JUDGMENT R. B. Misra, J. - This is a defendants' appeal against the decision of the 'Third Additional Civil Judge, Agra, dated 1-7-1966. The respondent, Sri Nirbhayanand, is the owner of a shop bearing Cantonment No. 29, Pratabpuri, Agra. Ranjit Singh, the first appellant, is the tenant in the said shop at a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- Appellants Nos. 2 to 4 are the own brothers of the first appellant, and they carry on business in the shop in the name and style of appellant No. 5. i.e. Messrs Ranjit Brothers, on behalf of the first appellant. Appellants Nos. 2 to 4 are, of course, in occupation of the shop at the instance and on behalf of the first appellant. The respondent wanted to evict Ranjit Singh from the shop. and for that purpose he obtained permission under Section 14 of the U. P. (Cantonment) Control of Rent and Eviction Act to institute a suit for ejectment of the first appellant. on the basis of the said permission, the respondent filed a suit (No. 800 of 1961) in the Court of the Munsif, Agra for recovery of arrears of rent and also for ejectment of the tenant-the first respondent Ranjit Singh. The suit was decreed for arrears of rent, but was dismissed for ejectment on the ground that service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been proved. The respondent, thereupon, filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal. 2. In the plaint the respondent clearly alleged that Ranjit Singh, the first appellant, alone was the tenant of the shop in question, and appellants, Nos. 2 to 4 were his real brothers; that the shop was in occupation of his brothers-appellants is Nos. 2 to 4-who carried on business in the name and style of appellant No. 5 at the instance of the first appellant, who is serving as guard in the Western Railway. His tenancy had been determined by a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 3. The suit was contested by the appellants on grounds, inter alia, that they were joint tenants of the shop, and that the permission to sue was invalid. It was further alleged that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served on him. 4. 3. The suit was contested by the appellants on grounds, inter alia, that they were joint tenants of the shop, and that the permission to sue was invalid. It was further alleged that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served on him. 4. The trial court held that the appellants were not joint tenants of the shop; that appellant No. 1 alone was the tenant of the shop; that the permission obtained under Section 14 of U. P. (Cantonment) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was a valid one; and that the notice to quit was served on the tenant. On these findings the suit for ejectment was decreed. The defendants went up in appeal, and the Civil judge confirmed the findings recorded by the trial court. They have now come to this Court in Second Appeal. 5. The Advocate-General, appearing for the appellants, raised only one contention before me. He challenged the finding of the learned judge on the issue of service of notice under Sec. 10 & of the Transfer of Property Act on the first appellant. Essentially this finding is a pure finding of fact and cannot normally be challenged in Second Appeal. The Advocate-General, however, attacked the said finding on the following grounds: Firstly, because the learned Judge has not correctly appreciated the various modes of service of notices provided by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; and, secondly, because the finding is based either on surmises and conjectures or on consideration of irrelevant evidence. 6. In order to appreciate the first part of his argument it will be pertinent to examine Section 106 of the said Act, which reads thus : "In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be. tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property." The second para. of this section deals with the nature and modes of service of notice determining tenancy. The first requirement is that the notice should, be in writing and signed by or on behalf of the person giving it. The second requirement is that (a) it may be sent by post to the party who is to be bound by it, or (b) it may be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or (c) it may be tendered or delivered personally to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (d) if such tender or delivery is not practicable, the notice may be affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. 