Judgment S.C.Misra, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,000/- as part of the unpaid consideration under a sale-deed dated the 18th October, 1951. The Suit was brought by the plaintiff respontdent on foot of a sale-deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of the appellant for a sum of Rs. 9,909/-. Out of this amount, Rs. 8,900/- was paid in cash but Rs. 1,000/- was left in deposit with the stipulation that by Jeth, 1952, that is the following year, the appellant would redeem a mortgage bond, which was put in possession of the mortgagee by the plaintiff for this amount. When the amount would be paid, the plaintiff would be able to come in possession of the land free from encumbrance. In case of default, the plaintiff was liable to pay damages to the vendor, The defendant-appellant, however, did not pay the amount and in spite of a lawyers notice to him by the plaintiff, he did not pay the mortgage amount. Hence the present suit was instituted for recovery of Rs. 1,000/- and another sum of Rs. 600/- as representing the profits of the mortgaged land for six years from 1955 to 1960. The suit was instituted on the 29th October, 1960. The land in respect of which the profit was claimed was plot No. 2234 of khata No. 667 of Mustafapur Bhadwar. 2. The defendant, however, resisted the claim of the plaintiff raising a plea that although there was a recital in the sale-deed executed by the plaintiff in his favour, as alleged in the plaint, and the defendant was liable to redeem the mortgage executed by the plaintiff, but subsequent to the execution of this document, the plaintiff came to the defendant with a prayer that the amount might be handed over to him and he would grant a receipt and a receipt (Ext. D) was actually grant ed. There was also a plea by the defendant that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. The courts below have con currently found that Ext. D was not a genuine document and they have also held that the suit was not barred by limitation. 4. D) was actually grant ed. There was also a plea by the defendant that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. The courts below have con currently found that Ext. D was not a genuine document and they have also held that the suit was not barred by limitation. 4. The case of the plaintiff was that at the time of the execution of the sale-deed, the defendant obtained the left thumb impression of the plaintiff on several pieces of blank paper which might have been converted into a receipt showing payment of the remaining amount of Rs. 1,000/-. This story of the plaintiff, however, was not accepted by the courts below, but they came to the conclusion all the same that the defendant failed to prove payment of Rs. 1,000/- to the plaintiff in a manner other than what was stipulated in the sale- deed and that the receipt relied upon by the defendant was not established by reliable evidence to be a genuine receipt, granted by the plaintiff to the defendant in token of payment of Rs. 1,000/-. 5. Mr. Kailash Roy, who appears for the appellant, has con tended, in the first place, that the finding of fact recorded by the courts below cannot be regarded as a satisfactory finding inasmuch as if the plaintiffs case of giving to the defendant at the time of the execution of the sale-deed several thumb impressions on blank pieces of paper has not been accepted, then there is nothing else to throw any doubt on the case of the defendant that, in fact, the receipt was duly granted by the plaintiff to the defendant with his thumb impression which was not denied by the plaintiff, and nothing else was suggested as to how the defendant could obtain the thumb impression of the plaintiff on the receipt filed by him in court in support of his case towards payment by the defendant to the plaintiff, which was, at variance, with the term inserted in the sale deed. This argument, no doubt, bearing on the question of fact, is of considerable force. It is, however, unnecessary for me to go into this question, as the contention on the point of limitation raised by Mr. Kailash Roy on behalf of the appellant appears to be sound. 6. This argument, no doubt, bearing on the question of fact, is of considerable force. It is, however, unnecessary for me to go into this question, as the contention on the point of limitation raised by Mr. Kailash Roy on behalf of the appellant appears to be sound. 6. The defence plea of the suit being barred by limitation has, as pointed above, not been accepted. The question of limitation was raised on behalf of the defendant in the manner that the sale-deed was executed in 1951. The amount to be paid for redemption of the rehan deed was to be paid by Jeth, 1952. It was further provided in the stipulation that if the payment was not made by Jeth, 1952, the defendant would be liable to pay damages. The exact recital of the sale-deed runs thus: Waje rahe ke minjumle den mahajanan majkurebala moblig Rs. 1,000/- Ek Hajar Rupeya, barbuniad wasi ka rehannama Registryauda matkuma tarik 12-6-49 moblig Rs. 700/- Satsaw Rupeya wo tarik 13-6-49 moblig 300/- Teensau Rupeya Yaf-tani Sarba Pandit wald Rangbehari Pandey majkurebala ka hai jiske ewajme digar eraji manmokir baha-siat rehandar badakal Sarba Pandit mawsuf ke hai jo bad infekak bada kalsir manmokir ke chala awega jiska nisbat mustari mokiralah mawsuf ne manraokir ko itminan wo itmad dilaya hai ke bamah Jeth linde jarrehan Yaftani Sarba Pandit majkur addaei nahi kare to jis kadar khesra manmokir ko bawojah adamdai uske bafel mustari mawsuf ke hoga. 7. According to the defendant-appellant, this recital indicates that a distinct date for payment of the dues of the mortgagee was mentioned in the sale-deed itself, According to the plaintiff, however, the effect of this recital was not insert any specific date for redemption of the mortgage by the plaintiff in favour of Sarba Pandit, But if the defendant would fail to pay up the dues under the mortgage bond in time in 1952, the defendant would be liable to pay damages to the plaintiff for the period that the plaintiff would remain out of possession on account of the failure of the defendant to redeem the mortgage bond in time as mentioned in the saledeed itself. It is thus clear that the crux of the question is the interpretation of the above passage as to whether payment of the amount in question being Rs. It is thus clear that the crux of the