JUDGMENT T.P. Mukerjee, J. - Appellant Guna Nand who was Constable No. 12894 of `F' Coy., Sp. Police Force, IX Bn., UP, PAC, Moradabad has been convicted under Section 6(e) of the U.P. Pradeshik Armed Constabulary Act (U.P. Act XL of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for a period of four years. The prosecution case is that the appellant had gone on leave before April, 1966. He overstayed the leave and when he came back he pretended madness. Consequently, he was put in the hospital under guard, evidently, for observation. On April 11, 1966 the appellant absconded from the hospital and became untraced. When the appellant did not return a FIR was lodged on June 1, 1966 at PS Kotwali, Moradabad. The investigation of the case was taken up by S. I. Ved Prakash. (P.W. 5) who arrested the appellant at Kotduar on June 12, 1966. After completing the investigation the S. I. submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant who, in due course, was committed for trial in the court of sessions. 2. The defence taken up by the appellant as recorded in his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Moradabad will appear from the following question put to him by the Sessions Judge and the answer which he gave thereto: "The evidence against you is that on April 11, 1966 while you were constable No. 12894 `F' Coy. Special Police Force, IX Bn., U.P. P.A.C., Moradabad being member of U.P. P.A.C. deserted the services of the P.A.C. What have you to say about this? Ans. Yes. I was a constable in the Special Police Force, Moradabad. Yes I ran away from the hospital S.P.F. Moradabad leaving all my articles and went away to my house." 3. The fact that the appellant was recruited as constable has been proved by Sri B. S. Rawat (P.W. 1) of the 35th U.P. S.S.P. Bn., and this is not denied by the appellant. There is also no denial of the fact that the appellant had gone on leave. He overstayed the leave granted to him and when he came back he feigned madness; consequently, he was put in the hospital under guard. It is also in evidence that he absconded from the hospital on April 11, 1966 and, as already stated, the appellant does not deny this fact. 4. He overstayed the leave granted to him and when he came back he feigned madness; consequently, he was put in the hospital under guard. It is also in evidence that he absconded from the hospital on April 11, 1966 and, as already stated, the appellant does not deny this fact. 4. The entire argument of the learned counsel for the defence is that on the above facts the charge under Section 6 (e) of the Act which has been described as a `heinous offence', has not been established. He said that, at the worst, he might have committed an offence under Section 7 (e) of the Act which is a less serious offence. 5. Sub-section (e) of Section 6 of the Act runs as follows: "More heinous offences - An officer of the Pradeshik Armed Constabulary who (a)..........(b)..........(c) .... (d).... and (e) deserts the service; shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years and shall also be liable to fine." It would be convenient at this place to quote sub-section (e) of Section 7 of the Act which runs as follows: "Section 7. Less heinous offences - An Officer of the P.A.C. who - (a).... (b) ....(c) ....(d) .... (e) malingers or feigns or produces disease or infirmity in himself, or intentionally delays his cure, or aggravates his disease or infirmity, or (f) ......(g)........; shall on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine or with both." 6. Learned counsel argued that the words `deserts the service' in Section 6(e) mean to run away from service without any intention to return. He says that running away from service per se is not a serious offence. It is only when a constable runs away from service without any intention to return to duty that he is punishable under Section 6 (e). He contended that the necessary criminal intent had to be proved by the prosecution. The prosecution, he contended, has failed to prove such intention and, therefore, the appellant is not liable to be convicted under Section 6 (e). He contended that the necessary criminal intent had to be proved by the prosecution. The prosecution, he contended, has failed to prove such intention and, therefore, the appellant is not liable to be convicted under Section 6 (e). The learned counsel also made out the point that running away from the hospital while under observation does not amount to desertion of service while on duty and hence also the offence is not punishable under Section 6 (e) of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. Taking the first point, it would be observed, that the word `desert' has not been given special meaning or definition in the Act and it is therefore to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary in which the word `desert' has been given, inter alia, the following meaning ; "to run away from the service, to forsake one's duty; one's post or one's party; specially of a