JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - I agree with the order proposed by brother Satish Chandra, J., but with respect disagree with him in that the word "Board" used in Section 95 (a) of the U. P. Municipalities Act includes the "President", and hence the representation made by the President under Section 47-A (1) (a) of the Act for the supersession of the Board, though addressed to the State Government, has to be forwarded through the District Magistrate. The Board (Municipal Board) consists of the President and members, but what the President does, or how he acts, is not necessarily for or on behalf of the Board. As provided in Section 47-A (1) (a) of the Act, on the passing of the motion of non-confidence, the President has the option either to resign his office or to represent to the State Government to supersede the Board. Resignation from the office is the natural result of the majority decision of the Board, but the representation for supersession cannot be regarded to be the wish or desire of the Board where the President does not act under the statutory powers or the powers delegated to him by the Board, he may, at occasions, act against the wishes of the Board. Consequently, the President, who is a constituent of the Board, does not always represent the Board, and he cannot be classed as the Board. The defnition of the term "Board" also leads us to the same inference. The term "Board" includes "any member, officer or servant of a Board authorised or required by or under this Act to exercise the power or perform the duty." Where the President acts on his own and is not exercising any statutory or delegated power, to place him in the category of the Board shall lead to confusion. 2. Section 95 (a) of the Act gives power to the State Government to make rules to regulate and govern the correspondence between the Board and the State Government or its officers; while Section 51-A empowers the State Government to prescribe how the President shall address the State Government or any of its Department on any question of general public interest. In case the term "Board" used in Section 95 included the President of the Board, there would have been no necessity to incorporate Section 51-A in the Act. In case the term "Board" used in Section 95 included the President of the Board, there would have been no necessity to incorporate Section 51-A in the Act. The mode of correspondence between the President and the State Government could also be prescribed under Section 95. When the legislature considered it necessary to incorporate Section 51-A in the Act enabling the State Government to prescribe the mode of correspondence between the President and the State Government, the Courts of law shall not be justified to extend the meaning of the term "Board" for purposes of Section 95. 3. The rules framed by the State Government under Section 95 (a) cannot be utilised to interpret Section 95 (a) . The rules are subordinate to the enactment and cannot extend its scope. Any rule framed beyond the rule making power shall be without jurisdiction. Consequently, the Courts shall not he justified in extending the meaning of the term "Board" simply because correspondence between the Board and the State Government concerning the supersession or dissolution of the Board has been prescribed therein, and what the President is advising under Section 47-A is the supersession of the Board. I am thus of opinion that any rule framed under Section 95 (a) cannot regulate the resignation submitted by the President under Section 47-A or the representation made by him for the supersession of the Board. 4. However, on a liberal interpretation of Section 47-A (I) of the Act, in order to give effect to the intention of the legislature, a representation made to the State Government under clause (a) thereof, must be made through the District Magistrate, or, in any case, a representation handed over to him within three days of the communication of the passing of the motion of non-confidence shall be a representation made within the prescribed period irrespective of when the representation reaches the State Government, and such a representation cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. 5. 5. Section 47-A (1) runs as below :- "If a motion of non-confidence in the president has been passed by the board and communicated to the President in accordance with the provisions of Section 87-A, the President shall- (a) within three days of the receipt of such communication either resign his office or represent to the State Government to supersede the board, stating his reasons therefor, and (b) unless he resigns under clause (a) , ceases to hold office of President on the expiry of three days after the date of receipt of such communication, and thereupon a casual vacancy shall be deemed to have occurred within the meaning of Section 44-A : Provided that if a representation has been made in accordance with clause (a) , the Board shall not elect a President until 'an order has been made by the State Government under sub-sec. (3)." 6. It shall be found that the sub-section does not, lay down to whom the letter of resignation or the representation shall be presented. It is only by implication that it can be said that the representation addressed to the State Government should be delivered to the State Government. 7. It is a settled rule of the interpretation of statutes that- "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies structure of the sentence ............. Where the main objection and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Nevertheless, the Courts are very reluctant to substitute words in a statute, or to add words to it, and it has been said that they will only do so where there is a repugnancy to good sense." (See Maxwell on Statutes (10th Edition) page 229) . 8. The rule on this point was expressed by Denning, L. J., in Seaford Court Estates, Ltd. v. Asher, 1949-2 All England Law Reports 155 at page 164 as below :- "When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. 8. The rule on this point was expressed by Denning, L. J., in Seaford Court Estates, Ltd. v. Asher, 1949-2 All England Law Reports 155 at page 164 as below :- "When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament ...... and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature .......... A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out ? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." 9. The above observations were quoted with approval in M. Pentiah v. Muddalti Veeramallappa, A.I.R. 1961 (SC) 1107 and Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, A.I.R. 1955 (SC) 830. 