prestige by tendering his resignation to the Governor and that it was to avoid Ministerial crises that the petitioner's term of service was cut short by the Chief Minister. The petitioner enclosed cuttings one from the Pioneer of 6-4-1964 and the other from Hindustan Times of 8-4-1964. Not to be favourably inclined towards a person does not mean having a malice against him. A resignation on account of grant of further extension to the petitioner could have been tendered on a point of policy relating to retired Government servants and not necessarily on account of any personal factor attaching to the petitioner in particular. The facts on which the plea of mala fides was based were by themselves, therefore, unable to make out a case of mala fides. The facts on which the plea of mala fides was based were by themselves, therefore, unable to make out a case of mala fides. The position was however made specifically clear from the counter affidavit of Sri Syed Ali Zaheer, the then Minister of Justice. In that counter affidavit dated 26-11-1964, two minutes said to have been recorded by the deponent as Minister of Justice in the relevant file in connection with the further re-employment given to the petitioner were reproduced. It appears therefrom that the objection related to the re-employment not only of the petitioner but of another person also named Manbhawan Lal who was re-employed as Election Inspector at Allahabad, and that the objection was to the re-employment on the basis of a principle and not because anything wrong was pointed out in regard to the two persons whose re-employment led the Minister to record his opposition. It was also stated in the counter affidavit that the resignation was the result of a difference on the question of policy very much wider and very comprehensive than the individual case of the petitioner or of anybody else. It is unnecessary to refer to a rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner and another affidavit filed by Sri Syed Ali Zaheer in which both only reiterated their stands. With the above material we agree with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that no case of mala fides was made out. 9. Coming to the other pleas, it may be noted that in the instant case the premature termination of the service of the respondent was caused not by anything wrong with him but because the extension in re-employment was given on the advice of the Chief Minister which was against the advice of the Minister of Justice and upon the latter tendering his resignation. On a difference in policy a via media was found in the form of curtailing the term which was originally fixed by the Government for the further continuance in re-employment of the respondent. On a difference in policy a via media was found in the form of curtailing the term which was originally fixed by the Government for the further continuance in re-employment of the respondent. The controversy in the instant case therefore boils down to the determination of the question whether the general rule framed in 1953 about termination of the services of temporary employees by one month's notice applies to the case of the respondent; whether the rule itself is ultra vires; and whether apart from that rule, the Government had the power to cut down the term for which extension in re-employment had been given to the respondent. 10. The rule promulgated under Article 309 of the Constitution is in the following words : "(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any existing rules and orders on the subject, the services of a Government servant in temporary service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority, or by the appointing authority to the Government servant. (2) The period of such notice shall be one month given either by the appointing authority to the Government servant, or by the Government servant to the appointing authority, provided that in the case of notice by the appointing authority, the latter may substitute for the whole or part of this period of notice, pay in lieu thereof; provided further that it shall be open to the appointing authority to relieve a Government servant without any notice or accept notice for a shorter period, without requiring the Government servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice. (3) This rule shall take immediate effect and shall apply to all persons who are appointed hereafter in a civil post in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh and who are under the rule-making control of the Governor, but who do not hold a lien on any permanent Government post. (4) In this rule, "temporary service" means officiating and substantive service in a temporary post, and officiating service in a permanent post, under the U. P. Government. (4) In this rule, "temporary service" means officiating and substantive service in a temporary post, and officiating service in a permanent post, under the U. P. Government. (5) Nothing in this rule shall apply to- (a) Government servants engaged on contract; (b) Government servants not in whole-time employment; (c) Government servants paid out of contingencies; and (d) persons; employed in work-charged establishments." The first sub-rule lays down the general provision that the services of a Government servant in temporay service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing and sub-rule (2) gives the period of notice and makes some other provisions. Sub-rule (3) lays down the extent of applicability of the rule and makes it applicable to all persons holding civil posts in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh and under the rule-making control of the Governor but who do not hold a lien on any permanent Government post. In sub-rule (4) the expression "temporary service" referred to in sub-rule (1) has, in addition, been defined as meaning officiating and substantive service in a temporary post and officiating service in a permanent post under the U. P. Government. The scope of sub-rule (3) is very wide, but out of that wide scope the four classes of Government servants mentioned in sub-rule (5) have to be excluded. On the side of the respondent it has been contended that this rule is not applicable to the case of the respondent because it is not meant to apply to appointments for a fixed term. Learned counsel for the respondent calls it a tenure appointment. Hesitatingly he also calls the appointment of the respondent as engagement on contract and therefore excluded from the application of the rale by virtue of clause (a) of sub-rule (5). There is no controversy that but for these features, the case of the respondent would come within the ambit of the rule inasmuch as he does not hold a lien on any permanent Government post and his re-employment was on a temporary post and for a small period, precisely fixed however, upto the attainment of the age of 58 years by him or expiry of the term of the post itself, whichever was earlier. 11. 11. The case of the respondent would not come within clause (a) of sub-rule (5) of the above quoted rule, for clause (a) relates to employments on special contracts and not the usual employments governed by service rules. There is an element of contract in every employment and if it was intended to include all such employments in clause (a) of sub-rule (5), the rule itself would become redundant as it would not apply to any temporary service. There is no case of the respondent that he was employed on a special contract or on contract basis. Apparently there was nothing special in him on account of which Government would have engaged him on contract. If his services were particularly needed he would have been given an extension in his service and would nave been governed by the ordinary rules. The letter Annexure 1 to the writ petition stated that "as a very special case Government had agreed to grant re-employment to Sri Kedar Nath Pande." He had thus been granted the benefit of re-employment as a special case. It is noteworthy that he joined the post even before the terms of his reemployment had been made known to him, They were unilaterally determined by Government. There is no case either that the period of re-employment was determined by negotiations and was not fixed by Government unilaterally. As it was a case of reemployment, normally some limit needed to be fixed for its continuance and so each time a date was fixed beyond which the reemployment was not to extend. It therefore remains to consider whether the above quoted rule, very wide in its application otherwise, does not include the case of a temporary employee who has been employed for a specific term otherwise than under a special contract. 