JUDGMENT P.T. Raman Nayar, J. 1. These applications under Art.226 of the Constitution (O. P. No. 661 of 1968 cites Art.227 and S.446 sie. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code as well), brought on behalf of two persons whose detention has been ordered under S.3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, for a writ or order of the nature of a habeas corpus have been heard together since the facts are similar and the questions of law that arise are much the same. 2. Ex. R 1 dated 26-1-1968 in O. P. No. 661 of 1968 is the order of detention in that case. It was made by the Additional District Magistrate, Kozhikode (the 1st respondent herein) who has been specially empowered in that behalf under S.3(2)(b) of the Act. It was served on the detenu concerned on 27-1-1968 and he was arrested and taken to the Central Jail, Cannanore, where he is now under detention. (The Superintendent of the jail is the 2nd respondent while the State of Kerala is the 3rd respondent). Ex. R 2 dated 28-1-1968 is a memorandum containing the grounds on which the order of detention was made, and this was duly served on the detenu on 30.1.1968 as required by S.7 of the Act. Ex. R 3 dated 5.2.1968 is the order made by the State Government under S.3(3) of the Act approving the order of detention made by the Additional District Magistrate (incorrectly referred to in the order as the District Collector, another, and the principal, office that the Additional District Magistrate holds) in respect of the detenues in these two cases and four other detenues. 3. Exs. R 1, R 2 and R 3 run as follows: R l: Whereas I, N. Kaleeswaran, I. A. S., Additional District Magistrate (Independent) Kozhikode District, am satisfied with respect to Kizhisseri Ali of Kuzhimanna Village that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary to make an order directing that the said Kizhisseri Ali be detained; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by S.3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Central Act IV of 1950 extended by Central Act 48 of 1966). I hereby direct that the said Kizhisseti Ali be detained". Date 26-1-1968. Sd/- Place: Kozhikode. I hereby direct that the said Kizhisseti Ali be detained". Date 26-1-1968. Sd/- Place: Kozhikode. Additional District Magistrate (1)" R-2 "In pursuance of S.7(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Central Act IV of 1950) Shri. Kizhisseri Ali, Kuzhimanna Village, Ernad Taluk is informed that the grounds for his detention are the following: Government of Kerala being of opinion that it is necessary and expedient for maintaining supplies of certain foodstuffs and for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair price to the public introduced Statutory Rationing system in the State. The Statutory rationing machinery is at present governed by the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966 dated 1-7-1966. The supply of food stuffs essential to the community is being made through the services of the Civil Supplies Department in the State, the Godowns of Food Corporation of India, wholesalers and retail ration dealers. The stocks necessary for distribution are obtained by the State Government, as allotted by Government of India periodically from other States and imported stocks. The stocks so obtained from outside have to be supplemented to the maximum extent possible by procurement of food grains produced within the State. For the purpose of procurement of rice and paddy to the maximum extent, out of the marketable surplus of food grains in the State, Government have promulgated the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order, 1966 dated 1-7-1966 and the Kerala Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order, 1966 dated 1-7-1966. In order to facilitate the procurement and requisitioning of stocks under the above said orders it is essential to cordon off surplus areas in the State during the harvest season. To restrict the movement the Government have also promulgated the Kerala Rice (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1966 dated 1-8-1966. Under this order no person shall move or attempt to move or abet the movement of rice the definition of which includes paddy from any place within the specified area to a place outside that area except under and in accordance with a permit issued by the Collector of that district or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf. Unless the restriction of movement so imposed by the Movement Control order is enforced effectively the procurement work in the State that is necessary to supply sufficient food grains to the public through rationing machinery in the State will suffer. Unless the restriction of movement so imposed by the Movement Control order is enforced effectively the procurement work in the State that is necessary to supply sufficient food grains to the public through rationing machinery in the State will suffer. Any person who works or attempts to defeat the provisions of Movement Control Order will be, by his action, hampering procurement and thereby adversely interfering in the supplies and services which are quite essential to the community and necessary for equitable distribution of the available food grains in the State. 