10. With the same intention in view the Court can, in construing the section, supply some words to make the meaning of the statute clears it will naturally prefer the construction which is mere in consonance with reason and justice (See Ramaswamy Nadar v. The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1958 (SC) 56) . 11. In Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf U.P., A.I.R. 1959 (SC) 198, the words "any party to an arbitration agreement'', occurring in Section 33 of the Arbitration Act were taken to mean "a person who is alleged to be a party to an arbitration agreement". While departing from the literal construction of the expression, Hon'ble Gajendragadkar, J. observed as below :- "It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a statute courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective; an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute." " .................. These decisions illustrate the principle that where the literal meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative." 12. Similarly, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, A.I.R. 1961 (SC) 1500 the expression "the date of the Collector's award" was held to mean the date when the award is communicated to or is known by the party whether actually or constructively. 13. The rule laid down above is an exception to the general rule that the enactment must be construed literally, i.e., where the language is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the legislature must be judged from the words used, and not on assumption that its intention was different. Necessity of liberal construction arises only when a literal interpretation of the provision will negative the intention of the legislature, or would cause some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended. In such circumstances alone, the Courts of law shall be justified in modifying the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence, or to add, delete or modify words used in the statute. 14. This leads us to the consideration of the material provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act, what intention of the legislature can be judged from the language of the enactment ? Will a literal construction negative the manifest intention of the legislature and also whether such a construction shall cause inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended ? 15. As already indicated above, Section 47-A (I) does not lay down to whom the President shall submit his resignation from office, whether to the Board itself or to the District Magistrate or the State Government. Section 87-A of the Act lays down how a motion expressing non-confidence in the President shall be made and the procedure to be followed thereafter. Sub-sec. (11-A) thereof casts a duty upon the District Magistrate to forward to the State Government, as soon as may be after three days of the receipt of the copies mentioned in sub-sec. Section 87-A of the Act lays down how a motion expressing non-confidence in the President shall be made and the procedure to be followed thereafter. Sub-sec. (11-A) thereof casts a duty upon the District Magistrate to forward to the State Government, as soon as may be after three days of the receipt of the copies mentioned in sub-sec. (11), together, in the event of the motion of non-confidence having been carried, with a report whether or not the President has forwarded his resignation in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47 and 47-A. It is by virtue of the reference to both Sections 47 and 47-A in the above sub-section that it is contended that Section 47 shall apply to the resignation under Sec 47-A on the motion of non-confidence in the President being passed, and that, as provided in Section 47, the resignation shall be forwarded to the State Government or the Prescribed" Authority, as the case may be, through the District Magistrate. If this view is accepted, i.e. the whole of Section 47 is made applicable, it will lead to a very anomalous position. Clause (b) of Section 47-A (1) does not apply to the resignation submitted under Section 47-A on the motion of non-confidence being passed, and if Section 47-A is literally construed, it shall be possible for the President to function as such even after the motion of non-confidence has been passed, and he can so function for so long as the resignation is not accepted by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority, as the case may be. Under sub-sec. (2) of Sec 47, the President shall be deemed to have vacated his office on receipt by the Board of information that the resignation has been accepted by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority. The acceptance of the resignation by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority cannot reach the Board for an appreciable period. Under sub-sec. (2) of Sec 47, the President shall be deemed to have vacated his office on receipt by the Board of information that the resignation has been accepted by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority. The acceptance of the resignation by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority cannot reach the Board for an appreciable period. It would, therefore, mean that if the President does not submit his resignation and instead represents to the State Government to supersede the Board, or the President takes no action under clause (a) , neither resigns his office nor makes a representation to the State Government, he shall cease to hold office of the President on the expiry of three days after the date of receipt of the communication of the motion of non-confidence having been passed; but if he resigns his office, he can hold the office for such period that the intimation of the acceptance of the resignation by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority is not received by the Board. Further, under sub-sec. (2) of Section 47, the State Government or the Prescribed Authority has a discretion to accept or not to accept the resignation. Is it to be assumed that the State Government can force the President on the Board even after the passing of the motion of non-confidence ? 