JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This is a Special Appeal from the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court by which he dismissed defendants' First Appeal against a decree for partition of a house passed by the 1st Additional Civil Judge, Benares. 2.The suit giving rise to the appeal was instituted by Gopal Ram against the other members of his family. Gopal Ram is now dead and his widow Smt. Radha Bahu has been substituted in his place as his heir and legal representative. The following genealogical table would show the relation. ship between the parties and will be helpful in appreciating the controvercy raised in the suit. 3. Jadduji, it would be seen was the common ancestor of the parties. The admitted facts of the case are that the four brothers, Mathura Nath, Kashi Nath, Sita Ram and Ram Narain, inherited a house from their maternal grand-father in equal shares. Out of these brothers Lakshmi Nath was the first to die. Mathura Nath sold his one-fourth share in the house to his brother Sita Rain and, thereafter, Sita Ram brought a suit (No. 204 of 1919) in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Benares for partition of the house. A preliminary decree was passed in that suit on February 28, 1921, under which Sita Ram was given 7/- share in the house although, considering the fact that he had purchased Mathura Nath's share, his share would actually have been 8/-. The remaining 9/- share went in equal halves to Girdhar Narain (son of Ram Narain) and Lakshmi Nath under the decree. On June 24, 1922 Girdhar Narain, who thus had 4/6 share in the whole house, executed a sale deed in favour of Gober-dhan Ram and Gopal Ram in respect of his share. Actual partition of the house in terms of the preliminary decree took place out of court on December 24, 1923, by which the eastern portion of the house now numbered as 7/36 in the Municipal records was allotted to Sita Ram as representing his 07/- share while the western portion numbered as 7135 was allotted to the other co-sharers, viz. the four sons of Lakshmi Nath. 4. It appears that on March 7, 1937 Goberdhan Ram executed a deed of gift in favour of Gopal Ram with respect to his share in the house. the four sons of Lakshmi Nath. 4. It appears that on March 7, 1937 Goberdhan Ram executed a deed of gift in favour of Gopal Ram with respect to his share in the house. Execution of this deed was denied by the contesting defendants, but the trial Judge found it proved and his finding was not challenged either before the learned single Judge or before us. The position, therefore, is that now execution of the said deed of gift is also one of the undisputed facts. 5. The claim of Gopal Ram, plaintiff, was that as a result of the transactions noted above, he had 12/- share in the western portion of the house i/e. in house No. 7/35. His claim was contested by defendants 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Goberdhan Ram, defendant No. 14, supported the plaintiff and the remaining defendants filed no written statement at all. The learned trial Judge upheld the claim of the plaintiff and awarded to him a decree for partition in respect of 12/- share. 6. The judgment of the learned single Judge shows that the sole contention raised before him by Shri G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellants, was that the plaintiff had only 8/- share and not 12/-share, because at the time of the execution of the sale deed dated June 24, 1922 by Girdhar Narain, the four sons of Lakshmi Nath were members of a joint Hindu family and the interest conveyed by the sale deed was acquired by the joint family with joint family funds. Before us too Shri N. D. Ojha, arguing the appeal on behalf of the appellants, reiterated the same contention. He urged that each of the four sons of Lakshmi Nath became entitled to 141 share in house No. 7/35 after the execution of the sale deed by Girdhar Narain, and as Gopal Ram became the owner of Goberdhan Ram's 4/- share by virtue of the deed of gift in his favour, his share came to be 8/-. In the trial court as well this was the main contention, and the finding recorded by the court was that the sons of Lakshmi Nath had separated before the execution of the sale deed dated June 24, 1922 and the sale was obtained by Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram with their own exclusive funds. In the trial court as well this was the main contention, and the finding recorded by the court was that the sons of Lakshmi Nath had separated before the execution of the sale deed dated June 24, 1922 and the sale was obtained by Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram with their own exclusive funds. The learned single Judge affirmed this finding of the trial court and accordingly held that Gopal Rana had 12/- share in house No. 7135 as claimed by him. 7. Admittedly, the sons of Lakshmi Nath had separated prior to the institution of the suit which has given rise to this appeal, and the presumption of jointness was, therefore, not available to the contesting defendants (hereinafter referred to as defendants). The sale deed executed by Girdhar Narain was ostensibly in favour of Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram alone and hence it was, for the defendants to establish facts which made the acquisition under the sale deed an acquisition by all the sons of Lakshmi Nath. The first essential required to be proved was that all the sons of Lakshmi Nath constituted a joint Hindu family on the date of the acquisition, and if the defendants have not proved that fact satisfactorily, no other question arises and their claim in regard to the sale deed must inevitably fail. 8. The evidence led by the defendants is negligible and of an extremely poor quality. From among the defend is the person chosen to be examined as&witness was Bharat who was only 35 years of age at the time of his examination and much of his statement with regard to the history of the family appears to be hearsay. In his statement