Judgment Ramratna Singh, J. This Second Appeal by the plaintiff company arises out of a suit for eviction, from a house, of the widow and children of one A.C. Banerjee, an employee of the company on the ground that the tenancy terminated along with the termination of the employment of Banerjee who died on 2.3.56. The company had let out the house to Banerjee as its employee on a monthly rent of Rs.16/- and the tenancy was to cease on the termination of Banerjee's employment. Banerjee died while in service and, therefore according to the company, the respondents, who were dependants of Banerjee had no right to occupy the house after 2.3.56. Some of the defendants contested the plaintiff's claim. Both the courts below found that A.C. Banerjee occupied the house as the tenant of the company as an employee until his death and the defendants were in occupation thereof as his dependants, and after Banerjee's death the defendants were in occupation as his heirs. The trial court further found that, since the employment of Banerjee ceased after his death, the defendants were liable to be evicted; and it decreed the suit. On appeal, however, the Subordinate Judge of Jamshedpur took the view that, inasmuch as the defendants were not in occupation of the house as employee-tenants and no case had been made out under any of the grounds for the eviction of tenants (other then an employee-tenant) laid down in Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, the defendants were not liable to be evicted. The suit was, therefore, dismissed by him. 2. On behalf of the appellant company, Mr. Lal Narain Sinha challenged the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the defendants inherited the tenancy right of Banerjee and, therefore, they could not be ejected on the ground that the tenancy ceased on the termination of the employment of Banerjee resulting from his death. He rightly submitted that the heirs or dependants of Banerjee could not, in law, inherit a right higher than that possessed by Banerjee and that right was at the bighest the right flowing from possession of Banerjee. It was therefore, a tenancy at will terminable at the pleasure of the landlord company, which was indicated by the plaint of the suit itself. 3. It was therefore, a tenancy at will terminable at the pleasure of the landlord company, which was indicated by the plaint of the suit itself. 3. In the plaint, it is stated that the house was let out to Banerjee as an employee of the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs.16/- and he was occupying it with his wife and other dependants (who are the defendants); but even though Banerjee ceased to be in the employment from 2.3.56 (date of cause of action for the suit), the defendants did not vacate the house in spite of repeated requests. The suit was valued at Rs.192/-, rent for 12 months, and court-fees were paid on that amount. Exts.1 and 3, which are reproduced below, contain the contract under which Banerjee occupied the house:- Ext. 1:- "The Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited. House Receipt no. 31323 A.C. Banerjee 139336 employed by Messrs The Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd, Jamshedpur in M/C Shop Department is permitted to reside during the will and pleasure of the company in quarter no. 41 N. Rd. H-4 Type, from 1.2.51. Rent 16/- per mensem. Sd./(Illegible) E.P. Chief Town Administrator. Jamshedpur. Dated 1.2.51 Ext. 3 :-"1 agree to vacate the within mentioned premises on being called upon by the Company to do so. Signature. Sd./A.C. Banerjee, 2/3". In May 1957, the company asked S.K. Banerjee, the eldest son of the deceased Banerjee to show cause (Ext. 8) why disciplinary action should not be taken against him on his refusing to vacate the suit house after his death even though he (i.e. S.K. Banerjee, who had also become an employee of the company) was offered an N type quarter. S.K. Banerjee, who was the only deposing defendant in the suit, showed cause; but it appears from Exts. 5 and 7 that he was discharged. In Ext. 7 dated 5.8.57 S.K. Banerjee wrote to the General Manager of the company, on learning that orders had passed for his discharge "within 10 days' notice" for not vacating the set of quarters of his father (A.C. Banerjee), requesting the Manager to reconsider the matter and "to provide a shelter either in Bistupur Area or in Kadma Area". His mother (defendant no. His mother (defendant no. 1) wrote to the Town Superintendent of the company in December, 1961, as "this last appeal" for reconsideration of her case and requested him to allot her "an L-4 type quarters". In this letter, she also said; "After my husband's death I was asked to vacate the quarter but I claimed that as per rules prevailing that a next type of quarter which was given to other employees should be given to me and the next type of quarter was L-4 which I had been asking. But disregarding this rule my son was given a TR typed quarter in Lohit Road and which was refused being not the next type and too small to accommodate self and adult sons and daughters. As a result, my son S.K. Banerjee, T. No. 79247 of Works Engineering Constructions has been discharged". These letters show that the defendants had been asked, after A.C. Banerjee's death, to vacate the house in suit and before the institution of the suit in December, 1960. In the written statements the relationship of landlord and tenant was denied and they claimed adverse possession over the suit house for more than twelve years in their own rights. This plea of adverse possession was, however, rejected by the courts, though the court of appeal below held that the defendants were in possession in their own rights. 