question is the interpretation of the above passage as to whether payment of the amount in question being Rs. 1,000/- was to be made by the 1.8th October, 1952 or ho specific date could be taken to follow from this date. Several decisions, which have been cited by learned Counsel for the parties, have laid down the proposition that if specific date is mentioned in a deed of transfer by which any act is to be done by the transferee, which would enure for the benefit of the transferor and the agreement is not carried out in accordance with the instruction of transfer, the period pf limitation for recovery of damages by transferor (plaintiff) would begin to run from the date of such breach of contract. If, however, no specific date is mentioned, but there is general agreement for any act to be performed by transferee, then the limitation would begin to run against the transferor for recovery of damages from the date that he has made a dear demand by way of giving a notice to the transferee. 8. The cases relied upon are I.L.R. 8 Pat. 860, A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 46, A.I.R. 1931 Pat. 271 and . In Ram Rachhya Singh Thakur v. Raghunath Prasad Misser I.L.R. 8 Pat. 860, the plaintiff transferred certain properties to the defendant who agreed to apply a portion of the consideration for payment of a previous debt due by the vendor, but no specified time was fixed in the deed of conveyance. It provided that in the event of the payment being made at a later date the vendee would be responsible for the payment of whatever interest might accrue due to the creditor from the date of the execution of the sale-deed. It was held that the suit was governed by Article 116 of the first schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 and terminus a quo was not the date of the execution of the sale-deed, but the date on which the contract was deemed to have been broken, viz., the date when either there was a repudiation of the liability under it or when the contract had become impossible of performance on account of the vendors debt having been satisfied. This was, therefore, a case where no date for payment was specified. This was, therefore, a case where no date for payment was specified. The sale-deed in that case provided that the purchaser was to pay to one Palakdhari a sum of Rs. 249/9/- which was the amount of debt due to him by calculation on the date of the execution of the sale-deed. There was, however a clause which provided that the vendee might pay the dues later, but in that case he alone would be responsible for the payment of whatever interest might have accrued due to the creditor from the date of the sale-deed. In A.I.R. 1931 Pat. 271, it has been specifically laid down by their Lordships that where part of the purchase money is deposited by the plaintiff vendor with the defendant vendee for payment of some prior encumbrance and no time is fixed for such payment and, therefore, no opportunity arises for the performance of the obligation and there cannot consequently be the breach of contract until the defendant is called upon to pay it the cause of action in such a case does not arise until the demand is made and ignored or when the person to whom the money is to be paid, sues the person with whom the contract has been made and consequent loss and damage occur. 9. In the case of Lala Shanti Swarup v. Munshi Singh , their Lordships have laid down that if a conveyance contains a covenant by a purchaser to pay off an encombrance on the property sold; the failure of the purchaser to do so may give raise to two different causes of action. In the first place, the failure of the purchaser to discharge the encumbrance within such time; as is provided expressly or by implication, entitles the vendor to bring1 an action to have himself put in a position to meet the liability which the purchaser has failed to discharge. In such a case, limitation will run under Article 116 of the Limitation Act from the date on which the purchaser ought to have paid off the mortgage. In the second place, it is also open to the vendor to bring a suit on the contract of indemnity if as a result of the failure of the, purchaser to discharge the encumbrance the vendor incurs a loss. In the second place, it is also open to the vendor to bring a suit on the contract of indemnity if as a result of the failure of the, purchaser to discharge the encumbrance the vendor incurs a loss. Such a suit will be governed by Art.: 83 whether the contact of indemnity is express or implied. 10. In the present case, the recital in the sale-deed clearly lays down that the vendee aforesaid assured the executant that the rehan amount to Sarba Pandit mortgagee would be paid by the Jeth following and if it were not to be done, then the vendor would be entitled to damages for the breach of contract. In this case, therefore, a distinct date has been specified and the Jeth of the following year has a mention, because it was a usufructuary mortgage deed and the mortgagee would not normally receive the amount prior to Jeth of the following year. It was in these circumstances that a distinct date was provided and clearly specified. Mr. R.S. Chatterji contended that the provision for damages in a suit militates against the view that a distinct date was provided. It is difficult to accede to this contention, for, even after a distinct date was provided and if the amount in question was not repaid to the mortgagee by that date, further provision by way of abundant precaution might be necessary and this did not mean that a date specified in the sale-deed was not a definite date on which payment to Sarba Pandit, the mortgagee, was to be made by the purchaser, so that the vendors land in possession of Sarba Pandit as a mortgagee might be put in possession of the vendor. The present case is, therefore, governed by the principle of a specific date which is provided in the sale-deed itself and, accordingly, the period of limitation would begin from that very date. Since the suit was filed beyond a period of 6 years from that date, it must be held that the suit is barred by limitation. 11. It is clear, therefore, that the courts below were in error in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgments of the courts below are reversed and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed. In the circumstances, parties must bear their own costs throughout.