he made a bald assertion to the effect that all the properties acquired by the members of the family were purchased out of joint family funds, but he did not depose to any tangible fact on which the assertion was founded and confessed total ignorance of the income of the family. He went to the length of saying that Brijpal Ram, son of Lakshmi Nath, still lived in jointness with him although in his statement recorded under Order 10, Rule 2, C. P. C. he had unambiguously said that all the four sons of Lakshmi Nath separated after 4 the death of Nauneet Lal. He went to the length of saying that Brijpal Ram, son of Lakshmi Nath, still lived in jointness with him although in his statement recorded under Order 10, Rule 2, C. P. C. he had unambiguously said that all the four sons of Lakshmi Nath separated after 4 the death of Nauneet Lal. The trial Judge and the learned single Judge did not accept the evidence of Bharat, and after going through it we are clearly of opinion that it is not worthy of acceptance both in view of its intrinsic character and of the strong documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff to which we will hereafter refer. It is significant that Bharat's mother from whom he derived his knowledge of the affairs of his family relating to the period prior to his attaining the age of discretion was not examined as a witness and Bharat's elder brothers too who were expected to be more conversant with the history of the family and its properties and more competent to speak about it kept away from the witness box. Out of the remaining witnesses examined by the defendants Harihar did not create a good impression upon the learned trial Judge and it is also clear from his statement that the sole basis of his statement regarding the jointness of the family was that its members resided in the same house. The only other witness (excepting one Beni Madhav who proved some entries in the account book Ext. B. 1 to be dealt with later) is Bal Krishna who is a close relation of the defendants. He admitted that there were two Chowks in the disputed house and that he had always seen Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram living in one of them and the sons of Nauneet Lal living in the other. His statement further shows that Nauneet Lars sons had a separate mess as well. Evidently the oral evidence led by the defendants is altogether inadequate and of too flimsy a nature for a finding that the sale deed in question was executed while all the sons of Lakshmi Nath were living in a state of jointness-a fact which the defendant had to prove, unaided by any presumption, in order to substantiate their claim. 9. The only documentary evidence on which reliance was placed on behalf of the defendants is the account book Ext. 9. The only documentary evidence on which reliance was placed on behalf of the defendants is the account book Ext. B. 1 of firm Mahadeo Prasad Kashi Prasad, formerly called firm Lakshman Ram Gajadhar Ram. The account book contains a few entries purporting to show that certain sums of money were received by the firm through Bhagat on behalf of a Ghee shop of Gopal Ram Goberdhan Ram. These entries have been proved by Beni Madhay. The learned trial Judge appears to have looked upon these entries with suspicion and we too feel that there are reasonable grounds for doubting their genuineness. Admittedly, Bharat was only 9 or 10 years of age when these payments are shown to have been made through him and it is a little difficult to believe that a mere lad of that age was entrusted on several occasions with the task of carrying money and making payments to the firm. It has no doubt been stated by Bharat that the money used to be actually taken to the firm by a servant and he only accompanied the servant. But what possible object was to be served by sending Bharat along with the servant we do not find it possible to comprehend, and if it is suggested that Bharat used to be sent only by way of a safeguard we need only say that this safeguard could hardly have been effective if one was really needed. The entries do not, therefore, inspire confidence. Assuming, however, that the entries are genuine, are they really indicative of the fact that Bharat had any proprietary interest in the Ghee shop on whose behalf the payments evidenced by them were made, regard being had to the fact that on his own showing Bharat worked at the Ghee shop just for two or three years. It often happens that a boy intended to be put in business is made to spend a period of training or apprenticeship at the shop of some relation or other person in order that he may learn the rudiments of business, and the mere fact of his having been allowed to sit and do jobs of petty nature at a shop cannot, therefore, be suggestive, much less be proof, of the fact that he was also one of the owners of the business done at the shop. In a Division Bench case of this Court, Kailash v. Shanker, A.I.R. 1945 Alld. 164, one of the points to be considered was whether on the basis of the fact that the sons of a person who were living with and being maintained by him and were deriving benefit from and helping him in a business started by him it could be held that the business had become the joint business of the family. The Bench observed : "But if a business is started by an adult member of the family separately, the mere fact that his sons who are dependant on him and are being maintained by him give him some help in carrying out the business would not necessarily make the business cease to be his own business and make it the joint business of himself and his sons". 10. A similar question came up before a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Chiranji Lal v. Gordhan, A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 102 and, dealing with the facts of the case, it held : "In the present case, though sons were living with their father yet it is difficult to assume that they jointly acquired any property along with their falter or that they dealt with the property acquired by the father as their joint property. While the sons of Ram Pratap were living with him it was but natural that they should sit on the shop of Ram Pratap and undergo a training under him so as to acquire the necessary knowledge of the technique of the business". 