4. A tenancy at will arises when the tenant expressly agree to vacate whenever possession is demanded by the landlord [see (1) Ram Lal V. Bibi Zohra, A.I.R. 1941 Patna 228; and (2) Babu Lal V. Gopi Lal, A.I.R. 1957 Patna 490)]. A tenancy at will is terminable by either party; a demand by the landlord for possession is sufficient [(3) Ramkishun V. Bibi Sohila, A.I.R. 1933 Patna 561). In (4) Jivraj Gopal V. Atmaram Dayaram (I.L.R. 14 Bombay 319), a person hired two houses under an agreement which read thus: “I have this day hired from you two houses. Rs.5/- a year are agreed as rent. I am to live there as long as you will allow me to do so". It was held that, although an annual rent was reserved, this was a tenancy at will. The terms of the tenancy in the instant case are similar and, therefore, it was a tenancy at will. Rs.5/- a year are agreed as rent. I am to live there as long as you will allow me to do so". It was held that, although an annual rent was reserved, this was a tenancy at will. The terms of the tenancy in the instant case are similar and, therefore, it was a tenancy at will. The observation in (5) Kishan Lal V. Ganpat Ram (A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 1554, paragraph 6) indicates that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not required in the case of a tenancy at will. 5. In the alternative, if the tenancy was to terminate with the termination of the employment of Banerjee, it was a tenancy for a certain time. The certainty need not be ascertained at the time the tenancy is created, because in the course of fluxion of time a day will arrive, which will make the term certain. The duration of the tenancy may be fixed expressly when the lease is created or by implication. The certainty of the duration by implication may be inferred from the terms of the contract. For instance, a lease for life is a lease for a certain time, as it terminates with the death of the lessee. In such a case, that is when the term of a tenancy depends upon the happening of a future event, the tenancy is determined when that event happens [(see Section 111(b) of the Transfer of property Act)]. In the instant case, therefore, the tenancy would be determined on the termination of Banerjee's employment by death or otherwise. 6. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act enacts : "111. A lease of immovable property determines – (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby; (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event by the happening of such event; X X X (h) On the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other". The notice mentioned in Clause (h) refers to the notice contemplated by Section 106, which reads as follows :- "In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property". The legal position regarding a notice to quit under Section 106 is summarised at page 664 of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (Fifth Edition) thus: "A tenancy at will is terminated by a demand, express, or implied, by a determination of the will, that is, by any act which is inconsistent with the will to continue the tenancy. A tenant holding under a rent note which is inadmissible for want of registration is a tenant at will and no notice is necessary to determine the tenancy. A demand for possession is sufficient. A tenant at sufference is not entitled even to a demand for possession. This distinction is based on the principle that ejectment can only be brought for unlawful or tortious detention; and when possession of the land has been obtained by, the consent of the owner such possession cannot ordinarily be deemed wrongful until at least a demand for possession has been made and refused. Notice under this section is not necessary, and a mere demand will suffice if the lease is on condition that the land demised should be surrendered whenever required. Notice under this section is not necessary, and a mere demand will suffice if the lease is on condition that the land demised should be surrendered whenever required. Notice is not necessary for lease for a fixed term which determine by the efflux of time and that is so whether the time is absolutely certain, or certain with reference to some future event". In (6) Ganga Dutt V. Kartik Chadra Das (A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 1067) it was held that no notice under Section 106 is necessary in a case where the tenancy is determined by efflux of time even though the tenant continues to occupy the building after the expiry of the terms by virtue of the protection given by successive Rent Control Statutes (that is, as a statutory tenant), but without a fresh contract between the parties. Similarly, it was held in (7) Pooran Chand V. Motilal (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 461) that no notice under Section 106 is required, when the term of a tenancy expires by efflux of time. 7. Now, let us see Section 11(1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 which enacts: "11(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and to those of Section 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction there from except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one more of the following grounds:- (a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for subletting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment; (b) where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or negligence or default of, the tenant, or of any person residing with the tenant or for whose behaviour the tenant is responsible; (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall there forth constitute the building within the meaning of Clause (aa) of Section 2, and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5; Explanation-In this clause the word 'landlord' shall not include an agent referred to in Clause (d) of Section 2. (d) where the amount of two months' rent lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or, in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 13; and – (e) in the case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of the tenancy". Section 2(f), on which Mr. J.C. Sinha relied, defines a 'tenant' thus:- "2(f) 'tenant' means any person by whom, or on whose account, rent is payable for a building and includes – (i) A person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour; and (ii) A person who occupies a building as an employee of the landlord of such building either on payment of rent or otherwise. It will be noticed that Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) contains three alternative contingencies, of which the third applies to the case of an employee of the landlord occupying the building as a tenant; such a tenant is liable to be evicted on his ceasing to be in such employment. It will be noticed that Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) contains three alternative contingencies, of which the third applies to the case of an employee of the landlord occupying the building as a tenant; such a tenant is liable to be evicted on his ceasing to be in such employment. Such a tenancy is covered by Section 111(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, In other words, it is a tenancy for a fixed term, inasmuch as it terminates with the happening of a certain event, namely, the