JUDGMENT J.N. Takru, J. - This revision by the tenant is directed against the order of the learned Munsif Nagina, dated the 13th August, 1966, dismissing his application under Section 7C of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act - hereinafter called the Act. 2. The application giving rise to this revision was filed on the allegations that the applicant was the tenant of the accommodation mentioned in his application on a monthly rental of Rs. 2.25. He tendered the rent of the said accommodation for the period 1.2.1961 to 2.4.1966 to the opposite-party who was its landlord, both personally and by money order, but he refused to accept the same. Hence the application under Section 7C of the Act. 3. On the aforesaid application being filed, the learned Munsif issued notice to the opposite party. The opposite party filed objections denying the allegations of the applicant that he tendered the rent to him (the opposite party) either personally or by money order. He further alleged that as the accommodation in question had ceased to be 'accommodation' under the Act, inasmuch as its roof had been burnt and its walls had fallen down, the provisions of Section 7C of the Act did not apply to it. The learned Munsif accepted the legal objection of the opposite party and dismissed the application, thus giving rise to the present revision. 4. On behalf of the applicant his learned counsel Shri R.P. Singh, strenuously challenged the finding of the learned Munsif on two grounds. His first contention was that as there was no legally admissible evidence to show that the accommodation in question had ceased to be 'accommodation' the learned Munsif in refusing to deal with his application on merits failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law. His second contention was that even if the opposite party's allegations that the roof of the said accommodation had been burnt and the walls had collapsed were accepted as correct, accommodation would still not cease to be accommodation under the Act and the learned Munsif in refusing to consider the application on merits failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties I am, however, satisfied that neither of these contentions has any force. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties I am, however, satisfied that neither of these contentions has any force. I shall, therefore, proceed to give my reasons for coming to that conclusion after quoting the relevant portions of Section 7(c). Thus quoted the section reads as follows :- "7C (1) When a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him by the tenant in respect of any accommodation the tenants may in the prescribed manner deposit such rent and continue to deposit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of such accommodation unless the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it.................." A plain reading of the aforesaid section shows that the rent which the tenant seeks to deposit under it must be rent in respect of an accommodation as defined in the Act. In other words if no accommodation under the Act exists on the date on which the application is made under Section 7C the provisions of that section would have no application to such a case. We have, therefore, to turn to the definition of the word 'accommodation' to see whether on the date on which the application was made the accommodation in question was accommodation under the Act or not ? "Accommodation" under Section 2(a), in so far as it is material for the present purposes, means residential or non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building, and includes gardens, grounds and out-houses if any appurtenant to such a building or part of the building. Thus according to this definition the basic concept, underlying the word accommodation is that it should be an accommodation in a building or part of a building which can be put to residential or non-residential use. In my judgment the use of the preposition 'in' in connection with the words 'a building' or 'part' of a 'building' clearly indicates that the accommodation under the Act must be inside a building or part of a building. In other words the accommodation must be inside a building having walls and a roof. So far as vacant land is concerned that can be regarded as accommodation only if it is appurtenant to a building or part of a building. 5. In other words the accommodation must be inside a building having walls and a roof. So far as vacant land is concerned that can be regarded as accommodation only if it is appurtenant to a building or part of a building. 5. On behalf of the applicant reliance was placed upon the decision in State of Bombay v. Sardar Venkat Rao Krishna Rao Gujar, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 991, for the proposition that the word building used in Section 2(a) of the Act was a word of sufficiently wide amplitude even the bare floor of a house without roof and walls. In other words that an accommodation even without a roof and wall would be accommodation if its floor remained in existence. No doubt in the aforesaid case the Supreme Court while interpreting certain provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estate Mohal Alienated Lands) Act (1 of 1951) held that the word building should be given its literal meaning of something which is built or constructed with the result that even uncovered Ottas and Chabutras fell within that term under that Act. This decision is, however, distinguishable for the simple reason that the word building was not defined in that Act, and it was for that reason that the Supreme Court saw no justification for not giving it its ordinary dictionary meaning as something which was built or constructed and as Chabutras and Ottas were constructions in that sense, it held them to be building. It is important to note that in giving this interpretation to the word 'building' the Supreme Court made it clear that where an Act defines that word, it is to be interpreted in the light of that definition and not dictionary meaning. I have already held that the word 'accommodation' is used in the Act as an accommodation in a building used for residential or non-residential purpose. As the bare floor of what at one time may have been an accommodation cannot be used for residential or non-residential purpose, it is obvious that it cannot be held to be an accommodation under the Act. I am, therefore, satisfied that the aforesaid decision is of no avail to the applicant. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant also cited the decision of this Court in Janki Prasad Misra v. Ranvir Singh Rathore, 1965 ALJ 942. I am, therefore, satisfied that the aforesaid decision is of no avail to the applicant. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant also cited the decision of this Court in Janki Prasad Misra v. Ranvir Singh Rathore, 1965 ALJ 942. That decision is, however, besides the point as all that it lays down is that on an application being made under Section 7C, the Munsif is required to issue notice to the landlord informing him that a deposit of rent has been made and then it is open to the landlord to accept the rent or not and in case the landlord does not accept the rent the amount has to remain in deposit fro the benefit of the person who may be found to be entitled to it. That case was not concerned with the question which is involved in this revision and hence is of no assistance to the applicant. I am, therefore, satisfied that unless the applicant can show that the remnant of what at one time was undoubtedly an accommodation fulfils the requirements mentioned above the benefits of Section 7C would not be available to him. 7. This brings me to the consideration of the question whether on the view expressed by me above the accommodation in question had as a matter of fact ceased to be accommodation or ? Shri R.P. Singh contended that as there was no evidence on the record of the present proceedings to prove that the roof of the accommodation had been burnt and its walls had fallen down, the finding of the learned Munsif that the accommodation had ceased to be accommodation was perverse. I do not agree. No doubt the learned Munsif appears to have based his finding an the admissions contained in a notice sent by the applicant to the opposite party, which is not to be found on the record of the present proceedings. But even if we were to ignore those admissions the fact remains that the opposite party in his objections had made similar allegations and it was, therefore incumbent upon the applicant, if had disputed the correctness of those allegations, to have stated so in his reply and put the opposite part to strict proof of them. But even if we were to ignore those admissions the fact remains that the opposite party in his objections had made similar allegations and it was, therefore incumbent upon the applicant, if had disputed the correctness of those allegations, to have stated so in his reply and put the opposite part to strict proof of them. He having not done that the learned Munsif was right in accepting the correctness of those allegations and in holding that the accommodation in possession of the applicant had ceased to be accommodation under the Act when he moved his application under Section 7C. 8. Thus for the reasons stated above the revision has no force. It therefore, fails and dismissed with costs.