JUDGMENT R. B. Misra, J. - This is a defendants appeal directed against the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge, Aligarh, dated 23rd October, 1962, arising out f a suit for demolition of wall A B and )other constructions set up by the defendants, and for recovery of Rs. 50 as damages. 2. Respondent No. 1, the plaintiff, based his title on prescriptive right of easement. Though he also took the plea that the passage was jointly used by him and the defendants, he mainly based his claims on the prescriptive right of easement. 3. The suit was contested by the appellants on the ground that the northern gate of the plaintiff's house came in existence only recently; it was not in existence since 40 years as alleged by the plaintiff. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had not prescribed his easementary right. But on appeal, the lower appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court holding that the plaintiff had acquired the right of prescription by user for more than 20 years. The contesting defendants have now come to this Court in second appeal. 5. The first contention of Shri Hajela, counsel for the appellants, is that the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the northern gate in the house of the plaintiff was in existence for the last 40 years is vitiated because of the use of inadmissible piece of evidence by the lower appellate Court. His argument is that the learned Judge has recorded a finding that the oral evidence of the parties on either side is evenly balanced, and therefore he has been swayed away by the inadmissible documentary evidence. One of the documents relied upon by the learned Judge is Ex. 6, which is a report along with a map prepared by Commissioner in another suit. It was argued for the appellants that a re-port or a map prepared by a Commissioner in another suit cannot be used in the present suit unless the report is proved by the person preparing the same. The Commissioner, who prepared Ex. 6, has not come in the witness-box to prove the same. In support of his argument the learned counsel relied upon (A. I. R. 1928 Calcutta 63). The Commissioner, who prepared Ex. 6, has not come in the witness-box to prove the same. In support of his argument the learned counsel relied upon (A. I. R. 1928 Calcutta 63). It was held in that case that the report and map prepared by a Commissioner can be taken into evidence only in the suit in which he made the enquiry. Yet they can be admitted in evidence in another suit under the Evidence Act on being proved by the person who made it. According to the learned counsel, since the Commissioner did not prove the document (Ex. 6), the same could not be used in the present case. But the learned Judge has used this piece of evidence and, therefore, his finding is vitiated. 6. It is true that Ex. 6 has not been duly proved as required by the law. But there is a lot of other documentary evidence which the learned Judge took into consideration in arriving at his conclusion. If the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court can be warranted by the other evidence on the record, the finding cannot be set aside merely because it chooses to rely also upon one piece of inadmissible evidence. 7. Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that- "The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision." 8. In this case we find that the learned Judge has taken into consideration other documentary evidence as well. Of course if oral evidence alone had been the basis of his decision, the position would have been different, because the learned Judge recorded a finding that the evidence of the parties was evenly balanced. In view of the fact that there is other documentary evidence besides Ex. 6 to warrant the finding, the first argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is not tenable. 9. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the land in dispute belonged to the State Government. In view of the fact that there is other documentary evidence besides Ex. 6 to warrant the finding, the first argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is not tenable. 9. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the land in dispute belonged to the State Government. It was kept under the management of the Municipality and later on the Municipality transferred the piece of land in question on 13th November, 1946, to one Mitthan Lal. Mitthan Lal in turn sold the piece of land to the defendants. Since the land belonged to the State Government, the period requisite for prescribing easementary or prescriptive right was 60 years. The argument is that even assuming that the door of the plaintiff's house came in existence in the year 1924 or 1925 as alleged by him, the 60 years period has not expired and the plaintiff cannot therefore claim prescriptive right of easement in this case. 10. It may at the very outset be noted that there was no specific plea in the written statement to the effect that the land in dispute at one time belonged to the State Government. However, since this question seems to have been raised both in the trial Court as well as in the lower appellate Court, the absence of a specific plea to that effect in the written statement should not be allowed to prevent the appellants from urging it here. It would be noticed, however, that the lower appellate Court while dealing with the point has recorded a further finding that there is no evidence on the record to prove that the land in dispute at any time belonged to the State Government. The learned counsel sought to challenge this finding on the ground that the sale deed in favour of Mitthan Lal speaks for itself, for the sale deed was executed in Mitthan Lal's favour by the Municipal Board after obtaining permission from the Collector. According to him, this could be possible only when the land belonged to Government otherwise there was absolutely no occasion for the Municipal Board's taking permission of the Collector. According to him, this could be possible only when the land belonged to Government otherwise there was absolutely no occasion for the Municipal Board's taking permission of the Collector. He also invited my attention in this connection to Rule 48 of the Nazul Manual, which provides that sale or lease could be made by the Municipal Board managing the property of the Government only with the consent either of the State Government, or the Commissioner or the Collector, as the case may be. The learned counsel urged that this is quite sufficient to show that the property in question belonged to Government, and the Municipal Board was only managing the property and, therefore, it had to obtain the consent of the Collector before transferring the same. 11. Shri Hajela is correct in his submission that there is some evidence on the record to show that the land in suit at one time belonged to Government. But, even assuming that the land. at one time belonged to Government, there is not much difference in the position. On the assumption that the land at one time belonged to Government the question that emerges for determination in this case is whether the plaintiff-respondent has acquired the right of easement by prescription. In determining this question we shall have to consider whether the period of enjoyment as of right by the plaintiff respondent during the period when the piece of land was owned by Government can be tacked with the period of his enjoyment when the property was purchased by Mitthan Lal and from him by the defendants-appellants. 