16. Article 14 of the Constitution permits classification, but the classification must be reasonable and co-related to the nexus. The President of the Board does not hold the office for a fixed period. There is no provision in the U. P. Municipalities Act laying down that he cannot be removed from his office during the period of his term even after a motion of non-confidence is passed against him. Consequently, the President of the Board cannot functions as such after the passing of the motion of non-confidence, irrespective of whether he decides to resign his office or to represent to the State Government to supersede the Board. The State Government or the Prescribed Authority does not, therefore, have the power to refuse to accept the resignation, and, in the circumstances, the resignation submitted by the President must take effect forthwith. The second anomaly can arise when the President resigns in the meeting convened for consideration of the motion of non-confidence, but before the motion has been put to vote. The second anomaly can arise when the President resigns in the meeting convened for consideration of the motion of non-confidence, but before the motion has been put to vote. In such circumstances, the President shall be resigning under Section 47, and such a resignation shall take effect only after it has been accepted by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority and information of the acceptance is received by the Board. 17. The object of Section 47-A is evident that once the President loses the confidence of the majority of the Board, he cannot function as such for more than three days: it is a different thing that in the special circumstances the State Government may decide to supersede the Board. Classification based on the option exercised by the President will, therefore, not be reasonable and such classification shall in no case be related to the object of the enactment. The classification based on the option to be exercised by the President shall, therefore, be unconstitutional. In these circumstances, the words "unless he resigns under clause (a) " used in clause (b) of Section 47-A (1) shall have to be disregarded while interpreting this clause. 18. When a provision has been poorly drafted, it cannot be said that the remaining part thereof is free from any defect. The Court of law can, therefore, suitably modify or interpret the remaining part of the provision to give effect to the intention of the legislature. 19. Even otherwise a literal construction cannot be given to the provisions of clause (a) . Clause (a) of Section 47-A (1) of the Act gives the option to the President, on the motion of non-confidence being passed against him, either, to resign his office, or to represent to the State Government to supersede the Board. In the representation the President has to give his reasons why he is recommending the supersession of the Board. The right given to the President to make a representation for the supersession of the Board is a valuable right, which he can enforce, if necessary. The recent experience has shown that legislators allotted a party ticket leave the party and join another political party or group. The right given to the President to make a representation for the supersession of the Board is a valuable right, which he can enforce, if necessary. The recent experience has shown that legislators allotted a party ticket leave the party and join another political party or group. If the President of the Board is a conscientious and impartial person, who refuses to show favour to the members of the Board, he can lose the majority not on account of any wrong act on his pan, but on account of his impartial and proper conduct. The replacement of the President shall not, in such circumstances, be for the efficient working of the Board. Consequently the State Government can consider the supersession of the Board. The right to make a representation for the supersession of the Board is thus a valuable right which a President of the Board may like to exercise and on such representation the State Government may decided to supersede the Board. 20. A representation to the State Government recommending the supersession of the Board without giving reasons can serve no useful purpose and can be summarily rejected by the State Government, all the more, when under clause (a) of Section 47-A (1) , it is necessary for the President to state his reasons for the supersession of the Board in his representation. 21. The preparation of a reasoned representation for the supersession of the Board will take some time. It can, therefore, be assumed that the legislature considered it proper to grant three clays for the purpose. If the representation has to be presented to the State Government at its Headquarters, either to the Secretary of the Department or to the Minister, the President shall have virtually no time available for the drafting and preparation of the representation. The letter sent by the District Magistrate of Aligarh forwarding the representation of the President took four days to reach the State Government. The letter was posted by the District Magistrate on 29-8-1968 and reached the State Government on 2-9-1968. There are many districts situate far away from Lucknow than Aligarh. Consequently, if it is necessary that the State Government must receive the re-presentation within three days of the communication of the passing of the motion of non-confidence, it shall be necessary for the President to send a messenger to Luck-now to deliver the representation to the State Government. There are many districts situate far away from Lucknow than Aligarh. Consequently, if it is necessary that the State Government must receive the re-presentation within three days of the communication of the passing of the motion of non-confidence, it shall be necessary for the President to send a messenger to Luck-now to deliver the representation to the State Government. There are many Municipal Boards in far off places and the messenger may take 2 or 3 days in reaching Lucknow. If the Head-quarters of the Board is at a place which is cut off, say, during the winter or rains, it shall not be possible for the messenger to reach Luck-now within 3 or 4 days. In such a case the President shall, for no fault of his, be unable to make a representation. for the supersession of the Board which he could, as a matter of right, under clause (a) of Section 47-A (1) of the Act. Similarly most of the Presidents shall not have more than a day available for the preparation of the representation. For the recommendation for the supersession of the Board, it may be necessary for the President to inspect the records of the Board before making a detailed representation. Inspection will take some time; hence a too technical view of Section 47-A (I) (a) shall, one may say, divest the President of a valuable right, and make this part of the statute meaningless or ineffective. As observed in Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf U.P., "an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute". The remedy can be so advanced by two modes of interpretation of clause (a) of Section 47-A (1) , either to hold that the resignation or the representation can be submitted to the State Government through the District Magistrate, and if the representation is made and handed over to the District Magistrate within three days of the receipt of the communication of the passing of the motion of non-confidence, it is a re-presentation made within the time prescribed by the above section. The other mode of interpretation is that clause (a) does not lay down the mode of presentation and hence a representation sent by post or delivered to the District Magistrate within three days, is a representation made within the prescribed period. 