JUDGMENT Mahseh Chandra, J. - This is a defendants' second appeal against the judgment and decree of the courts below. 2. The suit was brought by Sher Mohammad and Shri Jafar, plaintiff-respondents, against Peer Bux and Ghafoor-appellants and Shri Pusey and Shri Sabha Ram, res pondents 3 and 4 for a permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with the possession of the respondents 1 and 2 over agricultural plot Nos. 85181 of village Sarai Buley Khan and plot No. 2094119 of village Ahmadnagar Bamnoi of district Etah and the Beri trees standing on the land in dispute. Respondents 1 and 2 also claimed Rs. 400/- as damages for the value of the fruit crop alleged to have been taken by the appellants and respondents 3 and 4. Peer Bux and Ghafoor and respondents 1 and 2 alleged that it was their private grave-yard of their family, and in their possession, that the Beni trees in dispute were planted by them and were in their possession, that their fruit crop had been sold by them for a long period and that the appellants and respondents 3 and 4 have no concern with the trees or the grave-yard and have sold the fruit crop and the Beri trees to defendants 3 and 4 and had their name entered over the grave-yard in suit. 3. The appellants and respondents 3 and 4 contended that the land in dispute was not the grave-yard of the respondents 1 and 2, that they had no concern with it or the trees standing thereon and that the appellants are its tenants and that the trees in dispute were planted by them and their ancestors and have never been in possession of respondents 1 and 2. The appellant further alleged that the suit was barred by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and that fruit crop of the trees in dispute were never sold by respondent No. 2 and were actually sold by the appellants. 4. The trial court decreed the claim for injunction, but dismissed the suit for recovery of Rs. 400/- on the ground that the fruits were actually plucked by respondents 1 and 2 and not by the appellant. The decree was confirmed by the first appellate court. 5. In second appeal the first contention of the appellant is that since the land in dispute was waqf property it was not a private grave-yard. 400/- on the ground that the fruits were actually plucked by respondents 1 and 2 and not by the appellant. The decree was confirmed by the first appellate court. 5. In second appeal the first contention of the appellant is that since the land in dispute was waqf property it was not a private grave-yard. This contention is not without force. In Jhao Lal v. Ahmudullah, 1934 ALJ 248 it has been held by this Court that once a plot of land had been proved to be grave-yard, the zamindar had no rights left at all for the simple reason that the grave-yard became a waqf for the purpose of burying the dead. The zamindar cannot interfere with the use of the land as a grave-yard so long as it was used for that purpose. It was further held that it is against public interest to rule that a zamindar had a right to graze cattle upon a graveyard. Thus, once the land has become a waqf for the purpose of being used as a graveyard the title to the land vests in God and not in a private person. 6. In Chhutkao v. Gambhir Mal, A.I.R. 1931 Oudh 45 it has been held that the distinction between a private and public waqf has no application in the case of land used for the burial of the dead. 7. In Nazira v. Sukhdarshan La1, 1936 ALJR 651 it has been held that "where a grave of a Mohammadan exists on a piece of land the presumption is that that part of the site on which the dead body is buried is dedicated with the consent of the owners of the land and becomes sacred and ceases to be the private property of the former owners and should be considered as waqf land in which the members of the Mohammadan community would be interested and to which they would be entitled to have access?' This Court further held "if the descendants of a deceased owner, whose tomb stand on his land, transfer the land, the transfer does not involve the sale of the site of the tomb itself when that tomb must be regarded as a dedicated spot." This decision also shows that the site of a grave-yard does not remain the private property of any person. It will also be apparent from the statement of the plaintiff himself that he stated that the graves in the grave-yard in dispute are not only of his family. Thus, the land of the grave-yard cannot be said to belong to the plaintiff and respondents 1 and 2. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 then contends that even though they may not be the owner of the land of the grave-yard it has been proved that they planted the trees in dispute and had been in possession of them eversince and that they had been all along selling the fruit crop of those trees and thus were the owners of the trees in dispute and at least exercised possessory title over them. His contention is that the appellants being mere trespassers so far as the trees are concerned and have no right whatsoever to them cannot resist the suit for injunction in view of the possessory title of respondents 1 and 2 to the trees and their fruit crops. In fact, respondents 1 and 2 contended that they had acquired title to the trees in suit by adverse possession. So far as this question of