ORDER Shiv Dayal, J. 1. This is a complaint under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act by Shri S.R. Agrawal, Civil Judge, 2nd Class, and Magistrate 1st Class, Ambah, for taking action against Shri Gulzarilal, Shri Hardayal, Shri Atul Arvind Kamthan and Shri Devendra Tyagi,(hereinafter called the respondents). All the four are Advocates practising at Ambah, within the judicial district of Bhind. 2. It is alleged in the complaint that Shri Agrawal (hereinafter called the petitioner) has been a judicial officer since 14 December 1952 and has been the Civil Judge 2nd Class and Magistrate 1st Class at Ambah, since 14 June 1965. All the respondents are influential persons of Ambah town and Tahsil. The petitioner received copies of three complaints from the District Judge, Bhiod, with a demi-official letter dated 13 July 1967. These copies have been filed along with the complaint. The first one is a complaint dated 22 June 1967 addressed to the High Court and the District Judge, Bhind, while the second is a complaint dated 11 July 1967 addressed to the District Judge, Bhind. (They will hereinafter be referred to as annexure 1 and annexure 2, respectively). The petitioner contends that in those complaints allegations of "dishonesty, unfairness, favouritism, misbehaviour and illegal judicial work" have been made against him, which allegations are per se defamatory; they further amount to contempt of Court. They contain allegations in respect of pending and disposed of cases. The allegations are: "Scandalous, unwarranted, defamatory, contemptuous and have been made relating to character, conduct and judicial and legal ability of the complainant and have been made to obstruct and interfere in the course of justice and due and proper administration of law for the personal motive of the accused persons". The petitioner further adds that : "These allegations tend to create distrust in the popular mind and impair confidence of people in my Court. These allegations tend to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability and fairness of the complainant and they have caused embarrassment in my mind in the discharge of my judicial duties". The petitioner asserts that all the adverse allegations against him in those complaints are false, baseless and have been made and published intentionally and mala fide. The petitioner asserts that all the adverse allegations against him in those complaints are false, baseless and have been made and published intentionally and mala fide. It is also averred that the complaints being typed ones must have been got typed by 'others, and that they were sent without confidential covers. It is further alleged that the respondents personality spoke to the District Judge, Bhind, on the 6th and 7th July on the telephone from Ambah Post Office in the presence of Post Office staff. The District Judge visited Ambah on 11 July 1967 and held an enquiry against the petitioner and recorded statements of all the four respondents and some other members of the Bar Association, Ambah. It is then alleged that the respondents themselves gave wide publicity to the complaints in the Ambah town and through their registered clerks and agents with the result that when the District Judge arrived in the Court at Ambah, there were about 300 persons in the Court precincts. The petitioner says that according to his information, the matter of those complaints became the talk of the Ambah town long before 11 July 1967. 3. The learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, contended that contempt of Court has been committed: (1) in the complaints themselves, which were sent to the High Court and the District Judge; (2) by getting them typed by others; (3) by speaking to the District Judge on the telephone; and (4) by, otherwise, giving publicity to the contents of the complaints. 4. The third annexure is a copy of an anonymous complaint addressed to the Honourable the Chief Justice. In their reply, the respondents have disowned any connection with this anonymous complaint. They have expressed their complete ignorance of it and have said so in their affidavits. We have no reason to disbelieve them. Thus, annexure 3 goes out of the picture. 5. Before we deal with the question whether annexures 1 and 2 constitute contempt of Court of Shri S.R. Agrawal, we would dispose of the other contentions first. The respondents have, in their return, admitted that they sent the two complaints (annexures 1 and 2) to the High Court and the District Judge but they took all necessary steps to treat the same strictly confidential and avoided publicity in regard to their contents. They were sent in properly closed envelopes by registered post. The respondents have, in their return, admitted that they sent the two complaints (annexures 1 and 2) to the High Court and the District Judge but they took all necessary steps to treat the same strictly confidential and avoided publicity in regard to their contents. They were sent in properly closed envelopes by registered post. The envelopes were addressed to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice (not to the Registrar) and to the District and Sessions Judge. They say that it was never their intention to injure the interests of the public or to lower the authority of the Court in any manner whatever. They have denied that their statements in the said representations were made to create an apprehension in the mind of the public regarding the administration of justice by the Court of Civil Judge (Class II) and Magistrate 1st Class, Ambah, in contradistinction to the petitioner in his individual and personal capacity. They deny that they got the complaints typed by any stranger. They assert that the representations were kept strictly confidential. They deny that they gave any publicity to the contents of their representations. They say that telephone calls were booked to the District Judge merely to fix an appointment to seek interview with him. On the 6th July, the District Judge was not available on the telephone. On the 7th July, the District Judge gave an appointment for the 8th July; and, accordingly the respondents saw the District Judge on the 8th July at his residence at Bhind. At the time of this interview, no one else was present. 