11. The Rajasthan High Court also referred in its judgment to the above quoted observations of this Court in Kailashi v. Shanker, A.I.R. 1945 Alld. 164 and expressed its agreement with them. What has been said in the aforesaid decisions is true not only when the question to be determined is whether the acts of the kind spoken of in the decisions are sufficient to impress a separate business with the character of a joint family business, but also when it has to be seen whether those acts are indicative of the business having ever been a joint family business. It is true that Bharat was not a son of Gopal Ram or Goberdhan Ram but that did not make any material difference. It is true that Bharat was not a son of Gopal Ram or Goberdhan Ram but that did not make any material difference. The entries relied upon by the defendants, even if they are accepted as genuine cannot, in our opinion, go to establish either that the Ghee business became a joint family business or was a joint family business to start with or even that Gopal Rain and Goberdhan Ram lived in jointness with their brothers at the relevant time. 12. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff is principally documentary. For the reason which will presently appear we should first deal with the document Ext. 27. That document is an application which was made by Nauneet Lal to the District Judge under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for being appointed guardian of the person and property of his minor brothers Gopal Ram, Brijpal and Goberdhan Ram specifying their shares. The trial court and the learned single Judge have held that, irrespective of any other thing, this application had in law the effect of bringing about a severance of jointness in the family. In this opinion we find ourselves unable to concur. It is certainly true that the Karta of a joint Hindu family is, by virtue of his position as such, possessed of the right to manage the entire coparcenary property and no guardian of a minor's undivided interest in such property could, therefore, be appointed under the provisions of the said Act. But, we think, the incompetency of an application for appointment of guardian of a minor's undivided interest in joint family property under that Act or the Court's lack of power to grant such an application could not lead to the result that if such an application was granted or made that by itself and without anything more operated as a termination of the joint family status. The applicant might never have entertained the remotest intention of separating although he specified the shares in family property, and might have made the application for guardianship under a misapprehension of law or, as very often happened, for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of the court for a proposed transfer of joint family property and for providing to the intending transferee a sense of security. The court too might have, in ignorance of the true facts or without realising the correct legal position as to the applicability of the provisions of the said Act, granted the application. It is, therefore, not possible to accept that irrespective of anything else such an application or an order granting it could by its own force make the family automatically lose its joint family character and bring about its disruption. An application for appointment of guardian of a minor's undivided interest in joint family property cannot stand on 4 the same footing as a suit for partition of joint family property which is regarded as by itself effecting a severance of joint family status because of the expression on the part of the person filing such suit of his unequivocal intention to separate. No such intention is postulated or necessarily presupposed in an application for guardianship of the above description. It must be borne in mind that even though the provisions of the guardians and Wards Act, 1890 were not applicable, a Chartered High Court could, in the exercise of its inherent power, appoint the managing member of a the family to be a guardian of such interest where such appointment was clearly for the benefit of the minor-Vide Govind Prasad, In the matter of3 and Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law page 693 (Twelfth Edition). This position has now crystallised and has received a statutory shape in Section 12 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1856 which runs as follows : "Where a minor has an undivided interest in joint family 'property and the property is under the management of an adult member of the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in respect of such undivided interest : Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of a High Court to appoint a guardian in respect of such interest". 13. The above provision makes it obvious that neither an application for guardianship of a minor's undivided interest in joint family property nor an order granting it by itself results in an extinction of joint family status. The learned trial Judge placed reliance on L. Jagannath Prasad v. Chunni Lal, A.I.R. 1933 Alld. 180 in support of the view taken by him in regard to the legal effect of the application for guardianship made by Nauneet Lal. The learned trial Judge placed reliance on L. Jagannath Prasad v. Chunni Lal, A.I.R. 1933 Alld. 180 in support of the view taken by him in regard to the legal effect of the application for guardianship made by Nauneet Lal. That case, however, turned on its special facts and is clearly distinguishable. It appears that the person who applied for guardianship in that case had alienated his own share in the family property and then sought the sanction of the Court for a transfer of the minor's