JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - These four appeals arise out of two suits instituted by Raj Narain and Kailash Narain plaintiffs of the two suits against Shiva Raj Saran and Prithivi Raj Saran defendants for their ejectment and arrears of rent. The allegations made in the two suits are almost indentical. 2. The case of two plaintiffs in their respective plaints was that Sahu Maharaj Narain their father owned a piece of land 100 ft. x 100 ft. by the side of Station Road, Moradabad. It was alleged that out of the aforsaid land land 78 ft. east-west x 100 ft. north south were let out to the defendants on 75th July 1947 at the monthly rent of Rs. 100/- for a period of eleven months for the purpose of running a Tall. This land according to the plaintiffs was on the western side of 100 ft. x 100 ft. land belonging to Sahu Maharaj Narain. It was alleged that remaining portion of the aforsaid land measuring 22 ft. east-west and 100 ft. north-south along with the construction thereon was given to the defendants by Sahu Maharaj Narain on license and it was agreed between the licensor and the linsenees that the licensees would vacate the land along with the construction whenever Sahu Maharaj Narain world ask them to do so and that the licensees were not entitled to any notice. So far as the portion which was leased out was concerned it was alleged to,have been given on monthly rent according to the English calendar and the tenancy was to end with the last date of the month. It was further alleged in the plaint that under a decree in suit No. 27 of 1956 of the Court of Civil Judge, Moradabad, the land in suit (i.e. 100 ft. x 100 ft.) was partitioned and the northern half share fell in the share of Plaintiff Raj Narain and the southern half fell in the share of his brother Kailash Narain. It was asserted that the two plaintiffs after the partition became owners of their respective portions and thereafter the defendants entered into separate contract of tenancy and agreed to pay rent to each of the plaintiffs to the tune of Rs. 50/- per month. The plaintiffs alleged that the terms of the tenancy were reduced to writing on 10th August 1947. 50/- per month. The plaintiffs alleged that the terms of the tenancy were reduced to writing on 10th August 1947. It was alleged that the permission which had been given to the defendants in respect of 22 ft. wide land was revoked and that the plaintiffs through notice dated 16th August, 1963 asked the defendants to quit although it was not necessary to serve them with such a notice in view of the terms of the lease. Further allegations in the two plaints were that the land in dispute did not come within the definition of 'accommodation' as contemplated by Act III of 1947 which was not applicable to the land in dispute. The plaintiffs also prayed for the recovery of the arrears of rent and damages. It was alleged that since defendants did not vacate the disputed land nor paid the arrears, hence the suits. 3. Defendant Prithivi Raj Saran contested the suit and pleaded that his father Shiv Raj Saran had great faith in Sahu Maharaj Narain. He gave blank stamp paper to him and it appeared that a lease deed had been got prepared on those stamp papers. He denied his signature on the lease deed which had been referred to in the Plaint. It was pleaded that the tenancy started from 17th August, 1946 on the basis of a Keravanama executed on that date for a monthly rent of Rs. 501- for the entire accommodation in dispute and subsequently the rent was raised to Rs. 100/- per month. It was asserted that the property in suit was accommodation to which Rent Control and Eviction Act applied as such no suit for possession could be maintained without the permission of District Magistrate. It was further asserted that the notices given by the plaintiffs of the respective suits were also invalid. 4. The learned Munsif on the pleadings of the parties framed relevant issues and came to the conclusion that the defendants had been in possession over the 22 ft. x 50 ft. land of both the suits as licensees and that the property In dispute except the Kothri d;d not come within the definition of 'an accommodation' as contemplated by Act III of 1947. x 50 ft. land of both the suits as licensees and that the property In dispute except the Kothri d;d not come within the definition of 'an accommodation' as contemplated by Act III of 1947. It was further held that the defendants had made their construction upon the land in dispute with the consent of Sahu Maharaj Narain but they were bound to remove their constructions under the terms of the rent deed dated 10th August. 1947. The learned Munsif however found that the notices served on the defendant were invalid and did not terminate the tenancy of the land described in Schedule 'A' of both the suits. Having arrived at the above findings the learned Munsif decreed the suit for recovery of arrear, of rent and damages of the tune of Rs. 503, 50 P in one suit and for recovery of 581.50 P in the other The suit for recovery of possession over the Portion which was alleged to have been given on licence was also decreed but the suit for recovery of possession over the leased land was dismissed. 5. Plaintiff Raj Narain had filed Original suit No. 44 of 1964 whereas plaintiff Kailash Narain had filed Original suit No. 73 of 1964. Against the two decisions of these two suits given by the trial court, four appeals were filed before the lower appellate court. Two appeals were filed by the plaintiffs Raj Narain and Kailash Narain against the judgment of the Munsif dismissing their claim whereas the defendant Prithivi Raj Saran filed two appeals against the portion of the judgment which went against the defendants with the result that there were four appeals before the lower appellate court. All the four appeals were disposed of by a common judgment. 