2. Wandur firka in Ernad Taluk, Kozhikode District has been declared as a specified area under the Movement Control Order referred to above and all the restrictions imposed on movement of rice and paddy are applicable to it. During Kanni harvest season of 1967 some persons were persistently trying to violate and on many occasions successfully, these restrictions and their actions adversely affected the procurement work in the firka. The target for procurement and requisitioning in the firka could not be achieved owing to the above said anti social and illegal activities of smugglers and black marketers. The usual form of violation was either to crash through check posts ignoring the bamboo pole barricades or to smuggle food grains by head load otherwise than by the road where check posts can be set up and afterwards assemble outside the specified area for purposes of sale in black market. The activities of such persons increased the price within the surplus area as a result of which the stockholders were not willing to measure the stocks that have to be sold to Government under the procurement and Requisitioning Orders. The searches conducted in the houses of levy assessees for getting the levy due were not successful as the stocks had already been cornered by the smugglers paying higher prices. 3. During the current Makaram season also such anti social and illegal activities are being continued and unless they are put a stop to immediately by taking preventive action against the persons indulging in smuggling and black marketing activities the maintenance of essential supplies and services to the community will be detrimentally affected. 3. During the current Makaram season also such anti social and illegal activities are being continued and unless they are put a stop to immediately by taking preventive action against the persons indulging in smuggling and black marketing activities the maintenance of essential supplies and services to the community will be detrimentally affected. Taking action only in isolated cases detected has not been helpful in checking the activities of the smugglers as they are able to evade the staff by taking their stocks through various bye - ways which abound in the locality as well as by illegal means like crashing through cheek posts using lorries at dead of night after removing number plates. The use of the above said method, involves danger even to the lives of the Civil Supplies staff who are duty bound to stop the vehicles and who have to do their duty in limited strength in isolated places during night hours. 4. Sri. Kizhisseri Ali of Kuzhimanna Village, Ernad Taluk, is one such regular smuggler of food grains. He is in possession of two lorries viz. (1) KLP 2366 and (2) KLD 6942. He used to take illicitly food grains using the aforesaid vehicles to Calicut side for black marketing. These two vehicles have been seized several times with food grains by the Civil Supplies authorities. On 19-1-1968 he approached the Check post Inspectors at Kunduthodu and Tiruvali check posts to get his lorry allowed to pass through the check post with food grains. Since the Check post Inspectors did not comply with the request he approached the Check post Inspector. Pandikad to permit him to pass through the check post. They also refused permission. After sometime he forcibly took the loads through the Pandikad check post after breaking the check post at dead of night, at about 4.45 A.M. The Check post Inspector has immediately lodged a complaint to the local Sub Inspector of Police. It is understood that the Sub Inspector arrested him and subsequently released him on bail. A case has already been registered at the Pandikad Police Station. This is an instance in which he was actually caught. The Civil Supplies Inspectors have had several occasions to see him with loads while conducting raids and he used to escape cunningly at times. He is a reputed black marketeer. A case has already been registered at the Pandikad Police Station. This is an instance in which he was actually caught. The Civil Supplies Inspectors have had several occasions to see him with loads while conducting raids and he used to escape cunningly at times. He is a reputed black marketeer. He continues and is likely to continue to indulge in his illegal and unlawful activities. I am therefore satisfied that the presence at large of this individual who indulges in smuggling activities and thereby hampers the success of procurement and requisitioning work ' which has just begun in Wandur firka will affect adversely the maintenance of equitable supplies of food and services essential to the community. Therefore his detention for two months has been ordered in exercise of powers under S.3 sub-s.(i)(a)(iii) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 (Central Act IV of 1950) as extended by Central Act 48 of 1966) conferred on me by Government of Kerala Notification No. 61013/SS3/67 Home dt. 21-10-1967. Sri. Kizhisseri Ali is informed that he has a right to make a representation in writing against the order under which he is kept in detention. If he wishes to make any such representation he should address it to the Chief Secretary to Government of Kerala and forward it through the Superintendent of the jail within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this memorandum. He is also informed that if he does not submit his representation against the grounds of detention within the aforesaid period it will be deemed that he has no representation to make. Sd/- Addi. District Magistrate (1)" R-3 " GOVERNMENT OF KERALA ABSTRACT Preventive Detention Act - Detention orders issued by the District Collector; Kozhikode approved. Home (SS) Department G. O. Rt. No. 199/68/Home. Dated 5-2-1968 Read: Letter No. S2/3352/68 dated 29-1-1968 from the District Collector, Kozhikode. ORDER After careful consideration of the report received from the District Collector, Kozhikode the Government approve the detention orders issued by him in respect of the following persons: 1. Kizhisseri Ali, Kuzhimanna Village. 