JUDGMENT B. N. Lokur, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution raises the question of legality of the order of the State Government, dated 17th November, 1966 superseding the Town Area Committee, Captainganj, district Deoria, for a period of two years, under Section 36 (1) of the U. P. Town Areas Act, 1914. The petition came up for hearing before Beg, J. and, although six grounds had been set out in the petition challenging the validity of the order of supersession, it appears that the only ground urged was that the order is invalid as no opportunity was given to the Town Area Committee for submitting its explanation before the order was made. On behalf of the State, the decision of a Single Judge of this court in Iqbal Ahmad v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 Alld. 264 was cited in support of the proposition that no such opportunity need be given before an order of supersession is made. Beg, J., however, felt that the said decision required reconsideration as it was not in conformity with the later pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court and referred the whole, case to a larger Bench. 2. The only point urged before us is that in passing the order of supersession, the State Government was exercising a quasi-judicial function and ought to have given an opportunity to the Town Area Committee, before passing the order and the order is also contrary to the fundamental principles of natural justice and fair-play. 3. Section 36 (1) of the Town Areas Act reads thus :- 36 (1) if, in the opinion of the State Government a committee persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this or any other Act for the time being in force, or exceeds or abuses its powers, the State Government may, by an order published, with the reasons for making it, in the Official Gazette declare that committee to be in default, or to have exceeded or abused its powers; and supersede it for a period not exceeding two years to be specified in the order." 4. It would be convenient to set out the instances of default committed by the Town Area Committee in the performance of its Statutory duties and the instances of excesses and abuse of power, as mentioned in the order of supersession. The instances of default are :- "The Committee has failed to- (1) finalise the preparation of assessment lists for the years 1964-65, 1965-66 and " 1966-67 in accordance with the provisions of Section 15-B of the aforesaid Act and the U. P. Town Area Circumstances and Property Tax (Assessment and Collection) Rules; (2) utilise the road grant amounting to Rs. 5,000/- sanctioned to it in G. 0. No. 6118-A/XI-C-506-64, dated December 18, 1964, within the prescribed period; (3) prepare demand and collection registers, monthly accounts, annual balance sheet and report and office order book as required under rules 23, 40, 41, 42 and 54 of the Accounts Rules embodied in the Town Area Manual; (4) keep minimum working balance as required under rule 58 of the said Accounts Rules; and (5) to make proper and adequate arrangements for lighting in the town." The instances of excess and abuse of power are :- "The Committee has abused and exceeded its powers- (1) by revising the assessment lists for the years 1962-63 and 1963-64 prepared by the old Committee; and (2) by allowing the town fund to re-main with unauthorised persons i.e. with Sri Narain Modi, Member of the Committee and Sri Gautam Dubey, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, in utter disregard of the provisions of Rule 2 of the said Accounts Rules." 5. The circumstances leading to the order of supersession are briefly these: on 26th June, 1966, three members of the Town Area Committee, which was formed on the result of general elections held in 1964, made a written representation to the State Government complaining of various irregular acts of commission and omission on the part of the committee, whereupon the State Government directed the District Magistrate, Deoria, to make an enquiry into the allegations. The District Magistrate deputed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hata to hold an enquiry. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate made on the spot investigation and submitted his report to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate deputed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hata to hold an enquiry. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate made on the spot investigation and submitted his report to the District Magistrate. He recommended the supersession of the Committee in the following words :- "From the facts discussed above, I am of the opinion that the Committee has utterly failed in the discharge of its duties and has made persistent default in the performance of duties imposed on it by the U. P. Town Areas Act, 1914. It has abused its powers. It has further failed to provide any amenity to its people. This Committee in my opinion is incapable of running the administration of the Town. Keeping in view the persistent default made by the Committee as discussed above, I would recommend that the Committee may be superseded for a period of two years for the betterment of the people." 6. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate also made the following observations :- "Besides the points mentioned above I may further point out that the Chairman, Sri Lalta Prasad Gupta, is a Vakil and is doing Iegal practice at Gorakhpur. He seldom visits - Captainganj and finds very little time to look after Town Area affairs. In his absence Sri Gautam Dubey, Vice-Chairman looks after the Town Area affairs, but he too is working as Compounder in Cane Union, Captainganj. He also devotes very little time to the Town Area affairs, with the result that the structure of the entire Town Area has completely collapsed. The. Committee has completely failed in the discharge of its duties imposed on it. It has betrayed the faith of the people. From the statements of the people, I could gather that the public in general has got no faith in the present Committee and a sense of complete chaos prevails throughout." 