7. In our opinion, the allegations made by the petitioner that publicity was given to the contents of the complaint has no basis. The petitioner has filed two affidavits but, it is remarkable, in neither of them does he make any statement about publicity of annexure 1 or annexure 2. In either of the affidavits, (1) he does not say who typed the annexures; (2) he does not say that the annexures were not sent in confidential covers; (3) he does not name a single individual to whom the respondents or any of them disclosed either the contents of the annexures or even the fact of their having sent them to higher authorities : (4) he does not say what the respondents spoke to the District Judge on the telephone. In a word, his affidavits are silent about his allegations that secrecy was not observed about the representations made by the respondents to his superior authorities. He has not given the name of a single individual who came to know either the contents of, or the fact of, making, the representations. Mere presence of 300 persons in the Court precincts is not by itself indicative of anything. If it was connected with 'the visit of the District Judge their presence could be for various reasons, for instance, as a matter of curiosity, or to see him for any purpose. Even supposing they came to see the District Judge to complain against the petitioner, there is nothing to show (and the petitioner does not disclose in the complaint the basis for his supposition) that all those 300 persons were, or any of them was, aware of the contents of the annexures. That the annexures were got typed by others is also a mere guess of the petitioner. Similarly, the petitioner has not positively alleged that on the telephone the respondents or any of them repeated to the District Judge the contents of the annexures. It is also not probable that having sent the complaint to the District Judge, the respondents would read out on the telephone the whole or any part of their complaint. Each one of the respondents has filed a separate affidavit in support of their joint return, in which they have specifically denied the petitioner's averments regarding publicity. The petitioner has not reiterated those averments in either of his affidavits, We disbelieve and reject those averments made by him in the complaint to this Court. 8. Having thus disposed of the other contentions of the learned Deputy Government Advocate, we would now consider the question whether sending of the annexures constitutes contempt of Court. 9. Annexure 1, which is a complaint in the form of an application to High Court, makes a larger number of allegations which indicate that the petitioner is not impartial, that he shows favour to some legal practitioners that he is dishonest that his behaviour in the Court is not in accordance with its dignity, and that in weak cases bribe is actually demanded. The relief sought in the application is that an open enquiry be made and he should be removed or transferred. The relief sought in the application is that an open enquiry be made and he should be removed or transferred. More or less to the same effect is the complaint made to the District Judge in annexure 2. It is not necessary to reproduce verbatim the contents of the annexures. 10. The respondents say in their return that the representations in annexure 1 and annexure 2 are based on facts and are well founded. They say that they fully realise the gravity of the matter contained in the representations, but it was never their intention to injure the interests of the public or to lower the authority of the Court in the administration of justice in any manner. They say that it is their sacred duty as members of the legal profession to bring it to the notice of the Chief Justice and the District and Sessions Judge to whom the petitioner is subordinate and who are competent to redress their grievances, that the working of the petitioner is wholly contrary to law and/or public good. They say that they never attempted to expose the petitioner before the public and that they took all possible care to keep the matter strictly confidential and never gave any publicity to it. They emphasise in their return that in the interest of purity of judicial administration it is essential that the grievances they have placed before the superior officers of the petitioner were fully considered and the petitioner was not allowed to thwart the same by threat under the Contempt of Courts Act. 11. Contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice or dignity of a Court. (See 17 C.J.S.I). A Criminal contempt is conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the Court or a Judge acting judicially. It was laid down in The Queen Vs. Gray (1900) 2 QBD 36,40 :- "Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court. That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court. That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord Hard wicke L.C. characterised as 'scandalising a Court or a Judge' In re Read and Huggonson (1742) 2 Atk. 201, 469. That description of that class of contempt is to be taken subject to one and an important qualification Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court. The law ought not to be astute in such cases to criticise adversely what under such circumstances and with such an object is published; but it is to be remembered that in this matter the liberty of the press is no greater and no less than the liberty of every subject of the Queen". In King Vs. Davies (1906) 1 KB 32, 40, the fundamental principle was stated thus :- "What then is the principle which is the root of and underlines the cases in which persons have been punished for attach upon Courts and interferences with the due execution of their orders? It will be found to be, not the purpose of protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court from a repetition of them, but of protecting the public, and especially those who, either voluntarily or by compulsion, are subject to its jurisdiction, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal be undermined or impaired". It was said in B. Rama Krishna Reddy Vs, State of Madras, 1952 SCR 425 that defamatory statements about the conduct of a Judge even in respect of his judicial duties do not necessarily constitute contempt of Court. It is only when the defamation is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of justice that it amounts to a contempt. 