JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The question is who will be the legal representative of a female intermediary who held the estate as a limited owner. The son of the erstwhile female intermediary claims to be entitled to the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable for the estate. The claim is contested by the sisters of the deceased intermediary. Udai Chand was the proprietor of the estate. He died leaving a widow Smt. Sukhraji Kuer. The widow also died and left three daughters, Smt. Balraji Kuer, Smt. Shyam Kumari and Smt. Ram Kumari. These three daughters held the estate of Udai Chand on the date of vesting, namely 1st July, 1952. Compensation and rehabilitation grant was adjudged payable to all these three daughters of Udai Chand in respect of the shares of the estate held by them. Before the bonds or the grant could actually be paid out Smt. Balraji Kuer died on 14th May, 1953. Thereafter the present dispute arose as to the person entitled to receive the grants and bonds. Parikshit Singh, the plaintiff-respondent, claimed as the son of Smt. Balraji Kuer. The two appellants claimed that they were entitled as the sisters. 2. Section 67 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act states that where the person entitled to the compensation dies before it is paid to him, it shall be paid to his legal representatives. Similarly, under Section 75 of the Act the rehabilitation grant is payable to the legal representative of the intermediary in case of his death before its payment. Clause (16) of Section 3 defines the "legal representatives" to have the meaning assigned to it in the Code of Civil Procedure. Clause (11) of Section 2, C. P. C., defines a "legal representative" to mean "a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued". Thus, the legal representative within meaning of Sections 67 and 75, would be either of these three categories of persons: a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person; or a person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased; and in a case where the deceased was having a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on his death. It is to be noted that the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by Section 172 provides for succession to the holdings of bhumidhar and sirdars. But it makes no provision for the devolution of the compensation paid to them. 3. Smt. Balraji Kuer inherited the estate as a daughter. It is settled that under the personal law applicable to her, namely the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law she held it as a limited owner. On the extinguishment of her right, title and interest in the estate under Section 6 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act she was entitled to compensation as provided by the Act, in lieu of the rights which had been extinguished. She being a limited holder of the estate, would have, if she had received the compensation, held it as a limited owner. The question is who would be her legal representative. The daughter's sons claim as her personal heirs. They do not claim as intermeddlers. The point to be considered is whether the estate held as a limited owner would devolve on or be represented by her personal heirs or by the next heir of the last male owner ? 4. In Andhra Bank Ltd. v. Srinivasan, A.I.R. 1962 SC 232 the Supreme Court held that the phrase "person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person" does not mean the whole of the estate. A legatee who obtains only o part of the estate of the deceased under a will can be said to represent his estate and is, therefore, a legal representative under Section 2 (ii) , C. P. C. Thus, different persons may be the legal representatives of the same person, depending upon the nature or the capacity in which the various properties were held. 5. In Gyan Datt v. Sada Nand La1, A.I.R. 1933 Alld. 5. In Gyan Datt v. Sada Nand La1, A.I.R. 1933 Alld. 163 it was held that the definition of a legal representative in Section 2 (11) , C. P. C., is wide enough to cover the case of a coparcener who gets property by survivor ship on the death of a coparcener who sues or is sued in a representative character. The basis of the decision was that when a coparcener sues or is sued as such, he sues or is sued in a representative capacity and the legal representative would be the person on whom the estate would have devolved on the death of such a person. 6. Similarly in Jadubansi Kuer v. Mahpalsingh, A.I.R. 1916 Alld. 34, it was held that a Hindu woman in possession of an estate as such represents the estate and a suit brought by her to recover possession of the estate can be continued on her death during the pendency of the suit by a person entitled to succeed to the estate after her death. Where an unmarried daughter sues, then on her death her married sisters could continue the litigation as her legal representatives. 7. In Tribhuwan Sunder Kuar v. Sri Narain Singh, ILR 20 Alld. 341 it was held that a right to sue vesting in a widow would survive to, and devolve on, the heir of her husband entitled to the estate, and such heir, and not her personal heirs, would be her legal representatives for the purposes of Section 365 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which corresponds to Section 2 (11) of the present Code) . 8. These authorities make it clear that a person holding an estate as a limited owner represents the estate for the time being. On her death, the estate devolves on and is represented by the next heir of the last male owner. Such an heir would be the legal representative in relation to that estate. The lady held or would have held the compensation as a limited owner. After her death, it would go to the next heir of Udai Chand. The defendants-appellants as daughters are preferential heirs to the plaintiff, who was the daughter's son. 9. Such an heir would be the legal representative in relation to that estate. The lady held or would have held the compensation as a limited owner. After her death, it would go to the next heir of Udai Chand. The defendants-appellants as daughters are preferential heirs to the plaintiff, who was the daughter's son. 9. It was then urged for the plaintiff-respondent that this may be true of the compensation that may be paid for the estate, but the rehabilitation grant in its intrinsic nature is an ex gratia payment to the intermediary for the time being holding the estate. It was not a part of the compensation for the rights that were acquired. This precise question was raised and negatived by the Full Bench in Raja Suryapalsingh v. The U.P. Government, A.I.R. 1951 Alld. 674. In paragraph 65 the Bench repelled this argument and held :- "Upon a careful consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act we are of opinion that the compensation which the intermediary will receive for the acquisition of his property includes the amount (if any) to which he is entitled as rehabilitation grant. It is not necessary to come to the conclusion that the provisions for rehabilitation grant are as cloak or subterfuge, for it appears to us that considering the scheme as a whole it is impossible to resist the conclusion that both 'compensation' and (for those entitled to it) 'rehabilitation grant' are intended as a recompense or counter balance for the acquisition of their property, and that they together constitute the true compensation pay-able under the Act." 10. In view of this declaration of law it must be held that both the compensation bonds as well as the rehabilitation grants together formed the recompense or the quid pro quo for the acquisition of the estate of the erstwhile intermediary. Both these things would carry the same legal characteristics and would be held by a female intermediary as a limited owner. 11. In my opinion the trial court was right in upholding the claim of the daughters to receive the compensation as well as the rehabilitation grant. 12. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The appellate decree is set aside, and that of the trial court restored. The parties will, however, bear their own costs throughout.