Judgment :- RAMAPRASADA RAO J. On application made by the assessee under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 66(1) of the Income-tax Act and 25(1) of the Expenditure-tax Act, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred the following common question for our decision : "The Tribunal passed a consolidated order in the appeals against the assessments respectively made under the Income-tax Act and the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 and against the assessment under the Expenditure-tax Act for 1961-62. In all the appeals the Tribunal sustained the assessment made on the assessee in the status of an individual. The assessee, late R. Sridharan, was a member of a Hindu undivided family, along with his father and brothers. On a partition between the assessee, his brothers and father, a block of shares in T. V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Private Limited and three other limited companies were allotted to his share. At the time of the partition he was not married. On June 24, 1956, he married an Austrian lady, Rosa Maria Steinbchler, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 The institution of a joint Hindu family is peculiar to Hindu jurisprudence and has its origin in ancient orthodox texts and writings of Smritikars. Though it originated in the propagation of the theory of despotism and autoray in the father, yet by efflux of time, such a concept considerably sloped down so as to confer equal rights on his sons by birth. The induction of partners by birth into the family considerably whittled down the absolute power of the father. Several other inroads into such unitary rights and privileges of the father, which incursions had to be made with the growth of society and the appreciation of the value of individual rights, resulted in the enlargement of the body constituting the joint Hindu family. This body, which is a creature of law, enfolds within it the lineal male descendants of a common ancestor and includes their mothers, wives or widows and unmarried daughters. Joint family status is ordinarily the result of birth or affiliation by adoption or marriage and need not necessarily be linked with the possession of join family property. All members constituting the family have no equal rights, such as the daughter or a maintenance holder. The march of the personal law amongst Hindus has been from time to time refined by passive and provocative judicial precedents. All members constituting the family have no equal rights, such as the daughter or a maintenance holder. The march of the personal law amongst Hindus has been from time to time refined by passive and provocative judicial precedents. From ancient times, even an illegitimate son was not in any sense considered as quasi nullis filius although he did not share and had no coparcenary right in the joint family estate. He had a recognised, though lower, status in the family of his father and he was bound to be maintained from and out of the family estate. In fact, the principle appears to be that the disqualification is only as regards the sharing of the family estate, but it did not involve the disqualification to be maintained four of that estate. The above principle is unexceptional in so far as Sudras are concerned. But in the case of the twice-born, judge-made law recognised such an illegitimate son of a person belonging to a twice-born lass as being entitled to maintenance which could also be made a charge on the joint family property. Such maintenance is in lieu of inheritance : see Vellaiyappa Chetty v. Natarajan approved in Gur Narain Das v. Gur Tahal Das. Though an illegitimate son may not strictly be a coparcener in the Hindu family, yet he has undoubtedly the status of a member of such a family. There is, therefore, abundant authority to hold that even an illegitimate son is a member of the family consisting of the putative father and his status as such cannot be denied even by the twice-born class. If this is so, what would be the status of Nicolas Sundaram in the instant case ? He cannot be called an illegitimate son, because he is the son born of lawful wedlock, Marriage between a member of the twice-born community and a Christian under the Special Marriage Act is recognised as valid in law. Therefore, he is a legitimate son even viewing it with the lynx's eye of orthodox Hindu law. The assessee, therefore, is a lineal descendant who could claim to have the status of being a member of the joint family of which the assessee is the head. Therefore, he is a legitimate son even viewing it with the lynx's eye of orthodox Hindu law. The assessee, therefore, is a lineal descendant who could claim to have the status of being a member of the joint family of which the assessee is the head. At this stage the analogy of a Hindu widow and her rights both under the ancient texts and by virtue of the later statutory law may also be considered so as to appreciate the status of the assessee's son. The catena of decisions item at the Bar, Seethamma v. Veeranna Chetty, Parappa v. Nagamma, Subramanian v. Kalyanarama Iyer, Ramalingam Pillai v. Ramalakshmi Ammal, Lakshmi Ammal v. Ramachandra Reddiar and Satrughan Isser v. Sabujpari, do all afford a positive indicia as to how and in what circumstances the widow is treated as a member of the joint family. Observed the Supreme Court in the last case :" * The Act seeks to make fundamental changes in the concept of a coparcenary and the rights of members of the family in coparcenary property. The Act in investing the widow of a member of a coparcenary with the interest which the member had at the time of this death has introduced changes which are alien to the structure of a coparcenary. The interest of the widow arises