JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal. The suit was for an injunction. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been sub-tenants on behalf of the defendant and became sirdars. In the alternative they claimed to be in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli and since then till the date of the suit and so they became sirdars. It was alleged that the defendant had fraudulently obtained a surrender-deed from the plaintiffs and on that basis he was unlawfully interfering with their possession. 2. The defendant alleged that he was a hereditary tenant of the plots. Ten or 12 years ago he had mortgaged the plots with the plaintiffs. On 21st November, 1959, he redeemed the mortgage by a registered receipt for the payment of the mortgage money and in June, 1960 he obtained possession of the plots and was since then continuing in possession. 3. The trial court held that the theory that the plots had been mortgaged with the plaintiffs and then redeemed was not established. The document obtained on 21st November, 1959, was vitiated by fraud. The plaintiffs were found to be in possession till the date of the suit as sub-tenants and as such they became sirdars. The suit was decreed for the requisite injunction. 4. The defendant went up in appeal. The appellate court found that the plots had been mortgaged with the plaintiffs and that the defendant had actually paid off the mortgage money and redeemed the mortgage on 21st November, 1959. The transaction was not vitiated by fraud. It was held that the plaintiffs were in possession of the plots as mortgagees. They were not sub-tenants of the defendant. They did not acquire any title as adhivasis and sirdars. The suit was consequently dismissed. 5. The plaintiffs have come to this Court in second appeal. The findings that the plots were mortgaged with the plaintiffs and that they had been validly redeemed on 21st November, 1959 and that the plaintiffs were not in possession as sub-tenants are findings of fact which are binding in a second appeal. But, for the appellants it was urged that, firstly, Section 14 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was applicable. In view of its provisions the defendant was not entitled to the possession of the plots because they were not his sir or, khudkasht on the date of the alleged mortgage. But, for the appellants it was urged that, firstly, Section 14 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was applicable. In view of its provisions the defendant was not entitled to the possession of the plots because they were not his sir or, khudkasht on the date of the alleged mortgage. In the second place it was urged that the plaintiffs had remained in possession all through uptil now. By lapse of time they would become sirdars under Section 204 or 210 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In my opinion both these submissions cannot succeed. 6. On the findings the plaintiffs were the mortgagees in possession on the date of vesting. Under sub-clause (i) of clause (g) of Section 6 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act every mortgage with possession is to be deemed to have been substituted by a simple mortgage, on the date of vesting. This deeming takes place "save as otherwise provided in this Act." So the mortgage in favour of the plaintiff became a simple mortgage on 1st July, 1952 save as otherwise provided by the Act. The plaintiffs lost the right to re-main in possession of the mortgaged plots. The mortgagors were not intermediaries. They were hereditary tenants of the plots. Clause (d) of Section 21-. of the Act provides that a mortgagee in actual possession on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting from a hereditary tenant shall be deemed to be an asami of the plots. Section 202 provides for the ejectment of such asamis. The land-holder can eject a per-son, who became an asami under clause (d) of Section 21 if and when the mortgage has been satisfied or the amount due has been deposited in court (vide clause (c) of Section 202) . These two provisions would be relevant while considering the effect of the conversion of an usufractuary mortgage into a simple mortgage under Section 6 (g) (1) . The position would be that a mortgagee from a hereditary tenant becomes an asami and is liable to ejectment only when the mortgage has been satisfied or the amount due has been deposited in court. The position inevitably would be that till this event has taken place the land-holder cannot eject the asami. The position would be that a mortgagee from a hereditary tenant becomes an asami and is liable to ejectment only when the mortgage has been satisfied or the amount due has been deposited in court. The position inevitably would be that till this event has taken place the land-holder cannot eject the asami. In other words, the asami would be entitled to retain possession of the mortgaged plots till his liability to ejectment has accrued. Till the date of vesting the mortgagee remains in possession as a mortgagee; but from the date of vesting onwards he retains possession in the status of an asami. 7. Section 204 provides that if a suit for ejectment of an asami under Section 202 (c) is not instituted or a decree obtained in such a suit is not executed, within the period prescribed therefor the asami shall on the expiry of the period become sirdar of the land held by him. Under serial No. 25 (4) of Appendix III to the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, the prescribed period of limitation for such a suit is three years, from the date of the redemption of the mortgage. In the present case the mortgage was redeemed on 21st November, 1959. The suit was filed. in 1961. The prescribed period of three years had not expired till the date of the suit. The plaintiffs, therefore, could not be held to have become sirdars on the date of the present suit. They could not as such claim such a declaration. 