2. Pookunhi Koya Thangal, Pookottumpadam, Amarambalam Village.) 3. Pottanchali Mohammed, Chandakunnu, Nilambur Village. 4. Nedungadan Moideen Haji, Karakunnu Amsom. 5. Valasseri Kunhi Mohammed Haji, Wandoor Village. 6. Kokkadan Abdurahiman. Wandoor Village. (By Order of the Governor) S. Naganathan, Joint Secretary to Government". 4. The corresponding orders in O. P. No. 613 of 1968, Exts. Kizhisseri Ali, Kuzhimanna Village. 2. Pookunhi Koya Thangal, Pookottumpadam, Amarambalam Village.) 3. Pottanchali Mohammed, Chandakunnu, Nilambur Village. 4. Nedungadan Moideen Haji, Karakunnu Amsom. 5. Valasseri Kunhi Mohammed Haji, Wandoor Village. 6. Kokkadan Abdurahiman. Wandoor Village. (By Order of the Governor) S. Naganathan, Joint Secretary to Government". 4. The corresponding orders in O. P. No. 613 of 1968, Exts. R 1 and R 2 in that case, are in like terms -- Ex. R 3, in both cases, the State Government's order of approval, is the same -- and the material facts are similar. The only difference is that in Ext. R 2 in this case only one specific instance of smuggling of paddy by the detenue therein and the seizure thereof by the Civil Supplies Officers is mentioned. This difference is hardly material. 5. The petitioner in O. P. No. 661 of 1968 assails the detention on the following grounds: (1) The order of detention fixes the period of detention as two months, and this by itself is sufficient to render the order void having regard to the decision in Makham Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1952 SC 27 . (2) No Advisory Board has yet been constituted by the State Government as required by S.8 of the Act, and detention before the constitution of such a Board is illegal. (3) The order of detention and the grounds there for being in English, a language which the detenu does not know the petition here, as in other contexts mistakenly refers to the detenu as the petitioner the opportunity enjoined by S.7(1) of the Act has been denied and this is enough to render the detention bad in the light of the decision in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 911 . (4) The Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order and the Kerala Paddy (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order are unconstitutional and that being so the very basis for the order of detention goes; (5) The detention is mala fide; and (6) The grounds of detention are vague and indefinite, and if one ground is vague that is enough to vitiate the order of detention. That apart, the grounds are so vague as to deny the detenu the opportunity enjoined by S.7(1) of the Act to make a representation against the order of detention. 6. That apart, the grounds are so vague as to deny the detenu the opportunity enjoined by S.7(1) of the Act to make a representation against the order of detention. 6. In addition to grounds 1, 2 and 6 above, the petitioner in O. P. No. 613 of 1968 has taken the ground, a 7th ground, that no material has been placed before the court justifying the order of detention, the affidavit filed by the 1st respondent. Additional District Magistrate being insufficient for the purpose since the facts stated therein as justifying the detention fire not facts within the deponent's personal knowledge. 7. We shall deal with the several grounds one by one. 8. The first ground has no basis in fact, for, Ext. R 1 does not fix any period of detention. The statement in the penultimate paragraph in Ex. R 2 that detention for a period of two months has been ordered under S.3 of the Act is clearly a misstatement, and, whether this misstatement be accident or deliberate, and, if deliberate, whatever be its intended object, it cannot affect the fact that Ex. R 1, the order of detention, does not specify any period. There is no basis whatsoever for the suggestion made in the course of the argument that there might have been an order in between Exs. R 1 and R 2 fixing the period of detention as two months, for, it is nobody's case that there is such an order or that the detention is under any other order than Ex. R 1. Supposing it were the law, as perhaps, the Additional District Magistrate on reconsideration thought it was, that an order under S.3 which did not specify the period of detention was bad, would a subsequent misstatement that detention had been ordered for a specified period when in fact it had not, have cured the defect ? Of course not. Unless a fresh order of detention were made specifying the period, the detention would be illegal. Why should the position here be different? Short of a fresh order specifying a period of detention being made, the fact remains that the order in pursuance of which the detenu is being detained, does not specify the period of detention. Of course