22. The other mode of interpretation is that clause (a) does not lay down the mode of presentation and hence a representation sent by post or delivered to the District Magistrate within three days, is a representation made within the prescribed period. 22. Section 47-A does not lay down to whom the resignation, as a consequence of the passing of the motion of non-confidence, shall be submitted. Even sub-sec. (11-A) of Section 87-A of the Act is silent on this point. In fact, the words "has forwarded his resignation" would suggest that the resignation has not to be handed over to the District Magistrate. If the resignation was to be handed over to the District Magistrate sub-sec. (11-A) would have made a provision for forwarding the resignation to the State Government or the Prescribed Authority. There would have been no provision for the District Magistrate's re-port whether or not the President had forwarded his resignation. If the President submits his resignation direct to the State Government, it shall not be possible for the District Magistrate to submit his report without ascertaining facts from the President himself, and if the President is not available, no report under sub-sec. 11-A can be promptly forwarded to the State Government. However, to give effect to the provisions of sub-sec. (11-A) , it can be laid down that to whomsoever the letter of resignation may be addressed, it shall be handed over to the District Magistrate. If a departure from the literal interpretation of the enactment can be made in respect of the resignation, a simliar departure can be made in respect of the representation for the supersession of the Board. In fact, the same rule can be applied to such a representation. In other words, the representation to the State Government for the supersession of the Board can be handed over to the District Magistrate. 23. As a literal interpretation of clause (a) of Section 47-A (1) is likely to negative the intention of the legislature and to make this part of the statute meaningless or in-effective, the Courts of law can, to carry out the intention of the legislature and to give effect to all the parts of the enactment, add words laying down that the resignation or representation shall be sent to the State Government through the District Magistrate. If, for some reason, the addition of such words is repugnant to the principles of judicial interpretation of statutes, it can be held that clause (a) of Section 47-A (I) does not lay down the mode of presentation and -. if the resignation or representation is sent by post within three days or is, within this period. handed over to the District Magistrate, who represents the State Government in the district, it shall be proper presentation and such a representation cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. 24. The delivery of the representation to the District Magistrate within the prescribed period can be upheld on another ground also. It is not necessary that the representation to the State Government under Section 47-A must be delivered to the State Government at its Head-quarters: it can be handed over to its authorised agent wherever he may be. It is true that the State Government does not appear to have passed an order in writing authorising the District Magistrates to accept on its behalf representations under Section 47-A; but as conceded by the State Government, there is a long standing practice to deliver such representations to the District Magistrate and the representations so delivered to the District Magistrate within three days were accepted to have been made within the prescribed period. On account of this old practice amounting to usage, it can be said that the District Magistrate had the implied authority of the State Government to accept on its behalf the representations under Section 47-A of the Act. In this view of matter, the present representation delivered by the President to the District Magistrate of Aligarh could be held to be a representation duly delivered to the State Government within the prescribed period of three days. 25. I am thus of opinion that the representation under Section 47-A made in this case and delivered to the District Magistrate within three days was made within time which the State Government could not reject on the ground of limitation. Hence no election of the President can be held till an order has been made by the State Government under sub-sec. (3) of Section 47-A of the Act. Satish Chandra, J.- These two petitions are under Article 226 of the Constitution. Writ Petition No. 3797 of 1968 has been filed by the President of the Municipal Board, Sikandra Rao. Hence no election of the President can be held till an order has been made by the State Government under sub-sec. (3) of Section 47-A of the Act. Satish Chandra, J.- These two petitions are under Article 226 of the Constitution. Writ Petition No. 3797 of 1968 has been filed by the President of the Municipal Board, Sikandra Rao. Writ Petition 3974 of 1968 has been instituted by three members of the same Board. Both these petitions were at the hearing pressed for the adjudication of one question only: whether a representation by the President of a Municipal Board under Section 47-A, U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, to the State Government to supersede the Board could validly be presented to the District Magistrate. 