JUDGMENT : G.K. Mitter, J. 1. This is an appeal by a returned candidate against the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) setting aside his election to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Constituency `No. 107 which took place on 15th February, 1967. The appellant Secured 31,579 votes as against his nearest rival Gajadhar Ram singh Rathod who polled 30,807 votes. The latter filed an election petition impleading the appellant and other persons who had filed nomination papers and contested the election. The High Court allowed the election petition holding the appellant guilty of the commission of three corrupt practices, namely, (1) of bribery, (2) publishing a pamphlet attacking the personal character and conduct of the election petitioner, and (3) exercising undue influence on Muslim voters by holding out threats to certain leaders of the community. The learned advocate for the respondent tried to attack the judgment on three other points decided in favour the appellant, namely, (1) commission of corrupt practice by conveyance of voters in motor cars on the date of the election, (2) incurring of expenses exceeding Rs. 8000 - the limit fixed in respect of this constituency and (3) promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between the Banjara community to which the petitioner belonged and voters belonging to other castes. 2. In regard to bribery, the charge in the petition was that the appellant had induced one Shankarrao Ramji Arade, Respondent 2 in the election petition by payment of an amount of Rs. 1000 or more through Devkaran Marwad of Digras to withdraw his candidature from election. The evidence in support of this was the oral testimony of the said Shankarrao Arade and Devkaran Marwad. We were taken through the deposition of both these two witnesses as also that of the appellant but find ourselves unable to uphold the finding of the High Court that any corrupt practice was committed as alleged in the petition. In his examination-in-chief Deokaran stated that he had been approached by Chunnilal Singh to make efforts to secure the withdrawal of Shankarrao Arade from the contest as the election petitioner who belonged to the Banjara community had its full support and it was essential to make the contest a straight one between him and the appellant. In his examination-in-chief Deokaran stated that he had been approached by Chunnilal Singh to make efforts to secure the withdrawal of Shankarrao Arade from the contest as the election petitioner who belonged to the Banjara community had its full support and it was essential to make the contest a straight one between him and the appellant. It was not Deokaran's version that the appellant had told him that Shankarrao Arade should be prevailed upon by monetary considerations for withdrawing his candidature. According to Deokaran's evidence, he approached Shankarrao Arade whom he knew fairly well and told him that as a member of the Mali community he was not likely to get much support from the electorate and Chunnilal did not want that there should be any intervention by a third party in a contest between him and the election petitioner. On his own, he asked Shankarrao as to the amount he expected in return for his withdrawal, whereupon Shankarrao Arade told him that the appellant had already offered to pay him Rs. 700 to Rs. 800 through other persons and he should get anything between Rs. 1000 and Rs. 1500. Deokaran could not hold out any promise of a definite amount but told Shankarrao that it might be possible for him to secure up to Rs. 1000 but that he would try to get more if possible from Chunnilal Singh. Thereafter, he contacted the appellant and related to him his conversation with Arade. Chunnilal Singh told Deokaran that unless acknowledgment of withdrawal from Shankarrao was obtained, the question of making any payment could not arise but all the same made over Rs. 1000 to Deokaran for the purpose. Deokaran approached Shankarrao Arade again with instructions of the appellant and Arade came and showed him the acknowledgment of withdrawal of his candidature and demanded payment of Rs. 1000. The payment was then made to Shankarrao. The appellant had not taken any acknowledgment of receipt of Rs. 1000 from Deokaran. Beyond the statement in his examination-in-chief that he knew Chunnilal Singh, there was nothing to show that Deokaran was familiar with or intimately known to Chunnilal Singh and was a person in whom the latter could confide for carrying through this delicate mission Shankarrao's evidence was that he was an independent candidate and that he had filed his nomination paper on the 18th January, 1967. Thereafter, he had been approached by several persons on behalf of Chunnilal Singh for withdrawal of his candidature. Deokaran had seen him on the evening of 19th January and told him that Chunnilal Singh wanted him to persuade Shankarrao to withdraw his nomination and that Chunnilal was prepared to pay up to Rs. 1000 if Shankarrao was agreeable