DAVE, C. J.—This is a special appeal by the judgment-debtor Ganeshmal against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 25th July, 1961 dismissing his execution first appeal in limine. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows: One Raj Narain Mathur obtained a money decree for Rs. 37,086/15/- from the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, on 29 4-60 against the present appellant Ganeshmal. He took out execution of the said decree, but before it could be satisfied, he expired on 16-12-60. Thereafter an application under sec. 146 read with O. 21, r. 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on 7-1-61 by his widow Smt. Anand Kumar, his seven sons and two daughters and another similar application was filed by his remaining three daughters at 18-2-61 and therein it was prayed that they be substituted as the legal representatives of the deceased and also be allowed to proceed with the execution petition filed by Rajnarain. These applications were opposed by the judgment-debtor on three grounds, but these objections were repelled by the executing court and it was ordered that the names of the twelve applicants be substituted in place of the deceased and that the execution proceedings would continue. Aggrieved by this order dated 8-4-61, the judgment-debtor filed an appeal, but it was summarily dismissed by the learned single Judge of this Court, as pointed out above and hence this special appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged only one ground before us. It is contended by him that what was being executed by Raj Narain was admittedly a money-decree and that his legal representatives could not proceed with the execution application filed by him after his demise, without obtaining a succession certificate, because sec. 214(1) (b) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 lays down a specific bar to that effect. In support of his argument, he has referred to Tejraj Rajmal Marwadi vs. Rampyari w/o Kundanmal Marwadi (1), Shah Ramji Ladha vs. Hoti Harisangji Versalji (2), Thoma Chacko vs. Koshi Varghese (3) and P.L. Basappa vs. Siddamma (4). 4. In reply, it is urged by learned counsel for the respondents that if his clients were to file a fresh application for execution, the bar provided by sec. 4. In reply, it is urged by learned counsel for the respondents that if his clients were to file a fresh application for execution, the bar provided by sec. 214 (l)(b) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, might have come in their way, but since they had presented an application merely for substitution of the names in place of the deceased and had prayed for proceeding with the execution application filed by the deceased, it was not necessary for them to obtain a succession certificate and that the order of the Senior Civil Judge as also that of the learned single Judge of this Court are quite correct and the appeal should be dismissed. He relies upon Mahomed Yusuf vs. Abdur Rahim Bspari(5), Balmukand vs. Gobind Ram (6), Kaviraj Basudevanand vs. Raghubir Saran Rastogi (7), Raghubir Singh vs. Raj Rajeshwari Parsadsingh(8) and Lal Kumari Devi vs. Fulmati Kuer(9), to support his argument. 5. Since the question involved in the present appeal is based on the interpretation of sec. 2l4(l)(b) of the Indian Succession Act, it would be proper to reproduce it here in order to appreciate the arguments advanced from both the sides. It reads as under— "Sec. 214— I (1) No Court shall— (a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, or (b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production, by the person so claiming, of— (i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of admistra-tion to the estate of the deceased, or (ii) a certificate granted under sec. 31 or sec. 32 of the Administrator-Generals Act, 1913, and having the debt mentioned therein, or (iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein, or (iv) a certificate granted under the succession Certificate Act, 1889, or (v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1927 and if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein. (2) The word debt in sub-sec.(1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes." It would appear from the bare perusal of the said section that sub-sec. (1)(a) enjoins upon the court concerned that it would not pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, except on the production, by the person so claiming, of one of the documents enumerated in subclauses (i) to (v), as the case may be. In other words, if a plaintiff who has filed a suit for money decree dies during the pendency of the case and if his legal representative claims to realise that debt on the basis of the succession to the plaintiff, he must obtain a succession certificate before a decree is passed in his favour. The court in which the suit has been filed may continue the proceedings even after the demise of the deceased-plaintiff by bringing the name of his successor on record in his place, but the section puts a complete bar against its jurisdiction to pass a decree., unless the successor of the plaintiff is able to obtain a succession certificate from a competent court and produce it before the court in which the suit is pending. Thus, it is clear that sec. 214(l)(a) comes into play at the stage where a suit is pending in a civil court and where a decree still remains to be passed. It would be proper to