share-which was the only share left. In these circumstances it was held that the order of the District Judge granting the application raised a presumption of separation in the family and that presumption was found to have been strengthened by the subsequent conduct of the members of the family. The case is no authority for the proposition that an application for guardianship by an adult member of a joint family in respect of a minor's undivided interest in the joint family property or the grant of such an application ipso facto puts an end to the jointness of the family. Indeed, the fact that the order was held only as raising a presumption of separation would itself show that it was not regarded as having, in law, effected a separation. We may also point out that in the instant case the District Judge, on being subsequently apprised of the fact that Nauneet Lal formed a joint family with his minor brothers, had set aside the order appointing him as guardian, and such presumption as might have attached to the order is, therefore, destroyed. This does not,' however, affect the value and force of the remaining documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff, which goes to establish clearly that Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram had separated from their brothers prior to the execution of the sale deed in their favour by Girdhar Narain and that the interest acquired by means of that deed was their exclusive acquisition. 14. Besides the sale deed in question two other sale deeds were executed in favour of Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram, one (Ext. 21) dated February 8, 1922 by Anandi for a sum of Rs. 1320/- and the other (Ext. 22) dated March 8, 1922 by Makrandu Misir for a sum of Rs. 1,500/-. Also there are sale deeds dated April 7, 1927 and April 30, 1928 (Ext. 21) dated February 8, 1922 by Anandi for a sum of Rs. 1320/- and the other (Ext. 22) dated March 8, 1922 by Makrandu Misir for a sum of Rs. 1,500/-. Also there are sale deeds dated April 7, 1927 and April 30, 1928 (Ext. 24 and Ext. 28 respectively) by means of which Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram transferred properties jointly purchased by them. It is note-worthy that Nauneet Lal was the eldest amongst his brothers and yet he was neither associated as a co-vendee with Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram in the deeds in their favour nor did he join them as a co-executant in the deeds of transfer executed by them. Municipal receipts in regard to the properties purchased by Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram were also issued in their names only-vide Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. Further, it appears from entries (Ext. 36 and Ext. 37) of the account books of firm Scotian Pathak Girdhar Pathak that Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram deposited various amounts in their names from 1917 to 1924 and there is nothing to show that the other brothers had any interest in the deposits. Then there is a document which furnishes evidence of a most clinching effect and concludes the controversy in favour of the plaintiff. That document is Ext. 14 dated December 6, 1922, and it purports to be an agreement of reference to arbitration executed by all the four sons of Lakshmi Nath subsequent to the preliminary decree for partition in respect of the house and prior to its actual division into two portions as No. 75 and No. 76. The document contains a clear recital to the effect that in the said house Brijpal Ram had 1/- and 11 pies share, Nauneet Lal had similarly 1 and 11 pies share while -/6/9 share belonged to Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram and the remaining 7/- share to Kanhaiya and Sita Ram. According to the plaintiff's evidence the four sons of Lakshmi Nath wanted to have their shares in the house partitioned by metes and bounds and for that purpose they made a reference to arbitration by means of the said document. The genuineness of this document was disputed by the defendants and it was denied that the signature on it purporting to be that of Nauneet Lal was really his. The genuineness of this document was disputed by the defendants and it was denied that the signature on it purporting to be that of Nauneet Lal was really his. The trial Judge and the learned single Judge have held the document to be genuine and we have no adequate reason to come to a contrary conclusion. It is true that the document is not registered and the plaintiff admitted that the arbitrators appointed under it gave no award with the result that the reference fell through. These facts are not, however, sufficient for regarding the document as one of questionable authenticity. The plaintiff proved by his evidence that the agreement was signed by him and his three brothers and identified the signatures of all the executant's thereof. The statement of the plaintiff in this behalf does not appear to have been seriously challenged in cross-examination and, at any rate, it was not suggested to him that the document did not really bear the signature of Nauneet Lal. Bharat denied that it bore Nauneet Lal's signature but not much value can be attached to the denial because we find that he denied that even Ext. 27, the original application made by Nauneet Lal in the court of the District Judge for being appointed guardian of his minor brothers, had his signature on it. We are satisfied of the genuineness of the document and we are of opinion that it was executed by the four brothers as alleged by the plaintiff. There is yet another document on record proving the correctness of the stand taken by the plaintiff and negativing the contention of the defendants. That document is Ext. 15, the partition deed referred to earlier executed by Sita Ram as the first party and Nauneet Lal and his brothers as the second party on December 4, 1923. By that deed Sita Ram was allotted the eastern portion of the house, and the deed recited not only that Lakshmi