12. It is a contempt of Court to scandalise the Court itself or to say something against the dignity of a Judge by attributing to him dishonesty or impropriety or in competency. 12. It is a contempt of Court to scandalise the Court itself or to say something against the dignity of a Judge by attributing to him dishonesty or impropriety or in competency. The rejection on the Court imputing dishonesty, unfairness or ignorance is regarded as contempt. (See Advocate General Vs. Sheshagiri Rao, AIR 1966 AP 167 . The law in our country punishes contempt of Court for conduct which tends to bring the administration of justice in disrespect, or to obstruct or interfere with the due administration of justice. Vivian Bose, J. succinctly observed in Sub-Judge, Hoshangabad Vs. Jawahar Lal, 24 MPLC 293 = AIR 1940 Nag 407:- "Judges have to discharge responsible and often disagreeable duties and it is essential that they should be afforded the utmost protection if the administration of justice is to remain independent, clean, fearless, unbiased and impartial". See also In re Bholanath AIR 1961 Pat 1 . A contemnor cannot successfully plead the truth of his allegations when he is charged with contempt of Court by scandalising the Court itself. No evidence can be allowed to prove the truth of the allegations. On the contrary, such an attempt would itself be a fresh com tempt. (See Advocate General Vs. D. Sheshagiri Rao ILR 1959 AP 1262. Mens rea is not a necessary constituent of contempt. Lack of intention or knowledge is only material in relation to the penalty which the Court may inflict. To say to a Judge that he is a prejudiced Judge or to impute unfairness to him is contempt of Court. (See B.K. Lala Vs. R.C Dutt AIR 1967 Cal 153 . Having regard to the social and economic conditions of the public in India, it would be very dangerous to grant them the liberty of scandalising the Court in an unbridled manner. But it is settled law that even in our country, fair and bona fide criticism of the judicial acts of the Court may be immune. Every criticism or statement defamatory of a Judge is not contempt of Court. The nature and the circumstances under which the allegations are made, the extent and the character of the publication and similar other considerations have to be taken into account in order to determine whether the act complained of amounts to contempt. No action is called for, if the criticism is reasonable and is offered for the public good. The nature and the circumstances under which the allegations are made, the extent and the character of the publication and similar other considerations have to be taken into account in order to determine whether the act complained of amounts to contempt. No action is called for, if the criticism is reasonable and is offered for the public good. A line must be drawn between a well placed discussion and a sneering remark casting reflection upon the Court. Temperate criticism in good faith is immune. Merely because a statement against a Judge amounts to a libel, it does not necessarily amount to contempt of Court. 13. In Ambard Vs. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago 1936 AC 322, Lord Atkin, said thus:- "But whether the authority and position of an individual Judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way; the wrong headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men". In re Under Article 143, Constitution of India AIR 1965 SC 745 (791), Gajrendragadkar, C.J. recalled the observations of Lord Atkin in Ambard Vs. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago (supra) and observed thus :- "We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the Court but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint dignity and decorum which they deserve in their judicial conduct". 14. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint dignity and decorum which they deserve in their judicial conduct". 14. B.K. Mukherjea, J., as his Lordship then was, speaking for the Court, restated the law succinctly in Brahma Prakash v. The State of U.P. 1953 SCR 1169 - "It admits of no dispute that the summary jurisdiction exercised by superior Courts in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the Courts. It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened." "Scandalising the Court...............might manifest itself in various ways but, in substance, it is an attack on individual judges or the Court as a whole with or without reference to particular cases, casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character or ability of the judges. Such conduct is punished as contempt for this reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the Courts which are of prime importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties." "There are two primary considerations which should weigh with the Court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by 'scandalising' the Court itself. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in Courts can be created.............................................. In the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and what amounts really to contempt of Court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt." 15. Regarding the distinction between a libel and a contempt, it was pointed out thus in the above case:- "A defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court it can be punished summarily, as contempt. One is a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties." "It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law". 16. It was also pointed out in B. Ramkrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madrass 1952 SCR 425 (434)-. 