JUDGMENT G.D. Sahgal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It arises out of consolidation proceedings and relates to plots Nos. 282 and 283 which have now been comprised in chak No. 34. They belonged to one Haji Karim Bux who was the father of the petitioner. Haji Karim Bux died during the consolidation proceeding; and after his death the petitioner, who is his daughter, claimed that she was a preferential heir as compared to Rahim Bux, his brother; that she had been in possession over the land in dispute even during the life-time of her father and that she continued to be in possession after his death. She also relied on a registered will executed by him on the 26th of July, 1945. The petitioner, it may be pointed out, was married and divorced twice and at the time her father died she was a divorced woman. Her objection claiming herself to be mutated in place of her father was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer. She then made an appeal. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowed the appeal and ordered the mutation to be made in her favour. Rahim Bux, opposite party No. 1, then went up in revision which was allowed and the order of the Consolidation Officer restored. It is in these circumstances that this writ petition was filed challenging the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in favour of opposite party No. 1. 2. The case came up before our brother Lakshmi Prasad and it was urged before him that even though the petitioner may have been married twice, she, having been divorced already and having no husband at present, should be treated as an "unmarried daughter" within the meaning of that term under Section 171 (ee) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) and as such held entitled to the property in preference to opposite party No. 1, brother of the deceased. An authority of this Court, namely, Smt. Gauriya v. Kadhora, 1966 ALJ 909 was cited before him in support of the petitioner's case. But as the learned Judge did not agree with the view expressed therein, he has referred the case to a larger Bench and that is how the case comes up before us. 3. An authority of this Court, namely, Smt. Gauriya v. Kadhora, 1966 ALJ 909 was cited before him in support of the petitioner's case. But as the learned Judge did not agree with the view expressed therein, he has referred the case to a larger Bench and that is how the case comes up before us. 3. As the entire case has been referred to a Division Bench, we have to decide all the points raised in the case on behalf of the petitioner. 4. The first point that arises for determination and which is the main point in the case is as to whether the petitioner can be said to be an "unmarried daughter" within the meaning of that term under Section 171 of the Act. In Smt. Gauriyasl case, referred to above, a learned single Judge of this Court following an authority of the Calcutta High Court and another of the Lahore High Court came to the conclusion that though the primary meaning of the word "unmarried" is never "having been married", the secondary meaning of the word "unmarried" will include a widow who does not continue to remain in a state of marriage and necessarily, as is the case here, a divorced daughter also who is at present not in a state of marriage. 5. In Soleman Bibi v. E.I. Ry., AIR 1933 Calcutta 358 (2), on which case the learned single Judge has relied, the following observations occur at page 360 : "I would therefore prefer to state the result of the authorities as to the meaning of the word as follows: (1) That the dictionary or grammatical sense of the word is not married; (2) that the popular and more usual sense is never having been married; (3) that the word is commonly used in either sense and is therefore a "flexible" or equivocal term; (4) that for this reason the meaning must in all cases be discovered from the context; (5) that in the case of deeds and wills where there is no context, where the document is completely colourless, the popular sense will usually be adopted." 6. With these observations we are in agreement. With these observations we are in agreement. The question to be decided in this case is as to whether the word is to be interpreted in the popular and more usual sense as indicating a woman who has never been married or it has to be interpreted in the wider sense, i.e., a woman who is not in state of marriage at the relevant time. 7. In the Lahore case, namely, Mt. Moti Bai v. Agent, N.W. Ry., A.I.R. 1932 Lahore 1 the question that arose before that Court was whether the term "unmarried" used under Section 2 (1) (d) (i) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 was used in the sense of a person who had never been married or was it used in the sense of a person who was not married at the relevant time and the learned Judge came to the conclusion that it was used in the latter sense and in that connection the learned Judge considered the context in which that term had been used and drew his inference therefrom. The consideration that led the learned Judge to take that view was that the intention of the Legislature in the context was to compensate those whom the deceased was, having regard to the customs and ideas of the people, ordinarily expected to maintain. This view was followed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Soleman Bibi's case which was also a case under the same Act. 8. We, have therefore, to see whether in the context in which the term "unmarried daughter" has been used in the Act it connotes the secondary meaning or it should be given its primary meaning. 