Nath's branch had -1416 share in the ancestral house but also the fact crucial to this case, namely, that the share of Girdhar Narain had been purchased by Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram. The latter recital points to the conclusion that the interest acquired under the said purchase was the separate acquisition of Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram and the other two brothers had no share in it. The latter recital points to the conclusion that the interest acquired under the said purchase was the separate acquisition of Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram and the other two brothers had no share in it. The documentary evidence discussed above thus furnishes clear proof of the fact that the sale deed in question was not executed while all the sons of Lakshmi Nath constituted a joint family and that only Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram acquired the interest conveyed thereby. The oral evidence produced by the plaintiff consists mainly of the statements of Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram, but their testimony receives ample and very strong corroboration from the documentary evidence and we are, therefore, of opinion that it should be accepted in spite of its being of a highly interested character. On a careful examination of the facts and circumstances of the case we are in complete agreement with the finding recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the learned single Judge. 15. In view of the above finding the question whether there was any joint family property with the assistance of which the sale deed in dispute was obtained or could have been obtained hardly arises for consideration. We, however, find that the defendants have totally failed to prove the existence of any such property. All that the learned counsel for the appellants contended before us on this aspect of the case was that the Ghee shop from whose funds the consideration of the sale deed in dispute was paid, as entries in the account books of the shop show, was a joint family business started and carried on with the aid of money belonging to the joint family, but there is no evidence worth the name in support of this contention. Admittedly, the Ghee business used to be carried on in the name of Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram and such accounts of the business as have been filed show that only the said two persons and none else had any interest therein. It is significant that in the trial court the plaintiff offered to produce all the account books relating to the business, but the defendant did not choose to avail of that offer. It is significant that in the trial court the plaintiff offered to produce all the account books relating to the business, but the defendant did not choose to avail of that offer. The inference naturally is that during the entire period of the existence of the Ghee business no entry evidencing any connection of the defendants or of Nauneet Lal with the business was to be found in the account books. It was urged by the learned counsel that Lakshmi Nath was a Vaidya and so was Nauneet Lal and the savings from their income as Vaidya must have been utilised for staring and running the Ghee business. We do not, however, find any material on the basis of which it may legitimately be inferred that the savings of Lakshmi Nath or Nauneet Lal contributed to the commencement or to the growth of the business; indeed, there is nothing to indicate that there was any saving at all. Attention was invited by the learned counsel to the statement of Bharat to the effect that his father Nauneet Lal spent away every thing which had been left by his (Bharat's) grand-father and it was urged that this statement implied that Lakshmi Nath did leave some money. We, however, think that the statement, besides being extremely vague and indefinite, is too slender a foundation for a finding that Lakshmi Nath had really left some money. We have already rejected the statement of Bharat in regard to the jointness of the family at the time of the execution of the sale deed in question and we are not prepared to place reliance on his above statement either. Further, Bharat could not have been in a position to know if his grand-father had really left any money and the statement does not appear to be even inadmissible in evidence. Bharat has further stated that Nauneet Lal had given Rs. 500/- to Gopal Ram but nothing has been said by him as to the time when this payment was made and to the purpose for which it was used. There is nothing to corroborate this statement and we are unable to accept it as true. It would also appear from the statement of Bharat that almost all the ancestral property of the family had to be sold by Nauneet Lal for supporting the family and for paying off the family debts. There is nothing to corroborate this statement and we are unable to accept it as true. It would also appear from the statement of Bharat that almost all the ancestral property of the family had to be sold by Nauneet Lal for supporting the family and for paying off the family debts. Obviously, therefore, the position is that the evidence does not at ali prove the existence of any nucleus of income yielding joint family property or the existence of any joint family resources which were or could have been utilised for the Ghee business or for payment of the consideration of the sale deed in question. 16. In this connection we have also to point out that the presumption that a property in the name of a member of a joint Hindu family is a property of the joint family if the family is possessed of a nucleus of joint property does not apply to a business carried on by a member of such family, and unless it is found that the joint family property was actually utilised for starting or carrying on the business or that the income arising from the business was thrown into the common stock, the business would be a separate business of the member by whom it is being run. In K.L.S.V.E. Annamalai Chetty v. K.L.S.V.E. Subramanian Chetty, A.I.R. 1929 Privy Council 1 it was laid down by the Judicial Committee that :- "A member of a joint undivided family can make separate acquisition of property for his own benefit, and unless it can be shown that the business grew from joint family property, or that the earnings were blended with joint family estate they remained free and separate". 