6. The learned Civil Judge did not accent the decision of the Munsif holding the defendants to be licensees of 22 ft. x 100 ft. According to the learned Civil Judge the defendants were lessees of the entire 100 ft. X 100 ft. He held that he lease dated 25th July 1947 referred to in the plaint was inadmissible in evidence being unregistered He accepted the defence contention that the defendants were holding over the property in dispute as a tenant on the basis of Kerayanama dated 17th August, 1946. X 100 ft. He held that he lease dated 25th July 1947 referred to in the plaint was inadmissible in evidence being unregistered He accepted the defence contention that the defendants were holding over the property in dispute as a tenant on the basis of Kerayanama dated 17th August, 1946. He further held that the property in dispute was covered by the definition of the word 'accommodation' given in the Rent Control and Eviction Act as such Rent Control and Eviction Act applied and no permission having been taken from the District Magistrate the suit for possession could not be decreed. The learned Civil Judge also affirmed the decision of the Munsif about the invalidity of the notices served in the two suits. In the result the learned Civil Judge dismissed both the suits for possession and in modification of the decree of the trial court decreed the suit No. 44 of 1964 filed by Raj Narain for the recovery of Rs. 275.50 P as arrears of rent and the claim for damages was refused. Similarly Suit No. 73 of 1964 filed by Kailash Narain was decreed for the recovery of Rs. 337.50 P as rent and the rest of the claim was refused. 7. Aggrieved with the decisions of the lower appellate court in the four appeals mentioned above these four appeals have been filed by the platntiffs Raj Narain and Kailash Narain of the two suits mentioned above. 8. Sri V.P. Misra learned counsel for the appellants in these appeals does not dispute the finding of the lower appellate court that the defendants were lessees of the entire property in dispute. He does not press his case as set up in the plaint about license. He has submitted that the decisions of the two courts below holding the notices of termination of the lease as invalid, is erroneous in law and that the notices served on the defendants clearly show that the plaintiffs had asked the defendants to quit the premises in dispute and had demanded possession from them. He relied on a decision of this court in Ram Chandra v. Lala Duli Chand, AIR 1958 Allahabad 729, in support of his contention. He relied on a decision of this court in Ram Chandra v. Lala Duli Chand, AIR 1958 Allahabad 729, in support of his contention. It was next argued by Mr Misra that the lower appellate court has erred in holding that the property in dispute is covered by the word "accommodation" as defined in the Rent Control and Eviction Act did not apply to the facts of the present case. In support of this contention he relied on the case of T.K. Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quillon District Court, A.I.R. 1953 Tr. Co. 205 and Nagamony Kumarswamy v. S Thiruchittambalam, A.I.R. 1953 Tr. Co. 369. Alternatively he argued that even if his above contention is not accepted since the property in dispute was partitioned amongest the two plaintiffs Raj Narain and Kailash Narain, Raj Narain got the northern half share in which there was no construction at all as such so far as the property in suit No. 44 of 1964 concerned it could not by any stretch of argument be held to be an accommodation as defined in the Rent Control and Eviction Act hence at least the suit of Raj Narain should be decreed for ejectment of the defendants. 9. As against these submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant Sri Gyan Prakash learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the notice terminating the lease was invalid inasmuch as the plaintiff has not determined the tenancy as contemplated by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel placed reliance on the case of Ahmed Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin, AIR 1963 Allahabad 581. He contended that in a case which was covered by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, notice to quit cannot determine the tenancy. He further submitted that the lower appellate court was right in holding that the Rent Control and Eviction Act applied to the facts of the present case. He argued that the lease was in respect of a building and land appurtenant to it. Reliance was placed on ext. He further submitted that the lower appellate court was right in holding that the Rent Control and Eviction Act applied to the facts of the present case. He argued that the lease was in respect of a building and land appurtenant to it. Reliance was placed on ext. A. 9 and it was submitted that although originally there was only one Kothri on the disputed site but during the continuance of the lease with the materials supplied by the landlord the tenant had made other constructions over two-third portion of the leased land as such the suit related to an accoommdation as defined in the Rent Control and Eviction Act. It was contended that it in any case the Kothri which was the subject matter of the original lease was covered by the definition of the word "accommodation" and the suit in respect of the Kothri and the land appurtenant to the Kothri could not be decreed. He also submitted that the alternative casc of the appellant that in any case suit of the plaintiff Raj Narain should not be accepted in as much as the attotnment referred on behalf of the appellant was at best an attorntuent by one of the tenants and such an attornaient could not bring about an end of the original tenancy which had been entered into between the landlord and the two tenants Prithvi Raj Saran and Shiv Raj Saran. Learned counse' invited the attention the Court to the case of Chanda Lal v. Ram Kishan, AIR 1952 Allahabad 607, which lays down that "the word 'building' which