to withdraw from the contest. It may be noted that this was not Deokaran's version. If Deokaran is to be believed, he had no talk at first with Chunnilal Singh about any money being paid to Shankarrao for the purpose of withdrawal. Shankarrao's evidence further was that he had withdrawn his nomination by filling in the form of withdrawal on 21st January, 1967. On the next day, he went to Deokaran, twice but failed to meet him. Then he again went to Deokaran on 23rd January 1967 in the afternoon and showed him the slip given to him by the Sub-Divisional Officer acknowledging withdrawal of nomination, whereupon Deokaran paid him Rs. 1000. His cross-examination shows that he was a person who had secured money by withdrawing his nomination from an election contest even before the general election in 1967. According to him even before Deokaran's proposal he had been approached for the purpose by other persons acting in the interest of the appellant. He stated that he had come in close touch with Deokaran because of his serving Baburao in his cotton ginning factory while Deokaran was a cotton broker. Being in a hurry to obtain money he had filed his withdrawal on 21st January, 1967. He denied that he had obtained any money from the election petitioner to give evidence in this case. 3. The appellant, Chunnilal Singh stated in his examination-in-chief that his acquaintance with Deokaran was very slight having met him only once for a few minutes at a bus stand some time before the date of the election. He denied having approached Deokaran for the purpose of securing the withdrawal of Shankarrao Arade as alleged. No attempt was made during his lengthy cross-examination to show that his familiarity or intimacy with Deokaran was such that he might be expected to approach the latter to secure the withdrawal of Shankarrao Arade from the contest. The cross-examination of the appellant is singularly bare in this respect. No attempt was made during his lengthy cross-examination to show that his familiarity or intimacy with Deokaran was such that he might be expected to approach the latter to secure the withdrawal of Shankarrao Arade from the contest. The cross-examination of the appellant is singularly bare in this respect. Nor was any attempt made to show that similar overtures had been made through others as suggested both by Deokaran and Shankarrao. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that in the matter of taking of a bribe, Shankarrao Arade was in the nature of an accomplice and it would be difficult to act on his testimony unless there was same corroboration acceptable to the court. Deokaran's version is wholly unworthy of credit and his testimony taken along with Shankarrao's do not lead us to hold that withdrawal of the nomination by Shankarrao was brought about as deposed to by the two witnesses. In our view, the appellant cannot be held guilty of the charge of bribery by paying Rs. 1000 to Shankarrao Arade as alleged in the petition. 4. The second head of corrupt practice is pleaded in para 7(2)(iv) of the petition to the effect that the appellant had caused to be published a pamphlet containing false statements of fact in relation to the personal character of the petitioner and that the insinuation in that pamphlet was that the petitioner was corrupt by nature open to take bribes and was also a drunkard. It is unnecessary to examine the oral evidence on this point, because, in our opinion, the pamphlet, on the face of it bears no reference to the election petitioner and could not be described as derogatory to the petitioner's character. Looking at the whole of the pamphlet, one is left with no doubt that the subject of criticism and ridicule in immoderate terms was the Congress organisation and not an individual. The relevant portions of the pamphlet read as follows: "A pair of bullocks having no yokes which was formerly white but on account of old age became dark is for sale. The pair is exhausted (Khangar) and ricketty (Martukdi) is for sale. Colour and identifying marks: Colour: Like that of an ass (Now). Horns: Curved and loose; it cannot be told when they would fall. Tail: The tail-end black. Face: Pitch black. Teeth: Not one. Gums: Strong. Age 19 years. The pair is exhausted (Khangar) and ricketty (Martukdi) is for sale. Colour and identifying marks: Colour: Like that of an ass (Now). Horns: Curved and loose; it cannot be told when they would fall. Tail: The tail-end black. Face: Pitch black. Teeth: Not one. Gums: Strong. Age 19 years. Qualities: Can walk only when yoked. If tied to a plough sits down. If tied to a cart or Damnisits down. Does not eat grass. Khadba is not necessary ats "Gajraj" grass. Can eat money and drinks wine instead of water. Has come out first in Pat (competition) for the last 19 years without the use of stick with a nail (Purani). Does not fight with another bullock but fights internally. Advantages: If you purchase this pair of bullock your land is bound to lie fallow. Excepting the similarity of the work "Gajraj" with the name of the election petitioner "Gaiadhar": there is nothing to connect the pamphlet with the petitioner. The whole document goes to show that it was the Congress organisation which was being sought to be held in ridicule for inefficiency, corruption and other defects. It was the pair of bullocks mentioned in the pamphlet which ate Gajraj grass and it could eat money and drink wine instead of water. From this, we cannot hold that the petitioner was the person aimed at and that he was being termed a drunkard or a person open to taking bribes from others. More than that, the reference to the age of the bullocks as 19 years shows that the Congress organisation which had pair of bullocks for its symbol and had been in power in the different States for that period, was the subject-matter of the pamphlet. We find ourselves unable to hold that by the pamphlet, any attempt was made to launch an attack on the personal character of the petitioner so as to make the electorate go against him in the election. 5. With regard to the exercise of undue influence, it was pleaded in para 7(2)(iii) of the petition that the appellant had conveyed to the leaders of the Muslim community that if they voted for the Congress, it would be very difficult for them to live in peace at Mangrulpir and other villages. 5. With regard to the exercise of undue influence, it was pleaded in para 7(2)(iii) of the petition that the appellant had conveyed to the leaders of the Muslim community that if they voted for the Congress, it would be very difficult for them to live in peace at Mangrulpir and other villages. It was pleaded that the appellant took full advantage of the communal riots which had taken place in Mangrulpir and adjoining areas during the preceding Ganesh festival and held out a threat to the Muslim community through its leaders that if they voted for the Congress in the constituency as they had done in the past they would find it difficult to live safely in the constituency. In his written statement, the appellant pleaded that the charge was very vague and general and that no notice should be taken thereof. The petitioner then gave further particulars of the charge. He gave the names of seven persons as the leaders of the Muslim community referred to in para 7 of the petition. The particulars further went to show that the appellant had called all these leaders to his house at about 8 p.m. on 14th February 1967 and threatened them that they would not be able to live in peace if they voted for the Congress. Only three witnesses were examined by the petitioner to prove this charge; they were PWs 18, 19 and 20. PW 18 Abdul Jabbar stated that Abdul Munab Saudagar had called himself and 7 or 8 persons in the Darga at Mangrulpir on 14th February round about 6 in the evening and told the witness that the appellant had sent for them and that they were to go to his house. Thereafter, the witness and 6 or 7 persons went to the house of the appellant when the latter told them that he had heard that the Muslims were going to vote for the Congress but he expected all of them to vote for him and failure to do so would entail serious consequences. The witness's reply was that they would think it over. The witness however took it as a threat and told several persons of his community about what he had heard from the appellant. The witness's reply was that they would think it over. The witness however took it as a threat and told several persons of his community about what he had heard from the appellant. In cross-examination, he stated that when he had gone to the appellant's place, he found several persons of his community already gathered there, but the appellant was alone in the house. The talk continued for about an hour or so and there was no heated discussion. He had not made a complaint about the threat to the police or anyone else. 6. The evidence of Abdul Munar, PW 19 and of PW 20, Mirza Anvar Beg was much to the same effect. 7. As against the above evidence, we have the testimony of Chunnilal Singh himself and that of one Govind who figured as RW 1. The evidence of these two persons was to the effect that several persons including Govind, pleader Khapli and Chunnilal Singh were doing the work of drawing up lists of polling agents in the latter's election office from 4 in the evening on the 14th February till about 2 o'clock at night and that all of them were there for that time. The evidence of RW 6 Prabhakar was to the same effect. According to him, Chunnilal Singh was closeted with several persons from 4.30 in the afternoon of the 14th February till about 1.30 a.m. at night, explaining the procedure to be followed by the polling agents from the issue of ballot papers to the marking and placing of ballot paper in the box. 8. Apart from the conflicting testimony of the witnesses on either side, the burden of proof being on the petitioner, we find it impossible to believe the evidence adduced to uphold the charge of corrupt practice. If it was really the object