not. Unless a fresh order of detention were made specifying the period, the detention would be illegal. Why should the position here be different? Short of a fresh order specifying a period of detention being made, the fact remains that the order in pursuance of which the detenu is being detained, does not specify the period of detention. It is true that, for the purpose of deciding upon the validity of a detention, the order of detention and the grounds there for must be read together, but, even so, the obviously wrong statement in Ex. R 2 that detention has been ordered for a period of two months cannot alter the fact, which is quite apparent from Ex. P 1, that no such period has been specified. To render these detention bad, the order in pursuance of which the detention is being effected must itself specify the period of detention. A wrong statement elsewhere that a period has been specified, or even a specification in some other order, will not affect the validity of the detention. That is why in Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1952 SC 27 . Their Lordships were at pains to make out that the second order of detention specifying a period there for was a fresh order superseding the first order which specified no such period. 9. Ground AIR 1962 SC 911 . There is nothing in the Act to indicate that the constitution of an Advisory Board is a condition precedent to the making of an order under S.3. S.8 only says that the concerned Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute an Advisory Board. S.9 which says that, in every case where a detention has been ordered the grounds for the order and the representation made by the detenu shall be placed before the Advisory Board within thirty days from the dale of the detention under the order, shows that it is necessary to constitute an Advisory Board well in time for the case being placed before it within thirty days of the date of detention. There is no other provision in the Act laying down or indicating when the Board is to be constituted. It will be lime enough to complain if the case is not placed before an Advisory Board within the thirty days allowed by S.9. This ground therefore fails. 10. There is no other provision in the Act laying down or indicating when the Board is to be constituted. It will be lime enough to complain if the case is not placed before an Advisory Board within the thirty days allowed by S.9. This ground therefore fails. 10. Ground (3): The learned Advocate General who appears for the respondents is not in a position to state whether the detenu knows or does not know English. But, since it is now stated that the detenu does not know English well enough to read and understand Ex. R2 so as to make an effective representation against the order of detention, and further that the language the detenu knows well enough for the purpose is Malayalam, he has undertaken to see that the detenu is furnished with a Malayalam translation of Ex. R 2 well in time for him to make the representation. It cannot be a condition for the validity of an order of detention that the grounds of detention must be in a language which the detenu can read and understand. If that were so, there could never be a valid order of detention against an illiterate person. Nor can it be said that it is the duty of the authority making an order under S.3 to find out what language the detenu can read and write and furnish him with the grounds for his detention in that language. All that the detenu can demand is that he must be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order as required by sub-s.(1) of S.7 and this will be satisfied, if on the detenu making such a request he is furnished with a translation of the grounds in a language which he can read, or if he is illiterate the grounds are read out and explained to him in full and arrangements are made for the representation, he wishes to make being recorded in writing. It is only because of such a request having been turned down with the result that there was no compliance with sub-s.(1) of S.7 of the Act, that the detention considered in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 911 was held to be bad. This ground also fails. 11. It is only because of such a request having been turned down with the result that there was no compliance with sub-s.(1) of S.7 of the Act, that the detention considered in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 911 was held to be bad. This ground also fails. 11. Ground (4): No arguments have been addressed before us regarding the validity of what we might, for brevity, call the Procurement Order or the Declaration Order. But it is said that both orders have been declared void by a single Judge of this Court. Also, at the same time, that his order has been stayed in appeal by a division bench. However that might be, no attack has been made against the Kerala Rice (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1966, breaches of which are the basis of the action against the detenu, the object of the detention being to prevent such breaches by him in the future. Even if the particular orders under which rice and paddy are being procured by the State Government for the purpose of their equitable distribution at fair prices are bad, that cannot and should not stop the State Government from performing its duty of maintaining this essential supply to the community. It can arm itself with fresh statutory powers, or it can even make purchases in the open market. To enable it to do so, it is quite necessary that the private movement of these essential commodities from surplus to deficit areas, which would, of course, artificially push up prices in the surplus areas, should be stopped. Breaches of the Movement Order are thus calculated to prejudice the maintenance of the supply of these essential commodities, and, if the detention of the persons responsible becomes necessary in order to prevent such breaches, that would furnish a valid reason for detention under sub clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-s.