2. On 20th August, 1968, it was declared that a motion of no confidence against Sri Ram Gopal Gupta, the President of the Board, had been carried. The same day this declaration was communicated to the President. The out-voted President did not resign, but on 23rd August, 1968, served on the District Magistrate, Aligarh, a representation addressed to the State Government to the effect that the Government may supersede the Board. The District Magistrate appears to have sent this representation to the Government along with his letter dated 29th August, 1968. The representation was received by the Government on 2nd September, 1968. A fortnight later, namely on 17th September, 1968, the Government rejected the representation on the sole ground that it had not been given within the prescribed period of three days. 3. The petitioners challenge this view. According to them the presentation or service of the representation on the District Magistrate was due compliance with the requirements of the provisions of Section 47-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 4. The controversy principally turns upon an interpretation of Section 47-A and Section 95 of the Act. 3. The petitioners challenge this view. According to them the presentation or service of the representation on the District Magistrate was due compliance with the requirements of the provisions of Section 47-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 4. The controversy principally turns upon an interpretation of Section 47-A and Section 95 of the Act. Section 47-A reads :- "47-A. Resignation of President on vote of non-confidence- (1) if a motion of non-confidence in the President has been passed by the board and communicated to the President in accordance with the provisions of Section 87-A, the President shall- (a) Within three days of the (receipt) such communication either resign his office or represent to the State Government to (supersede) the board, stating his reasons therefor, and (b) unless he resigns under clause (a) , cease "to hold office of President on the expiry of three days after the date or receipt of such communication, and thereupon a casual vacancy shall be deemed to have occurred within the meaning of Section 44-A : 5. Provided that if a representation has been made in accordance with clause (a) , the Board shall not elect a President until an order has been made by the State Government under sub-sec. (3) (2) (xxxx) (3) If a representation has been made in accordance with sub-sec. (1), the State Government may, after considering the same (either supersede the Board for such period, not exceeding the remainder of the term of the Board, as may be specified, or reject the representation) ...................." 6. The relevant part of Section 95 reads :- "95. Conduct of correspondence, accounts, budgets, etc. The following matters shall be regulated and governed by rules made by the State Government, namely- (a) the intermediate office or offices, if any, through which correspondence bet-ween boards and the State Government or officers of the State Government and representations by the board addressed to the State Government shall pass; (b) ...... (c) ....... (d) ....... (e) the accounts to be kept by boards, the manner in which accounts shall be audited and published, and the power of auditors in respect of disallowance and surcharge; (f) ...... (g) ...... (h) ...... (i) the returns, statements, and re-ports to be submitted by boards; and (j) regular periodical inspection of office and works of the Board." 7. Under clause (a) of sub-sec. (g) ...... (h) ...... (i) the returns, statements, and re-ports to be submitted by boards; and (j) regular periodical inspection of office and works of the Board." 7. Under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 47-A the President can within three days of the receipt of the communication, that the motion of non-confidence has been passed by the Board, either resign his office or represent to the State Government to supersede the Board. If he makes such a representation he ceases to hold the office of the President on the expiry of three days after the receipt of the communication; but, under the Proviso the Board is not to elect a President till the disposal of the representation by the State Government. The President can represent to the State Government but the section is silent as to the mode of communication with the State Government. Under Section 47 of the Act when a President wishes to resign he has to forward his written resignation through the District Magistrate to the State Government, where he is the President of the Board of city. Similarly under Section 39 a member of a Board wishing to resign has to deliver the resignation at the office of the District Magistrate Contrasting these differing provisions G. C. Mathur, J. in R.K. Verma v. State of U.P., 1966 ALJ 1091 at page 1097 held : "It is therefore, clear that, wherever the Legislature intended a communication to be made to the State Government through the District Magistrate, it has made specific provision in that regard. In sub-sec. (1) of Section 47-A, there is no provision that the representation may be made through the District Magistrate. The conclusion is inevitable that a representation under sub-sec. (1) of Section 47-A must be made directly to the State Government within the time prescribed." 8. With respect, the omission of the words "through the District Magistrate" in clause (a) of Section 47-A (1) would not necessarily exclude the District Magistrate from being an agency on whom the representation meant for the State Government may be served, if otherwise the District Magistrate is authorised to receive such a representation. Further, such an omission would not inevitably mean that the representation can be made only directly to the State Government. Further, such an omission would not inevitably mean that the representation can be made only directly to the State Government. In R. K. Vertna's case it was observed : "No rule has been brought to my notice under which a representation under sub-sec. (1) of Section 47-A may be forwarded through the District Magistrate." 9. Mr. Kacker invited our attention to certain rules which according to him were germane to this matter. I shall deal with them presently. 