7. The District Magistrate forwarded the report to the State Government along with his own report. The State Government, on a consideration of these reports, passed the order superseding the Committee. 8. The District Magistrate forwarded the report to the State Government along with his own report. The State Government, on a consideration of these reports, passed the order superseding the Committee. 8. The petitioners, who are Lalta Prasad Gupta Chairman of the Committee and the Town Area Committee, allege in their petition that the entire proceedings are mala fide, all the district authorities were hostile to the Committee as a majority of its members were members of the Bhartiya Jan Sangh and were under the pressure and influence of the Congress Party and a Bakshi of the Committee who was dismissed by the Chairman and further that the district authorities were bent upon creating a situation to supersede the Committee. These allegations are, however, denied by the District authorities in their counter-affidavits. At the hearing of this petition, however, the allegations of mala fides were not pressed before us. We have set out the position only to complete the record. 9. As observed above, the sole point agitated before us by the petitioners is that the State Government ought to have given an opportunity to the petitioners before making the order of supersession since in making the order the State Government exercised a quasi-judicial function and the principles of natural justice require the petitioners to be heard before the order was made. 10. On this question, reference may be made at the outset to two decisions of this High Court. 11. In Town Area Committee, Janseth v. Stale of U.P., 1957 AWR 215 , the order of supersession of the Town Area Committee did not give reasons for making a declaration that the Committee had committed a default, Mehrotra, J., setting singly, observed :- "There is no provision in the Town Areas Act under which an explanation need be called for from the Chairman for passing an order of supersession and consequently it is necessary that the order itself should contain reasons so that there may be sufficient material before this court to examine whether the order is a proper order or not." 12. In Iqbal Ahmad v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 Alld. 264, jagdish Sahai, J., also sitting singly, observed :- "Considering the scheme of the Act and the language of Section 36 it appears to me that the State Government has not to act judicially or quasi-judicially. In Iqbal Ahmad v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 Alld. 264, jagdish Sahai, J., also sitting singly, observed :- "Considering the scheme of the Act and the language of Section 36 it appears to me that the State Government has not to act judicially or quasi-judicially. There is no provision requiring the State Government to call for an explanation from the Committee before superseding it. Section 36 does not also require that the State Government must be satisfied that the Committee has made persistent defaults before superseding it. Actually that section speaks not of satisfaction on the part of the State Government but of a mere opinion that the Committee has made persistent defaults in the discharge of its duty. Having carefully, scrutinised the language of Section 36 of the Act it appears to me that the State Government while acting under Section 36 of the Act only discharges the administrative duties and does not perform the judicial or quasi-judicial functions." 13. The learned judge also pointed out the difference in language between Section 36 of the Town Areas Act and the corresponding Sec.. 30 of the Municipalities Act; though both the Acts were passed by the same Legislature, he no`ed that the Municipalities Act provides for the explanation of the Municipal Board and the satisfaction of the State Government, whereas the Town Areas Act does not provide for the explanation of the Town Areas and the opinion of the State Government would be the basis of the order of supersession. 14. The question before us then is whether there is any sufficient reason to upset the view taken earlier by this High Court. 15. It may be mentioned that there does not appear to be any decision of the Supreme Court as to whether the order of supersession of a local body is a quasi-judicial or an administrative order. The question was raised in The State of Assam v. Gauhati Municipal Board, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1398 but the Supreme Court observed that it was not necessary in that case to decide whether the proceedings under the relevant section of the Assam Act were quasi-judicial proceedings or merely administrative proceedings. 16. It would, however, be relevant to ascertain the views held by other High Courts. 16. It would, however, be relevant to ascertain the views held by other High Courts. In Bidhu Bhushan Bagchi v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Calcutta 901, the Calcutta High Court held that the order of supersession made under the Bengal Local Self-Government Act, 1885, was purely an administrative act on the part of the Provincial Government. That Act provided that an explanation might be called from the District Board before making an order of supersession but the High Court held that that fact does not necessarily show that the decision had to be arrived at by the Provincial Government by the application of a judicial process. 