is the key word in the definition of the accommodation contained in Section 2 (A) Connotes a roof structure within the meaning of the Act. Any compound or enclosure which is not appurtenant to any roofed structure cannot be considered to be accommodation within the meaning of the Act. 10. By parity of reason he submitted that the compound or enclosure which is appurtenant to any roofed structure will be accommodation within the meaning of the Act. Learned Counsel distinguished the case of Nogamony Kumaraswamy v. Thiruchittambalam, and submitted that the definition of the word "house" contained in the Travencore Rent Control Order was different from the word "accommodation" used in the Rent Control and Eviction Act. He argued that admittedly in the present case the 1949 Kerayanama Ext. Learned Counsel distinguished the case of Nogamony Kumaraswamy v. Thiruchittambalam, and submitted that the definition of the word "house" contained in the Travencore Rent Control Order was different from the word "accommodation" used in the Rent Control and Eviction Act. He argued that admittedly in the present case the 1949 Kerayanama Ext. A-I indicated that two things were let out, viz the Kothri and the land-Kothri being 13 ft x 10 ft out of the total area of 100 ft x 100 ft was a substantial portion. According to the learned counsel, the Kothri which was part of the tenancy must be governed by the Rent Control and Eviction Act. He pointed out that the access to the Kothci was only from the open land in front of it towards west. Therefore at least some part of the land must be appurtenant to it. He further submitted that in any case the Kothri and land appurtenant to the Kothri must be held to the accommodation and suit in respect of the Kothri and land appurtenant to it in no way can succeed. He further argued that the plaintiff having set up the case of license should not be allowed to succeed on the case of tenancy which was never set up by him. He should not be permitted to succeed on a new case. )Reliance was placed on cases of Salig Ram v. Munshi Ram, A.I.R. 1961 S C. 1374 para. 4 and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paul Avira, A.I.R. 1959 S. C. 91 para. 34. 11. I have considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and in my opinion the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants have force and should be accepted. Before dealing with the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants it is necessary to dispose of the objection of the learned counsel for the respondents to the effect that the case of the plaittiffs in respect of a portion of the property in dispute based on license having been negatived by the lower appellate court and that position having been conceded by the learned counsel for the appellants, the suit should be dismissed. True it is that the plaintiffs appellants in the present case came to Court on the allegation that a portion of the property in dispute was leased out to the defendants. True it is that the plaintiffs appellants in the present case came to Court on the allegation that a portion of the property in dispute was leased out to the defendants. The defence contention has been accepted by the lower appellate court. Even on the acceptance of the defence contention if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief claimed in my opinion the relief cannot be refused. The two Supreme Court cases relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The present case in my opinion is covered by the principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandra Mauli, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735-1966 A.L.J. 799, wherein the Supreme Court approved a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Abdul Ghani v. Mt. Babni, I.L.R. 25 All, 256. In this Full Bench case plaintiff had asked for the ejectment of the defendant on the ground that defendant was the tenant of the premises but failed to prove the tenancy set up but the Court allowed the ejectment of the defendant on the ground that although the tenancy was not proved it was established that the possession of the defendant was that of a licensee. Similarly in the case before me although the defendants have not been held to be lesses of a part but have been held to be lesses of the entire property in dispute still if the plaintiffs have validly terminated the tenancy they should be held to be entitled to the relief of ejectment claimed by them. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent mentioned above cannot be accepted. 12. Now I proceed to deal with the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. The first point that needs consideration is as to whether the notices served in the two cases are valid are terminated the tenancy in respect of the entire property in dispute or not. A glance over the notice sent by the plaintiffs would show that the plaintiffs had through the notices asked the defendants to quit the premises in depute and to hand over possession to the plaintiffs failing which suit for ejectment would be bled. The contents of these notices clearly show that they clearly directed the defendants to vacate and quit the premises in dispute. The contents of these notices clearly show that they clearly directed the defendants to vacate and quit the premises in dispute. The contents of the notices in my opinion clearly show the intention of the plaintiffs, and the notices can safely be accepted to be covered by Section 111 (h), Transfer of Property Act, which reads as follows : ''111. A lease of immoveable property determines - * * * (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of Intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other." It is clear from the above that a notice to quit also determines the tenancy. The question of the determination of the tenancy by a notice to quit was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Chandra