10. Section 95 authorises the State Government to frame rules to regulate and govern the matters mentioned in it. Clause (a) speaks of the intermediate office or offices through which correspondence between boards and the State Government or officers of the State Government and representations by the Board addressed to the State Government shall pass. 11. For the respondents it was urged that clause (a) speaks of "board". The terms "board' has been defined by sub-sec. (1) of the Act which states :- " 'Board' means a Municipal Board and shall include, in any case where a power is expressed as being conferred or a duty as being imposed on a Board, a committee appointed by a Board and any member, officer or servant of a Board authorised or required by or under this Act to exercise the power or perform the duty." 12. On the basis of this definition it was submitted that the term "board" in clause (a) of Section 95 would refer to the Municipal Board as such or to the committee, member, officer or servant of Board in relation to the powers and duties which have been conferred on the Board but which are authorised or required to be exercised or performed by them. The Municipalities Act confers powers. functions and duties on members, officer and servants of a Board independently and in their ex offico capacity also. In such matters the member, officer or servant of a Board would not be a Board as defined. Under Section 47-A the President as such has been given the power to make a representation to the State Government to supersede the Board. While making such a representation the President would not be a 'Board' within the meaning of the definition clause, and so within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 95. Under Section 47-A the President as such has been given the power to make a representation to the State Government to supersede the Board. While making such a representation the President would not be a 'Board' within the meaning of the definition clause, and so within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 95. The rules framed by the State Government under Section 95 (a) would hence not regulate or govern the correspondence between the President and the State Government. The submission is sound in so far as it goes, but it omits to consider the opening part of Section 2 which says : "In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context". 13. The definitions given in Section 2 are to prevail unless there is something repugnant in the subject or the context where the relevant term has been used. 14. The proper approach in considering the definition clause was indicated by the Supreme Court in The Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Fraser and Ross, A.I.R. 1960 SC 971. In was held :- "It is well settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context." Wanchoo, J. speaking for the Court then continued to observe : "Therefore in finding out the meaning of the word 'insurer' in various sections of the Act, the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause. But this is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word has been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. In view of this qualification, the court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning in-tended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances." 15. The principal rule appears to be that the legislative intent controls the legislative definition. If the definition does not conflict with the intention of the legislature it must be given effect to; but to give the interpretation clause precedence where the two cannot be harmonised, would operate to make the ancillary portion of the statute superior to the primary portion. The statutes 'meaning, in all probability would be distorted, and legislative meaning defeated (vide Crawford 364 and Legislation and Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup, 1968 Edition, p. 169) . 16. Keeping these principles in view it has to be seen whether Section 95 has used the word "Board" in the sense in which it has been defined in the Act or in some other sense. Under Section 9 of the Act a Board consists of a President and the elected members. The U. P. Municipalities Act provides for officers and servants of the Board and confers specified powers on them as such. In the course of the performance of their powers and duties as such officers and servants they have to correspond with the State Government also wherever it is so prescribed. For instance under Section 51-A the President can address the State Government on any question of general public interest. Under Section 47-A the President can represent to the State Government to supersede the Board. Section 95 (a) is the only provision for regulating the mode in which correspondence may be conducted with the State Government. Obviously the reason for conferring this rule making power on the State Government appears to be to enable it to conduct its affairs in relation to Municipal Board in a defined and an orderly manner. If the rule making power is confined to regulate the mode of correspondence by only some of the functionaries of the Board (namely those who come within the definition) and not of others, though similarly situate, it would expose the State Government to confusion and may impede instead of advancing the purpose of the provision. If the rule making power is confined to regulate the mode of correspondence by only some of the functionaries of the Board (namely those who come within the definition) and not of others, though similarly situate, it would expose the State Government to confusion and may impede instead of advancing the purpose of the provision. The functionaries outside the definition would be at liberty to devise their own methods. Some may send delegates or processions of men to the State Government to convey their representations, others may use the post or the telegraph. Some others may route it through the central or other State Governments, especially if there is some juicy scandal about the State Government to expose. The State Government may find its administration and efficiency put out of gear. It appears to 'me that the rule making power was intended to cover the field of correspondence with the State Government in its entirety. The aim and aspiration of the legislature would be fulfilled if the word "Board" in clause (a) of Section 95 is read as meaning not only the Board as defined, but also the various functionaries of the Board who are required or authorised to correspond with the State Government. 