17. The judicial Commissioner's Court of Himachal Pradesh, dealing with the Punjab- Small Towns Act in Ramesh Chandra v. State of Himachal Pradesh, A.I.R. 1955 HP 11, pointed out that the Act does not say that before a Committee is suspended an enquiry should be held and opportunity should be given to the Committee to clear its position. Nothing that the corresponding provision in the Punjab Municipal Act distinctly provides that before a member of the Municipal Committee is removed, the reasons for his proposed removal shall be communicated to him and he shall be given an opportunity of tendering an explanation, the learned Judicial Commissioner (who, incidentally, is now Ramabhadran, J.) observed that an omission of a similar provision in the Punjab Small Towns Act appears to be deliberate. In another case, Pirthi Chand v. Lieutenant Governor, Himachal Pradesh, A.I.R. 1962 HP 59, the Judicial Commissioner (C. B. Capoor) held that an order passed under the Punjab Small Towns Act removing a member of the Small Town Committee was not a judicial or quasi-judicial order but was purely an administrative order, not amenable to writ jurisdiction; he also observed that the opinion formed by the State Government was subjective and not objective and was not justiciable. 18. The Madhya Pradesh High Court had two occasions to consider the question. The Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act required the State Government to give, before making an order of supersession, a reasonable opportunity to the Committee to furnish an explanation and also provided that the order should state the reasons for supersession. 18. The Madhya Pradesh High Court had two occasions to consider the question. The Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act required the State Government to give, before making an order of supersession, a reasonable opportunity to the Committee to furnish an explanation and also provided that the order should state the reasons for supersession. Hidayatullah, C. J., presiding over a Full Bench, observed that whenever action is to be reasonable and the reasons for the action are to be recorded, the test is not entirely subjective unless the law says that it should be so. Further, the fact that a reasonable opportunity to show cause has been made a condition precedent to the exercise of power and reasons for supersession have to be notified to the electorate shows that there is not to be a subjective appraisal but the reasons must be sufficient under the Act and an objective test is indicated Municipal Committee, Kareli v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1958 MP 323. The other case Maursinha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1958 MP 397 was under the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act which provided for an opportunity to the Municipality to tender explanation before an order of supersession is made but the incompetence or default of the Municipality was to be "in the opinion of the Government". A Division Bench of the High Court held that the words "in the opinion of" in the context meant not purely subjective determination by the Government but had a reference to tentative conclusions reached at an earlier stage and opportunity was to be given to establish to the contrary so as to induce the Government to modify the opinion. 19. A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 Pun. 280 observed as follows :- "........ when a question arises whether a statutory authority has or has not acted in accordance with law, the terms of the statute setting up that authority have to be examined and the court has to decide, in view of the statutory provisions, whether the authority concerned has exceeded its power or acted in a manner contrary to the statutory provisions. It is, therefore, neither permissible nor in any sense proper to invoke the assistance of any outside rule, whether of natural justice or otherwise. It is, therefore, neither permissible nor in any sense proper to invoke the assistance of any outside rule, whether of natural justice or otherwise. It is equally clear that it is only when statutory authority is required by the appropriate statute to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner that any question of any rule of natural justice really arises. In every case, therefore, the real, question always is whether the terms of the particular statute setting up the particular authority have been observed or violated." 20. In Madhoram v. State, A.I.R. 1953 Raj 149, Wanchoo, C. J. had to consider the provisions of the corresponding section of the Bikaner Municipalities Act. That section did not provide for calling for an explanation for the Board. It was pressed that inasmuch as objective tests were provided for acting and there were no words to the effect "in the opinion of" in the section, the action taken was quasi-judicial and that although the section did not provide for calling for explanation, it was implicit in it by reason of the nature of the provision. It was held that in view of the absence of provision for calling for an explanation from the Board, the order of supersession was purely administrative and could not be interfered with by the High Court. 21. There are numerous decisions of the Supreme Court laying down the test for determination whether in the given situation an authority exercise quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The leading case, which has been repeatedly relied upon and explained later, is that of The Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, A.I.R. 1950 SC 222. 