12. It had been given out in the writ petition that the petitioner (respondent) was not a temporary employee. As a retired reemployed servant, he could not but be a temporary employee. In any case, sub-rules (3) and (4) of the rule clearly cover his case, for he did not hold, on re-employment, a lien on any permanent Government post and he was holding a temporary post. As a retired reemployed servant, he could not but be a temporary employee. In any case, sub-rules (3) and (4) of the rule clearly cover his case, for he did not hold, on re-employment, a lien on any permanent Government post and he was holding a temporary post. The argument however is that because in his case the period of re-employment was specified and the rule does not specifically lay down that it would apply also to cases of temporary employments for fixed terms, the rule is inapplicable. We do not think that any such exception can be inferred from the rule itself which is very wide in its terms. Indeed, sub-rule (4) shows that the temporary service which can be terminated by one month's notice under the rule includes substantive service in a temporary post. Substantive service carries the implication of continuance of service till the post itself lasts or the employee superannuates. If the rule specifically covers a case like this, there is no reason to infer a limitation in its application to a case where the employment on a temporary service is for a fixed period (in this case one year and 41/2 months) and where the employment was to come to an end even though the post could continue. Reading the rule by itself, it, in our opinion, was meant to cover also cases of temporary service for a specific period over and above cases of service for an indefinite period or in substantive basis on a temporary post, and in order to exclude its application there must be a contract to that effect expressly or by necessary implication. 13. The learned Single Judge referred to the Supreme Court case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 SC 36 which is a classic on the subject, as laying down that if a person is appointed to a temporary post for a fixed term, his service cannot, in the absence of a contract or a service rule permitting its premature termination, be terminated before the expiry of that period otherwise than by way of punishment. He also came to the conclusion that this part of the law laid down in Dhingra's case in regard to temporary servant remained unaffected by whatever was said in the later case, Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, N. E. Frontier Railway, A.I.R. 1964 SC 600 since this case related to permanent employment. The learned Single Judge also held that the rule about termination of services of temporary employees covered the case of the respondent's employment also, but it was not enforceable against him on account of the employment being for a fixed term. The ratio of his argument was that the rule would be applicable only subject to any contract and in the respondent's case there was a contract that he would continue to remain in service till the age of 58 years. According to him the appointment of the respondent was for a period terminating on his attaining the age of 58 years and by his conduct in continuing to remain in service it amounted to a contract that he would be retained in service till the attainment of the age of 58 years. But a rule of service would give way to such an implied contract only where it can further be clearly inferred from the facts of the case that the particular service rule was agreed to be abrogated for the purposes of the particular employment. For there is nothing to bar employment for a specified period with an Overriding condition that the employment can be terminated any time by one month's notice on either side. We may state that the petitioner himself did not advance any such case in any of his writ petitions and he nowhere said that he agreed to continue in service only on the condition that his employment would not be brought to an end before attaining the age of 58 years. The reason is not far to seek. It was more of a favour that he was taken in reemployment after he had retired and had ceased to be in service. His first re-employment was only for a period of 6 months. Apparently there was nothing for him to insist upon the last extension being for 1 year-and m months. The reason is not far to seek. It was more of a favour that he was taken in reemployment after he had retired and had ceased to be in service. His first re-employment was only for a period of 6 months. Apparently there was nothing for him to insist upon the last extension being for 1 year-and m months. Even in the case of the last extension it is noteworthy that his employment was liable to come to an end any time by the temporary post of Election Inspector being abolished. We have already found above that the petitioner's employment was not an engagement on contract so as to be excepted from the application under Cl. (a) of sub-rule (5) of the rule. We accordingly hold that the rule applied to his case. 14. The last point to be considered is whether the rule is ultra vires. In this connection reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case A.I.R. 1964 SC 600. In that case, by a majority opinion, Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Railway Establishment Code, which authorised the Railway Administration to terminate the services of all permanent servants to whom the rules applied merely on giving notice for the specified period or on payment of salary m lieu thereof, were held to be invalid as con travening the provisions of Article 311 (2). The learned Single Judge has pointed out that the decision relates to substantive appointment to a permanent post and is distinguishable from the case of appointment to a temporary post. Permanent appointment to a permanent post carries the right to continue to hold the post till the age of superannuation or compulsory retirement under the rules and a rule permitting the termination of such service by just a month's notice would amount to the very negation of the right accrued or conferred. Appointment on a temporary post is always subject to termination of the service whether the appointment is for an indefinite period, or till the post is to last (subject to earlier termination on superannuation), or the appointment has been made for specific period but with the condition of its terminating upon the post itself being abolished. Appointment on a temporary post is always subject to termination of the service whether the appointment is for an indefinite period, or till the post is to last (subject to earlier termination on superannuation), or the appointment has been made for specific period but with the condition of its terminating upon the post itself being abolished. The rule relating to termination by one month's notice of temporary employment cannot therefore be regarded as invalid on the strength of Moti Ram Deka's case, A.I.R. 1964 SC 600. 15. In view of what has been found above it is unnecessary for us to enter into the question whether the term of re-employment of the respondent could be cut short by the Government apart from the exercise of powers under the aforesaid rule. 16. In the result the appeals must be allowed. In the matter of costs we are of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case the parties be made to bear their own costs. 17. We accordingly allow both the appeals and dismiss the two writ petitions filed y the respondents. Parties shall bear their own costs both before the learned Single Judge and at the appellate stage.