17. Clause (e) of Section 95 relates to the accounts to be kept by the Board. Clause (1) deals with the returns, statements and reports to be submitted by the Board. It is well-known that Municipal Boards have various Departments like Health Department, Tax Department etc. These departments have their own budget and accounts. Each department has to prepare returns, statements and reports. But, if the Board in these clauses is read in the light of the definition, the various departments would not be the Board, because the definition refers to the Municipal Board as such or to a committee, member, officer or servant of a Board only. A department has not been included in the definition clause. According to the definition the rules could regulate the accounts or the returns, statements and reports of the Board as such or of the committee, member, officer or servant of the Board only. That will exclude the various departments from the controlling power of the State Government in relation to these matters. Plainly, the subject and the context of Section 95 is repugnant to the definition. That will exclude the various departments from the controlling power of the State Government in relation to these matters. Plainly, the subject and the context of Section 95 is repugnant to the definition. The object of the Legislature would be achieved if the word "Board" is understood as including its various functionaries and departments. 18. Clause (a) of Section 47-A (1) requires the President to make his choice within three days either to resign or to make the representation. Evidently, the Legislature has given the President three days to think over the matter and to make up his mind. If the interpretation advanced on behalf of the respondents and accepted in R. K. Verma's case be correct, the poor President would never have three days at his own disposal. If he has to make the representation directly to the State Government, then obviously his representation must reach the State Government within the prescribed three days. It is well known that the seat of the Government is at Lucknow and there are hundreds of Municipal Boards scattered throughout the State. The mode of communication not having been prescribed, the President can in each case devise his own method of delivering his representation to the State Government. One President may send it through a messenger by the fastest available train or taxi, yet it may take a day or more, depending on the distance to be covered. Another, but not so affluent, President may perforce have to use the postal agency. If he does so, he would run the risk that his representation may not reach the Government within the prescribed time. In the present case the District Magistrate sent the representation to the State Government on 29th August, 1968, and it reached the Government on 2nd September, 1968. The District Magistrate must have sent it through post, but between Aligarh and Lucknow the communication took four days. If a President is to use this method, his representation would get time barred without any fault of his own. Further, many Municipal Boards are situate in outlying and difficult to reach parts of the State. It may well become physically impossible for the President of a Municipal Board like Chamoli of Uttar Pradesh to make his representation reach the State Government in three days. Further, many Municipal Boards are situate in outlying and difficult to reach parts of the State. It may well become physically impossible for the President of a Municipal Board like Chamoli of Uttar Pradesh to make his representation reach the State Government in three days. In all such cases the object of Section 47-A would be completely frustrated; and practically in every case the President would not have three days to himself. That is, in my opinion, a circumstance which compels one to read the word "Board" as used in Section 95 (a) in the wider sense. So read, the President would comply with the requirements of Section 47-A to make the representation within three days by delivering it to the District Magistrate who is normally in the same city or town or in a nearby one (under the rules, which will be noticed presently, such representations are to be delivered to the District Magistrates) 19. It has been admitted by the State Government that the practice of receiving the representations under Section 47-A through the District Magistrate has developed ever-since and is generally followed because that is the normal channel of correspondence "Prescribed". In R. K. Verma's case, brother G. C. Mathur pertinently observed that he was very doubtful whether on the basis of such practice it was permissible for the court to add the words "through the District Magistrate" after the words "represent to the State Government" in clause (a) of sub-sec. (I) of Section 47-A. There was some argument that clause (b) of Sec-47-A creates anomalies by introducing the phrase "unless he resigns under clause (a) " and that clause would work properly only if this phrase is held redundant. Supposing it so, that would be no reason to introduce the words "through the District Magistrate" in clause (a) which is an independent provision dealing with a different aspect. There is no anomaly or absurdity in it. In seeking to add such words in clause (a) the court would be entering the Prohibited domain of legislation. Supposing it so, that would be no reason to introduce the words "through the District Magistrate" in clause (a) which is an independent provision dealing with a different aspect. There is no anomaly or absurdity in it. In seeking to add such words in clause (a) the court would be entering the Prohibited domain of legislation. But the existence of this long established practice would suggest that the State Government and all concerned always thought that the term "Board" in Section 95 (a) included its President and so the rules prescribed thereunder applied to the representations made by him under Section 47-A. If the teen "Board" in Section 95 is understood in the wider significance this wholesome practice would gain validity in law. 20. The objective sought to be attained by Section 95, the ambit and context of the subject matter provided in clause (a) , the practical reality of the varying time required for reaching the seat of the Government and the settled practice acted upon for long by all concerned, impel me to hold that the term "Board" has not been used in Section 95 in the restricted sense given in the definition clause, but has a wider connotation. It includes the President of the Board. The communications which the Municipalities Act requires him to address to the State Government would be governed and regulated by the rules framed under Section 95 (a). 