7. A tenancy can be determined only within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and in no other way, and the service of notice has to be within the framework of the modes provided by the section and described above. One has not to look to any other mode of service as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. In the present case the respondent sought to serve notice by registered post, and he sent the notices by five different addresses as noted below : (i) Ranjeet Singh c/o Station Master, Idgah (Notice Ex. 12) ; (ii) Notice to Ranjeet Singh enclosed in an envelope addressed to the Station Master, Idgah, with a covering letter to the said Station Master requesting him to deliver the notice to Sri Ranjeet Singh (Ex. 12) (iii) Notice addressed to Ranjeet Singh c/o Divisional Superintendent, Western Railway Kotah (Ex. 13) ; (iv) Notice addressed to Ranjeet Singh at the address of 25, Pratabpura and also at the address of shop No. 29, Pratabpura; (Ex. 14) ; and (v) Copy of the notice was affixed at the shop (No. 29, Pratabpura, Agra) in the presence of witnesses, and copies of the same were also sent by registered post to appellants Nos. 14) ; and (v) Copy of the notice was affixed at the shop (No. 29, Pratabpura, Agra) in the presence of witnesses, and copies of the same were also sent by registered post to appellants Nos. 2 to 4 (Exs. 6, 7 and 17). All the envelopes containing the notices sent to Ranjeet Singh with different addresses were received back with an endorsement of refusal bearing date 14th August, 1964. The endorsement of refusal on all the envelopes is in one and the same handwriting. It may be noted that the plaintiff-respondent did not himself come in the witness-box nor did he produce the postman concerned. He rests content merely by producing one Makkhan Lal clerk of B. Ram Bharose Lal, Vakil, to prove the notices. In order to prove the service of notice, the respondent merely banked upon the presumption either under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act or under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. 9. The learned judge has drawn the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act or under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, and held that the notices will be deemed to be served on Ranjeet Singh. 10. The argument of the Advocate-General is that the learned judge has erred in drawing the presumption under the aforesaid sections. According to him, before any presumption is drawn it must be proved that the notices were sent by the correct or proper address. The plaintiff has not come in the witness-box, nor has he produced the postman to depose about the place of service of notice. Ranjeet Singh is admittedly serving as a guard in the Western Railway. He further urged that the notices sent to Ranjeet Singh care of Station Master, Idgah, Agra (Ex. 12) and the notices sent to Ranjeet Singh c/o Divisional Superintendent, Western Railway, Kotah (Ex. 13) were redirected to the address, "Ranjeet Brothers,".and there is endorsement "refused" on both of them. 11. Now the question is whether endorsement of refusal on the notices Exs. 12 and 13 can raise the presumption of service. The Advocate-General contends that they cannot. To my mind the contention is well-founded. While scanning the second paragraph of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act it has already been seen that the notice can be vicariously served by tendering or delivering to one of Ranjeet Singh's family or servants at his residence. The Advocate-General contends that they cannot. To my mind the contention is well-founded. While scanning the second paragraph of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act it has already been seen that the notice can be vicariously served by tendering or delivering to one of Ranjeet Singh's family or servants at his residence. It is also admitted by the plaintiff-respondent in his plaint that 29, Pratabpura is the shop and not the residence of the appellant. Law requires that vicarious service can be made only at the residence and not at any other place. It is, therefore, evident that Exs. 12 and 13 do not fulfil the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 12. Similarly the affixation of notice at 29, Pratabpura, Agra or the alleged refusal of notices by appellants Nos. 2 to 4 sent at the address of 29, Pratabpura, cannot be recognised by law. The mode of service by affixation can be resorted to only when it is not practicable to serve the tenant by other modes. There is no such finding by the learned judge. Endorsement of refusal by appellants Nos. 2 to 4 could raise the presumption of service only when the notices were addressed to the appellants Nos. 2 to 4 as family at the place of residence of Ranjeet Singh. As already indicated above, 29, Pratabpura is admittedly not the place of residence of Ranjeet Singh. It is used as a shop of chemists and druggists. Thus Exhibits 6, 7 and 17 and the service by affixation also do not fulfil the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. Now the only notice that remains to be considered is Ex. 14. The envelope contains two addresses : "(i) Ranjeet Singh, 25 Pratabpura, or (ii) Ranjeet Singh clo Shop No. 29, Pratabpura. There is an endorsement dated 10-8-1964 on the envelope as under : "Ghar par nahi milte hairs. Railway; Station Idgarh par kaam karte hairs." There is another endorsement of 1418, "Refused." 14. As said earlier, the plaintiff-respondent has not produced any evidence to show the place of residence of Ranjeet Singh. It is also known where was the said notice refused. The postman concerned could have thrown light on this aspect, but for reasons, best known to the plaintiff, he did not produce the postman nor did he himself appear in the witness box. It is also known where was the said notice refused. The postman concerned could have thrown light on this aspect, but for reasons, best known to the plaintiff, he did not produce the postman nor did he himself appear in the witness box. The position with regard to Ex. 14 is that there is no evidence as to who refused the notice and where. If it was refused by one of the family or servants of Ranjeet Singh, the refusal had to be proved to have been made at the residence. The other possibility is that the refusal was made by Ranjeet Singh himself, and in that case no proof of refusal at residence was necessary, but the endorsement on the envelope Ex. 11 does not show that it was refused by the first appellant. 