v. Lala Dulichand and in similar circumstances it was held that a notice to quit did determine the the tenancy of the defendant in that case. The above decision fully spports the contention of Sri V. P. Misra, learned counsel for the appellants the decision referred to in the judgment of the lower appellate court and relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents in Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin, does not help him. In this case the notice which had been served on the defendant was held to be a valid notice, but while considering that case it was observed that a notice terminating the tenancy may include a demand for possession but a notice only demanding possession cannot be interpreted as a notice terminating the tenancy. This observation in the case which way: not necessary to decide that case is in the nature of obiter. The precise point which is before me was considered in the case of Ram Chandra v. Lala Dulichand referred to above and it is a clear decision in favour of the appellants and is binding on me sitting singly. In view of this Division Bench case this has to be held that the decisions of the two courts below holding the notices to be invalid has to be set aside the decisions of the two courts below on this point. 13. In view of this Division Bench case this has to be held that the decisions of the two courts below holding the notices to be invalid has to be set aside the decisions of the two courts below on this point. 13. The next point to be considered in this case is as to whether the property in dispute is 'accommodation' its defined in the Rent Control and Eviction Act. This is an undisputed fact that the property in dispute is 100 ft. X 100 ft land in which there is a Kothri in one corner. This is admitted by the defendants' witnesses that this Kothri is being used by the Chaukidar of the defendants who looks after the timber business of the defendants. This is clear from the evidence on the record that me defendants took the premises in dispute for the purposes of doing timber business. The word 'accommodation' has been defined in the Rent Control and Eviction Act, as follows :- (a) "Accommodation" means residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building and includes - (i) gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building ; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building ; (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. 14. But does not include any accommodation used as a factory or for an industrial purpose where the business cartted on, in or upon the building is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. In view of the above definition it is a building or a part of the building used for residential or now residential purposes and the land appurtenant to the building which can be held to be accommodation. If the letting is in respect of the open land which is not appurtenant to any building, it may not be covered by the definition of the word 'accommodation'. If the letting is in respect of the open land which is not appurtenant to any building, it may not be covered by the definition of the word 'accommodation'. On the facts of the present case it is clear that the open land which was leased out to the defendants was not appurtenant to the Kothri which was situate in the corner of the land leased out, rather it can safely be said that the small Kothri which was in a corner of that land may be treated as appurtenant to the land itself. Building including the land appurtenant to the building may be accommodation but open land which has been leased out in which on a minor portion there is a Kothri cannot be termed to be an "accommodation" as contemplated by the Rent Control and Eviction Act. 15. In this case the rent deed of the year 1946 Ex A-1 clearly shows that what was let out to the defendants was a piece of land over which stood certain trees of the lesiar and a small room called Nashishtagah, was also there. Subsequently the two plaintiffs partitioned the properties amongst themselves, the defendant Prithiviraj Saran addressed two letters to the respective plaintiffs in which he wrote as follows :- ''jo ki zamin hamare pas lakri ke tal Shriman Sahu Maharaj Narain Jr ki keraye ki hai uske bare men Sahu Maharaj Narain Sahib se hamen ittila mili hai ki uski adhi zamin uttar ki tarafwali yani Saroj Talkies ke bagalwali ap ke hisse men at hai main taslim karts hun ki pahli September 1959 se apso keraya yani 50/- rupaya hamwar diya karon ga Kerayanama ap ke nam pichhle kerayanama ke anusar likh donga." 16. The above was the letter written by Prithivi Raj Saran to Raj Narain. Similar letter was written to Kailash Narain by Prithivi Raj Saran as well. These are Exts. 3 and 4 on the record. These two Letters as well as the Ext. A-1 the Kerayanama clearly show that primary intention of the lessor was to lease out the open land and the Kothri situate in that open land was also given for the use of the lessee. The lessee appears to have taken the land for his timber business along with the small room standing thereon which he used for the residence of his Chaukidar. The lessee appears to have taken the land for his timber business along with the small room standing thereon which he used for the residence of his Chaukidar. On the facts of this case it is clear to me that what was leased out was land to which a Kothri was appurtenant. In such a case I am of opinion that there is no letting of accommodation as contemplated by the Rent Control and Eviction Act. This view of mine is supported by the cases of T. K. Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quilon District Court and Nagamony Kumaraswamy v. S. Thiruchittambalam as well as of Israrul Haq v. Seth Sridhar Lal and Sheikh Kalloo, 1952 A.L.J. 106 Summary of cases. 