read clause (b) of sec.214(1) in this context. This clause applies to the case, where during the pendency of an application for execution, the decree-holder dies, and his legal representative presents an application to be substituted in his place to continue the execution of a decree or when a fresh application for execution is made by the legal representative of the deceased decree-holder, because the decree or order for payment of debt remains unsatisfied. It enjoins upon the court that if an application for execution is made by the legal representative of the deceased decree-holder, then the executing court shall not proceed upon an application of a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased decree-holder, to execute a decree or order for payment of debt, except on the production by that person of one of the documents enumerated in the subsequent clauses. The use of the words "claiming to be so entitled" appearing in clause (b) shows that the Legislature meant this clause to be read in the context of clause (a). These words were used to avoid repetition of the words "claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person" appearing in clause (a). If clause (b) is read without the context of clause (a), the word sowould become redundant and meaningless. The words "so entitled" mean "claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person" and nothing else. Similarly, the words "such a debtor" appearing in clause (b) mean "a debtor of a deceased person" used in clause (a). Thus, clause (b) has got to be read in the context of clause (a) to understand it in its real sense. 6. Now, in our opinion, the main purpose of sec. 214, reproduced above, is to protect the debtor from vexatious proceedings and from being harassed at different times by different persons claiming to be the successors of the plaintiff or the decree-holder. Just as clause (a) of sec. 214(1) provides protection to a debtor and enjoins upon a court not to pass a decree against him, unless the person claiming to be entitled to the effects of the deceased plaintiff is able to obtain a succession certificate and produce it in the court, so also, clause (b) means to provide protection to the judgment-debtor against rival claimants, if any, to the effects of the deceased decree-holder. If this basic principle underlying the provisions of sec. If this basic principle underlying the provisions of sec. 214 is kept in view, then the natural interpretation of clause (b) would be that no court shall proceed to execute a decree or order for payment of debt against a debtor in case the decree-holder expires, unless the person claiming to be entitled to execute the decree in place of the deceased decree holder obtains a succession certificate and produces it in the court. We see no reason why a mere substitution of a legal representative in place of the decree-holder should be enough in the case of the pending application for execution of the decree, and why the legal representative of a plaintiff should be called upon to obtain a succession certificate before a decree is passed in his favour. Similarly, we see no reason why a person who claims to be the successor of the deceased decree-holder should be permitted to proceed with the execution application filed by the deceased decree-holder, but in case no application of the decree-holder himself is pending and the successor has to file a fresh application, he must obtain a succession certificate. 7. We have carefully looked into the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. The earliest case, which has been followed in other cases cited by him, is that of Mohd. Yusuf vs. Abdur Rahim Bepari (5), referred to above. It may be pointed out that in that case, the decree whose execution was taken out was a mortgage-decree. It is true that a personal decree was also granted in that case against one of the defendants, but he was not an appellant before the High Court. In that case, it was observed by the learned Judges that sec. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act No. 7 of 1889, which then corresponded to the present sec. It is true that a personal decree was also granted in that case against one of the defendants, but he was not an appellant before the High Court. In that case, it was observed by the learned Judges that sec. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act No. 7 of 1889, which then corresponded to the present sec. 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, did not come into play, because, to quote the very words of the learned Judges, "the Court was not proceeding upon the application of a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of a deceased person, but was proceeding originally upon the application of the creditor himself and it was only during the pendency of the execution proceedings that the original mortgagee decree-holder died and his legal representatives, the present respondents, were brought on record." It is clear from the said observation that, in the opinion of the learned Judges, if the successors of the decree-holder were to file a fresh application for execution of the decree, a succession certificate would have been necessary, but since they wanted to proceed with the execution application filed by the deceased decree holder and which was still pending, it was not necessary for them to obtain a succession certificate. It appears from the observations of the