of the appellant to coerce the members of the Muslim community to vote against the Congress candidate, efforts in that direction would have been made long before 14th February. The election was held on 15th February when votes were cast. We do not believe that the leaders of the Muslim community of about 5000 voters would be summoned only a few hours before the commencement of the election and given a threat in the way suggested. The election was held on 15th February when votes were cast. We do not believe that the leaders of the Muslim community of about 5000 voters would be summoned only a few hours before the commencement of the election and given a threat in the way suggested. If the threat was to be conveyed to the members of the community, the leaders would have to be given sufficient time for the purpose and nobody could expect the leaders to go round Mangrulpir, call up people from their beds and tell them that they must not cast their votes in favour of the Congress candidate the next morning. The story on the face of it is incredible. We also find ourselves unable to believe that the leaders of the Muslim community were at the beck and call of the appellant and could be summoned to gather at the appellant's house at a moment's notice as suggested or that they were all so cowed down with fear or under the appellant's influence to such an extent that they would immediately flock to his house. If the appellant was really minded to take advantage of the situation created by the communal riots to coerce the members of the Muslim community, he would have proceeded in a manner very different from that stated in the petition and of which evidence was given at the hearing. The appellant denied having sent for any of the leaders of the Muslim community or to have held out any threats to them. On an examination of the entire evidence adduced, we have no doubt in our mind that a threat like the one pleaded in the petition could not have been given in the way suggested and was not as a matter of fact given. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the witnesses on behalf of the appellant who stated that Chunnilal Singh was busy with his election programme from the afternoon of 14th February till late at night and certainly this was not the hour when anybody would think of summoning the leaders of the community for the simple reason that there would be no time left for the leaders to convey the threat to the electors. We are therefore of the view that the learned trial Judge had gone wrong in deciding these three issues of corrupt practice alleged against the appellant. 9. We are therefore of the view that the learned trial Judge had gone wrong in deciding these three issues of corrupt practice alleged against the appellant. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent addressed us on the three additional issues already mentioned. With regard to the first of these, the plea in the petition was that: "the Respondent 1 (Chunnilal Singh) had employed about 8 cars for the purpose of conveying the voters to the polling booths on the date of election. The cars which were used by him bore numbers BYJ 5265, BYJ 3780, MHR 1187, BYJ 5351, MHR 1145, BMJ 1566, BYJ 5614 and BYJ 6079". The answer of the appellant to this charge was that he did not use any vehicles for the purpose of conveying voters to the polling booths as alleged in the petition. He however stated that two cars numbered 8YV 5265 and BYJ 3780 owned by his brother had at times been allowed to be used for election purposes but the payments had been made in respect thereof. He also admitted having hired three cars from Karanja for his election but submitted that none of those vehicles had been used for the carriage of voters on the date of election. The petitioner gave detailed particulars about the user of the different vehicles on the date of election stating the villages from which they had been collected and the polling stations to which the voters had been taken, the registration numbers of the cars so used with names of some of the persons who had been carried. There was abundant oral evidence adduced on the side of the petitioner to the effect that cars belonging to various persons had been used on the date of polling for conveyance of voters. It will be enough to refer only to the testimony of two of them. 10. PW 6, Gajanan, owner of the motor car bearing No. MHR 1187 said that the above car had been given to the appellant for his use from 8th January till 28th February, 1967 and that it was stipulated between him and Chunnilal Singh that the latter should put the car in order by carrying out the necessary repairs to bring it in a working condition and use it for his election work. He stated further that Chunnilal Singh had got the car repaired at a cost of Rs. He stated further that Chunnilal Singh had got the car repaired at a cost of Rs. 2500 to Rs. 2750 and used it in his election and that he himself had gone round in the said car with Chunnilal Singh to different parts of the constituency, and that on the date of the poll he had been to Wadfal and Mendhra area to bring voters to the polling station at Hiwra Khurd. He also stated that Chunnilal Singh had bought two new tyres for his car out of which he had kept one and made over the other to the witness. During the cross-examination of this witness, the learned Judge noted by an order that there had been an error committed in mentioning the registration number of the car, the correct number being MHR 1187 and not BYJ 1187 as mentioned in the election petition. 