adverse possession is concerned it was not specifically pleaded in the plaint and even the ingredients of adverse possession were not alleged by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. For adverse possession it is necessary to allege that for more than twelve years possession has been hostile, overt and exclusive. It is true that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 claim a title to the trees in dispute, but it has not been alleged in the plaint since when they claimed or that they claimed it for more than 12 years. So even if they had been in possession overtly for more than 12 years, the ingredients of adverse possession cannot be said to have been alleged in the plaint. The plea of adverse possession being a mixed question of fact and law cannot, therefore, be allowed to be taken in second appeal. 9. The learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 then contends that if he has not taken the plea of adverse possession he relies on his possessory title and his right to sue for injunction against trespassers. 9. The learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 then contends that if he has not taken the plea of adverse possession he relies on his possessory title and his right to sue for injunction against trespassers. The ingredients of possessory title were certainly alleged in the plaint and the trees were even alleged to have been planted by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In fact it was found by the trial court that there was Ext. 9 executed on 18-4-1937 by P. W. 2, who was a Mali for planting the trees in dispute at the instance of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, and that in view of the statement of P. W. 2 in the witness box and Ext. 9 it was clear that the trees had been planted at the instance of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is true that the first appellate court has not referred to this part of the case and has not gone to the extent of affirming the finding of the trial court that the trees were actually planted by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 but it held that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were owners of the trees and were in possession thereof. The finding of the trial court regarding the planting of the trees at the instance of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 does not appear to have been reversed by the first appellate court and cannot be said to be unjustified by the evidence on record.. There is not the slightest doubt that eversince 1937, as found by both the courts below, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had been in possession of the trees in dispute and had been taking the fruit crops and it is also in evidence and as found by both the courts below that the fruit crops were also sold by respondents 1 and 2 from time to time. It is thus clear that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have established their possessory title to the trees in suit. 10. It is thus clear that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have established their possessory title to the trees in suit. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that there is no question of possessory title to the trees in dispute since the trees go with the land and for this he relies on Ruttonji Edulji Shet v. The Collector of Tanna and The Conservator of Forest, XI Indian Appeals Cases 295 at p. 313, Pir Makhdum v. Malik Boola Khan, A.I.R. 1921 Sind 109, Sagwa v. Bhagwan Das, A.I.R. 1925 Alld. 119, Raghubir Saran Das v. Ram Das, A.I.R. 1925 Alld. 348 and Maung Kye v. Maung Tha Han, A.I.R. 1925 Rangoon 87. None of these decisions, however, help the appellant. 11. In Ruttonji Edulji Shet v. The Collector of Tanna and the Conservator of Forest it was held : "At the time, then, that this lease was made, the whole of the land, and all the rights connected with the land, subject to such claims as third parties might have upon it, belonged to the Government. The trees upon the land were part of the land, and the right to cut down and sell those trees was incident to the proprietorship of the land." 12. The appellant in that case was merely a farmer of the public revenue and had no right whatsoever to those trees. Their lordships of the Privy Council held that it was a necessary incident of the lease by reason of the objects of the lease, that they had acquired no title or right to cut them under any positive law or custom or under the express terms of the lease. The question in appeal before their lordships of the Privy Council was whether the farmer of the revenue had a right to fell and carry away teak, blackwood, Khair or other trees growing within the boundaries of that village. It was held that he had no such right. There was no question of any possessory title to the trees in that case against the trespasser. The person who was claiming title to the trees was a person entitled to them and not a trespasser. 13. It was held that he had no such right. There was no question of any possessory title to the trees in that case against the trespasser. The person who was claiming title to the trees was a person entitled to them and not a trespasser. 