learned Judges that they placed literal interpretation on the words "upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled" appearing in clause (b), but, with utmost respect to the learned Judges, no reason was given as to why a succession certificate would be necessary on a fresh application by the successor of the decree-holder and no succession certificate would be needed if he only requests the court to proceed with the application already pending. While giving the above interpretation, the word fresh appears to have been imported in clause (b) although it was not used there by the framers of the law. The Legislature did not even use the word "written" before the word "application". Even in a case where an execution application is pending and his legal representative presents an application to be substituted in his place, it is, in substance, his application to the court to execute the decree or order. The Legislature did not even use the word "written" before the word "application". Even in a case where an execution application is pending and his legal representative presents an application to be substituted in his place, it is, in substance, his application to the court to execute the decree or order. In our view, the word application in clause (b) was not meant to convey the sense of only a fresh appli-cation for execution of the decree, but it also included an application for continuing the pending application for execution of the decree presented by the deceased decree-holder. 8. In Balmukand vs. Gobindram (6) Kaviraj Basudevanand vs. Raghubir Saran Rastogi (7), Raghubirsingh vs. Raj Rajeshwari Persadsingh (8) and Lal Kumari Devi vs. Fulmati Kuer (9), referred to above, the view taken in Mahommed Yusuf vs. Abdur Rahim Bepari (5), cited above, was simply followed and the rationale of sec. 2l4(1) (b) of the Indian Succession Act was not considered. It may be pointed out that the view expressed in Mahomed Yusufs case was considered by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Tejraj Rajmal, Marwadi vs. Rampyari w/o Kundanmal Marwadi, 1), referred to above, and it was observed that "under sec. 214(1) (b), the proper application is for leave to carry on for proceed with) the pending execution proceedings. Such an application would fall within the words "upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled" "To be entitled"means, as is plain from the words of sec. 214 (1) (a), "to be entitled to any part of the deceaseds estate." This widow claims to be so entitled and she made an application, which is necessary, before the court can proceed with a pending execution. The court cannot, on that application proceed with the execution unless a succession certificate is produced. This view was followed in Shah Ramji Ladha vs. Hoti Harisanghi Versalji (2), cited above. In that case, it was further observed as follows— "It will be seen that the object of making provision for production of a certificate of succession in S. 214 was to protect interest of debtors making payment to persons claiming to be entitled to the effects of decree-holders, since deceased. It was therefore provided in clause (a) that a decree should not be passed in favour of a legal representative till he produced a representation certificate. It was therefore provided in clause (a) that a decree should not be passed in favour of a legal representative till he produced a representation certificate. It was further provided that a legal representative of a deceased decree-holder should not be allowed to execute the decree till he produced a certificate of succession. When these provisions were made in the interest of debtors and judgment-debtors, it cannot be accepted that the Legislature did not make any provision in the interest of judgment-debtors when a decree-holder died after he had filed an application for execution. Till a decree is executed and satisfied, there is no difference in the two positions of a decreeholder dying before an application for execution was filed and of a decree-holder dying during the pendency of an application for execution filed by him so for the question of giving protection to a judgment-debtor making payment is concerned. It is quite apparent that the Legislature did not intend to make any such fundamental distinction between the two positions stated above." It is obvious that this observation supports the view which we have expressed above. The same view was expressed in Thoma Chacko vs. Koshi Varghese (3) and P.L. Basappa vs. Siddamma (4), referred to above. 9. Before we conclude, we think it proper to make it clear that we express no opinion as to whether a succession certificate would be necessary in case a person wants to proceed with the execution application of a deceased decree-holder as a surviving co-parcener under the Hindu Law. 10. The special appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and order of the learned single Judge of this Court dated 25-7-61 and that of the Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, dated 8-4-61 are set aside and the case is sent back to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, with direction that a reasonable opportunity should be given to the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder to obtain and produce succession certificate before that court in order to enable them to proceed with the execution of the decree. 11. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.