not by inheritances, nor by survivorship, but by statutory substitution : Lakshmi Perumallu v. Krishnaveniamma relied on. By the Act certain antithetical concepts are sought to be reinstalled. A widows of a coparcener is invested by the Act with the same interest which her husband had at the time of his death in the property of the coparcenary. She is thereby introduced into the coparcenary, and between the surviving coparceners of her husband and the widow so introduced, there arises community of interest and unity of possession........... "Even so the position of an idiot, who cannot share but yet is considered as a coparcener on principle, is adumbrated in Amirthammal v. Vallimayil Ammal which is very instructive. If a person is a congenital idiot, that by itself is a disqualification for him to be a heir. But still he has all the status of an aurasa son. He is a partner; he has a right by birth; he can induct persons into the joint family who could have varied rights of inheritance or succession therein. If a person is a congenital idiot, that by itself is a disqualification for him to be a heir. But still he has all the status of an aurasa son. He is a partner; he has a right by birth; he can induct persons into the joint family who could have varied rights of inheritance or succession therein. If, therefore, a widow who by virtue of matrimony could be inducted into the family and can claim the status of a member thereto and indeed an all for a partition and if an idiot who is disqualified to be a sharer an yet be a coparcener and claim himself to be a member of the joint family, it would be hypertechnical and indeed a refinement without any fineness if it is to be said that a legitimate son born out of lawful wedlock and who is acknowledged by the father to be a Hindu, and who has rights of succession Act to the estate of his father, cannot be terminological called as a member of the family of his father.This discussion apart, Explanation (b) to section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, whose language is in pari materia in each of the Acts, provides as follows :" * Explanation. - The following persons are Hindus........... (b) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu........ by religion and who is brought up as a member of the tribe, community, group or family to which such parent belongs or belonged;.......... "The later statutory law, therefore, expressly provides for the conferment of the status of a Hindu on a person even though such status is doubtful when the personal law of the parties is invoked. All such Acts provide that the expression "Hindu" shall be construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu by religion, is nevertheless a person to whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained respectively in such Acts. Ordinarily, under the personal law, an illegitimate child would take after the religion of the mother. Particularly it is so in the case of regenerate classes. Ordinarily, under the personal law, an illegitimate child would take after the religion of the mother. Particularly it is so in the case of regenerate classes. But, as already stated, if such a son of a parent belonging to a twice-born lass inducts the child into the Hindu family and brings him up as such, then the statute invests him with the status of a Hindu and recognises him as a Hindu. Mr. Balasubrahmanyan placed reliance upon the decision in Myna Boyee v. Ootaram. That was a case where the illegitimate children born to a woman of the Brahmin caste through an Englishman were disentitled to claim inter se as between themselves rights of survivorship though they were considered as Hindus. This has no application to the facts of this case. Even so, the decision in Lingappag Goundan v. Esudasan, cited by the revenue, where the plaintiff therein was not regarded as a Hindu by birth as his mother was a Christian, has no application for the reason that the later development of statute law recognises such a status in the child, by an overt act on the part of the father who is a Hindu, who takes him into the fold of the family and brings him up as his son and acknowledges him as his undivided son. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that even under the Mitakshara law, an illegitimate son is entitled to maintenance as long as he lives, in recognition of his status as a member of his father's family and by reason of his exclusion from inheritance even among the regenerate classes : see A. R. Raja Kumar v. Narayana Rao. It this here so, it not open to the revenue to say that Nicolas Sundaram who is a legitimate son, who is admittedly entitled to statutory rights of succession under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 * The Indian Succession Act, 1865, does not affect rights of coparcenership as between those to whom it applies. The purpose of that Act was to amend and define the rules of law applicable to intestate and testamentary succession. It is with the devolution of rights on intestacy that the Act deals....... The purpose of that Act was to amend and define the rules of law applicable to intestate and testamentary succession. It is with the devolution of rights on intestacy that the Act deals....... "While respectfully adopting this view of the learned judges therein, we would add that section 21 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 Having thus come to the conclusion that Nicolas Sundaram belongs to the family of the assessee by requestion of the treatment meted out by the assessee and his unequivocal intention and declaration to treat him as his son and as a member of the Hindu undivided family, it is for consideration whether the property in the hands of the assessee and at his disposal