15. It is also clear from the various exhibits enumerated above that some of the notices were-re-directed once or twice, yet by a queer coincidence the endorsement of refusal was made on one and the same date on all the envelopes and in the same handwriting. It appeared to be an enigma even to the learned judge as to how all those envelopes happened to contain an endorsement of refusal in one and the same handwriting when the notices had apparently been transferred from one beat to another. Referring to Ex. 14, the learned judge observed : "On 10th August the postman made an endorsement that the defendant, worked at Idgah Station, and redirected the letter towards that beat. However, the endorsement of refusal of 14th August was made by that very postman. From endorsement of this letter it is not known as to how this envelope remained with that very postman on 14th August." 16. It is no doubt true that under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act as well as under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, Court may presume the service of notice, but before the Court can draw such a presumption it must be proved that the notice contained the correct address. As noted above, the plaintiff-respondent did not enter the witness-box nor did he produce any other evidence to prove what the correct and proper address of the first appellant (Ranjeet Singh) was. As noted above, the plaintiff-respondent did not enter the witness-box nor did he produce any other evidence to prove what the correct and proper address of the first appellant (Ranjeet Singh) was. The learned judge, while dealing with this aspect of the matter, has said that it was for the appellants to prove that the addresses given on the envelopes containing the notice were not the correct addresses. He further said that there is a sort of admission on the part of the appellants that 29, Pratabpura was the correct address. It is the admitted case of the plaintiff-himself that 29, Pratabpura a is the shop where business is carried on by appellants Nos. 2 to 4, and not the residence of the first appellant. The learned judge also made a reference to the address given by the first appellant in the memorandum of appeal, and on that basis he observed that the address given by him in the memorandum of appeal is a sort of admission. To my mind, however, the learned judge was not quite justified in assuming the address as given by Ranjeet Singh in his memorandum of appeal as an admission of his residential address at the time when the notice was sent to him. Moreover, an admission is to be taken as a whole. The address given in the memorandum of appeal should be read with grounds Nos. 7 and 9 thereof. Ground No. 8 reads : "Because the notices were not sent on the correct address of defendant No. 1 and he was not available and, according to the reports of the postman, he was not found on any of the addresses mentioned on the envelopes of the notices present on the record." This negative the theory of admission of the residential address by the defendant-appellant. 17. The learned judge also seems to have lost sight of the last clause of the second paragraph of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which definitely says that the service by affixation to a conspicuous part of the property can be resorted to only if tender or delivery of notice in the modes contemplated earlier in that paragraph was not practicable. It is only because of this omission on the part of the learned judge that he felt satisfied that the affixation of the notice at shop No. 29, Pratabpura was sufficient service. 18. It is only because of this omission on the part of the learned judge that he felt satisfied that the affixation of the notice at shop No. 29, Pratabpura was sufficient service. 18. In a case where the various notices sent by different addresses came back with the endorsement "refused" made on one and the same date and in the same handwriting, it does create a grave suspicion, and in such a case it is open to the Court to refuse to draw the presumption of service either under Section 114 of the Evidence Act or under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The learned Judge, though alive to the suspicious circumstances, drew the presumption of service of the notice because of his misapprehension of the requirements of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. Had the respondent produced the postman or had he himself come in the witness-box, the suspicion could have been dispelled. But the respondent became complacent and rest satisfied by the presence of the endorsement of refusal on the envelopes. The trial Court at one stage directed the respondent to produce evidence, but the respondent refused to do so. It is no doubt true that it is for the parties to suit to produce such evidence as they deem fit to prove their cases, and the Court cannot direct them to produce evidence. Discretion in the matter lies with the parties and not with the Court. It the respondent did not choose to produce any evidence, the Court could not compel him to do so. But it is open to Court to refuse to draw presumption either under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act or under Section 27, General Clauses Act if the circumstances are suspicious. 