soldier etc. to run away from the service without permission." It is clear therefore that in the ordinary lexicographical sense the word `desert' means to run away from service without permission. The offence under Section 6 (e) of the Act is, therefore, complete as soon as it is proved that a constable ran away from service without permission. It is inconsequential whether he had any intention to return to duty on some indefinite future date. In the present case, the facts proved by the prosecution and not denied by the appellant are as follows: (1) The appellant had gone on leave. (2) The appellant overstayed the leave. (3) Subsequently when the appellant returned after overstayal he pretended madness. (4) The appellant was put under observation in the P.A.C. Hospital and kept under guard. (5) The appellant absconded from the hospital on April 11, 1966. (6) The appellant could not be traced until June 12, 1966 when he was arrested at Kotduar. 7. These facts, in my opinion, are sufficient to constitute desertion from service within the meaning of Section 6 (e) of the Act. Section 7 (e) of the Act refers to malingering or pretending illness or infirmity etc. It does not apply when there has been absconsion from duty. 7. These facts, in my opinion, are sufficient to constitute desertion from service within the meaning of Section 6 (e) of the Act. Section 7 (e) of the Act refers to malingering or pretending illness or infirmity etc. It does not apply when there has been absconsion from duty. Had it been a case simpliciter of feigning madness in order to avoid duty the appellant would have been charged and punished under Section 7 (e) of the Act? Had it been merely a case of overstayal of leave it would be a minor offence punishable under Section 8 of the Act. In the present case, however, the appellant not only overstayed the leave and when he came back started malingering to escape duty but also absconded from the hospital where he had been kept under observation. He, therefore, committed the offence of desertion of service on April 11, 1966. I have already stated that whether there is desertion of service with an intention to return to duty subsequently is immaterial. In the present case, however, there is nothing to suggest that the appellant had any intention to return to duty later on. In fact, he remained untraced for about two months before he was arrested. The intention of a person is to be gathered from attending circumstances. In the present case the circumstances clearly indicate that the appellant had no intention to return to his post. 8. As to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the offence under Section 6 (e) of the Act is committed only when a constable deserts the service while on active duty and not otherwise, he pointed out that in the present case the appellant was not on active duty in the hospital when he left; he was merely under observation with regard to his plea of madness. In the circumstances, the learned counsel contended that no offence under Section 6(e) of the Act was committed. In order to draw the distinction between leaving the service while on active duty and leaving service in other circumstances, the learned counsel referred to Section 38 of the Indian Army Act, 1950 (Act 46 of 1950). Section 38 of that Act lays down: "38. In order to draw the distinction between leaving the service while on active duty and leaving service in other circumstances, the learned counsel referred to Section 38 of the Indian Army Act, 1950 (Act 46 of 1950). Section 38 of that Act lays down: "38. (1) Any person subject to this Act who deserts or attempts to desert the service shall, on conviction by court-martial, if he commits the offence on active service or when under orders for active service, be liable to suffer death or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned; Section 38 of that Act further provides that "any person subject to that commits the offence under any of circumstances, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may tend to seven years.' It is true that the Indian Army Act, 1950 draws a distinction between desertion service while on active duty and desertion under any other circumstances provides separate punishments for two categories of offences mentioned therein. Section 6(e) of the Act. pointed out above, makes no such distinction and if any person subject to that Act `deserts service' whether on active duty or not, will be liable to punishment under that section. 9. In the present case, I find that the appellant definitely committed an offence under Section 6(e) of the Act. The maximum sentence provided under Section 6 (e) is life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of 14 years. The learned Sessions Judge has dealt with the appellant very leniently in awarding him a sentence of four years' RI only. There is no question of any reduction in the sentence. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant is in jail. He shall serve out the sentence imposed upon him.