ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - The petitioner was an employee in the Development and Planning Department of the State Government as an Assistant Development Officer, Animal Husbandry, from 5th February 1960, as a temporary hand. In April 1936, he was working as such in the Muirpur Block in the District of Mirzapur. On 18th April 1964, the Minister for Agriculture visited that Block and made a note in the Visitors Register that he was pained to hear" (according to the respondents, "to know") of the working and procedure of that Block specially when no care was taken even when rinderpest (a disease of cattle) had Spread. The Agricultural Production Commissioner had also visited the Block. He made a long inspection note, of which only paragraph 4 has been quoted by the petitioner. In this paragraph, the Agricultural Production Com. missioner observed that Krishi Mantri had ordered that the services of the Assistant Development Officer (A. H.) a temporary hand be terminated forthwith. The petitioner states that in compliance with the verbal orders of the Minister for Agriculture, the Agricultural Production Commissioner directed the Deputy Director, Animal Husbandry, Varanasi, to issue orders terminating the petitioners services forthwith. Accordingly, on 20th April 1966, the Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry, Varanasi, issued the impugned order terminating the petitioners services. The order stated that the petitioners services were no longer required and were consequently terminated with immediate effect. It has been stated in the counter, affidavit that subsequently the order of termination was amended on 21st May 1966 and it was made clear that the petitioner was entitled to one months pay in lieu of one months notice. It has also been asserted that the petitioner accepted one months pay in lieu of notice on 17th February 1967. 2. For the petitioner, it has been urged that his services had been terminated in view of the developments consequent upon the visit of the Agriculture Minister. They indubitably show that the petitioner was visited with a penalty. Though the petitioner was a temporary hand, nonetheless he was entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. On the facts of the case, the petitioner was removed from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2), without complying with requirements of that Article. 3. They indubitably show that the petitioner was visited with a penalty. Though the petitioner was a temporary hand, nonetheless he was entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. On the facts of the case, the petitioner was removed from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2), without complying with requirements of that Article. 3. The visit of the Agriculture Minister may have occasioned the impugned order, but it is clear that there were no specific charges against the petitioner. The petitioners allegations that the Block Pramukh was inimically disposed towards the petitioner and that he whispered something against the petitioner in the ears of the Agriculture Minister have not been substantiated. These allegations have been denied in the counter-affidavit. No particulars or details of the alleged talk have been given; and a vagus assertion of this kind cannot, ex facie, be enough for a finding, when it has been denied. If the petitioner had made the Block Pramukh, against whom he has made an allegation, a party to the writ petition, he would have been in a position to state the truth. 4. It may be that after the inspection of the Minister and the Agricultural Production Commissioner, the officers were satisfied that the petitioner was not fit to be continued in service or to hold the post. But that would not necessarily be a reason for an imputation or allegation of any misconduct against the petitioner and taking action with a view to penalise or punish him. I am not satisfied that on facts it has been established that the respondents intended to punish the petitioner on account of any charges against him. 5. In Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, N. E. F. Railway, A.I.R. 1964 S C 600, in paragraph 14 of the judgment, the majority held that in regard to temporary servants, or servants on probation, every case of termination of service might not amount to removal. In cases falling under those categories, the terms of contract or service rules might provide for the termination of the service on notice of a specified period, or on payment of salary for the said period; and if in exercise of powers thus conferred on the employer, services of a temporary or probationary servant are terminated, it might not necessarily amount to removal. In every such case, courts examine the substance of the matter and if it was shown that the termination of service was no more than discharge simpliciter effected by virtue of the contract or the relevant rules, Article 311 (2) might not be applicable to such a case. If, however, the termination of the services of a temporary servant in substance represented a penalty imposed on him or a punitive action taken against him, then such termination would amount to removal and Article 311 would be attracted. For this view, reliance was placed by the Supreme Court upon its earlier decision in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, AIR 196 4 S C 449 and ether eases. In Jagdish Hitters ease, the Supreme Court emphasised that even while an enquiry was proceeding against the Government servant on specific charges of misconduct, it was open to the employer to drop the proceedings, and to exercise its powers under the contract of service or the relevant rules and terminate the services of temporary or probationary servants. The fact that the enquiry had commenced or was being taken would by itself be no ground to deprive the employer of his rights under the service contract or rules. 6. Thus, in either case, whether the work and conduct of a temporary employee is unsatisfactory, or his performance is such that the employer does not desire to retain him in service, it will not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the employer did not desire to exercise the contractual power, but wished to punish the employee on imputations of misconduct. In my opinion, the respondents as section that the services of the petitioner were terminated in exercise of the contractual power has not been displaced in the present case. It cannot, therefore, be said that the impugned order was not a discharge simpliciter but was an order of removal within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 7. In I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1967 S C 1264, the Supreme Court ruled that where there were no express words in the order itself which would throw any stigma on the Government servant, court could not look into the background resulting in the passing of such order in order to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred. That would be another ground, on which the petition would fail. That would be another ground, on which the petition would fail. 8. The other point taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner has also not appealed to me. It was urged that the impugned order was bad because it was contrary to the rules which provide that services of a temporary Government servant can be terminated only by giving him one months pay or notice in lieu thereof. No doubt, initially the order suffered from this defect, but subsequently when the order was amended by another order of May 21, 1966 wherein it was clearly stated that the petitioner would be entitled to one months pay in lieu of notice this defect became non-existent. The petitioners services would be deemed to have been terminated on that day. 9. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.