19. In the totality of the circumstances present in the case the learned Judge was not justified in raising a presumption of service of notice on the basis of endorsement of refusal on the envelopes in the absence of evidence that the notices were sent by the correct address. 20. Now I pass on to the other ground urged by the Advocate-General. His contention is that the learned judge has made unwarranted assumptions and his judgment is based more on conjectures than on the basis of evidence on the record. 20. Now I pass on to the other ground urged by the Advocate-General. His contention is that the learned judge has made unwarranted assumptions and his judgment is based more on conjectures than on the basis of evidence on the record. The various assumptions and conjectures made by the learned judge, with which I shall presently deal, do, to my mind, appear to be unwarranted. 21. According to the Advocate-General, Ranjeet Singh was not available for service of notice on the 14th August, and the reported refusal by the first appellant was not possible. It has been accepted by the learned judge that the first appellant started from Bayana on 13th August, 1964 at 8.15 p.m. and reached Gangapur City at 3.10 a.m. on 14th August, 14th August was a free day for him. He started from Gangapur City at 2.20 p.m. and reached Idgah Station at 6.15 p in. because he had to take a goods train to Agra at 7.30 p.m. The relevant entry in the Guard's Rough Journal Book is as follows : "Duty Pass No. 60598. Spare by 3 Dn/83 Dn. GGC : 14/20 IDH : 18/15" It would appear from the above that the guard (appellant No. 1) was spared by 3 Dn.183 Dn. train and started from Gangapur City at 2.20 p.m., reaching Idgah at 6.15 p.m. on 14th. The learned judge relied on the entries in the Guards Rough Journal Book only in part. He accepted that Ranjeet Singh had gone to Gangapur City with a goods train, reaching there at 3.10 a.m. on 14th August, 1964 but was not prepared to accept the above quoted endorsement made in the diary. He was of the view that Ranjeet Singh being a railway employee had all facility to travel by any train, and therefore he would not have waited at Gangapur City till 2.20 p.m. on the 14th of August and would have started by any train available. The presumption drawn by the learned judge that railway employees have all facilities, and they can travel by any train they like, seems to be without any warrant. At least no rule has been shown to the Court, nor has any witness been produced to prove it. Normally a person would like to travel by a train which is most convenient to him. At least no rule has been shown to the Court, nor has any witness been produced to prove it. Normally a person would like to travel by a train which is most convenient to him. The Advocate-General has referred to the then railway time table, and demonstrated that the other trains which the learned judge had in view were either too expensive or were most inconvenient. Some of those trains appertained not to the Western Railway but to foreign railways, and journey by other available trains entailed longer routes and consequently more expensive as well. Ranjeet Singh could have got the 23 Du. Delhi Janta Express from Gangapur City at 6.17 a.m. and reached Bharatpur Junction at 8.30 a.111. as it was no good to stop at Bayana from where no connecting train was available. The distance between Bayana and Bharatpur is 32 Km. From Bharatpur he could get a branch line Bandikui Bharatpur, Agra Fort. He could get train No. 102 Dv. Passenger at 9.02 a.m. and reacn Idgah at 11.7 a.m. The other possible train was of Central Railway. He could reach Mathura junction by Western Railway at 9.15 a.m. From there he could get a train (Punjab Mail) at 9.30 and reaching Agra Cantt. at 10.45 a.m. According to the appellant, the most convenient train available to him was the one which started at 2.20 p.m. and reached Idgah at 6.15 p.m. 22. Be that as it may, I do not find any warrant for the presumption drawn by the learned judge in the absence of any evidence to that effect that Ranjeet Singh could travel by any train, merely by virtue of being a railway employee. The learned judge has discarded the Guard's Rough Journal Book and has said that it cannot be believed for "practical reasons." The grounds for discarding it was that it was in the appellant's custody and had not been examined by any superior officer. The mere fact that it had not been examined by a superior officer cannot detract from the value of a Government record which was kept in the regular course of business. The learned Judge, however, chose to rely upon this document, but only in part. The mere fact that it had not been examined by a superior officer cannot detract from the value of a Government record which was kept in the regular course of business. The learned Judge, however, chose to rely