21. There are numerous decisions of the Supreme Court laying down the test for determination whether in the given situation an authority exercise quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The leading case, which has been repeatedly relied upon and explained later, is that of The Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, A.I.R. 1950 SC 222. The principles have been summarised by S. R. Das, J. (as he then was) in these words : "The principles, as I apprehend them, are : (i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there, is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. In other words, while the presence of the two parties besides the deciding authority will prima facie and in the absence of any other factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially." 22. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division Assam, A.I.R. 1958 SC 398, the Supreme Court observed that whether or not an administrative body or authority functions as a purely administrative one or in a quasi-judicial capacity must be determined in each case on an examination of the relevant statute and the rules framed thereunder. 23. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division Assam, A.I.R. 1958 SC 398, the Supreme Court observed that whether or not an administrative body or authority functions as a purely administrative one or in a quasi-judicial capacity must be determined in each case on an examination of the relevant statute and the rules framed thereunder. 23. In Radhe Shyam Khare v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 SC 107, action was taken under Section 53-A of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act appointing an Executive Officer on the ground of incompetence of the Municipality. The question was raised whether the action was of a quasi-judicial nature, S. R. Das, C. J., referring to the two principles laid down in Province of Bombay v. Khushal Dass S. Advani, said : "It is clear that in the present case there is no question of any contest between two contending parties which the State Government is, under Section 53-A, to decide and, therefore, there is no 'lis' in the sense in which that word is understood generally and the principle referred to under the first heading has no application. We have, therefore, to consider whether the case comes within the principle enunciated under the second head, namely, whether the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1902, requires the State Government to act judicially when taking action under Section 53-A." 24. In holding that the action taken by the State Government was not a judicial or quasi-judicial act but was an administrative act, the learned Chief Justice observed :- "The sole question is does the statute require the State Government to act judicially. There need not be any express pro, vision that the State Government must act judicially. It will he sufficient if this duty may be implied from the provisions of the statute but the mere fact that a question of fact has to be determined as a preliminary condition before action can be taken under the statute by itself does not carry that implication. ,There must be some indication in the statute as to the manner or mode in which the preliminary fact is to be determined. I find nothing in Section 53-A which in terms imposes a duty on the State Government to act judicially. No form of procedure is laid down or even referred to from which such a duty could be inferred." 25. I find nothing in Section 53-A which in terms imposes a duty on the State Government to act judicially. No form of procedure is laid down or even referred to from which such a duty could be inferred." 25. Referring to Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance which was the subject matter of consideration in Khushaldas Advani's case, his Lordship observed :- "That section of the Bombay Ordinance opens with the words 'if in the opinion of the Provincial Government...' which were taken as indicative of the Legislature's intention to leave to determination of the existence of all the conditions precedent entirely to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government so as to make the action a purely administrative one." 26. S. K. Das, J., agreeing with these conclusions and the reasons therefore, answered that the question whether the State Government violated the principles of natural justice would depend on whether the State Government performed an administrative function or a quasi-judicial function-implying thereby that the principles of natural justice cannot be invoked where an administrative function is performed. His Lordship held in arriving at the decision that the State Government had only to consider the policy and expediency and at no stage was there before it any form of lis. Kapur, J. said :- "The State Government must necessarily be the sole judge of the state of in-competency of the Municipality otherwise it would not be able to take its administrative decision as to the action it should take and which it considers is likely to improve the administration...... If that were not so then on the question of incompetency of the State Government of procedure wilt be analogous to a judicial process subject to review of courts and the action it will take will be an administrative decision." 27. If that were not so then on the question of incompetency of the State Government of procedure wilt be analogous to a judicial process subject to review of courts and the action it will take will be an administrative decision." 