JUDGMENT S.N. Dwivedi, J. - This revision comes to us on a reference by a learned single Judge. The applicants are the Vaish College Society, Shamli, the Executive committee of the said college and one Shri Salek Chand. The contesting opposite party is one Shri Lakshmi Narain. He instituted a suit against the applicants with the allegations that he was the duly appointed Principal of the Vaish Degree College, Shamli, and that the applicants were illegitimately trying to interfere with his acting as such. The suit was instituted in the court of the Munsif at Kairana. He claimed the following reliefs in the plaint: (1) The applicants should be restrained by a permanent injunction from interfering with the discharge of his duties as Principal of the College; (2) from acting on the resolutions dated March 12 and 29, 1967, terminating his service until they are approved by the Vice-Chancellor of the Meerut University; and (3) from appointing any one to perform the functions and duties of the Principal of the College. He also claimed another relief against the 4th defendant in his suit to the effect that the said defendant be restrained by a permanent injunction from acting as Principal of the College during the tenure of the plaintiff. For purposes of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court he valued the first set of reliefs at Rs. 1,000/- and the second set of relief also at Rs. 1,000/-. 2. In their written statement the applicants alleged that the suit was under-valued, and that when properly valued, it should be instituted in the court of the civil judge. The Munsif framed a preliminary issue regarding the correct valuation of the suit and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court. The issue was heard as a preliminary issue and decided against the applicants. Hence this revision. 3. As before the Munsif, so here also it has been strenuously urged before us that the correct valuation of the suit is muds more than Rs. 5,000/, The argument has been developed in this manner: On account of the reliefs claimed in the plaint, the case is covered by Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act as amended in this State. 5,000/, The argument has been developed in this manner: On account of the reliefs claimed in the plaint, the case is covered by Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act as amended in this State. Accordingly the valuation for purposes of the pecuniary jurisdiction should be the same as the valuation for purposes of paying court fees as provided for in Section 7 (iv-B) (b) of the Court Fees Act as amended in this State. According to the rules of the Institution, the Principal is entitled to keep supervision over the immovable properties of the College and certain funds. Admittedly, the value of the said properties is more than Rs. 10,000/-. The reliefs sought in the plaint involve or affect those properties. So the valuation for purposes of the pecuniary jurisdiction should be the admitted valuation of the said properties. 4. The Munsif did not accept this argument. We think he is right. 5. Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act, as amended in this State, provides that suits mentioned in Section 7 (iv-B)., Court Fees Act, shall be valued for purposes of jurisdiction "at the market value of the property involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought, or at the amount involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought." Section 7 (iv-B) (b) provides that the court fees payable in suits to obtain an injunction shall be according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The first proviso and the second Explanation to the section are material for our purpose. The first proviso prescribes that the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint shall not be less than 115th of the market value of the property "involved in or affected by the relief sought" or Rs. 200/- whichever is greater. Explanation 2 provides that in case of a suit to obtain an injunction, the property which is affected by the relief sought "shall be deemed to be the property involved in or affected by the relief sought within the meaning of the proviso." Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act and Section 7 (iv-B) (b) of the Court Fees Act are complimentary, and the crucial words in these sections should, we think, receive similar construction. It may be observed that these sections have two common expressions, namely, "involved in" and "affected by". Section 4 contains one more material expression, namely, "the title to which is affected by". The words "the relief sought" are to be read along with all these three expressions. The third expression is, however, not to be found in Section 7 (iv-B) . Counsel for the applicants has not urged that the plaint before us falls within the third expression His argument is that it is covered by either of the other two expressions, "involved in" and "affected by" the relief sought. 6. It may at once be noticed that there is a certain indeterminacy in the words "involved" and "affected". It is not possible to give them such an exhaustive meaning as will fit in with the changing patterns of cases. Each case should, we think, be decided on its own facts. We also think that these words will not cover a case where a property is remotely involved in or affected by the relief sought (compare the decisions under Section 110, Civil Procedure Code, and Article 133 (1) (b) of the Constitution) . Again, the true nature and character of the allegations in the plaint should be examined in order to determine whether any property is involved in or affected by the relief, sought, see In re. Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P. Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth v. Ram Charan, A.I.R. 1946 Oudh 61. 