9. Section 171 of the Act speaks of unmarried daughters, unmarried sisters, married daughters and married sisters. It does not make any mention of a widowed daughter or a daughter who has been divorced or who has been abandoned by her husband. Sec; 171 by itself, therefore, cannot be of much help to us to understand the meaning in which the term "unmarried" has been used by the Legislature. We may. however, refer to another provision in that very Act. Sec; 171 by itself, therefore, cannot be of much help to us to understand the meaning in which the term "unmarried" has been used by the Legislature. We may. however, refer to another provision in that very Act. Under Section 157 certain disabled persons have been allowed to let the whole or a part of their holding and those persons include an unmarried woman, or if married, divorced or separated from her husband or whose husband suffers, from any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (c) or (d) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 157, or a widow. If the term "unmarried woman" also included a woman who had been divorced at who had been separated from her husband or who was a widow and was not remarried, then this provision of law would not have been as it is. Instead, it would have provided in that list only an unmarried woman or a woman whose husband suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (c) or (d). No mention would have been made of a woman divorced or of a woman separated from her husband or a widow. The use of the words "if married, divorced Or separated from her husband" clearly indicates that a woman who is married and who is divorced or separated from her husband does not come within the meaning of the term "unmarried". The term having been used in the statute in one sense in Section 157, there is a presumption that it must have been used in the same sense in Section 171 also. 10. We are, therefore, of opinion that the term "unmarried daughter" in Section 171 does not include a daughter who, having been married, was divorced and the Deputy Director of Consolidation was right in making that interpretation. 11. It was then urged that the petitioner would in any case inherit the khata on the basis of the will of her father executed in her favour. The will is a registered document and was executed on the 26th of July, 1945, as appears from the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but no such will could be executed under the U. P. Tenancy Act. The will is a registered document and was executed on the 26th of July, 1945, as appears from the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but no such will could be executed under the U. P. Tenancy Act. The learned counsel, however, points out that under Section 169 of the Act a will could be executed in respect of bhumidhari rights and though it may not have been a valid will under the U. P. Tenancy Act, but as it began to speak on the death of Haji Karim Bux who died after the coming into force of the Zamindari Abolition Act, it will be effective so 4. far as the bhumidhari interests are concerned. In his petition the petitioner has nowhere stated as to what the nature of the tenancy is. A mention has been made in paragraph 2 of the petition about the will but not about the nature of the tenure affected. In the counter affidavit in paragraph 2, however, it has been specifically mentioned that the land was hereditary tenancy. After the abolition of zamindari it would become sirdari and not bhumidhari and Section 170 of the Act which prohibits bequeathing such property by will will apply and not Section 169, with the result that it is not possible to bequeath, such property by will. 12. Lastly, it was urged that the petitioner was in any case in possession of the holding at the time of the death of her father and as such she was entitled to get her name mutated on his death. The application of the petitioner was made under Section 12 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act which provides that all matters relating to changes and transfers affecting any of the rights or interest recorded in the revised records, for which a cause of action had not arisen when proceedings under Sections 7 to 9 were started or were in progress, may be raised before the Assistant Consolidation Officer as and when they arise. Such matters under sub-sec. (2) of Section 12 shall be dealt with in the manner provided under Sections 7 to 11 of that Act. A perusal of Sections 7 to 11 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act would show that such matters are decided on the basis of title and not on the basis of possession. This position is not disputed. (2) of Section 12 shall be dealt with in the manner provided under Sections 7 to 11 of that Act. A perusal of Sections 7 to 11 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act would show that such matters are decided on the basis of title and not on the basis of possession. This position is not disputed. We are, therefore, relieved of considering these provisions in detail and pointing out therefrom that under Sections 7 to 11 the matters are decided on the basis of title and not of possession. Title and not possession therefore was relevant in the case and title went against the petitioner. 13. Altogether, therefore, the petition has no force and must be dismissed. We would, however, make no order as to costs as in any case the petitioner had in her favour a case of this Court which might have induced her to file the petition which case, with respect, we are of opinion, has not been correctly decided. 14. The petition is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to costs.