12. Shri Hajela, in support of his argument that the plaintiff-respondent will have to show 60 years' period of user in order to acquire the right by prescription as the land at one time belonged to Government, relied on "Srinivasa Upadhya v. Ranganna Bhatta, A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 120" and "Lalit Kishore v. Ram Prasad, A.I.R. 1943 Alld. 362". 13. In "Srinivasa Upadhya v. Ranganna Bhatta, A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 120" it was held that :- "The words 'belongs to Government' in the last paragraph of Section 15 refer not to the time of suit but to the time during which the easement is enjoyed. 120" and "Lalit Kishore v. Ram Prasad, A.I.R. 1943 Alld. 362". 13. In "Srinivasa Upadhya v. Ranganna Bhatta, A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 120" it was held that :- "The words 'belongs to Government' in the last paragraph of Section 15 refer not to the time of suit but to the time during which the easement is enjoyed. Where, therefore, after 40 years' enjoyment of an easement as against Government, the latter transfers the property to a private party, the easement does not become absolute, but the person claiming it must make good his title by 20 years enjoyment against the transferee after the transfer." 14. It was further held- "Where the 60 years' period has nearly expired during Government ownership oi the land and the land is then transferred by Government to a private party, the acquisition of the easement might be held to be completed if the deficiency was made up by subsequent enjoyment against the transferee." 15. This case itself, to my mind, makes an exception and it does contemplate that in a case where 60 years' user has not been completed during the period when the land was owned and possessed by Government, the deficiency could be made good by the subsequent user when the property was transferred to that person. To my mind this case helps the plaintiff-respondent more than the appellants. 16. The case of "Lalit Kishore v. Ram Prasad, A.I.R. 1943 Alld. 362" next relied upon by Shri Hajela is a Division Bench case of this Court. Only one of the two hon'ble Judges constituting the Bench decided the question involved in the present case, and even that learned Judge clearly observed that on the findings recorded in that case it was not at all necessary to enter into the question, yet as the point was canvassed at some length he chose to express his view on the question. Obviously therefore the observation of the learned Judge on the particular question is only obiter dictum. It was held in that case by Mr. Justice Allsop that :- "A person who had begun a period of prescription against the Government might continue as against the Government's transferee as such. But a person claiming "an easement against a transferee from the Government has an option. It was held in that case by Mr. Justice Allsop that :- "A person who had begun a period of prescription against the Government might continue as against the Government's transferee as such. But a person claiming "an easement against a transferee from the Government has an option. He can either base his claim upon user for a period of 60 years against the Government and the transferee, as such, of the Government, or, if he so prefers, he can ignore the period of prescription against the Government and base his claim entirely upon user for a period of 20 years while the property has been in the possession of the transferee." 17. As already observed above, the above observation is only obiter dictum as it was not at all necessary in that particular case to enter into the controversy. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, referred to "Jehangiriji v. Nariman, A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 318" ; "Saya Rama v. Lahore Electric Supply Company, A.I.R. 1942 Lahore 124"; "Kesriehand v. Chananmal, A.I.R. 1959 Raj. 58" and "K. Nagappa v. Babu Achari, A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 179". In the case of "Jehangiriji v. Nariman", the last paragraph of Section 15 of the Indian Easements Act was the subject-matter for consideration, and it was held that :- "When at the date of suit the property over which the easement is claimed, belongs not to the Government but to a private individual either by transfer or otherwise from the Government, the period prescribed under Section 15 for establishing easementary right is 20 years and not 60 years. The person claiming the right as against the transferee from Government can take the benefit of the period of user as against the Government for establishing his claim against the transferee." "A. I. R. 1942 Lahore 124" (supra) and "A. I. R. 1929 Allahabad 318" were relied on in this case. "A. I. R. 1953 Bombay 318" (supra) affirms "A. I. R. 1942 Lahore 124" (supra) , and the same view is reiterated in "A. I. R. 1959 Rajasthan 58" (supra) and "A. I. R. 1962 Mysore 179" (supra). 19. Shri Hajela then urged that the case involves an important question of law and should be referred to a larger Bench so that there may be an authoritative decision on the point from this Court. 19. Shri Hajela then urged that the case involves an important question of law and should be referred to a larger Bench so that there may be an authoritative decision on the point from this Court. The earlier case of "Lalit Kishore v. Ram Prasad" cannot be said to be a decision by a Division Bench and the observations made in that case by one of the learned Judges also appears to be an obiter dictum. If I felt myself bound by the earlier decision of this Court in "Lalit Kishore v. Ram Prasad", I had no option but to refer the case to a larger Bench in case I chose to differ from the view taken in that case. But, as said earlier, only one of two learned Judges dealt with the point and that too, on his own showing, was only obiter dictum, I think I am free to take my own view on the point. 20. Having considered the cases cited on either side, I find myself in accord with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in (Jehangirji v. Nariman). 21. Before parting with the case, however, it must be clarified that the plaintiff-respondent has prescribed his right of passage on the land in dispute. It does not, however, authorise him to pass through the entire land belonging to the defendants-appellants. He can have only a reasonable width of land for his passage. In the circumstances of the case I think six feet will be the reasonable width of passage which the plaintiff-respondent can use as passage. 22. For the reasons given above I do not find any fault in the judgment of the lower appellate Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. 23. Let the record of the case be sent own to the Court below at an early date.