during the assessment years, was impressed with the character of ancestral property or should it be deemed to be the property of the assessee and liable to be assessed as was done by the revenue. Considerable light was thrown at the Bar on this aspect and the discussion was almost full and complete. It is unnecessary for us to delve into the historical development of the concept as we have a few decisions of the Supreme Court entirely overing the ground. Strong reliance was placed by Mr. Balasubrahmanyan on Kalyanji Vithaldas v. commissioner of Income-tax, which disapproved the ratio of the Bombay High court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan. It is very significant that the Supreme court in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax, expressly approved the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Lakshminarayan, and observed :" * Property of a joint family, therefore, does not cease to belong to the family merely because the family is represented by a single coparcener who possesses rights which an owner of property may possess. In the case in hand the property which yielded the income originally belonged to a Hindu undivided family. On the death of Buddappa, the family which included a widow and females born in the family was represented by Buddanna alone, but her property still continued to belong to that undivided family and income received therefrom was taxable as income of the Hindu undivided family. On the death of Buddappa, the family which included a widow and females born in the family was represented by Buddanna alone, but her property still continued to belong to that undivided family and income received therefrom was taxable as income of the Hindu undivided family. "On the salient question whether there should be more than one male member to form a Hindu undivided family as a tax unit under the taxing statutes, the court said :" * The plea that there must be at least two male members to form a Hindu undivided family as a taxable entity also has no force. The expression 'Hindu undivided family' in the Income-tax Act is used in the sense in which a Hindu joint family is understood under the personal law of Hindus. Under the Hindu system of law a joint family may consist of a single male member and widows of deceased male members, and apparently the Income-tax Act does not indicate that a Hindu undivided family as an assessable entity must consist of at least two male members. "In the case under review the assessee acquired the property at a partition. During the accounting years relevant to the assessment years, a lineal descendant of his has come into existence. He is a Hindu. Notwithstanding the collateral statutory rights of succession guaranteed to the minor son under section 21 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, he does not cease to be a member of the joint family. We have held him to be such a member. If this has to be accepted, as it ought to be, there is no difficulty in rejecting the contention of the revenue that the instant case is only reflective of fats where there his only a some surviving coparcener and none else. In fact, the Supreme court in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax left open the question whether the Hindu undivided family may, for purposes of the Income-tax Act, be treated as a taxable entity when it consists it consists of a single member - male or female. Emphasis was apparently laid on the presence of a single member and no more. Rightly, the revenue drew our attention to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the same volume in T. S. Srinivasan v. Commissioner of Income-tax where the court held the view that in such a case :" * ....... Emphasis was apparently laid on the presence of a single member and no more. Rightly, the revenue drew our attention to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the same volume in T. S. Srinivasan v. Commissioner of Income-tax where the court held the view that in such a case :" * ....... till the child was born, the income which accrued or arose to, or was received by, the appellant was his income, as no Hindu undivided family was then in existence, and this position could not be displayed by the birth of the son, which brought into existence a Hindu undivided family. "We are of the view that the opinion expressed by the Supreme court in the last case to the effect :" * The doctrine that under Hindu law a son conceived or in his mother's womb is equal in many respects to a son actually in existence, in the matter of inheritance, partition, survivorship, and the right to impeach an alienation made by his father, is not one of universal application and it applies mainly for the purpose of determining rights to property and safeguarding such rights of the son. This doctrine does not fit in with the scheme of the Income-tax Act, and it was not the intention of the legislature to incorporate the special doctrine into the Act does not militate against the ratio in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax as the fats in those two cases are different. Whilst in the former case the Supreme court was confronted with a case where the sole surviving coparcener had no son at least for a part of the amounting year, in the latter case is was not so; particularly in the case under review the son was there during the entire year. In fact, the claim for being assessed as a Hindu undivided family was made long after the birth of the lineal descendant. Adopting the ratio for the Supreme Court in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax, we hold that the claim of the assessee to be reckoned as a Hindu undivided family is well merited and founded and has to be accepted. In fact, under similar