cessation of the employment; and it is well settled that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is required in such a case, If, however, the terms of the contract evidenced by Exts.1 and 3 are taken into consideration, it was a tenancy at will, and no notice under Section 106 is required in such a case as well. I am unable to agree with Mr. J.C. Sinha that the said Bihar Act of 1947 does not contemplate the case of a tenancy at will because of the definition of 'tenant' therein, as the definitions have to be read with the other provisions of the Act, inasmuch as they are to be read subject to the context in the operative sections; and it is manifest that an employee tenant contemplated by Section 11(1)(a) would ordinarily be a tenant at will or a licensee. The full bench decision of this court in (8) N. Pal V. C. Ghosh (1964 B.L.J.R. 583) is of no assistance in the instant case, as it related to a periodic tenancy from month to month and eviction was sought on the ground contained in Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Act; and Paragraphs 16 and 19 of the report indicate the well-established principle that no notice for determination of the tenancy is required in the case of a statutory tenancy or in the case of a tenancy envisaged in Section 111(b) of the Transfer of Property Act which is determined by the happening of the event contemplated by the contract. 8. Notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would not, therefore, have been necessary to evict A.C. Banerjee after the cessation of his employment-which terminated in this case with his death. 8. Notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would not, therefore, have been necessary to evict A.C. Banerjee after the cessation of his employment-which terminated in this case with his death. The position would not be different in the case of his dependants and heirs who continued to occupy the building after his death, because they could not inherit a right higher than that of A.C. Banerjee himself-this right being the right of Banerjee to be in possession of the building until the pleasure of the employer or until the termination of the employment. The defendants could, after the death of A.C. Banerjee, at the best be statutory tenants until the pleasure of the plaintiff company (landlord); and, therefore, no notice under Section 106 was necessary before a suit to evict them. It is well settled that the possession of such a person can be of no avail against the true owner; vide (9) Govind Dutta V. Jaganarain (A.I.R. 1952 Patna 314), wherein it was held that possession does not avail against the true owner. Of course, the facts in that case were different and it was not a case of eviction of a tenant from a house by the owner of the home; but the principle was relied on by Mr. Lal Narain Sinha in support of his contention that mere occupation of the building in question by the defendants does not create any right in them higher than the right which A.C. Banerjee had. Mr. J.C. Sinha, however, submitted that the defendants claimed to be in possession as trespassers; but that part of the defence was rightly rejected by the courts below after taking into consideration all the evidence. If, therefore, Banerjee could be evicted without any notice under Section 106, no such notice would be necessary for eviction of his heirs. 9. Even though, the relationship of landlord and tenant terminated in the instant case long before the institution of the suit, the suit for eviction would still be governed by Section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees Act and the suit has been rightly valued at the amount, which would be the aggregate of rent for twelve months. 9. Even though, the relationship of landlord and tenant terminated in the instant case long before the institution of the suit, the suit for eviction would still be governed by Section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees Act and the suit has been rightly valued at the amount, which would be the aggregate of rent for twelve months. So far as this court is concerned, it is well settled that 'tenant' in Section 7(xi)(cc) of the Act includes a person to whom that description would apply immediately before the institution of the suit but whose tenancy has terminated entitling his landlord to eject him [(see the division bench decision in (10) Ram Charan V. Sheo Dutta: A.I.R. 1923 Patna 380-I.L.R. 2 Patna 260; the special bench decision in (11) Narayan Jha V. Jogni Prasad : A.I.R 1934 Patna 184, which follows (12) Govinda Kumar V. Mohini Mohan; A.I.R 1930 Calcutta 42; and Single Judge decisions in (13) Telanga Marandi Majhi V. Chandra Mohan: A.I.R. 1933 Patna 664 and (14) Ram Lal V. Mt. Bibi : A.I.R. 1935 Patna 90)]. In a case relating to the Calcutta Rent Act, 1920, the Privy Council said in (15) Karnani Industrial Bank V. Satya Niranjan Shah (55 I.A. 344) - Section 2(g) defines 'tenant' as any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any purpose; in Section 11, which provides for what has come to be known as statutory tenant, 'tenant' must include a person whose terms under the contract has come to an end; the words 'landlord' and 'tenant' must include, as they do in ordinary parlance, ex-landlord and ex-tenant. 10. To sum up, my conclusions are these :- (1) The tenancy in question was a tenancy at will between the plaintiff company and its employee A.C. Banerjee (vide Exts.1 and 3), in spite of the fact that rent was payable monthly or, at the best for Banerjee, it was a tenancy terminable at the happening of an event, namely, the cessation of his employment. It was not a periodic tenancy of uncertain duration. (2) The defendants who are heirs of A.C. Banerjee did not inherit from him a right higher than he had at the time of his death. (3) It follows that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary to evict them. It was not a periodic tenancy of uncertain duration. (2) The defendants who are heirs of A.C. Banerjee did not inherit from him a right higher than he had at the time of his death. (3) It follows that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary to evict them. (4) Court-fee paid and the value of the suit given are correct. 11. In the result, the judgment and decree of lower appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court are restored. The appellant will also get costs of this court and the lower appellate court. The appeal is allowed accordingly. ANWAR AHMAD, J. I agree. Appeal Allowed