27. In Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. v. Ghanshyam Das, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1110 the earlier cases were reviewed and it was observed :- "Now it may be mentioned that the statute is not likely to provide in so many words that the authority passing the order is required to act judicially; that can only be inferred from the express provisions of the statute in the first instance in each case and no one circumstance alone will be determinative of the question whether the authority set up by the said statute has the duty to act judicially or not. The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion, if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected and other indicias of the statute. A duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it will be impossible and indeed. inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively." 28. In Dwarka Nath v. I.T.O. Special Circle, Kanpur, 1965 (2) SCJ. 296 Subba Rao, J. again reviewed the previous decision of the Supreme Court and observed :- "In all these cases the Government, the Examination Committee and the Board of Revenue were administrative bodies but the acts impugned were quasi-judicial ones, for they had a duty to act judicially in regard thereto. The law on the subject may be briefly stated thus: The provisions of the statute may enjoin on an administrative authority to act administratively or judicially. If the statute expressly imposes a duty on the administrative body to act judicially it is a clear case of a judicial act but the duty to act judicially may not be expressly conferred but may be inferred from the provisions of the statute. If the statute expressly imposes a duty on the administrative body to act judicially it is a clear case of a judicial act but the duty to act judicially may not be expressly conferred but may be inferred from the provisions of the statute. It may be gathered from the cumulative effect of the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion to be adopted, the phraseology used, the nature of the power conferred or the duty upon the authority and other indecia afforded by the statute. In short, a duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances and it is not possible or advisable to lay down a hard and fast rule or an inflexible rule of guidance." 29. In Sahib Singh Dugal v. Union of India, 1966 (1) SCJ 215 , the Supreme Court observed :- "There is undoubtedly a clear distinction between the cases in which an authority is invested with power to determine the rights of a person, and cases in which the authority is invested with power to act in a certain manner, and the exercise of that power affects the rights of a person. In the former, the duty to act judicially may readily be inferred. But whether a public authority invested with powers to pass specified order is required to act judicially must depend upon the scheme of the statute which invests him with that power. The nature of the authority conferred, the procedure prescribed and the nature of the powers exercised will determine the question whether the public authority is required to act judicially; ..... It is sufficient to state for the purpose of this case that there is no principle or binding authority in support of the view that wherever a public authority is invested with power to make an order which prejudicially affects the rights of an individual, whatever may be the nature of the power exercised, what ever may be the procedure prescribed, and whatever may be the nature of the authority conferred, the proceeding of the public authority must be regulated by the analogy of rules governing judicial determination of disputed questions." 30. Having regard to this long trend of the decisions of the Supreme Court, there can be little doubt that where a Public Authority is entrusted by a statute with power to take certain action, such power is not necessarily to be exercised quasi-judicially even though it hurts individual rights; the scheme of the statute, its express provisions, the object which the action is designed to subserve are, among others, factors which have to be taken into consideration in determining whether the action is administrative or quasi-judicial. The statutes providing for local-self-Government unquestionably imply that the authorities concerned have to function effectively for the good of the community. If they fail to perform their duties and discharge their responsibilities, the sooner action is taken to displace them the better for all concerned. The town Areas Act confers upon the State Government the power to take such extreme action and there is no question of the State Government calling upon the Town Area Committee to explain itself if the State Government finds that the Committee has persistently committed defaults and exceeded or abused its powers. If the State Government prima facie considers that the Committee has continuously erred, it would be for the State Government to decide subjectively whether the Committee should continue to exist. We are fortified in these views by the plain language of Section 36 (1) of the Town Areas Act. Under that section it is the opinion of the State Government regarding the conduct of the Committee that is decisive. The Committee is given no say in the matter even by way of submitting its explanation. Notwithstanding the corresponding provisions of the Municipalities Act, which provide for an opportunity to the Municipality to tender an explanation, the Legislature has not conceded a similar opportunity to Town Area Committees. No doubt, before forming an opinion for the purpose of Section 36 (1) the State Government does make or cause to he made the necessary enquiry, as it has done in the present case. Then once the State Government forms an opinion, it has the power to take action under Section 36 (1) without further asking for the Committee's explanation. 31. For all these reasons we respectfully agree with the previous decision of this Court in Iqbal Ahmad v. State of U.P. and dismiss this petition. 32. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.