11. PW 22, Babban Bhagat, the Joint Secretary of the Mangrulpir Taluka Republican Party who claimed to have helped Chunnilal Singh during the election stated that about 8 motor cars had been used by the appellant for his propaganda purpose, one of them being a jeep belonging to Gajanan, the witness abovementioned and two cars of Balkhande of Karanja among others. According to him, arrangements with regard to work at the polling stations had been fixed up on 13th February, 1967 and the witness was to be in charge of polling in Umbarada Circle and the adjacent Kawthal Circle. Vehicles had been entrusted circle wise in pursuance of the polling arrangement and the witness was given a car belonging to Balkhande of Karanja on 14th February, 1967 and he was required to convey voters from Sukli to Umberda Polling Station and from Waghola to Inzori Polling station on the 15th February, 1967. He gave the names of three persons who had been conveyed from Waghola, and were examined in court afterwards. No voter from Sukli was examined by the election petitioner. 12. Besides the above, several other persons were called to prove that voters had been conveyed by means of cars on the date of election. They were, to mention a few, PWs 27, 28 and 29. Evidence was also given about a complaint having been made to the Sub-Divisional Officer at Mangrulpir regarding the use of cars for conveyance of voters on the date of election by PW 1. They were, to mention a few, PWs 27, 28 and 29. Evidence was also given about a complaint having been made to the Sub-Divisional Officer at Mangrulpir regarding the use of cars for conveyance of voters on the date of election by PW 1. Another witness deposed to a complaint having been made to the police on the subject. 13. Leaving aside the question of expenses of hiring of cars and purchase of petrol which will have to be dealt with under the next issue, although there was led a substantial volume of evidence to the effect that voters had been carried by means of motor cars to the polling booths, such cars having been employed or procured by the appellant, the evidence falls short of proof of charge of a corrupt practice under Section 123(5) of the Act. Omitting the proviso and the Explanation, Section 123(5) reads as follows: "(5) The hiring or procuring, whether on payment or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent or by any other person (with the consent of a candidate or his election agent) or the use of any elector (other than the candidate himself, the members of his family or his agent) to or from any polling station provided under Section 25 or a place fixed under sub-section (1) of Section 29 for the poll:' This section came up for consideration by this Bench in the case of Joshbhai Chunibhai Patel v. Anwar Beg A. Mirza (Civil Appeal No. 799 of 1968 decided on September 13, 1968). There it was pointed out by the learned Chief Justice that the section requires three things: (1) hiring or procuring of a vehicle; (2) by a candidate or his agent etc. and (3) for the free conveyance of an elector. It was also pointed out that the section was inartistically worded inasmuch as it admitted of a construction that the mere hiring or procuring of a vehicle for the free conveyance of an elector, no matter whether it was actually used for this purpose, amounted to a corrupt practice. But we are not called upon to solve that problem here. Whatever be the meaning of this section, it is quite clear that the hiring or procuring of a vehicle or the use thereof must be for the free conveyance of voters. But we are not called upon to solve that problem here. Whatever be the meaning of this section, it is quite clear that the hiring or procuring of a vehicle or the use thereof must be for the free conveyance of voters. In this case, evidence establishes that vehicles were used for conveyance of voters but there was no pleading in the petition itself nor was there any evidence of a single witness out of the many produced before the Court to show that voters had been carried to polling free of any booths charge or cost to them. On the pleadings and the evidence adduced, it is not possible to hold that the commission of a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(5) had been established. 14. On the issue as to incurring of expenses exceeding Rs. 8000 i.e. the limit fixed, the position is as follows. 