21. The State Government has framed rules under clause (a) of Section 95. They are printed at page 339 of the Municipal Manual. The rules as amended by notification No. 2253-F/XI-A-1014-57 dated 23rd October, 1958, provide by rule 1 that all correspondence of the Board with the Government shall pass through the office of the District Magistrate. Rule 2 provides that the correspondence between the Board and the State Government shall be transmitted by the District Magistrate along with his comments, if any. Under the second proviso the correspondence in relation to proposals regarding, inter alia, the dissolution or supersession of the Board is to be transmitted by the District Magistrate to the office of the Commissioner and the latter is to submit such correspondence to the State Government along with his comments. Under the second proviso the correspondence in relation to proposals regarding, inter alia, the dissolution or supersession of the Board is to be transmitted by the District Magistrate to the office of the Commissioner and the latter is to submit such correspondence to the State Government along with his comments. The rules, therefore, contemplate that proposals regarding supersession of the Board is to reach the State Government through the District Magistrate and the Commissioner, and is to be accompanied with their respective comments. 22. In view of the wider connotation of the word "Board" in Section 95, the use of the same word "Board.' in the rules would also include the President of the Board. Thus, the rules provide that a proposal by the President regarding the supersession of the Board shall be presented to the District Magistrate. The position would, there- , fore, be that when the President desires to make a representation to the State Government to supersede the Board under clause (a) of Section 47-A(1) , he is required by the rules to present it to the District Magistrate. The matter is thereafter beyond his reach. The District Magistrate is required by the rules to send it to the Commissioner with his comments wherefrom it has to go to the State Government. Presentation to the District Magistrate would be due compliance of representing to the State Government, under Section 47-A. 23. It was then urged for the respondents that in the present case the President received the communication of the passing of the no confidence motion on 20th August, 1968. His representation to supersede the Board was served on the District. Magistrate on 23rd August, 1968, that is to say on the fourth day. Section 47-A requires the President to represent to the State Government within three days of the receipt of such a communication. It was urged that the word used is "of" and not "from". Section 9 of the Central General Clauses Act would hence not apply, and the date of receipt of the communication could not be excluded in computing the period of three days. 24. Section 110 (3) (c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, requires an application for substitution to be presented within 14 days of the publication of the notice of withdrawal. 24. Section 110 (3) (c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, requires an application for substitution to be presented within 14 days of the publication of the notice of withdrawal. This provision was considered by a Bench of this Court in Kashi Nath Pandey v. Shibban Lal Saxena, A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 54. V. Bhargava, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench observed :- "There would, of course, have been no difficulty at all if, in Section 110 (3) (c) of the Representation of the People Act, the word used had been 'from' instead of the word 'of. Had the language been that the application for substitution had to be presented within 14 days 'from' such date, no argument could at all have been raised as Section 9 of the Central General Clauses Act would have applied under which the day of publication would have been excluded. A slight confusion has arisen because the Legislature used the word 'of' instead of the ward 'from'. However, we have also to take into account the principle laid down in Section 12 (1) of the Limitation Act. The principle contained in Section 12 (1) is that 'in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded'. Under Section 110 (3) (c) of the Representation of the People Act the period of 14 days has to be computed from the date of publication of the notice of withdrawal even though the word 'from' is not used and the word 'of is used." 25. This authority is in all fours with the Present case. Even though the word "of" has been used in Section 47-A, the date of receipt of the communication will have to he ex-eluded. If 20th August, 1968, is excluded, the representation made on 23rd August, 1968, was within the requisite three days. 26. In the present case the State Government rejected the representation on the ground that it was not made within three days. The State Government was dearly in error in taking that view. The representation to the State Government could validly be served on the District Magistrate. It was served on him within the prescribed three days. It was incumbent upon the State Government to "consider the same under sub-sec. The State Government was dearly in error in taking that view. The representation to the State Government could validly be served on the District Magistrate. It was served on him within the prescribed three days. It was incumbent upon the State Government to "consider the same under sub-sec. (3) of Section 47-A. The order rejecting the representation without considering it was illegal and invalid. 27. Under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Section 47-A the Board cannot elect a President until an order has been made by the State Government upon the representation, under sub-sec. (3) . So, till the State Government considers the representation and passes an appropriate order, the Board cannot elect a President. From the affidavits filed in the present petitions it is clear that the authorities have already fixed dates for nomination, withdrawal and polling for the election of a President. This was premature. 28. I would, therefore, allow the petitions, quash the order of the State Government dated 17th September, 1968, and direct the respondents not to hold the election of the president until an order has been made by the State Government under sub-sec. (3) of Section 47-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Costs on parties. By The Court-Both the Writ Petitions Nos. 3797 and 3974 of 1968 are allowed and the order dated 17-9-1968 of the State Government rejecting the representation of the President on the ground of limitation is quashed. It is further ordered that the respondents, namely, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the District Magistrate of Aligarh and the Municipal Board of Sikandra Rao, shall not hold election of the President until an order has been made by the State Government under sub-sec. (3) of Section 47-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Costs on parties.