ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - This is a Defendant tenant's appeal from the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge of Kanpur who by reversing the decree of the court of first instance in appeal decreed the Plaintiff-Respondent's suit for ejectment of the Defendant-Appellant from the premises in suit and for recovery of a small sum as arrears of rent. 2. The only point which has been raised by Sri S.C. Budhwar, Learned Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant, is that the notice served by the Plaintiff as landlady upon the Defendant as tenant purporting to be u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid and ineffective inasmuch as it did not clearly and unambiguously terminate the tenancy. I think the notice in question a copy of which is Ext. 1 on record, with sufficient clarity and precision shows that the legal relationship of the landlady and tenant was to be ended between the parties on the expiry of 30 days from the date of service of that notice. 3. In the first part of the notice which was signed by a lawyer on the instruction of the Plaintiff landlady, it was stated that she had purchased the premises in suit for her own use and had obtained permission, after contest by the Defendant tenant, u/s 3 of UP Act No. III of 1947 from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for filing a suit for ejectment on the condition that 6 months time would be available to the tenant for vacating the premises. The second part of the notice stated that the Defendant-tenant had fallen in arrears and had not vacated the premises and therefore, he must pay all the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice and quit on the expiry of 30 days from the receipt thereof. The actual words used in the notice which is in Hindi are: 4. Sri Budhwar, Learned Counsel for the Defendant Appellant, contended that the only demand which has been made in the notice is for the delivery of possession from the Defendant tenant on the expiry of 30 days and there is complete absence of any expression or words that the tenancy was being terminated or that the relationship of landlady and tenant was to cease, __thus the notice did not fulfil the requirement of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. 5. No doubt the language used in the notice leaves much to be desired and the notice Ext. 1 by no means can be said to be an ideal notice but the fact remains that when it is read as a whole then it clearly manifests an intention on the part of tie landlady that on the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of the notice the contract of tenancy between the parties will no longer remain operative and the legal relations of a landlady and tenant or that of the lessor and lessee would cease. I have no hesitation in holding that the Hindi words 'Khali Kar Digyey' when used in relation to the affair of an ordinary lease of a house let out from month to month are understood as meaning that the tenants shall quite the premises let out, completely effacing the contractual or legal relationship which existed between him and his landlord or landlady. It is difficult to translate into English: the actual import of the words "Khali Karna." In that context the nearest approach which lean venture in that direction would be that those words are almost equivalent to what in the English law will be described as a demand to quit. I have no doubt in my mind that by using the language, of demand couched in the Hindi words described above, the Plaintiff landlady was conveying to the Defendant-tenant her unequivocal intention not to keep him as tenant after the expiry of 30 days. 6. Learned Counsel referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin 1963 AWR 490 ALJ 567 and drew my attention to certain observations, of Desai, C.J. at page 570 of the report. I do not find any words in the observations to which my attention was drawn as negativing the approach I have made in the instant case. In fact the decision cited itself proceeds on the principle that no legal form having been prescribed for a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act it would depend upon the, fact and the circumstances of each case as to whether the notice in dispute complied with the requirement of the law. In fact the decision cited itself proceeds on the principle that no legal form having been prescribed for a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act it would depend upon the, fact and the circumstances of each case as to whether the notice in dispute complied with the requirement of the law. In the case cited the question that was being considered, was whether a composite notice demanding arrears of rent u/s 3(1)(a) of UP Act No. III of 1947 and terminating the tenancy u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was valid and whether on the language of the notice in, that case the tenancy was terminated with immediate effect or 30 days period was afforded for termination of the tenancy. It is while considering these questions that certain observations were made. The point which arises in the, instant case did not come up foe, consideration in the case cited. The Learned Counsel then argued that the learned Judge of the court below had wrongly relied upon my decision in the case of Har Sarup Lal Vs. Chiddalal, AIR 1965 All 291 and thus made a wrong approach to the question of interpretation of the disputed notice in suit. I do not think that the learned Judge of the court below made any wrong approach to the question before him. I have again emphasised in the case of Har Swarup v. Chidda Lal (supra) that it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and the language of the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act that the said notice complied with the provisions of law. In referring to the, case of Har Swarup v. Chidda Lal (supra) the learned Judge of the court below did not fall in any error. 7. No other point has been, urged in support of the appeal. Accordingly dismiss this appeal but direct the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.