15. In his return of expenses submitted by the appellant, the amount shown was Rs. 5598-30. The learned trial Judge held on the evidence that a sum of Rs. 1180.44 had mistakenly been included in the said sum and there was no dispute on this point before us. There is, therefore, an admitted amount of Rs. 4418-66 which the appellant had incurred by way of expenses according to his return. Counsel for the respondent tried to establish that besides the above, the appellant had also incurred the following expenses: (1) for petrol and spare parts of cars - Rs. 3,869-41; (2) for the hire of a car belonging to one Mansa Ram - Rs. 450-00; (3) for hire of and repairs effected to Gajanan Bhiku's car - MHR 1187 Rs. 2500 and (4) amount forfeited to the Congress organisation - Rs. 600-00. We will take these one by one. The break-up of the sum of Rs. 3869-41 for petrol supplied directly in the cars or in barrels as follows: (a) Rs. 196-00 according to the evidence of PW 3, Kamal Kishore; (b) Rs. 787-77 according to the evidence of PW 4, Mukund; (c) Rs. 444-37 according to the evidence of PW 5, Radhey Sham, and (d) Rs. 1804-57 according to the evidence of PW 10, Hakim. Besides the above an expense of Rs. 646-70 was incurred for supply of parts and spares according to the evidence of PW 11 and PW 33. 787-77 according to the evidence of PW 4, Mukund; (c) Rs. 444-37 according to the evidence of PW 5, Radhey Sham, and (d) Rs. 1804-57 according to the evidence of PW 10, Hakim. Besides the above an expense of Rs. 646-70 was incurred for supply of parts and spares according to the evidence of PW 11 and PW 33. The appellant disputed the correctness of these figures but it appears to us that excepting a few items which we shall mention presently, the others were proved. The items which according to us were not proved are as follows: (a) Rs. 196-00 as deposed to by PW 3, Kamal Kishore. This witness who was in the service of one Onkarmal Rumtha at his petrol pump at Akola referred to a bill book of his master called credit book which contained the duplicate of Bill No. 258 showing the supply of 200 litres of petrol to Chunnilal Singh on 6th February, 1967. According to him, the bill had been handed over to Chunnilal personally and the registration number of the car for which the petrol was issued in a barrel was shown therein as MHV 872. The witness tendered Ex. 62 as a true copy of the carbon copy of the said bill. In his cross-examination he said that he was unable to give precisely the date on which the payment for the supply of petrol had been made, but he remembered that the supply of petrol was on credit. On the bill being shown to him he was not prepared to admit that the words "Chunnilal Singh - Ko" had been interpolated therein later above the words "Mangrul Joint Motor Service": In our view there was no sufficient evidence brought before the court to hold that the appellant had taken this petrol for use in his election work but had suppressed it from the return of expenses. The original of the document was not tendered but it would appear from the copy itself and the cross-examination of the witness that the supply was made to Mangrul Joint Motor Service through the appellant and if the words "through the appellant" had been inserted later on, it would be difficult to hold that it was the appellant who had taken this quantity of petrol. Besides the car MHV 872 was not one of the cars mentioned in the petition as having been used by the appellant. 16. PW 4, Mukand, a servant of R.J. Chaware at Karanja came to court with duplicate bill book with regard to supply of petrol from his master's pump from 1st January, 1967 to 1st March, 1967. According to him, petrol had been supplied only against payment in cash and the particulars supplied by him went to show that diverse quantities of petrol had been supplied to the car BY16070. He also stated that he had omitted to mention an item of supply of 205 litres of petrol on 15th January, 1967 against car No. BYJ 5265. The figures which are culled from the bill are given in Ex. 64-A. Out of the amounts mentioned therein two items of Rs. 16-75 against date 20th January, 1967 and Rs. 3-00 against date 22nd January, 1967 were not given by him in his statement on oath before the court. It is also to be noted that the car BYJ 6070 was not mentioned in the petition although it was mentioned in the particulars. The position therefore is that a sum of Rs. 19-75 included in Ex. 64-A was not sworn to by the witness while as regards the sum of Rs. 190-65 our attention was drawn to the return of expenses filed by the appellant of which Item 39 is an amount of Rs. 210 purported to have been paid to R.J. Chaware at Karanja on the 15th January, 1967, the date mentioned by the witness himself in respect of the supply in bulk. On this point the witness was speaking from memory and not with reference to any document and on the state of the evidence we would rather accept the statement given in the return of expenses which was for 220 litres of petrol and not 205 litres as spoken to by the witness. The price of this quantity of petrol cannot be added to the appellant's expenses. 