(i) of S.3 of the Act. This ground also is without substance. 12. Ground (5): The allegation has been made that the 1st respondent has ordered the detention in order to satisfy local committees known as Popular Committees composed mostly of individuals of low social status and belonging to political parties to which the detenu is opposed and to which he has been refusing contributions. This ground also is without substance. 12. Ground (5): The allegation has been made that the 1st respondent has ordered the detention in order to satisfy local committees known as Popular Committees composed mostly of individuals of low social status and belonging to political parties to which the detenu is opposed and to which he has been refusing contributions. This allegation has been categorically denied by the 1st respondent in Para.14 of his counter affidavit wherein he has stated that no popular Committee had anything whatsoever to do with the action he has taken against the detenu and that no Popular Committee and no member of any such committee has at any time made any representation or complaint to him with regard to the detenu. We see no reason for doubting this denial. 13. It would appear that a case has been registered against the detenu by the Pandikkad Police for breaking through a check post on the night of the 19th January 1968. Also that proceedings have been initiated against him under S.107 of the Criminal Procedure Code and an interim bond taken. It is contended that, in the face of these proceedings, detention under the Act is unnecessary and that the order of detention could have been prompted only by vindictiveness and mala fides. 14. We fail to see any substance in this contention. Investigation by the police with regard to an offence alleged to have been already committed and a bond to keep the peace can hardly prevent a person from indulging in smuggling and black marketing, if indeed he is indulging in such activities. The purpose to be served by the preventive detention cannot in the least be served by these proceedings excepting, of course, if the person concerned is sentenced to imprisonment something which has not yet happened here and we find no basis for the suggestion that the 1st respondent is merely harassing the detenu by taking successive proceedings against him. The ground of mala fides also fails. 15. Grounds (6) & (7) proceed on a misconception as to the scope of judicial review in respect of a detention ordered under the Act and on a confusion between grounds of detention and particulars of the facts on which these grounds are based. The ground of mala fides also fails. 15. Grounds (6) & (7) proceed on a misconception as to the scope of judicial review in respect of a detention ordered under the Act and on a confusion between grounds of detention and particulars of the facts on which these grounds are based. The following quotations from three decisions of the Supreme Court, Shibban Lal v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1954 SC 179 at 180) Puranlal Lakhanpal v. Union of India (AIR 1956 SC 163 at 171) and Naresh Chandra v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1959 SC 1335 ) should suffice to clear both the misconception and the confusion, and it is hardly necessary to refer to any other of the numerous decisions cited at the bar. 16. In Shibban Lal v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1954 SC 179 at 180) it was observed: "It has been repeatedly held by this court that the power to issue a detention order under S.3 of the Preventive Detention Act depends entirely upon the satisfaction of the appropriate authority specified in that section. The sufficiency of the grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be based, provided they have a rational probative value and are not extraneous to the scope or purpose of the legislative provision cannot be challenged in a court of law, except on the ground of 'mala fides'. Vide the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram, AIR 1951 Supreme Court 157. A court of law is not even competent to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu under S.7 of the Act". 