7. In the light of these considerations we shall now have to decide whether any property is involved in or affected by the reliefs sought in the instant case. We have briefly mentioned the allegations in the plaint and have already set out all the reliefs asked for therein. It appears to us from the allegations in the plaint that the subject-matter of dispute is not any property but the right of the plaintiff to act as the Principal of the College. The property of the College, indeed is vested in a Managing Body. Rule 5 of the Rules and Bye-laws of the Society (which have been shown to us) entrusts the control of the funds of the society and the management of its property to an Executive Committee. The Principal is an ex-officio member of the Committee. The property of the College, indeed is vested in a Managing Body. Rule 5 of the Rules and Bye-laws of the Society (which have been shown to us) entrusts the control of the funds of the society and the management of its property to an Executive Committee. The Principal is an ex-officio member of the Committee. Bye-law 3 provides that the Secretary-cum-Manager shall (1) receive all grants, contributions, donations and subscriptions, (2) arrange for the safe custody and investment of all properties and money, (3) administer and control the finances and (4) operate all accounts. He is made responsible for the management and administration of all property and money. Bye-law 13 deals with the duties of the Principal. He is made responsible for looking after all the College property. He also controls and administers all Boys Funds such as Games and Reading Room Funds. Rule 13 shows that he keeps supervision over College Property and controls certain Funds. It cannot be said that he is in possession of any property. In law it is the society which is really in possession over the buildings and has custody of the funds through the Secretary-Manager. As Principal, he has got no beneficial interest in the property of the College and the College funds. He is merely a paid employee of the College and performs certain duties of a merely ministerial nature with respect to the College property. The effective possession of property and control of funds is really vested in Manager and, through him, ultimately in the Managing Body of the Society which runs the College. Accordingly it cannot be said that any property is involved in or affected by the reliefs sought in the plaint. 8. Counsel for the applicants has relief on Bishambhar Nath v. Kr. Sri Prakash Singh, A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 405, In re. Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P. Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth v. Ram Charanl, Shanti Prasad v. Mahabir Singh, A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 402 and K.A.V. Karuppanna Nadar v. M.K. Mathalai Karuppa Nadar, A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 776. These cases do not help him for one reason or the other. The first case was a suit for declaration that certain villages were the subject of a public trust and not a private trust. It is obvious that the title to those villages would be affected by the relief sought. 776. These cases do not help him for one reason or the other. The first case was a suit for declaration that certain villages were the subject of a public trust and not a private trust. It is obvious that the title to those villages would be affected by the relief sought. In the second case the relief sought was an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's right to collect Tahbazari dues. As the Tahbazari right is a substantial right in land, the right to property was evidently affected by the relief sought. In the third case the main relief claimed in the plaint was for recovery of possession over a certain land and a house. The subject-matter was obviously property. The fourth case related to an institution. The plaintiff alleged in that case that the defendant was elected manager of the institution, that he did not discharge his duties properly, that in a meeting of the general body of all the per-sons in whom the ownership of the institution was vested the defendant was removed from the office of manager. that the general body appointed the plaintiff as the manager and that the defendant was refusing to hand over the management of the institution. The plaintiff prayed that the defendant should be declared to have been validly removed from the office of the manager, that the plaintiff should be declared to have been duly appointed as manager and that, as such, he alone was entitled to manage the school. He also asked for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from functioning as the manager. There was also a prayer that if need be, the plaintiff should be put in possession of the office of the manager. The suit was instituted in the Munsif's court. Following an earlier Division Bench decision Mr. Justice Somayya held that the- "right to the managership certainly affects the right to be in possession of and to manage the institution and its properties. Hence the value for the purpose of jurisdiction is the value of the properties affected." 9. As the properties were undoubtedly worth more than Rs. 15,000/- it was held that the suit did not lie in the Munsif's court. This case is distinguishable from ours for two reasons. Hence the value for the purpose of jurisdiction is the value of the properties affected." 9. As the properties were undoubtedly worth more than Rs. 15,000/- it was held that the suit did not lie in the Munsif's court. This case is distinguishable from ours for two reasons. Firstly, the dispute was in regard to the office of the manager who was vested with the right to possess and manage the property of the institution. Again, there was an alternative relief in the plaint that the plaintiff should be put in possession of the office of the manager. In those circumstances it was held that the properties were involved in or affected by the reliefs sought. In our case there is no dispute regarding the office of the manager. The relief relates to the office of the Principal. We have already pointed out that the effective control and management of the College property and funds is vested in the Secretary-Manager by the Rules and Bye-laws of the Society. The Principal performs duties of a ministerial nature in regard to the property and the funds. The plaintiff is still holding the office of the principal. He does not ask for a relief to be put in charge of the office of the Principal. Accordingly if the reliefs claimed are granted to him, the control and possession of any property will not be changed in any manner. The second distinguishing feature, which is not less important, is this. The decision is rested on an earlier Division Bench decision in Veeramma v. Marupudi Butchiah, A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 563. In that case the plaintiff claimed a declaration that her husband was the adopted son of one Rama Swami. Certain properties belonging to Rama Swami were alienated by the plaintiff. A certain person instituted a suit against the alienees for recovery of the said properties on the allegation that the plaintiff's husband was not the adopted son of Rama Swami. His suit was decreed. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted her suit for the foregoing declaration on the allegation that the alienees were threatening to enforce against her the indemnity clauses in their favour. As a cloud was cast on her title to the alienated property, she was compelled to institute the suit. These were the allegations in her plaint. The learned judges held that no provision of the Suits Valuation Act applied to the case. As a cloud was cast on her title to the alienated property, she was compelled to institute the suit. These were the allegations in her plaint. The learned judges held that no provision of the Suits Valuation Act applied to the case. They found that the case was governed by Section 12 of the Madras Civil Courts Act (akin to the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act) . Section 12 uses the expression "subject-matter of the suit." It was said that the subject-matter of the suit was the validity of the alleged adoption. Then they discussed certain cases of the Madras High Court and formulated two general principles. They are: (1) where the subject-matter of a suit is wholly unrelated to anything which can be readily stated in definite money terms, then the plaintiff, having to put some money value for purposes of jurisdiction, must put a more or less arbitrary value, and there being no factors in the case from which the court can say his valuation is wrong or dis-honest, the court will accept that valuation; (2) where the subject-matter is so related to things which have a real money value that the relief asked for will affect these, then the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction is to be taken as the market value of the property affected. When counsel for the plaintiff submitted that her plaint fell within the first principle the learned judges said : "There is a good deal to be said logically for this position, but clearly it has not been adopted in this Presidency as the law ........ The present case cannot therefore come under the first category, but must fall under the second, the valuation to be adopted for the purposes of jurisdiction being the actual market value of the property." (Italicised by us). 10. It may be noticed that the reliefs claimed in the plaint clearly affected the right to property. But that apart, the learned judges obviously preferred stare decisis to logic. There is no such conflict between logic and precedent with respect to the issue before us in our state see Sahu Madan Mohan v. Tej Ram George Coronation Hindu School Association, A.I.R. 1949 Alld. 207, Sri Thakur Sitaramji Maharaj v. Raghunath Das, A.I.R. 1944 Alld. 279 and Thakuri v. Brahma Narain, ILR 19 Alld. 60. 11. There is no such conflict between logic and precedent with respect to the issue before us in our state see Sahu Madan Mohan v. Tej Ram George Coronation Hindu School Association, A.I.R. 1949 Alld. 207, Sri Thakur Sitaramji Maharaj v. Raghunath Das, A.I.R. 1944 Alld. 279 and Thakuri v. Brahma Narain, ILR 19 Alld. 60. 11. In Smt. Rukmani Bai v. Joshi Ram Kishan Joshi Bhawani Shanker, A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 242, a person filed an application under Section 63, Lunacy Act, for an inquisition to be made that her husband was of unsound mind and was incapable of managing his affairs, and praying for the appointment of a guardian of his person and property. The District Judge who heard the application authorised the Court of Wards to manage his property. Then he filed an appeal in this Court. The appeal was allowed and the case was sent back to the District Judge for rehearing. The District Judge, after re-hearing, again held that the husband was a lunatic and was incapable of managing his property. Accordingly he directed the Court of Wards to take over his property and manage the same. On appeal this finding was reversed and the appeal was allowed. Then an application was made to the Court for a certificate to appeal to the Federal Court. It was urged that the appeal lay as of right under paragraph 2 of Section 110, civil procedure Code, for the case "involved" directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property valued at more than Rs. 10,000/-. Repelling this argument Mr. Chief Justice Malik said. "The only question for consideration by the District Judge is a question of the mental capacity of the so-called lunatic. No question of title to any property is involved and it cannot, therefore, be said that an order under the Lunacy Act affects, directly or indirectly, and claim to the property." 12. This case and the other cases of our Court already mentioned support the view which we have taken earlier. Accordingly we hold that no property is involved in or affected by the reliefs sought in the case before us. 13. In the end, it was pointed out on be-half of the applicants that the plaintiff drew a monthly salary of Rs. Accordingly we hold that no property is involved in or affected by the reliefs sought in the case before us. 13. In the end, it was pointed out on be-half of the applicants that the plaintiff drew a monthly salary of Rs. 900/-, but there is no provision in the Suits valuation Act linking the salary with the valuation of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction. Again, the monthly salary of Rs. 900/- is within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif. It is only when salary for six months or more has fallen due and is claimed in the plaint that will oust the jurisdiction of the Munsif. But in the absence of any provision in the Suits Valuation Act, why should salary for six months or more and not less than months be taken into account for purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif. The plaintiff has not claimed any arrears of salary in the suit. The reliefs claimed by him were incapable of valuation and he put a value on them according to his own choice. The valuation put by him will, in the circumstances of this case, be deemed to be the correct Valuation and will determine the forum. 14. The revision is accordingly dismissed with costs payable to the plaintiff