JUDGMENT Lakshmi Prasad, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner was appointed as Manager of Zilla Sahkari Bank limited, Unnao, on 8th October, 1963. Later on he was confirmed as such on 29th June, 1967. The Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 has been repealed and replaced by the U. P. Co- operative Societies Act (11 of 1966). Section 31 of U.P. Act t 11 of 1966) provides for the appointment of a secretary. It says that there shall be a secretary of every co-operative society, to be appointed and removable by the society subject to the pro- visions of the rules and the regulations framed under sections 121 and 122. Section 131 of the said Act provides that any co-operative society registered under the Co- operative Societies Act, 1912 or under any other law relating to co-operative societies in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh shall be deemed to be registered under this Act, and its bye-laws shall, so far as the same are not inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, continue in force until altered or rescinded according to the provisions of this Act. It further says that every co-operative society covered by sub-section (1) shall, within a period of one year from the date of coming into force of the Act, delete or amend such bye-laws as are inconsistent with the pro- visions of this Act and the Rules and shall make such further bye-laws as may be necessary having regard to the provisions of this Act and the Rules. On 5th February, 1968, Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1968 was promulgated. By section 2 of the said Order the following is added as sub- section (10) to section 131 of the Act : "(10) For so long as a Secretary is not appointed by a Society, in accordance with sub- section (1) of section 31 of this Act (a) where there is an officer already appointed by the Society, under its existing bye-laws to work as its Chief Executive Officer, whether designated as General Manager or Manager or by any other name, such officer shall be deemed to be the Secretary of the Society appointed in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 31 of this Act, and (b)............................................. 2. 2. The contention of the petitioner is that in view of the above noted provision of the Act as introduced by the Order he is to be deemed to be the Secretary of the Bank as envisaged by sub-section (1) of section 31 of the Act of 1966. His gravamen is that the Administrator, opposite party No. 1 who came to be appointed on supersession of the Board of Directors, prevents him from working as Secretary of the Bank. Accordingly the prayer in the petition is that the opposite parties, namely, the Administrator, Zilla Sahkari Bank Ltd., Unnao, the District Magistrate Unnao and Zilla Sahkari Bank Ltd., Unnao, through its Administrator, be directed to treat the petitioner as Secretary of the Bank and not to appoint any one as the Secretary of the Bank. 3. The petition is opposed by opposite parties 1 and 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on their behalf. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Chief Standing Council appearing for opposite parties 1 and 3. In view of clause (a) of sub-section (10) of section 131 of the Act as inserted by the Order of 1968 it is abundantly clear that an officer already appointed by the Society under its existing bye-laws to work as Chief Executive Officer, no matter what is his designation, is to be deemed to be the Secretary of the Society appointed in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 31 of the Act. It is also not in controversy that the petitioner was appointed Manager of the Bank, a registered society, on 8th October, 1963 and was subsequently confirm- ed on 29th June, 1967. The contention of the petitioner is that having regard to what is provided by bye-law No. 71 of the bye-laws, a copy of which is filed as Annexure I to the petition, it must be held that he was appointed by the Society to work as its Chief Executive Officer and hence, as provided in section 131 (10) (a) he is to be deemed to be the Secretary of the Society appointed in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 31 of the Act. As against that, the contention raised on behalf of the opposite parties is that having regard to what is provided in bye-law No. 69 it is the Managing Director who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Society and not tho petitioner who was appointed as Manager. It is not disputed that if the petitioner is held to be the Chief Executive Officer under the bye-laws then he would be covered by clause (a) to sub-section (10) of section 131 of the Act and would as such be deemed to be the Secretary of the Society appointed in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 31 of the Act for so long as a Secretary is not appointed by the Society in accordance with that provision. Thus, the controversy centres round, a short question as to whether or not having regard to what is provided in bye-laws 69 and 71 of the Bye-Laws (Annexure 1) the petitioner can be held to be the Chief Executive Officer of the Society within the meaning of that expression as used in clause (a) to sub-section (10) of section 131 of the Act. Bye-law No. 69 no doubt says that under the general supervision of the President the Managing Director will be "Mukhya Niyantrak and Prabandhak " and it shall be his primary responsibility to manage the Bank properly. Bye-law No. 71 says that under the supervision of the Managing Director the Manager shall be responsible for the discharge of all such functions as may be entrusted to him by the Board of Directors. Then it goes on to provide for the various functions which he shall discharge. The argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel is that having regard to the language of these two respective bye- laws (No. 69 and 71) there is no escape from the conclusion that it is the Managing. Director who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Society and not any other employee. It may be so. Still we have got to see as to what is the meaning of clause (a) to sub- section (10) of section 131 of the Act. It does not speak of the Chief Executive Officer to be determined as such with reference to the bye-laws of the Society. It may be so. Still we have got to see as to what is the meaning of clause (a) to sub- section (10) of section 131 of the Act. It does not speak of the Chief Executive Officer to be determined as such with reference to the bye-laws of the Society. On the other hand, it expressly refers to an officer appointed by the Society under its existing bye-laws to work as its Chief Executive Officer. Evidently, the Managing Director cannot fall under that description even though otherwise he may be the Chief Executive Officer. It is so for the simple reason that a Managing Director is not an officer appointed by the Society under its existing bye-laws. We have bye-law No. 49 to say as to how the Board of Directors is to be constituted. Then we have bye- law No. 68 of the Bye-laws (Annexure 1) to show as to how the Managing Director is elected. Having regard to these provisions it is impossible to say that a Managing Director even though otherwise he may be the Chief Executive Officer of the Society " is an officer............appointed by the Society under its existing bye-laws to work as its Chief Executive Officer." Once the Managing Director is excluded from consideration for the reason just mentioned there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner who was appointed in accordance with bye-law No. 71 would be covered by clause (a) to sub-section (10) of section 131 of the Act. I would accordingly uphold the contention of the petitioner to the extent that he is entitled to function as Secretary of the Society and be deemed to have been appointed as such in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 31 of U.P. Act (I1 of 1966) for so long as a Secretary is not appointed by the Society in accordance with that provision. 5. In the end, the petition is allowed in part and the opposite parties are directed not to interfere with the petitioner in his functions as Secretary for so long as a Secretary in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 31 of the Act is not appointed. Otherwise the petition is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.