17. With regard to the amount of Rs. 444-37 composed of several items our attention was drawn to the evidence of PW 5. This is borne out by Ex. 66. The price of this quantity of petrol cannot be added to the appellant's expenses. 17. With regard to the amount of Rs. 444-37 composed of several items our attention was drawn to the evidence of PW 5. This is borne out by Ex. 66. There is only a petty difference of 93 paise with regard to the supply of one litre of petrol on 27th January, 1967 and the benefit of doubt must go to the returned candidate. The other items were proved. With regard to the item of Rs. 1804-57 spoken to by PW 10, Hakim, the position is as follows. In his oral testimony Hakim referred to 8 items of sale but in the statement prepared by him and marked as Ex. 79, there are 10 items. He did not speak about Bill No. 256 dated 31st January, 1967 for Rs. 218-25 and the bill dated 10th February, 1967 for Rs. 19-40 while he was giving evidence in court. As these amounts in the exhibit were not sworn to by him in his statement, they will have to be excluded. Besides these, there is a minor discrepancy with regard to two figures given by him in his oral testimony as compared to the figures given hi Ex. 79. Taking all this into account, the correct figure should be Rs. 1562-67 and not the sum of Rs. 1804-57. 18. With regard to the item of Rs. 646-70 deposed to by two witnesses PW 11 and PW 33 as expenses incurred by the appellant in the purchase of spare parts used in the car, it appears that the spare parts were supplied to two cars BYJ 5265 and BYJ 4580 and from the evidence of the appellant as also his written statement, it is clear that these two cars did not belong to him but to his brother and had been loaned to him for the purpose of his election work. That being so, the expenses incurred in connection therewith could not be charged to his election expenses but were properly debitable to his brother. 19. Besides the sum of Rs. 3869-41, learned counsel for the respondent sought to prove three other items of expenses as having been incurred by the appellant but not mentioned in his return. The first of these is a sum of Rs. 19. Besides the sum of Rs. 3869-41, learned counsel for the respondent sought to prove three other items of expenses as having been incurred by the appellant but not mentioned in his return. The first of these is a sum of Rs. 450 which was claimed to have been paid as hire for Mansa Ram's Car No. 6070. Mansa Ram who was examined as PW 34 stated that he had hired the car BYJ 6070 to the appellant in his election campaign for 11 days, the hiring charges being agreed upon being Rs. 50 per day and that he had received charges for 9 out of 11 days. In cross-examination he admitted that the agreement for hiring was not with the appellant himself but with one Tukaram Patil Yedsikar who did not give anything in writing to show that the vehicle was required for the appellant's election work. As against this, we have the evidence of the appellant that so far as he remembered, the registration number of the motor vehicle supplied by Mansa Ram was BYJ 6079 and it had been used for only a single day by one Ramdhansingh Thakur of Umbarda and the appellant himself had paid the charges for that day. amounting to Rs. 13 besides the value of petrol supplied. He also stated that he had not hired any car from Mansa Ram bearing registration No. 6070. In this state of the evidence it is not possible to hold that a sum of Rs. 450 had been paid by the appellant by way of car hire which Should have been included in his return of expenses. It should be noted that the appellant had also denied that Tukaram Patil had entered into any contract with Mansa Ram on his behalf in respect of hire I of any motor car. 20. The only man who spoke about the expenses for repair of a car amounting to Rs. 2500 was Gajanan the owner of MHR 1187. Gajanan's evidence as already recorded was that he had loaned his car to the appellant on terms that the appellant should put the car in road-worthy condition and incur all expenses in connection therewith. It was his further version that one Ayub who had a motor workshop carried out the repairs which must have cost the appellant between Rs. 2500 to Rs. 2750. It was his further version that one Ayub who had a motor workshop carried out the repairs which must have cost the appellant between Rs. 2500 to Rs. 2750. Ayub was not examined and we find ourselves unable to hold that the appellant would go in for a car of this type when the evidence shows that he could easily have got a car at Rs. 50 per day. There is no document to support this item and on the face of it, the evidence is incredible and was rightly rejected by the learned trial Judge. 