17. In Puran Lal Lakhanpal v. Union of India AIR 1956 SC 163 at 171. it was said:) "In State of Bombay v. Alma Ram Sridhar Vaidya 1951 SCR 167 (AIR 1961 SC 1967), this Court has unanimously held that under S.3 of the Act, it is the satisfaction of the appropriate authority which is necessary for an order of detention, and if the grounds, on which the appropriate authority has said that it is so satisfied, have a rational connection with the objects which are to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction cannot be challenged in a court of law except on the ground of mala fides. It has been further held by the majority that c. (5) of Art.22 confers two rights on the detenu, namely, first a right to be informed of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and secondly, to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. If grounds which have a rational connection with the objects mentioned in S.3 are supplied, the first condition is complied with. But the right to make a representation implies that the detenue should have such information as will enable him to make a representation and if the grounds supplied are not sufficient to enable the detenue to make a representation, he can rely on the second right". 18. And Naresh Chandra v. State of West Bengal AIR 1959 SC 1335 after pointing out that the grounds of detention that have to be communicated to the detenu as soon as practicable are the conclusions of fact on which the detention is based and not a complete recital of all the relevant facts, and that if the information supplied to a detenu does not contain sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation, the detenu is entitled to ask for further particulars went on to observe: "Thus, on a consideration of the provisions of S.3 and 7 of the Act, it may be observed that the detenue has to be served with a copy of the order passed by the authority contemplated by sub-s.(2) of S.3, containing, firstly, recitals in terms of one or more of the sub clauses of clauses (a) and (b) of S.3(1), which we may call the 'preamble', and secondly, the grounds contemplated by S.7, namely, the conclusions of fact which have led to the passing of the order of detention, informing the detenue as to why he was being detained. If the grounds do not contain all the particulars necessary for enabling the detenue to make his representation against the order of his detention, he may ask for further particulars of the facts and the authority which passed the order of detention is expected to furnish all that information, subject, of course, to the provisions of sub-s.(2) of S.7; that is to say, the person detained shall not be entitled to the disclosure of such facts as the authority making the order, considers against public interest to disclose. Thus, the order of detention to be served upon the person detained would usually consist of the first two parts, namely, the preamble and the grounds, but it may also consist of the third part, namely, the particulars if and when they are required or found to be necessary. But it has to be noted that the particulars referred to in sub-s.(3) and (4) of S.3, would not be identical with the particulars which we have called the third part of the order. The State Government, as also the Central Government, would naturally, be placed in possession of all the relevant facts and particulars on which the order of detention has been passed. But these particulars may contain such details of facts as may not be communicated in public interest, to the person detained". 19. Both in Ex. R 1 and in his counter affidavit the 1st respondent has stated that he was satisfied that it was necessary to make an order for the detention of the detenu concerned with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. Mala fides having been negatived that establishes the satisfaction required by sub-s.(1) of S.3 of the Act and, further, shows that the object of the detention is a valid object in the terms of that sub-section. As for the grounds or the conclusions of fact on which the order of detention is based, it is clear from Ex. R 2 in each case that the conclusions are that the detenu concerned is a notorious smuggler and black marketer of food grains, that he has in the past indulged in smuggling of food grains thus prejudicing the maintenance of supplies essential to the community, and that it is highly likely that he will continue to do so in the future. There is nothing whatsoever vague about any of these grounds and it cannot be denied that each one of them has a rational connection with the object of the detention, namely, to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies. There is nothing whatsoever vague about any of these grounds and it cannot be denied that each one of them has a rational connection with the object of the detention, namely, to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies. With the sufficiency of the grounds we are not concerned, and if the particulars furnished of the facts on which the grounds are based are not sufficient to enable the detenu to make an effective representation, it is open to him to call for further particulars and the authority concerned, namely, the 1st respondent, would be bound to furnish them. The fact of his satisfaction and the grounds for the satisfaction are matters within the personal knowledge, indeed the exclusive personal knowledge, of the 1st respondent, and the counter affidavit filed by him is proof of those matters. In to the truth or otherwise of the facts on which the grounds are based, the court is not competent to inquire, and that these facts, as stated in the counter affidavit, are matters not within the personal knowledge of the 1st respondent, is of no consequence. These grounds also fail. 20. In the result we dismiss these petitions but make no order as to costs.