Judgment :- 1. The second accused in C. C. 353/65 on the file of the District Magistrate, Ernakulam is the revision petitioner. He along with the first accused, was prosecuted by the Food Inspector of Ernakulam Municipality under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (shortly stated the Act) for offering for sale adulterated cumin seed (zeera PocIw ). The first accused was stated to be the proprietor of the shop and the second accused his servant, who was in charge of the shop. 300 grams of the cumin seed in question was purchased by the Food Inspector on 3rd June 1965 from the 2nd accused and on analysis it was found to contain 14.8 percent of extraneous seeds and as such adulterated. The plea of the accused was one of denial. The first accused stated that shop No. 2922 from where the article was purchased by the Food Inspector did not belong to him and that he is an I.T.I, student who has nothing to do with the sale of cumin seed. The 2nd accused also denied having sold any cumin seed to P.W.I. The 2nd accused is a servant of one Rao, the uncle of the first accused. He had gone there carrying tiffin for Rao. Exts. P-2, P-3 and P-4 have been signed by him* and this fact was not denied. The learned District Magistrate convicted both the accused and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 100 and to undergo S.I. for two weeks each. The learned Magistrate was obliged to take a lenient view in the matter of punishment since both the accused were found to be first offenders. On appeal before the Sessions Judge of Ernakulam the first accused was acquitted since the evidence was not conclusive to fix him with the ownership of the shop. The conviction and sentence passed on the 2nd accused was confirmed. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner directed his attack firstly, on the report of the analyst. He stated that the report is bad and unacceptable for the reason that he has not stated reasons for his conclusions, and the certificate is lacking in details as to the particular test applied by the analyst in reaching his conclusion. The analyst has not stated the genesis of the extraneous seeds found on analysis. He stated that the report is bad and unacceptable for the reason that he has not stated reasons for his conclusions, and the certificate is lacking in details as to the particular test applied by the analyst in reaching his conclusion. The analyst has not stated the genesis of the extraneous seeds found on analysis. Relying on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Ali v. Food Inspector, Tellicherry 1967 K.L.T. 1095 the learned counsel stated that 'all the material facts should be stated in the certificate. The opinion expressed by the Public Analyst or Director of Central Food Laboratory has no conclusiveness about it. If the particular variety of non-permitted coaltar dye had been stated in the certificate, that would have been conclusive but the court cannot act upon the opinion of an individual, however highly placed, unless the basis of the opinion is also stated.' In other words, the criticism was concentrated on the absence of the basis of the opinion of the analyst, in the certificate. Learned counsel also cited a few other decisions, of which the most important are State v. Bhausa Hanmantsa Pawar A.I.R. 1962 Bombay 229 and Titli v Alfred Robert Jones A.I.R. 1934 All. 273. The gist of the decision in State v. Bhausa Hanmantsa Pawar A.I R.1962 Bombay 229 is as follows: "The evidence of the Chemical Examiner, however treating the certificate as evidence is no more than opinion evidence. The probative value to be attached to the certificate must depend upon a variety of circumstances such as the data available to the examiner, the method of analysis adopted by him the fullness of his conclusions and speaking generally,the vulnerability to which his premises is subject. In order that a certificate may inspire confidence in the mind of the court, it is not sufficient that the Chemical Examiner merely records his negative opinion. To permit the prosecution to rely, upon a mere negative opinion without making available to the accused the grounds on which that opinion is based is a procedure which runs counter to the well established restrictions subject to which alone opinion evidence can be accepted." To the same effect is the ruling in Tith v. Alfred Robert Jones A.I.R. 1934 All. 273. 273. About the expert's opinion the learned judges observed in that case: "The opinion of an expert by itself may be relevant but would carry little weight with a court unless it is supported by a clear statement of what he noticed and on what he based his opinion. The expert should, if he expects his opinion to be accepted, put before the court all the materials which induced him to come to his conclusion so that the court although not expert, may form its own judgment on those materials." But none of these observations is relevant for the present case. They all apply to homogenous compounds where a scientific and more detailed analysis is necessary to know what exactly is the extraneous matter that has been mixed up with the food article in question. In the present case, we are dealing with a mixture and not a compound a mixture of cumin seed with other extraneous or foreign seeds. Foreign seeds are visible by the naked eye and are easily distinguishable from the cumin seed. As given in item A. 05.02 under Appendix B, cumin seed shall not contain more than 5 per cent of foreign seed. When once it is found that foreign seeds are in excess of the 5 per cent allowed, the Rule must be taken to have been contravened and in such cases it is unnecessary that the origin or the particular variety of the foreign seed should be stated in the analyst's certificate. "Where the analysis shows that such a prohibited dye is used, the foodstuff must be considered adulterated under the Act irrespective of the quantity of the adulterant. Where the extraneous matter of a type like prohibited varieties of coaltar dye is used the Analyst's report certifying to its presence in the food without specifying the exact quantity of the adulterant is sufficient to support a conviction." Vide In re Abdul Azeez 1963 K.L.T. 698 3. To the same effect is the Single Bench ruling in Abdul Hameed Khan v. Muhammed Haneefa 1962 K.L.T. 415 where it was held that: "Tea containing gram husk or coffee husk falls below the quality or purity prescribed for it and has therefore to be deemed adulterated apart from any consideration as to whether such extraneous matter is injurious to health." 4. The sum and substance of the above pronouncements is that when a prohibited foreign matter is discovered in the article of food, the accused must be held to have contravened the provisions of the Act and the prosecution in such a case is not expected to go further and enlighten the court as to the quality, genesis, etc., of the extraneous matter. I see, therefore, no defect in the analysis in the present case, and the offence has well been brought home to the accused. The contention of the 2nd accused that he was not the salesman and that he had gone there for some innocent purpose, cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that he has signed Exts. P-2 to P-4. Sale was, in fact, effected and the price was received by him. The conviction of the 2nd accused, in the circumstances, is proper and has only to be upheld. 5. On the question of punishment I should think that he being below the age of 21 has to be dealt with under the Probation of Offenders Act. S.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act lays down that when any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that it would not be desirable to deal with him under S.3 or S.4 of the Act. In the present case there is no dispute on the point that the 2nd accused is below the age of 21. He is only 15. I see nothing standing in the way of his being dealt with under S.4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The question would then arise whether it is desirable to apply the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to an offence committed under S.16 (as it stands amended) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He is only 15. I see nothing standing in the way of his being dealt with under S.4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The question would then arise whether it is desirable to apply the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to an offence committed under S.16 (as it stands amended) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. By the amendment as has been held by a Division Bench of this court in City Corporation of Trivandrum v. Mathew 1967 K.L.T. 672 a sentence of imprisonment, however, short, is compulsory and it must run along with the sentence of fine; but the compulsory nature of the imprisonment as enjoined by the Act cannot deter the court from applying the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, because the latter Act is intended to apply to offenders convicted under the Penal Code or any other law in force in the State. The following observations of the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal v. The State of Punjab AIR. 1965 SC. 444 is pertinent in this connection: "The Act (Probation of Offenders Act) is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age> and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence." The compulsory nature of the imprisonment cannot stand in the way, because in the above case of the Supreme Court the conviction was under S.451 and 354 IPC., of which imprisonment is compulsory in the former. I should, therefore, think that the second accused is one fit to be dealt with under S.4 read with S.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. 6. The result is that the conviction passed against the petitioner is upheld; but the sentence is set aside. He will be released on his entering into a bond with two sureties to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period of one year and to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period. Fine, if realised, will be refunded. He will be released on his entering into a bond with two sureties to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period of one year and to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period. Fine, if realised, will be refunded. The revision petition is allowed to the extent indicated above, and dismissed in other respects.