21. The only other item of expense which we have to deal with is the sum of Rs. 600 paid by the appellant for securing ticket. The appellant admitted having deposited Rs. 600 with the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee on 15th September, 1966 which included a sum of Rs. 100 towards fees for the application and Rs. 500 towards the necessary deposit. According to his written statement, the amount deposited was returnable and was not an account which could be said to have been spent for the election. He further claimed that the money having been paid long before the date of the publication of the notification could not properly fall within the ambit of Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act. In his oral evidence the appellant stated that he had sent notice to the Congress authorities demanding the refund of Rs. 600 deposited by him. He was shown proforma of a declaration marked Ex. 166 but he stated that he did not give any such declaration when he applied for the Congress ticket. He was shown a certified copy of an application alleged to have been made by him and he admitted having made an application of that type. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that under the rules of the Congress organisation this sum of money was not refundable. Exs. 167 and 168 have not been included in the record, but whatever may be the rules of the Congress party, in order that the appellant may be debited with the sum paid by way of deposit, it must be shown to the court that the amount was debitable as election expenses and the appellant had lost the sum for good. There being no evidence to that effect, the sum of Rs. 500 out of Rs. There being no evidence to that effect, the sum of Rs. 500 out of Rs. 600 cannot in our opinion be included as expense incurred in connection with the election by the appellant. Taking into account all the evidence adduced and the figures mentioned we are unable to find that the limit of Rs. 8000 was exceeded by the appellant by way of expenses incurred in the election. Consequently he cannot be held to have committed a corrupt practice in terms of Section 77(3) read with Section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act. 22. That leaves us with the last question sought to be raised by learned counsel for the respondent pleaded in para 7(2)(ii) of the election petition to the effect that the appellant himself and by other persons interested in him and with his consent secured votes by promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between the Banjara community to which the petitioner belonged and other classes of voters belonging to other castes such as Marathas, Patils, Audhs, Navabhudhas and Muslims. The case in the petition was that the appellant through his canvassers represented to the voters that the voters of the caste of the petitioner were much less in number than the voters belonging to the other classes and it was the common cause of the majority of the people that they should not allow a Banjara to be returned as their candidate. Some evidence was adduced on this point but it was so inconsequential that the learned trial Judge found himself unable to place reliance thereon. The evidence consisted mainly of the testimony of one Kishan Dhere, a taxi owner who spoke of a meeting held in support of the appellant on 11th February, 1967. The learned trial Judge found himself unable to accept this testimony in the absence of corroboration and we do not see any reason why we should take a different view. The other material on record on which reliance was placed was the testimony of Deokaran who purported to have told Shankarrao Arade that the appellant wanted that there should be a straight contest between the Banjara community and the other communities and therefore Shankarrao Arade should drop out. Deokaran's evidence, as we have already noted was wholly unacceptable to us. The other material on record on which reliance was placed was the testimony of Deokaran who purported to have told Shankarrao Arade that the appellant wanted that there should be a straight contest between the Banjara community and the other communities and therefore Shankarrao Arade should drop out. Deokaran's evidence, as we have already noted was wholly unacceptable to us. The election petitioner also relied on the evidence of two other persons who spoke about another meeting where attempt was made to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the Banjara community and the other castes including the Navabhudhas. As regards this, the learned Judge held that there was no evidence on the side of the election petitioner establishing that the appellant had authorised propaganda on these lines mentioned by these witnesses, or that the nature of the speeches alleged to have been made at the meetings was conveyed to the appellant and therefore had his tacit consent. We see no reason to take a view different from that of the learned trial Judge on this part of the case and therefore we hold that the learned Judge rightly held this issue against the election petitioner. 23. For the reasons given no charge of corrupt practice having been proved against the appellant, the appeal is allowed with costs, throughout.