upon this document, but only in part. If the factum that Ranjeet Singh had gone to Gangapur City is admitted, it was for the respondent to prove that the (Ranjeet Singh) came back on the 14th August, 1964, and was available at Idgah. No such evidence has been produced. The learned judge enters into the realm of conjectures and says that the first appellant must have come earlier, as various trains were available. Guard's Rough Journal Book is a very important and valuable record. It clearly shows the train by which Ranjeet Singh started from Gangapur City. Another reason given by the learned judge for discarding the aforesaid entry in the said journal is that there is no other similar entry in the document. I, however, find, that there are other entries of a similar nature, e.g. entries dated 24-8-1964, 30-8-1964 and others. 23. The learned Judge has also relied upon the alleged habit of the first appellant of avoiding service of notice as evidenced in the earlier suit in not accepting the service of notice. The learned judge, to my mind, was not justified in taking the so called habit of the appellant into consideration and deciding that the notice must have been refused by the appellant. The learned judge again was not justified in saying that "there was no material on record which raises any suspicion about the service" when he himself, at an earlier stage of his judgment, had found certain inexplicable circumstances referred to by me earlier. The learned judge drew upon his imagination when he observed that "either this letter must have been returned back by the postman of Idgah Station or that, in spite of this endorsement, the letter might not have been sent to the redirected address and it may have remained with the postman." This, suspicion created by the endorsement of refusal on Ex. 14 in the same handwriting and of one and the same (late as on the other notices sought to be served in the case, should have been dispelled by the respondent by producing the postman concerned. 14 in the same handwriting and of one and the same (late as on the other notices sought to be served in the case, should have been dispelled by the respondent by producing the postman concerned. It was for the plaintiff-respondent to prove that the notices issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act were duly served upon the tenant. In the plaint the respondent had only enumerated the modes in which and the various addresses to which the notices were sent. He did not allege that the notices were served or were deemed to have been served. If the plaintiff-respondent had alleged in the plaint that Ranjeet Singh, the tenant, had been served, then the defendant-appellant would have pleaded that he was at Gangapur City and was not available for service at Agra. 24. Thus I find that the finding of the learned judge on the issue of service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is vitiated because the learned Judge did not appreciate the requirements of the section. The finding is also vitiated because the learned judge has raised presumption of service in the absence of proof about the correct address on the envelopes. The finding is further more vitiated by unwarranted surmises and conjectures on the part of the learned judge. 25. Before parting with the case I must confess that on the first impression I thought there was enough to support the finding of the judge and it ought not be disturbed. On the able arguments of the Advocate-General and a close and careful scrutiny of the evidence on the record I find that the finding cannot be sustained. Under the circumstances there is no option but to reverse the judgment of the lower appellate Court. 26. It is really unfortunate that the plaintiff-respondent had lost his first suit on the ground that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been served, and he has to lose this time as well on the same ground. There was absolutely no difficulty for the plaintiff-respondent to have produced the postman to prove the refusal and to have himself appeared as a witness to prove the place of residence or the correct address of the tenant. There was absolutely no difficulty for the plaintiff-respondent to have produced the postman to prove the refusal and to have himself appeared as a witness to prove the place of residence or the correct address of the tenant. Nothing of the kind was done and to a very great extent the plaintiff himself is responsible for this unhappy situation. 27. Sri Hari Swarup, appearing for the respondent, vehemently urged that the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court, being pure findings of fact, could not be challenged in Second Appeal. He also contended that notice could be tendered or delivered at any place according to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; and tendering and delivering notice also includes refusal to receive notice and, therefore, refusal to receive notice could also be made at any place. This argument cannot be accepted. When a notice is refused, there is no tendering or delivery. But by fiction of law the Court will presume that the person may be presumed to have received the notice if he refused to receive it. Now, the refusal would amount to service of notice only when it is proved that the notice was