17. It was contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents that the Travencore. Cochin cases are distinguishable. In as much as the definition of 'accommodation' as found in our Act is not the same as in the Travencore-Cochin Act. I find that in the case of T.K. Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quilon District Court, definition of the word 'building' has been given at page 207 which reads as follows :- (1) 'Building' means any building or hut or part of building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes, and includes - (a) the garden, ground and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut and let or to be let with-such building or hut, (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house." This definition shows that there is not much defference although there is no doubt a slight difference but the principle of law enuniated in that case can safely be relied on in coming to the conclusion about the word' accommodation' in our Rent Control and Eviction Act. In the case of T.K. Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quilon District Court, it was held with reference to the word 'building' used in that Act that ''Where the lease deed states that what is leased out is the garden land together with all the building, sheds etc standing thereon the land does not come within the scope of the word 'building' as used in the Travencore-Cochin Building "Lease and Rent Control Order 1950". To the same effect is other case viz. Nagamoney Kumaraswamy v. S. Thiruchittambalam. In the case of Irrarul Haq v. Seth Girdhar Lal and Sheikh Kalloo, it was held ''where what has been leased is not the building as such but it Is the Cinema business to which the building is treated as appurtenant, then it is not a type of lease which is covered by the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947." Thus from the cases referred to above it can safely be inferred that if land is leased out and a small Kothri is appurtenant to the land the letting would not be of an accommodation. 18. To was argued on behalf of the defendants that Ext. A-9 receipt granted by Sahu Maharaj Narain showed that rent was charged not only of the land but also one room with certain tin shed that had been constructed on the land. The subsequent construction on the land cannot convert the lease which was not originally a lease about accommodation into a lease for accommodation. It cannot be disputed that if the original lease is in respect of the land only and thereafter certain constructions were made on the leased land it will not be converted into a lease of an accommodation, vide. Mohd. Sami v. Shrimati Savitri Devi, 1957 A.L.J. 435. 19. It was next argued that in some of the receipts issued by Sahu Maharai Narain he had used the word 'premises' and granted receipt for premises as such it should be inferred that the lease was in respect of an accommodation. This argument of the learned counsel has not appealed to me. The word 'premises' does not necessarily mean 'building'. It may be building' or even 'open land'. The word 'premises' was used in the authority cited by the learned counsel for the defendants respondents himself in the case of Chanda Lal v. Ram Krishan. This argument of the learned counsel has not appealed to me. The word 'premises' does not necessarily mean 'building'. It may be building' or even 'open land'. The word 'premises' was used in the authority cited by the learned counsel for the defendants respondents himself in the case of Chanda Lal v. Ram Krishan. wherein letting was held to be not about an accommodation. Nevertheless the letting was termed to be letting of premises. The word 'premises' was used at various places in this reported case relied on the defendants respondent. Thus by the mere use of the word 'premises' in some of the receipts it cannot be argued that what was let out to the defendants was an accommodation. Disagreeing with the views of the lower appellate court on this point I hold that the letting in the two cases was not in respect of an accommodation but was a lease of open land to which the Kothri was appurtenant in this view of the matter the Rent Control and Eviction Act cannot be held applicable to the facts of the two suits before me. 20. In view of my decision on the two points argued by the learned counsel for the appellants it is clear that the plaintiffs of the two suits are entitled to succeed. As such I do not consider it necessary to decide that third point about attornment raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. At the same time it cannot be said that the argument advanced on the third point has no force. 21. For the reasons given above, these appeals succeed. The decisions of the two courts below refusing the relief of ejetment are hereby set aside. The plaintiffs' suits for ejectment from the property in dispute in both the suits are hereby decreed. The plaintiff Raj Narain in Suit No. 44 of 1964 is entitled to recover Rs. 275.50 P as arrears of rent and damages due till the date of the institution of quit No. 44 of 1964 whereas apneliant Kalish Narain in Suit No. 73 of 1964 will he entitled to recover Rs. 337.50 P as arrears of rent and damages due till the date of the Suit No. 73 of 1964. Thereafter the plaintiffs of the two suits will he entitled to recover at the rate of Rs. 337.50 P as arrears of rent and damages due till the date of the Suit No. 73 of 1964. Thereafter the plaintiffs of the two suits will he entitled to recover at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month in their respective suits till the date of the recovery of possession subject to the payment of necessary court-fees in the execution department. The defendants, however, are allowed 'to remain in occupation for period of six months from today on payment of Rs. 50/- per month as damages for use and occupation of the property of each snit for these six months. In the particular circumstances of this care, the plaintiffs-appellants will get half of the costs of this Court.