17. The above proposition was enunciated by the Judicial Committee in more explicit terms in Bhurumal v. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1942 Privy Council 13 and it was observed : ".......... though a business, if it be longs to Hindu joint family, is an item of joint family property, special considerations apply to the question whether or not a business belongs to the family or to the individual member who carries it on. If it be a joint family business, then all the members of the family are liable for its debts upon the terms and to the extent laid down by the Hindu Law. If it be a joint family business, then all the members of the family are liable for its debts upon the terms and to the extent laid down by the Hindu Law. Whether or not it can be said that if a joint family is possessed of some joint property, there is a presumption that any property in the hands of an individual member is not his separate individual property but joint property, no such presumption can be applied to a business". 18. The Judicial Committee referred in its judgment to the above quoted passage from the case of K.L.S.V.E. Annamalai Chetty v. K.L.S.V.E. Subramanian Chetty, A.I.R. 1929 Privy Council 1 and proceeded to observe : "It is not irrelevant to reflect how many times businesses of substantial size have arisen not merely from small beginnings but by the activity of an energetic man wholly without capital content to begin selling goods for others and in due course obtaining credit for small transactions on his own account". 19. Relying on the above decisions a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nain Singh v. Tikam Singh, A.I.R. 1925 Alld. 388 held : "Now, it is well settled that where a joint family is possessed of joint property the mere fact that a particular item of the property stands in the name of a single member of the family does not raise the presumption that it is the separate and self-acquired property of that member. The presumption, on the other hand, is that that property also is joint family property like every other joint family property. In the case of a business, however, there is no such presumption". 20. Even if, therefore, there had been a nucleus of Joint family property the burden would still have been upon the defendants to show that the Ghee business owed its commencement or growth to that joint property. Having regard to the nature of the business the observations made by the Judicial Committee in the second passage quoted above from Bhurumal v. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1925 Alld. 388 have to be particularly borne in mind. It appears that the Ghee business carried on by Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram was not a business done on any large scale and required much investment either at its inception or during its continuance. 388 have to be particularly borne in mind. It appears that the Ghee business carried on by Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram was not a business done on any large scale and required much investment either at its inception or during its continuance. The indications clearly are that it was entirely the result of the exertions of Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram. At any rate, there is no material for holding that there was any nucleus of joint property with the help of which the business started or grew. Our finding, therefore, is that the Ghee business was the separate business of Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram and the property acquired under the sale deed in question was their exclusive property. 21. It is not disputed that if the interest conveyed under the sale deed dated June 24, 1922 executed by Girdhar Narain was acquired by Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram alone, the plaintiff has 12/- share in house No. 7/35. The result is that the plaintiff is entitled to the decree that has been awarded. 22. It appears that the northern portion of the house in suit was reconstructed by Gopal Ram and Goberdhan Ram and a sum of about Rs. 5,000/- was spent by them on the reconstructiop. The learned trial Judge directed that the Amin should draw up a scheme of partition allotting the northern portion to the plaintiff and while equalising the shares of the parries he should take into consideration the fact that a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was spent by Ram Gopal in the construction of the northern port ion. Learned counsel for the parties agreed before us that in case the plaintiff is held to have 112/- share in the house in dispute the portion reconstructed by Ram Gopal would be covered by his share in the house and no question of compensation for the sum spent by him in reconstruction would in that event arise. The direction contained in the operative portion of the order of the learned trial Judge in regard to the equalisation of shares by taking into account the expenditure of Rs. 5,000/- by Ram Gopal in the reconstruction of the northern portion may, therefore, be ignored. The direction contained in the operative portion of the order of the learned trial Judge in regard to the equalisation of shares by taking into account the expenditure of Rs. 5,000/- by Ram Gopal in the reconstruction of the northern portion may, therefore, be ignored. The partition, however, should be so effected that the plaintiff is allotted the northern portion of the house and the portion given to her includes that part of the house which was reconstructed by Ram Gopal. With these observations we dismiss the appeal with costs.