JUDGMENT : Bhargava, J. 1. These five connected appeals have been filed by special leave challenging a common order passed by the Labour Court, Hubli on five applications presented to it under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on behalf of five workmen of the appellant Company, New Taj Mahal Cafe (P) Ltd. These five workmen were suspended by the management of the appellant Company on different dates by different orders, pending domestic enquiries to be held against them for misconduct. The domestic enquiry was not held in any of these cases and the management recalled the orders of suspension and called upon those workmen to resume duty. This, however, happened after the presentation of the applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Act before the Labour Court. In the applications, the workmen claimed that they were entitled to full wages from the date of suspension in each case up to the date of filling the applications under Section 33-C(2), on the ground that the orders of suspension were illegal and unauthorised. The workmen prayed to the Labour Court to compute the benefit, determine the amounts due and direct the management to pay the amounts so determined to the various workmen. The Labour Court accepted these applications, determined the amounts and directed payment of the determined amounts as prayed. 2. The order passed by the Labour Court was challenged by learned counsel for the appellant Company before us on two grounds. The first point was that, under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, the jurisdiction of a Labour Court is confined to determining the amount claimed by a workman, if it is disputed by the employer, and does not extend to deciding the existence of the right of the workman to claim the amount in case that right is denied by the employer. This argument was sought to be supported on the basis of the language of Section 33-C(2) as it exists now after the amendment in 1964. It was urged that, on this language, the entitlement to some amount claimed by the workman is a condition precedent to an application being presented under Section 33-C(2) and, consequently, if the right of the workman to claim any amount at all is itself not admitted by the employer, the Labour Court cannot proceed under this section. It was urged that, on this language, the entitlement to some amount claimed by the workman is a condition precedent to an application being presented under Section 33-C(2) and, consequently, if the right of the workman to claim any amount at all is itself not admitted by the employer, the Labour Court cannot proceed under this section. This point sought to be raised by learned counsel is already concluded by a decision of this Court in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd., Bararee Colliery Dhanbad v. Rameshwar, (1968) 1 LLJ 6 where it was held: "Since proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by a workman is in such cases in the position of an executing court, the Labour Court, like the executing court in execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent under Section 33-C(2) to interpret the award or settlement where the benefit is claimed under such award or settlement and it would be open to it to consider the plea of nullity where the award is made without jurisdiction. It is clear that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer. Since the scope of sub-section 2 is wider than that of sub-section 1 and the sub-section is not confined to cases arising under an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, there is no reason to hold that a benefit provided by a statute or a Scheme made thereunder, without there being anything contrary under such statute or Section 33-C(2), cannot fall within sub-section 2. Consequently, the benefit provided in the bonus scheme made under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948 which remains to be computed must fall under sub-section 2 and the Labour Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain and try such a claim, it being a claim in respect of an existing right arising from the relationship of an industrial workman and his employer. The contention that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction because the claim arose under the said scheme or because the benefit was monetary or because it involved any substantial question between the Company and the workman must, in view of the said decisions, fail." This decision plainly lays down that, if the money or the benefit is claimed by a workman on the basis that the right already exists and the existence of that right is denied, it is competent for the Labour Court in proceeding under Section 33-C(2) to decide whether the right does or does not exist. In the present cases, the amount that was claimed by the five workmen was based on their admitted contract of employment and on the further plea that, their suspension being unjustified, they were entitled to their wages in accordance with their conditions of service. It was not a case where the workmen wanted a right to be granted to them by the Labour Court which is a relief that cannot be claimed in proceeding under Section 33-C(2) and may be claimed by raising an industrial dispute. The Labour Court, in these circumstances, was competent to arrive at the finding that the suspension of these five workmen did not extinguish their right to receive their wages for the period of suspension because of the conditions of service and, thereafter, compute the amount claimed by them. This ground, therefore, fails. 3. The second point urged by learned counsel was that the Labour Court violated principles of natural justice in giving its decision by ignoring in its order the plea that was put forward on behalf of the appellant in para 5(b) of the counter-statement filed by the appellant. So far as this ground is concerned, it does not appear from the order of the Labour Court that, at the stage when the court had to give its decision, this point was urged before it. Even in the special leave petition, there is no mention that this ground was pressed in the course or arguments before the Labour Court after the conclusion of the enquiry made by the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2). In the circumstances, this can be no ground at all for challenging the order made by the Labour Court. 4. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of costs.