refused by the man concerned. In the present case the circumstances are so suspicious that it is difficult to hold that the refusal was made by the first appellant. It having been established that the appellant was at Gangapur City on the 14th of August, it was for the respondent to have proved that the first appellant came back to Idgah in time and was available for service of notice. That has not been done. 28. Sri Hari Swarup next contended that there is no denial or averment in the written statement that the first appellant was not at Agra on the 14th of August. This argument also has no force, as the learned judge himself has accepted the presence of appellant No. 1 at Gangapur City on the 14th. Moreover, the appellant could have been expected to make a denial in his written statement only if there had been any allegation about the service of notice on that date in the plaint. There is no allegation in the plaint that the notices were served or would be deemed to have been served on the first appellant. Moreover, the appellant could have been expected to make a denial in his written statement only if there had been any allegation about the service of notice on that date in the plaint. There is no allegation in the plaint that the notices were served or would be deemed to have been served on the first appellant. All that paragraph 6 of the plaint says is that "looking to the antecedents the plain tiff sent the said notice to quit as follows." It then enumerated the five addresses by which the plaintiff sent the notice. Then in paragraph 7 of the plaint the respondent alleges that "after the service of notice as aforesaid, and after the period of one month........ It would be noticed that though in paragraph 7 there is a mention of "service of notice as aforesaid", there is no mention about the service of notice in the earlier paragraphs (nor even in the subsequent paragraphs) . If the material allegation was wanting in the plaint itself, there was no occasion for the first appellant to deny a point that it had not been alleged in the plaint. 29. Sri Hari Swarup then urged that, at any rate, the notice contained in Ex. 14 was sent by the address of the first appellant's residence. It has already been shown in the earlier part of my judgment that this notice contains two alternative addresses : (i) at 25, Pratabpura, and (ii) at 29, Pratabpura. Further, it has not been proved that 25, Pratabpura was the place of residence of the first appellant-the tenant. No evidence on the point has been produced in the case. The learned judge assumed 25, Pratabpura to be the residential address of the first appellant without any warrant. There is also no such admission on the part of the defendant-appellants and, therefore, the very basis of the argument goes. 30. In support of his arguments Sri Hari Swarup relied upon Bhagwan Radha Kishan v. Income Tax Commissioner, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 857, Wasu Ram v. R. L. Sethi, 1963 A.W.R. 472, Balbhadar Mal v. Income Tax Commissioner, AIR 157 Punjab 284 and Buddha v. Smt. Kamla Narain, 1968 A.L.J. 707. 31. 30. In support of his arguments Sri Hari Swarup relied upon Bhagwan Radha Kishan v. Income Tax Commissioner, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 857, Wasu Ram v. R. L. Sethi, 1963 A.W.R. 472, Balbhadar Mal v. Income Tax Commissioner, AIR 157 Punjab 284 and Buddha v. Smt. Kamla Narain, 1968 A.L.J. 707. 31. In Buddha v. Smt. Kamla Narain it was held that: "Once a registered letter is handed over to the accepting post office for delivery to the addressee and a postman from the delivery post office takes it to the residence of-the addressee and makes an endorsement that it has been refused, the presumption would be that the notice has been served on the addressee. Like all other presumptions of fact, this presumption is rebuttable." Further, dealing with Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act it was observed :- "Section 114 of the Evidence Act deals with presumption of facts. Presumption of facts are no more than logical inference of the existence of one fact drawn from other proved or known facts without the help of any artificial rules of law and they are always rebuttable. As was pointed out by Holmes, T. "In Greer v. U. S., 245 U.S.R. 559 a presumption upon a matter of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that courts may notice the truth'. Presumptions are drawn on the basis of law, experience in the conduct of human affairs and in the official acts being regularly and properly performed." From the aforesaid observation it is clear that the Courts may draw a presumption but they are not bound to draw it if the circumstances appear to be suspicious. In the instant case it has already been shown that there are suspicious circumstances and also want of evidence to show that the notices were issued by the correct address. The lower appellate Court, to my mind, was not justified in drawing the presumption. 32. On similar grounds the other cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent are distinguishable. 33. For the reasons given above, I allow the appeal, set aside the decree ; f the lower appellate Court and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. But in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.