8. It was urged for the plaintiffs-appellants that he has been in continuous' possession since the suit was filed. This question of fact cannot be assumed or presumed. There was no occasion for a finding on this question nor any finding has been recorded. The trial court found that the plaintiffs had been continuously in possession till the date of the suit. Even that finding has not been completely affirmed by the lower appellate court, which only mentioned that the plaintiffs had been in possession for some time. From the pleadings and the evidence it could not, therefore, be found,'much less assumed, that the plaintiffs remained in actual possession for three years since 21st November, 1959, and on that basis became sirdars. Even that finding has not been completely affirmed by the lower appellate court, which only mentioned that the plaintiffs had been in possession for some time. From the pleadings and the evidence it could not, therefore, be found,'much less assumed, that the plaintiffs remained in actual possession for three years since 21st November, 1959, and on that basis became sirdars. The question whether the plaintiffs were in such possession or not cannot be gone into in the present suit and will have to be left open. 9. For the appellants it was urged that Section 14 would apply and since the land in dispute was not the sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, the defendant would have no right to regain or retain possession of the mortgaged plots. In my opinion Section 14 would not be attracted to the case of a mortgage by a hereditary tenant. Section 14 applies to a mortgage of an estate or a share therein. In view of the definition of the word 'estate' a specific plot would undoubtedly be covered by it. So, on its terms Section 14 may be applicable to a mortgage of an individual plot, but the question then is, would it govern a mortgage by a tenant. Section 14 contemplates that a mortgagee governed by this provision shall cease to have any right to hold or possess the mortgaged land unless he becomes a hereditary tenant by paying an amount equal to five times of the rent calculated at hereditary rates. By such payment he becomes entitled to hold the land as a hereditary tenant. He is entitled to become a hereditary tenant of the mortgaged lands which were not sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage. The facts that Section 14 deals with mortgages of sir and khudkasht land, coupled with the position that Section 21 (d) provides a special status of an asami to mortgagees from tenants and coupled with the further provision for ejectment of a mortgagee from a tenant as an asami by Section 202 (c) would compel one to hold that a mortgagee from a tenant would not be dealt with again by Section 14 and that section would be confined to mortgages by intermediaries. 10. If Section 14 is held to extend to mortgages by tenants as well, an anomalous situation would arise. 10. If Section 14 is held to extend to mortgages by tenants as well, an anomalous situation would arise. Such a mortgagee would be entitled to become a hereditary tenant on payment of the requisite five times of the rent and to retain possession as such. He is deemed to be a hereditary tenant for purposes of Section 19, that is to say, he becomes a sirdar under Section 19. But at the same time he becomes an asami under Section 21 (d) . A sirdar is not liable to ejectment except at the instance of a Gaon Sabha under Section 201 or Section 206 of the Act; but, the same person would be liable to ejectment as an asami under Section 202 (c) . The same person cannot possibly become a sirdar as well as an asami at the same time. The various provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act subserve a purpose and scheme, namely, to extinguish all preexisting tenures and their encumbrances and to substitute for them a fresh status. Every person who had some right or interest in land prior to the date of vesting has been conferred a status by the Act; but the Legislature was careful to avoid all duplications. The U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act contemplates three principal tenures, that of a bhumidhar, sirdar and an asami. An adhivasi was not contemplated to be a tenure itself. It was only a transitory step towards acquisition of a sirdari right. The Legislature had scrupulously conferred only one such tenure-holder on an individual. My attention has not been invited to any provision where-under a person may become a bhumidhar and at the same time a sirdar or an asami, or in any manner be the holder of a combination of more than one of the three tenures. To subserve and advance the purpose of such a scheme it would be but pro-per to reconcile and harmonise the various provisions so as to avoid one provision being rendered superfluous or ineffective. If Section 14 is construed to govern mortgages from tenants, Section 21 (d) would become nugatory; because, under Section 14 the mortgagee is entitled to acquire a higher status than that of a asami in comparison to the status of an asami conferred by Section 21 (d) . If Section 14 is construed to govern mortgages from tenants, Section 21 (d) would become nugatory; because, under Section 14 the mortgagee is entitled to acquire a higher status than that of a asami in comparison to the status of an asami conferred by Section 21 (d) . The provision in Section 202 (c) would also become superfluous because it will be useless to contemplate the ejectment of a person as an asami if the same person could successfully resist the suit for ejectment as a sirdar. In order to make the various provisions have the full play of their amplitude, the general provision in Section 14 will have to give way to the special provision in Section 21 (d) . The mortgages dealt with by Section 21 (d) would be outside the purview of Section 14. So construed, both the provisions will operate in their respective fields with out any overlapping. For all these reasons I am of the opinion that Section 14 does not apply to mortgages by tenants. The plaintiffs, therefore, could not claim any benefit from that provision. 11. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.