13. Similarly, in Pir Makhdum v. Malik Boola Khan, the dispute was between the zamindars and the Jagirdars and it was held that it was not necessary for the zamindar to take the permission of the Jagirdar to cut down and sell those trees since they were owners of the Jungle and trees. That was also not a case between a person in possessory title and a trespasser. The Zamindar who owned the land could not be said to be a trespasser and was, in fact, held to be the owner of the trees in dispute. 14. In Sagwa v. Bhagwan Das and Raghubir Saran Das v. Ram Das it was held that the tenant was entitled to trees in the absence of a custom or contract and the zamindar claiming the trees must prove some special contract or custom. It was held that the trees on a holding partake of the nature of the holding and in the absence of a con-tract or custom to the contrary a tenant has the same right in respect of them as he has in the holding. The plaintiff did not allege in that case that the trees in question had been planted by him. The defendant alleged that they had planted it but they failed to prove their allegation. The tree in question was, therefore, deemed to have been a self-sown tree growing on the occupancy tenancy of the appellant and the tenant was as such entitled to the fruits or to the fallen wood of such tree. The appellant in the present case is not a tenant of the land in dispute and was not entitled to any right to the land. So far as the fruit crops of the trees are concerned he has no right whatsoever. Then the person who had been exercising possession over it for a long time will be entitled to a decree for injunction as given by the courts below. 15. The case of Raghubir Saran Das v. Ram Das was certainly a case based on possessory title. Then the person who had been exercising possession over it for a long time will be entitled to a decree for injunction as given by the courts below. 15. The case of Raghubir Saran Das v. Ram Das was certainly a case based on possessory title. It is true that there was a plea of possessory right on the basis that it was frequented by passers by as if it were a public land and it was held by the court below that no question of possessory right should, therefore, attach to such property. There was no de facto possession of the plaintiff over the land. Consequently this Court refused to order demolition of the roof in the absence of a finding that the land over which the roof was built was the property of the plaintiff. 16. The case of Maung Kye v. Maung Tha Han, XXV ALJ 281 was a case of a trespasser, who had planted the paddy crop on the land of another persons and it was held that the trespasser was not entitled to that crop. The case is clearly distinguishable. This is a case of a tree which has been planted in 1937 and has been in possession of the respondents 1 and 2 ever since it is planted. If the decision is taken to extend to the case of a possessory title over a tree planted by and in possession of a person we with respect cannot agree with that view. 17. In Ram Dayal v. Saraswati, XXV ALJ 281 a Division Bench of this Court held : "Even independently of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act a person who has been ousted by a trespasser from the possession of immovable property to which he had merely a possessory title, is not debarred from bringing a suit in ejectment on the basis of his possessory title even after the lapse of six months from the date of dispossession and where the plaintiff was in continuous and peaceful possession for a long period, he would be entitled to retain such possession." 18. In Uttam v. Tabu, 115 Indian Cases 480 it was held by Lahore High Court : "A trespasser who interferes with the lawful possession of another may be restrained by an injunction, even though the latter is not able to prove any title to the property of which he is in possession. Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act is no bar to the granting of such an injunction." 19. Similarly in Mata Badal Singh v. Bhaiya Hanwant Prasad Singh, 1950 ALJ 615 it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that a person who is in peaceful and undisturbed possession of any property though without title, has the right to continue in possession until he is evicted by the person who is the real owner of the property. His peaceful possession is by itself a title which is good against the whole world except the rightful owner. "This decision fully covers the present case. The appellant is not the rightful owner. He claimed that he was tenant of the land in dispute and was the owner of the trees, but both the courts below found against him. He is a mere trespasser and as such has no right to either the trees or the fruit crops. Whatever the position may be in a suit which may be filed under Order 1, Rule 8, C. P. C. The appellant has no right to disturb the possession of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who have proved their possessory title to the trees in dispute. The suit for injunction in respect of the trees in dispute and the crop thereof was, therefore, rightly decreed. 20. The result is that the appeal is dis-missed except for the modification of the decree of the courts below that the suit for injunction shall stand decreed in respect of the trees in dispute and their fruit crops only. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs.