JUDGMENT J.N. Takru, J. - This revision by the Union of India is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Mirzapur dated the 7th January, 1966, whereby he allowed the application of Kamta Prasad Tandon (Since dead, and represented in this revision by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 10) under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this revision are as follows : The applicant and the aforesaid Kamta Prasad Tandon entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause. Disputes having arisen between them, the Chief Commissioner of Railways appointed Shri S. P. Lal as the sole arbitrator to decide the same. There upon Kamta Prasad Tandon filed an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, seeking a declaration that the arbitration clause was not binding on the parties, as it was vague, uncertain and unenforceable, and the appointment of Shri S. P. Lal as the sole arbitrator by the Chairman of the Railway Board was invalid because he had no authority under the arbitration clause to make the appointment. The learend Additional Civil Judge, who was seized of the matter, held in favour of the opposite party on the first point, and against him on the second point, and on this view of the matter allowed his application. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the Union of India field the aforesaid revision and the only point which was raised in it by its learned counsel Shri D. Sanyal, was that as the learned Additional Civil Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction on a wrong interpretation of the arbitration clause his order was liable to be revised. I shall deal with this point after quoting clause 24 of the agreement, which contains the arbitration clause. That clause reads as Follows : "All difference or dispute which shall arise touching these presents or the construction of application therof or the rights or obligations of the parties hereunder and whether arising during the continuance of this agreement or after the termination therof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chief Inspector of Mines appointed under the Indian Mines Act 1923 or any statutory modification or re-enactment therof for the time being in force or such other person as the Chief Commissioner of Railways may appoint whose decision shall be final and binding upon the parties to such difference or dispute." 3. A plain reading of the aforesaid clause shows that the dispute arising under the agreement in question can be referred either to the arbitration of the Chief Inspector of Mines appointed under the Indian Mines Act, 1923, or any person nominated by the Chief Commissioner of Railways. The words "as the Chief Commissioner of Railways may appoint" govern the antecedent 'such other person', and have no correlation with the words "the Chief inspector of Mines". Apart from that, the very fact that the word 'other' has been used in connection with the words 'such .... person as the Chief Commissioner of Railways may appoint' is sufficient to show that the person whom the Chief Commissioner of Railways could appoint had to be a person other than the Chief Inspector of Mines. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary-on which Shri Sanyal relied - the word 'such' means, "of the same kind or class as something mentioned or referred to of that kind; similar; the like". Obviously in the instant case the "something mentioned or referred to" consists of person whom the Chief Commissioner of Railways may appoint, but does not include the Inspector of Mines, who not be appointed as the sole arbitrator under the arbitration clause without reference to the Chief Commissioner of Railways. I am fortified in this interpretation by the fact that if the drafts-man of the agreement had intended to include the Chief Inspector of Mines also in the category of 'such other persons.', or had also intended to leave his selection as a sole arbitrator to the Chief Commissioner of Railways, then he would have expressed his intention by just saying that all disputes or differences shall be settled by a sole arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Commissioner of Railways. I am, therefore, satisfied that the learned Additional Civil Judge was right in his interpretation of the arbitration clause, and as on that view the said clause makes no provision as to who is to exercise the option of appointing the sole arbitrator, it is clearly uncertain and void and as such unenforceable. Shri Sanual frankly conceded-and in my opinion very rightly-that if the arbitration clause suffered from the uncertainly and vagueness referred to above it could not be enforced. 4. Shri Sanual frankly conceded-and in my opinion very rightly-that if the arbitration clause suffered from the uncertainly and vagueness referred to above it could not be enforced. 4. Thus for the reasons stated above this revision fails and is dismissed, but in all the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.