16. It was also pointed out in B. Ramkrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madrass 1952 SCR 425 (434)-. "What is made publishable in the Indian Penal Code is the offence of defamation as defamation and not as contempt of Court. If the defamation of a subordinate Court amounts to contempt of Court proceedings can certainly be taken under S. 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, quite apart from the fact that other remedy may be open to the aggrieved officer under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. But a liable attacking the integrity of a judge may not in the circumstance, of a particular case amount to a contempt at all, although it may be the subject-matter of a libel proceeding". 17. It is quite clear to us that a complaint or report, about a judicial officer of his dishonesty, partiality or other conduct unbecoming of a Court made to an authority to whom he is subordinate, is not contempt of Court if all reasonable care is taken by the maker to keep it confidential. He must not give any publicity to it. Such a complaint or report initiates an enquiry to ascertain the truth of the allegations made against the judicial officer which will be in the interest of justice and maintenance of purity in its administration. If the allegations are found true suitable action will be taken Integrity is the first and foremost characteristic of a judge ; everything else comes afterwards. It is necessary that the writer discloses his identity, by stating his name and full address, and also gives such details as he may be in possession of, on which his complaint is based. The tendency of sending anonymous applications or reports, whether actuated by cowardice or malice hardly serve any useful purpose; they may merely create prejudice for a moment in the mind of the addressee, without rendering any real assistance in maintenance of purity of judicial administration. But where the complainant is bold enough to sign the complaint, disclose his identity, be definite in his allegations and realises the gravity of the matter he does public good and discharges a public duty. There is no undermining or impairing the authority of the Court. 18. But where the complainant is bold enough to sign the complaint, disclose his identity, be definite in his allegations and realises the gravity of the matter he does public good and discharges a public duty. There is no undermining or impairing the authority of the Court. 18. To sum up, the law may be recapitulated thus: (1) contempt of Court, which is characterised as 'scandalising' a Court or Judge, consists of an act done or writing published which is calculated to bring the Court or the Judge into contempt or lower his authority. A reflection on the Court imputing dishonesty, partiality, unfairness or incompetence is contempt by scandalizing Mens rea is not a necessary constituent of contempt. Truth of the allegations constituting contempt is not a good defence. (2) Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or public good. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful comments of ordinary men. Judges must remember that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the utility of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum, which they deserve in their judicial conduct. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in Courts can be created. Temperate criticism in good faith is immune. (3) The purpose of punishment for contempt of Court is not to protect the Court or the Judge from a repetition of attacks and interferences but to protect the public from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the Court is undermined or impaired. (4) There is a clear distinction between a libel and a contempt. The former is a wrong done to the Judge personally, while the latter is a wrong done to the public. If the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice, it can be punished summarily as contempt. But, otherwise, a defamatory attack on a Judge is only a libel and it is open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action, if he so chooses. If the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice, it can be punished summarily as contempt. But, otherwise, a defamatory attack on a Judge is only a libel and it is open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action, if he so chooses. (5) In that connection, the nature and the circumstances under which the allegations are made, the extent and the character of the publication and similar other considerations have to be taken into account. (6) A complaint or report about a judicial officer of his dishonesty, partiality or conduct unbecoming of a Court, made to an authority to whom he is subordinate, is not contempt of Court if all reasonable care is taken by the maker to keep it confidential, and be gives no publicity to it. It is necessary that the maker discloses his identity by stating his name and address, and gives such details as he may possess. 19. By the above tests we shall now Judge the present case. In the two representations which were made by the respondents to the District Judge and the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, very serious allegations have been made against the petitioner. His integrity has been severely attacked. There are straight charges against him of corruption, of partiality, of favouritism, of injudicious discretion and of undignified behaviour. A number of instances have been given. The petitioner is right when he says that these allegations are per se defamatory. But it is firstly conspicuous that they put their signatures and addresses. They styled themselves as members of the Bar Association. They gave all details which they possessed. In each case, they specified the number of the case. These data afforded a handle for instituting an enquiry against the petitioner. They provide with concrete and definite basis for an enquiry to be held against the petitioner. They actually demanded an enquiry. We have disbelieved and rejected the petitioner's allegations that the respondents got them typed by a stranger, that they were transmitted without confidential covers, and that wide publicity was given to their contents. We have believed the respondents when they say that they had been careful enough to observe secrecy and that they did not, in any way, give out to anyone else the contents of, or the fact of having made the two representations. We have believed the respondents when they say that they had been careful enough to observe secrecy and that they did not, in any way, give out to anyone else the contents of, or the fact of having made the two representations. The communications were sent in closed covers by registered post. They were addressed to the authorities to whom the petitioner is subordinate. Having regard to all this, we hold that the respondents are not guilty of contempt of Court. The petitioner has gone to the extent of saying in parag. 