circumstances, the Mysore High Court fin commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Lt. Col. Adopting the ratio for the Supreme Court in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax, we hold that the claim of the assessee to be reckoned as a Hindu undivided family is well merited and founded and has to be accepted. In fact, under similar circumstances, the Mysore High Court fin commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Lt. Col. D. C. Basappa, the Allahabad High Court Pratap Narain v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Beni Prasad Tandon and the Patna High Court in Panna Lal Rastogi v. Commissioner of Income-tax, are all of the same view that the character of the property in the hands of a sole surviving coparcener, on the induction of a lineal descendant or in the presence be impressed with the character of joint family property.The decisions in K. R. Ramchandra Rao v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Mukat Beharilal Bhargava v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. N. V. Narendranath, relied on by the revenue, if they are intended to sustain a general proposition of law that the property in the hands of a sole surviving coparceners, under no circumstance can be characterised as joint family property, we are afraid that they are no longer good law after the Supreme court has laid down a contrary tenet in unmistakable terms in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax. No doubt, K. R. Ramachandra Rao v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax is in line with the reasoning of the Supreme court in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax. The case related to a single coparcener with no lineal descendant and no other person either female or to there entitled to claim maintenance. In the instant case, however, the fats are entirely different. The Rajasthan High Court in Mukat Beharilal Bhargava v. Commissioner of Income-tax relied upon Kalyanji Vithaldas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the ratio in which is of doubtful value after the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Arunachalam Chettiar. No reference has been made in this case to Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Arunachalam Chettiar. The Rajasthan High Court in Mukat Beharilal Bhargava v. Commissioner of Income-tax relied upon Kalyanji Vithaldas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the ratio in which is of doubtful value after the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Arunachalam Chettiar. No reference has been made in this case to Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Arunachalam Chettiar. In any event, after the elucidation of the facts in Kalyanji Vithaldas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, by Shah K. in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax, it is clear that that case concerned itself with the" * income assessed to tax which belonged separately to four out of six partners : of the remaining two it was from an ancestral source, but the fact that each such partner had a wife or daughter did not make that income from an ancestral source income of the undivided family of the partner, his wife and daughter. "It is not safe, therefore, to rest our conclusion on the decision in Kalyanji Vithaldas v. Commissioner of Income-tax. With great respect to the learned judges, who decided Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. N. V. Narendranath, we are bond to say that the principle laid down therein is opposed to that set in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax. Even the dicta in T. S. Srinivasan v. Commissioner of Income-tax are reconcilable. Though one may gain the impression that the principle excerpted above and contained in T. S. Srinivasan v. Commissioner of Income-tax eliminates the application of the Hindu law doctrine which concedes the right of a son in the womb of the mother being equal in many respect to a son actually in existence, it was stated so in the peculiar facts of that case where there was no lineal descendant up to a particular point of time during the accounting year during which the department rightly treated the assessee therein as an individual. In the later decision of the Supreme out in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the true content of the doctrine has been brought out and saintly stated thus :" * ......... In the later decision of the Supreme out in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the true content of the doctrine has been brought out and saintly stated thus :" * ......... Under the Hindu system of law a joint family may consist of a single male member and widows of deceased male members, and the Income-tax Act does not indicate that a Hindu undivided family as an assessable entity must consist of at least two male members." In the case under consideration, Nicolas Sundaram has to be treated as a male lineal descendant of the assessee. Even otherwise, as a son who should at least be maintained by the assessee, his claim to be engrafted into the joint family as its member cannot be lightly brushed aside. Taxing statutes ought not to be so astutely considered so as to ignore physical facts and literally be trained against the assessed fiscal statutes have to be interpreted for the benefit of the assessee, if courts are confronted with any doubt regarding its strict application.The Tribunal, therefore, was in error in holding that there was no Hindu undivided family of Sridharan and his son whereby the assessee could claim to be assessed and taxed as such either under the Income-tax Act, the Wealth-tax Act or the Expenditure-tax Act. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.