11 of the complaint made to this Court that he has reason to believe that the respondents sent the representations for putting extra-judicial pressure upon him so that he may be amenable to their wishes. In our view, even if the imputations are false, no case of contempt of Court is made out. The petitioner is free to institute an action under the law of torts, thereby putting the respondents to proof of the allegations they made against him, or to prosecute them for the offence punishable under the Penal Code. Their Lordships' remarks in Brahma Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (supra) may be recalled:- "A defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action, if he so chooses". The respondents may have committed an offence under section 500, Penal Code, but every defamation is not contempt of Court. On the other hand, if the allegations are true, the respondents, far from being guilty of contempt of Court, deserve commendation. 20. Learned Deputy Government Advocate relied on State of M.P. Vs. Revashankar 1959 SCR 1367 . In our opinion, that case is not apposite to the present case. There, the respondent, who had filed a complaint in respect of an alleged offence under section 500, Penal Code, in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate of Indore, made a number of aspersions against the Magistrate in an application made to him under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, two of which were of a serious character. There, the respondent, who had filed a complaint in respect of an alleged offence under section 500, Penal Code, in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate of Indore, made a number of aspersions against the Magistrate in an application made to him under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, two of which were of a serious character. It was alleged that the Magistrate was a party to a conspiracy with certain others, the object of which was to implicate the complainant in a false case of theft and that a lawyer appearing for the accused persons to whom the Magistrate was favourably inclined, bad declared that he had paid a sum of Rs. 500 to the Magistrate. Those allegations were later on repeated in an affidavit. The Magistrate reported the matter to the Registrar of the High Court for necessary action. The High Court called upon the respondent to show cause why he should not be proceeded against in contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act. The Judges of the Division Bench who beard the matter, without going into the merits of the case, held that prima facie the offence was one of intentional insult under section 228 of the Penal Code and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted under section 3 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had taken an erroneous view of the matter and set aside its order. It need not be said by us that that case does not apply to the present case. 21. The other case relied on by the learned Deputy Government Advocate is Vinod Maheshwari (M.P. Chronicle) In re 1966 JLJ 950 = 1966 MPLJ 1096 . In that case, it was held that the report which appeared in the M.P. Chronicle to the effect that Purshottam Kaushik had said at a Press Conference that Shri Justice Pandey bad on one occasion helped the Chief Minister, Mr. D.P. Mishra, in the election petition filed against him was substantially correct. This statement of Purushottam Kaushik, which scandalised the Court, clearly constituted gross contempt of this Court. It was observed:- "The dignity and authority of this Court should be maintained and any statement, or publication or calumny which has the tendency of embarrassing and' hindering the administration of justice must be repressed". This statement of Purushottam Kaushik, which scandalised the Court, clearly constituted gross contempt of this Court. It was observed:- "The dignity and authority of this Court should be maintained and any statement, or publication or calumny which has the tendency of embarrassing and' hindering the administration of justice must be repressed". That case also is not apposite to this case. In State Vs. Reshi Kumar AIR 1961 J & K 76, the respondent in his speech stated the person who was posted as Sub-Judge was dishonest, corrupt and used to take bribes in deciding cases. It was found that he had no material before him to show that the Judge was corrupt and he had himself no experience of that. It was held that it could not be said that the conduct of the respondent in making this statement was within the limits of bona fide or genuine criticism. Therefore, it was contempt of Court by willfully scandalizing the Sub-Judge. It was also held that where a Judge is openly scandalised by being depicted as a corrupt officer, such a speech would naturally obstruct the course of justice, or, at any rate, would have the tendency to do so and would therefore, amount to contempt of Court irrespective of the question as to whether the allegations made in the speech against the Judge are correct or not. This narration makes it evident that that case too does not apply to the facts of the present case. 23. So also the decisions in State Vs. Nityanand AIR 1960 Orissa 132; In Re Provash Chandra AIR 1961 Cal. 495 ; State Vs. Radhakishana AIR 1961 Punj. 113, and Advocate General Vs. D. Seshagiri Rao AIR 1966 AP 167 ; are clearly distinguishable on facts. 24. The petition (complaint) is dismissed.